









THE NAVAL HISTORY  
OF  
G R E A T B R I T A I N.



THE  
NAVAL HISTORY  
OF  
GREAT BRITAIN,

FROM THE  
DECLARATION OF WAR BY FRANCE IN 1793,  
TO THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE IV.

BY WILLIAM JAMES.

A NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS AND NOTES,  
AND  
AN ACCOUNT OF THE BURMESE WAR AND THE BATTLE  
OF NAVARINO.

BY CAPTAIN CHAMIER, R.N.

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VERITÉ SANS PEUR.

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IN SIX VOLUMES.

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ADMIRAL, SIR SYDNEY SMITH.

FROM A LIFE BY J. R. KER POLPER.









ADMIRAL, SIR GEORGE COCKBURN

FROM A PICTURE BY SIR WILLIAM DUGGLES





## NAVAL HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

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### BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

A REFERENCE to the abstract of the British navy, drawn up for the commencement of the year 1800, will show a slight decrease in the number of line-of-battle ships.\* This partly arises from the removal, by the pair of "Converted" columns, of four 64-gun ships to an under-line class. A similar cause explains the decrease in the total of "Cruisers;" from which, 26 of the 27 converted ships have been withdrawn, in order, as may be inferred from the denomination of the classes, to serve for the conveyance of troops in the several expeditions of the preceding and present years. On the other hand, notwithstanding that decrease, the total of commissioned cruisers remains the same as in the last abstract, and the grand total of the navy shows an increase of 35 vessels.

This is the first year since the war commenced, in which the "Launched" and "Purchased" columns appear vacant of line-of battle ships; and the whole six acquired by the "Captured" column, were of little comparative value. The few ships and vessels in the "Ordered" column, are accounted for by the augmented numbers in the successive annual prize-columns, as well as by the number of fine ships which had been ordered and launched in the preceding years of the war, particularly in 1796, 7, and 8.

The numerical amount of vessels, added to the navy of England by captures made from the respective navies of the

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 8.

powers at war with her, is greater in this than in any preceding year;\* but some of the other years, the last especially, show, by the "Tons," that those years greatly exceeded the present in the real quantum of strength acquired. The wrecked cases still continue to comprise nearly the whole annual loss sustained by the British navy: the three captured vessels, indeed, did not exceed a small sloop of war in their united tonnage.†

The year 1797, as we formerly stated, gave the 32-pounder carronade, for a quarterdeck and forecastle gun, to line-of-battle ships in general;‡ and, to complete the triumph of General Melville's piece of ordnance, the year 1799 saw the carronade established, in a similar manner, throughout the different classes of frigates. On the 31st of May in that year, urged by the captains of most of the frigates that were fitting, the navy-board obtained an admiralty order to arm them all, 17 in number, with carronades,§ chiefly 32-pounders, on the quarterdeck and forecastle, except in the pair of ports on each of those decks which opened against, or in the wake of, the rigging. Towards the end of the year, namely on the 12th of December, the order for carronades was extended to frigates in general, and made to include all the ports on the quarterdeck and forecastle, except the two foremast ones. The reason of the exception is clear: long guns, at any elevation to be given them through port-holes, carrying farther than carronades, two of them would be useful as bow, or, if shifted, as stern chasers.

The order in question, and one we have to notice in the ensuing year, completed the demolition of the rating system, or that system of classification founded upon the number of long guns only mounted by the respective ships.|| As the 74, by the subtraction of 12 of her 18 long nines, to make room for the same number of carronades, had, in strictness, been reduced to a 62-

\* See Appendix, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

† See Appendix, No. 5.

‡ See vol. ii., p. 106.

§ The number of carronades, which the ordnance-board was directed immediately to supply, were one hundred and sixty-six 32-pounders and forty-two 24-pounders. The frigates for which the former were ordered, were as follows:

Gun-frigate

40	(Y) Lavinia . . . building,	16, with 4 nines, making 50 guns.	
38	{ .. Active . . . fitting,	14	ditto
	{ .. Boadicea .. "		
	{ .. Leda . . . . "		
	{ .. Hussar . . . . "		
36	{ (B) Jason . . . . "	14	ditto
	{ .. " Immortalité "		
	{ (C) Aigle . . . . building		
	{ .. " Apollo . . . . "		
	(D) Décade . . . . "		44

This makes but 142 out of one hundred and sixty-six 32-pounders: the remaining 24 had been ordered for two prize frigates (12 each) which were afterwards found on survey, not worth fitting out.

|| See vol. i., p. 37.

gun ship; so the 38, 36, and 32 gun frigates were now, according to the same rigid rule, reduced to frigates of 30 and 28 guns, being two guns more than they each mounted upon their main decks: whereas the total number of guns, established upon the three latter classes respectively, were, at the least, 46, 44, and 40. It was this that threw such confusion into the Steel's lists of those days; some of the frigates having their carronades enumerated, others not, as information happened to reach the publisher.

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year 1800, was,

Admirals	. . . . .	38
Vice-admirals	. . . . .	41
Rear-admirals	. . . . .	47
„	superannuated	31
Post-captains	. . . . .	515
„	superannuated	19
Commanders, or sloop-captains	. . . . .	394
Lieutenants	. . . . .	2091
„	superannuated	50*
Masters	. . . . .	527

and the number of seamen and marines voted for the service of the same year, was, for the first two months, 120,000, and for the remaining 10 months 110,000.†

We left General Buonaparte on the 9th of October, 1799, just landed at Fréjus, from the French frigate Carrère, in which he had escaped from Egypt. He hastened to Paris, and, both on his journey to, and on his arrival at, the French capital, was most enthusiastically received by all ranks. Having a powerful army to second him in any thing he might undertake, Buonaparte, on the 10th of November, at the head of his soldiers, dissolved the executive directory, and on the next day changed the government to a consulate, composed of three members, Roger-Ducos, himself, and Sieyes. Early in December the plan of the new constitution was settled, and Buonaparte managed to oust Roger-Ducos, and Sieyes, and get himself appointed chief consul, having as his coadjutors, Cambacérès and Lebrun.

One of the first measures of the new government of France was, to attempt the renovation of the navy. The consulate issued several state-papers on the occasion; enjoining, among other important regulations, the exercise of the men in great guns and small arms, and of the ships in manœuvring. Even swimming was included among the exercises ordered. The number of officers was fixed to be as follows:

Vice-amiraux . . . . .	8	Capitaines de frégate . . .	180
Contre-amiraux . . . . .	16	Lieutenants de vaisseau . . .	400
Capitaines de vaisseau . . .	150	Enseignes de vaisseau . . .	600

\* With the rank of commanders.

† See Appendix, No. 6.

As the best means of carrying into effect these new regulations, a board of admiralty was appointed, resembling that of England as nearly as national customs and prejudices would admit. One of the state-papers, published on this occasion, represented the French navy to consist of 48 sail of the line at sea and in the different ports of France, and 13 building, of which eight were nearly ready for launching, and 42 ship and brig corvettes. The gun-brigs and smaller vessels, down to 177 flat-bottomed boats, constructed for the descent on England, were stated to amount to 243, making a grand total of 398 ships and vessels. A very large proportion of this total, consisting of non-cruising and insignificant vessels, may fairly enough be compared with the largest total, 757, in the abstract of the British navy for the commencement of the present year.

Among the first diplomatic acts of Buonaparte at his assumption of the chief-consulship was a letter, dated the 25th of December, 1799, addressed to the King of England, containing proposals for a general peace.\* To this letter Lord Grenville replied, stating the terms to be inadmissible; and the negotiation was broken off.† It was considered to be merely a plan of the subtle chief to induce England to grant an armistice by sea, of which immediate advantage was to be taken, in the transit of troops and the entry of convoys with provisions and naval stores.

At the commencement of the present year the British Channel fleet, composed of 28 sail of the line, under Admiral Sir Alan Gardner in the *Royal-Sovereign*, cruised off the port of Brest, blockading the combined French and Spanish fleet, composed, as already mentioned, of 45 sail of the line.

On the 9th of March the 64-gun ship *Repulse*, Captain James Alms, having been detached by Sir Alan Gardner to cruise off the Penmarcks, for the purpose of intercepting some provision-vessels expected at Brest, experienced a violent gale of wind; in the height of which Captain Alms, by the rolling of the ship, was thrown down the companion-ladder, and so seriously injured as to be incapable of doing any further duty on deck. For two or three days previous the weather had been so thick as to render it impracticable to take an observation; and on the 10th, at about 10 p. m., the *Repulse*, then going about six knots an hour, struck on a sunken rock, supposed to be the Mace, about 25 leagues south-west of Ushant. After beating on the rock for nearly three quarters of an hour, during which the water rushed in so fast that the lower deck was flooded, the *Repulse* got off, and, by great exertions, was kept afloat long enough to be able to approach and run aground upon the French coast, near Quimper.

On the 11th, at 10 h. 30 m., A. M., Captain Alms, and his

\* For a copy of the original letter, see Appendix, No. 7.

ship's company, quitted the *Repulse*, then stranded, and made good their landing on one of the Glénan islands, situated about two miles from the continent. From this island the British officers and crew were sent as prisoners to Quimper, except the first lieutenant, John Carpenter Rothery, the master, George Finn, two midshipmen, and eight seamen; who got into the large cutter, and, on the fourth day, after experiencing much bad weather and being nearly lost, reached the island of Guernsey.

In a few months afterwards, on his return home, Captain Alms, his officers, and crew, were tried by a court-martial for the loss of the *Repulse*. The first lieutenant and master were dismissed the service, and declared incapable of serving again, for having disobeyed the orders of the captain, who, as already stated, was incapacitated from active duty by a serious accident: the captain and remainder of the crew were honourably acquitted.

In the latter end of March Lord Bridport resumed the command of the Channel fleet off Brest, bringing with him 17 sail, making, when Sir Alan Gardner had gone home with seven ships to refit, a fleet of 38 sail of the line. On the 24th of April, however, Lord Bridport resigned the command of the Channel fleet then in port, and Admiral Sir Alan Gardner sailed with it on a cruise. Two days afterwards Admiral Earl St.-Vincent hoisted his flag on board the 90-gun ship *Namur* at Spithead, as the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, and soon afterwards joined it off Brest.

On the 1st of June, Earl St.-Vincent detached Captain Sir Edward Pellew, with the *Impétueux* and six other 74s, also five frigates, one sloop, and five troop-ships, having on board about 5000 troops including 200 artillery, commanded by Major-general Maitland, for the purpose once more of rendering assistance to the Chouans, and other royalists in Quiberon bay and the Morbihan. On the 2d the squadron anchored in the bay; and on the 4th the 32-gun frigate *Thames*, Captain William Lukin, 16-gun ship-sloop *Cynthia*, Captain Micajah Malbon, and some small-craft, attacked the south-west end of Quiberon, and silenced the forts, which were afterwards destroyed by a party of troops, landed under Major Ramsay. Several vessels are represented to have been brought off, and some scuttled, with the loss of only two men killed and one wounded on board the *Cynthia*.

On the 6th, before daybreak, about 300 men of the Queen's regiment landed in the Morbihan, covered and sustained by a division of small-craft and gun-launches under Lieutenant John Pilfold, first of the *Impétueux*. This united force brought off two brigs, two sloops, two gun-vessels, and about 100 prisoners. The French 16-gun brig *Insolente* and several smaller vessels were burnt, the guns of the fort destroyed, and the magazine



blown up; all with the loss of only one seaman killed in the boats, and some slight hurts. A descent upon Belle-Isle was intended to be the next operation; but, intelligence being received that the force on the island amounted to 7000 men, the enterprise was abandoned as impracticable. The British troops then landed and encamped upon the small island of Houat, situated about two leagues to the south-east of Quiberon point; whence they subsequently re-embarked, and proceeded for the Mediterranean.

Before we quit the neighbourhood of the Channel and bay of Biscay for the Mediterranean, we have to notice the loss of a second British ship of the line, off the coast of France. On the 4th of November, in the night, while the British 74-gun ships Captain, Captain Sir Richard John Strachan, and Marlborough, Captain Thomas Sotheby, were cruising in company between the islands of Groix and Belle-Isle, the latter ship struck on the Bividaux or Bervadeux shoal. Here the Marlborough hung for several hours; but, by the great exertions of her officers and crew in throwing overboard a part of her guns and the whole of her heavy stores, the ship got off. The Marlborough, however, had received so much damage that, even after all her masts had been cut away and the remainder of her guns thrown overboard, the quantity of water she made obliged the officers and crews to leave her to her fate. The Captain, and a Danish brig which had just joined, received the whole of them; and shortly afterwards the Marlborough sank at her anchors. Under these circumstances no blame could attach to her captain, his officers, or ship's company, and a court-martial pronounced their full acquittal.

There being no longer a French fleet to watch in the port of Toulon, Vice-admiral Lord Keith and his cruisers were principally employed in blockading the island of Malta, and in co-operating with the Austrians in their efforts to expel the French from Piedmont and Tuscany. On the 16th of March Lord Keith, having, with Lieutenant John Stewart and four other persons, landed at Leghorn from his flag-ship the Queen-Charlotte, ordered Captain Todd to get under way, and proceed to reconnoitre the island of Capraia, distant about 36 miles from Leghorn, and then in the possession of the French; and which island there was some intention of attacking. On the succeeding morning, the 17th, when only three or four leagues from Leghorn on her way to Capraia, the Queen-Charlotte was discovered to be on fire. Every assistance was immediately forwarded from the shore; but a great many boats were deterred from approaching the ship, in consequence of the firing of the guns, which were shotted, and which, when heated by the fire, discharged their contents in all directions.

Among the survivors on this melancholy occasion, was the carpenter, Mr. John Baird. His account is as follows: "At

about 20 minutes after six o'clock in the morning, as I was dressing myself, I heard throughout the ship a general cry of *fire!* I immediately ran up the fore-ladder to get upon deck, and found the whole half-deck, the front bulk-head of the admiral's cabin, the coat of the mainmast, and the boats' covering on the booms, all in flames; which, from every report and probability, I apprehend was occasioned by some hay, that was lying under the half-deck, having been set on fire by a match in a tub, which was usually kept there for signal guns. The mainsail at this time was set, and almost instantly caught fire, the people not being able, on account of the flames, to come to the clue-garnets.

"I immediately went to the fore-castle, and found Lieutenant (the Honourable George Heneage Lawrence) Dundas and the boatswain encouraging the people to get water to extinguish the fire. I applied to Mr. Dundas, seeing no other officer in the forepart of the ship (and being unable to see any on the quarter-deck from the flames and smoke between them), to give me assistance to drown the lower decks, and secure the hatches, to prevent the fire from falling down. Lieutenant Dundas accordingly went down himself, with as many people as he could prevail upon to follow him; and the lowerdeck ports were opened, the scuppers plugged, the fore and main hatches secured, the cocks turned, water drawn in at the ports, and the pumps kept going by the people who came down, as long as they could stand at them. Owing to these exertions, I think the lower deck was kept free from fire, and the magazines preserved from danger for a long time: nor did Lieutenant Dundas or myself quit this station until several of the middledeck guns came through the deck. At about nine o'clock, finding it impossible to remain any longer below, Lieutenant Dundas and myself went out at the foremast lowerdeck port, and got upon the fore-castle; on which, I apprehend, there were then about 150 of the people drawing water, and throwing it as far aft as possible upon the fire. I continued about an hour on the fore-castle, till finding all efforts to extinguish the flames unavailing, I jumped from the jib-boom, and swam to an American boat approaching the ship; by which boat I was picked up and put into a tartan, then in the charge of Lieutenant Stewart, who had come off to the assistance of the ship."\* Captain Todd, with Mr. Bainbridge, the first lieutenant, remained upon deck to the last moment giving orders for saving the crew, without providing, or apparently caring, for their own safety.

We shall now enter upon the sorrowful task of showing what loss of lives was the consequence of this dreadful accident. The number of persons on shore at Leghorn, including five who did not know the ship had been ordered to sea, were the admiral,

\* Schomberg, vol. iii., p. 481.

one lieutenant, the admiral's secretary, with his two clerks, one chaplain, one master's mate, two midshipmen, and two servants, total 11. Those saved from the wreck by the boats that came off were, three lieutenants, two lieutenants of marines, one carpenter, one gunner, three midshipmen, one secretary's clerk, and 146 seamen and marines, total 156; making 167 as the whole number saved. Now for the contrary side. Those who perished appear to have been, one captain, three lieutenants, one captain of marines, one master, one purser, one surgeon, one boatswain, four master's mates, 18 midshipmen, one secretary's clerk, one schoolmaster, one captain's clerk, three surgeon's mates, and about 636 seamen, boys, and marines; making the total loss amount to 673 souls.

A sad calamity indeed! lamentable to humanity for the loss of so many individuals, and, considering the origin of the accident, and the time of day in which it happened, not very creditable to the discipline of the ship. The *Queen-Charlotte*, and her sister-vessel the *Royal-George*, were, next to the *Ville-de-Paris*, the largest British-built ships at this time afloat. It was, then, no trifling loss which the British navy sustained, when the *Queen-Charlotte*, with all her guns, stores, and provisions, and upwards of three fourths of her numerous ship's company, perished in the flames.

The above, with a slight verbal alteration, is precisely as the account stands in the first edition of this work; and yet the following paragraph has since appeared in the work of a contemporary: "We should have hoped, that the bravery, perseverance, and self-devotion of Captain Todd, who, to the last moment gave orders to save the lives of his men, regardless of his own, would have secured his memory from the imputations cast on it by a contemporary historian, who observes, that 'the accident was not very creditable to the discipline of the ship.'"<sup>\*</sup> What "imputations" are here cast upon the memory of Captain Todd? Who was the first, our contemporary or ourselves, to record the "self-devotion" of that officer? Was the accident, which is admitted to have originated in the manner we have stated, creditable to the discipline of the ship? Were the *Queen-Charlotte's* crew, in short, in a state of discipline? Let our contemporary answer the latter question himself. Referring to the conduct of the *Queen-Charlotte* in the mutiny at Spithead in April, 1797, Captain Brenton says, "This ship, from the shamefully relaxed state of discipline in which she had been kept while the flag of Earl Howe was flying on board of her, naturally became the focus of all mutiny, a character which she maintained until she was burnt off Genoa."<sup>†</sup> If we required higher authority than Captain Brenton's, the same writer has furnished us with it in the following extract of a letter from

<sup>\*</sup> Brenton, vol. iii., p. 112.

<sup>†</sup> Ibid., vol. i., p. 414.

Earl St.-Vincent to the secretary of the admiralty, dated April 16, 1799: "The Queen-Charlotte will be better here than on home service, for she has been the root of all the evil you have been disturbed with."\*

The commencement of the present year saw the famous army of Italy, which under Buonaparte had performed such prodigies, reduced to less than 25,000 men, and those in the greatest misery for the want of food and clothing. A powerful Austrian army, under General Mélas, presented an effectual barrier by land, and the cruisers of Lord Keith shut out all supplies by sea. On the 21st of April, after having sustained some severe losses in action with the Austrians, and left at Savona a garrison of 600 men under Brigadier-general Bugey, General Masséna retreated upon Genoa; and General Mélas immediately commenced the siege of that strong and important fortress.

The Austrian force blockading the fortress of Savona was under the command of Major-general Count St-Julien; and the British fleet cruising before the port consisted of the 36-gun frigate *Santa-Dorotea*, Captain Hugh Downman, the 18-gun brig-sloop *Chameleon*, Lieutenant Samuel Jackson acting, and the Neapolitan brig *Strombolo*, Captain Settimo. By Lord Keith's orders, the sea-blockade of Savona had been more especially committed to the care of Captain Downman; and the boats of his little squadron with a highly commendable perseverance, rowed guard off the harbour's mouth during 41 nights; until, in fact, the garrison reduced by famine, on the 15th of May surrendered to the allies.

The blockade of the port of Genoa was undertaken by Lord Keith himself; who, after the accident to the *Queen-Charlotte*, shifted his flag, first to the 74-gun ship *Audacious*, Captain Davidge Gould, and subsequently to the *Minotaur* 74, Captain Thomas Louis. The principal part of the vice-admiral's force consisted of frigates sloops, and Neapolitan gun and mortar boats. These had on several occasions successfully co-operated with the Austrian army in attacks upon the outworks of Genoa. The services of the 38-gun frigate *Phaëton*, Captain James Nicholl Morris, had been particularly noticed by the Austrian general, Baron d'Ott, who had succeeded General Mélas in the command: and who, in the early part of May, had pushed his advance to the village of Coronata, and compelled General Masséna to retire within the walls of Genoa.

Within the first two or three weeks of May the town had been bombarded three times by the gun and mortar vessels and armed boats of the ships, under the direction of Captain Philip Beaver, late of the 28-gun frigate *Aurora*. Being much annoyed by these attacks, the French determined to board the bombarding force by a flotilla of their own, consisting of one large galley,

\* Brenton, vol. ii., p. 356.

rowing 52 oars, and mounting two extremely long brass 36-pounders besides smaller pieces, an armed cutter, three armed settees, and several gun-boats. On the 20th, in the afternoon, this flotilla, standing along outside of the new or south-western mole-head, exchanged several shot with some of the British ships in passing; particularly with the *Audacious*, who was once or twice hulled by the long 36-pounders of the galley. At sunset the flotilla took up a position under the guns of the two moles and the city bastions, which were covered with troops, manifesting a determined resistance.

Notwithstanding this formidable indication, the bombarding flotilla, at about 9 p.m., quitted the *Minotaur* to make a fourth attack upon the town and shipping. On the 21st, at about 1 a.m., a brisk cannonade was opened upon the town, and quickly returned from various points; particularly from the long 36-pounders of the *Prima* galley, now lying chain-moored close to the inside of the old or eastern mole-head. Being unable, from his lighter metal, to offer any effectual check to this annoyance by a cannonade, Captain Beaver resolved to attempt carrying the galley by boarding. For this service a detachment of 10 boats, containing between them about 100 officers and men, immediately drew off from the flotilla. While the British were proceeding with all possible silence, in the hope to approach undiscovered in the prevailing darkness, a gun-boat stationed between the two mole-heads opened her fire upon them. Every moment's delay now adding to the danger, the boats dashed on towards the galley. On arriving alongside a new obstacle presented itself. The gangway, or gunwale, of a galley projects three feet and upwards from the side of the hull, and that of the *Prima* was strengthened by a stout barricade, along the summit of which were mounted several blunderpieces and wall-pieces. As an additional obstruction to the advance of boats, the oars were banked or fixed in their places, ready for use, with the handles secured to the benches or thwarts. Thus, with a crew of 257 fighting men, and those by the gun-boat's alarm, prepared for resistance, the *Prima* galley, even had she not been chain-moored in a harbour the entrance to which was guarded by numerous batteries, would have been a formidable object of attack.

All this, however, as we shall soon see, was of no avail. The first entrance was made amidships on the starboard side, in the most gallant manner, by a boat of the *Haerlem*, under the command of Midshipman John Caldwell; who was promptly supported by some of the other boats. In the mean time the boats' crews of the *Minotaur's* cutter, commanded by Captain Beaver, and of the *Vestal's* launch, by Lieutenant William Gibson, supported by the remaining boats, had clambered up the images on the quarter, to carry the poop, where a considerable number of French soldiers had assembled. After a desperate struggle the British succeeded in their object; and, as they gained footing

on one side, the greater part of their opponents fled overboard on the other. Almost immediately afterwards the night burgee, or commodore's broad pendant, the only colours flying on board the galley, was hauled down by Lieutenant Gibson, first of the *Vestal*, and all further resistance ceased.

The boats were immediately ordered ahead to tow; and the slaves, in seeming cheerfulness, manned the sweeps, crying out, in broken English, "Bless the king of Gibraltar!" After some delay, the galley was cleared from the chains by which she had been moored to the mole, and began moving to the entrance of the harbour under a tremendous fire of shot, shells, and musketry; the latter from a numerous body of troops drawn up on the mole-head; round which the galley passed within 10 yards, with no greater loss or damage than five British seamen wounded one shot through the head of the mainmast, and some cut rigging. Of the galley's people, one was killed, and 15 wounded, by the British when they boarded: a few others, in all probability, were drowned; and many succeeded in gaining the shore. According to the French accounts, the captain, Bavastro, was among the latter, and had leaped into the water on seeing that 50 Ligurian grenadiers, stationed on board his vessel, had treacherously fired only three muskets at the assailants.\* From the testimony of the latter, there is not the least ground for this accusation; and, in Lord Keith's letter in the *Gazette*, the captain of the galley is named Patrizio Galleano.

Soon after the *Prima* had passed the mole-head, Captain Beaver quitted her in his boat to acquaint Lord Keith with his success, and the command devolved upon Lieutenant Gibson, already mentioned as the officer, who, with his own hand, had struck the galley's colours. Before the galley had got quite out of gun-shot of the mole-head, an alarm was raised of fire below. Lieutenant Gibson instantly rushed down, and found a half-drunken French sailor, with a light and a crow-bar, in the act of breaking open the door of the magazine, for the purpose, as he unhesitatingly declared, of blowing up the vessel and all on board of her. The man was promptly secured and a sentry placed over the hatchway. Had the wretch succeeded in his villanous attempt, between 400 and 500 souls might have perished; for, besides the British officers and men who had captured the galley, and the 60 or 70 French soldiers and seamen remaining on board out of those that had belonged to her, there were upwards of 300 miserable beings chained to the oars.

It was principally by the exertion of these very slaves, that the galley shot so quickly past the mole-head, and thus escaped destruction by the batteries. So vigorously did these practised rowers continue to ply their sweeps, that the galley nearly overran the British boats towing ahead. As soon as the galley had got out of gun-shot, the slaves, by the permission of

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xii., p. 199.

the British commanding officer, released themselves from their fetters. This operation they performed with surprising quickness; and, now that the galley's lateen sails began to supersede the use of the oars, the poor fellows were jumping about the deck in a delirium of joy; heaping blessings upon those who had restored them to liberty, and evincing so different a feeling towards their former masters in the galley, that the latter for their personal safety, were transferred to the boats towing astern.

The half-frantic wretches little dreamt of the fate for which Lord Keith had reserved them. To that we shall come presently. We must first express our regret that Captain Beaver, who, throughout this dashing enterprise, appears to have conducted himself in the most gallant manner, was not allowed to write the official letter; as, doubtless, he would have named the officers who served under him. Not one officer, besides Captain Beaver, is mentioned in Lord Keith's letter; and it has been with no inconsiderable difficulty that we have been enabled to give the names of two of the number.

Shortly after daylight on the 21st the galley was brought to an anchor under the stern of the *Minotaur*, and a more beautiful vessel of the kind had never been seen. Her extreme length was 159 feet, and her breadth 23 feet six inches. In her hold were 30 large brass swivels, intended to have been mounted upon her forecastle and poop. Not being a vessel adapted for the British navy, the *Prima* was sold to the Sardinians, for, we believe, the comparatively small sum of 15,000 dollars.

The garrison of Genoa, as was well known to the British admiral cruising off the port, was in a state bordering on famine. Had there been a doubt on the subject, the lank and miserable appearance of the galley's crew must have instantly removed it. Perhaps it is conformable to the laws of war, however repugnant to those of humanity, to press an evil of this sort upon an enemy. At all events Lord Keith, with that object in view, restored to General Masséna the few French or Ligurian soldiers and seamen which, out of the small number taken, had survived the sudden change from starvation to plenty. His lordship did more: he actually sent back the galley-slaves, or 250 of them at least, about 50, fortunately for them, having been blown off the coast in the Expedition 44. Lord Keith must have been certain that the poor slaves would, at the least, have been retrained to their oars. What some would consider a more merciful fate awaited them. It having been made known to General Masséna that, by their aid principally, the galley was moved from her strong position inside of the mole, he ordered the victims of Lord Keith's breach of faith (for, surely, there was an implied, if not an expressed promise not to betray human beings so peculiarly circumstanced), to be taken to the great square of the town and shot!

Starved at length into compliance, General Masséna, on the

4th of June, consented to evacuate the town of Genoa, and, with the 8000 of his troops that were able to march, retire to Nice. In some preparatory conferences held on shore between General d'Ott, Lord Keith, and General Masséna, the latter expressed as much contempt for Austria, as he did respect for England; observing to Lord Keith, "*Milord, si jamais la France et l'Angleterre s'entendent, elles gouverneraient le monde.*"\* Much more passed in the same strain. There was, no doubt, a little policy in all this; and it may indeed be gathered from an apparently authentic account of the negotiation for the surrender of Genoa, that the French general seldom paid a compliment to the British admiral or nation, without exacting in return some solid concession. On the 5th, the Minotaur, Audacious, and Généreux 74s, Charon store-ship, Pigmy cutter, and a small Neapolitan squadron, anchored in the mole of Genoa.

On the very day on which the treaty was signed for the evacuation of Genoa by Masséna, the first consul of France, having with a powerful army crossed the Alps, entered the city of Milan, the capital of Lombardy, and on the same day proclaimed afresh the Cisalpine republic. The Austrian general, Mélas, as soon as this news reached him, abandoned the whole of Piedmont, and concentrated his forces at Alexandria. On the 7th of June, Buonaparte, still unacquainted with the surrender of Genoa, quitted Milan to attack the Austrians. On the 9th and 10th he defeated General d'Ott, who had evacuated Genoa after three days' possession, at Casteggio and Montebello. On the 14th was fought the famous battle of Marengo, in which Buonaparte defeated General Mélas, with a loss to the latter of 4500 left dead on the field of battle, nearly 8000 wounded, from 6000 to 7000 prisoners, 12 stands of colours, and 30 pieces of cannon, and with a loss to himself of only 2000 killed, 3600 wounded, and 700 prisoners.

On the 15th, at Alexandria, a convention for a suspension of arms was signed between the two commanders-in-chief; by the terms of which France was to be put in possession of the 12 following fortresses: Tortona, Alexandria, Milan, Turin, Pizzighittone, Arona, Placenza, Cori, Seva, Savona, Genoa, and Fort Urbin. Repossession of the city of Genoa was taken on the 22d of June by General Suchet, and on the 24th General Masséna himself returned to it. This reoccupation was so sudden and unexpected, that the Minotaur found some difficulty in warping herself out of the mole in time. We must now leave, for a while, the shores of northern Italy, to attend to operations in another quarter of the Mediterranean.

At the close of the year 1798 we left the French general, Vaubois, with about 3000 soldiers and seamen, shut up in the fortress of Valetta, menaced on the land side by a powerful force

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xii., p. 210.



of Maltese, Neapolitans, and British, and blockaded at the mouth of the harbour by a squadron of British and Portuguese ships. In the latter end of January, 1799, the garrison, already beginning to be straitened for provisions, received a supply by a schooner from Ancona; and in the early part of February the French 36-gun frigate *Boudeuse*, from Toulon, with a still greater quantity of stores, including some munitions of war, managed to elude the vigilance of the blockading squadron and enter the harbour.

During the remainder of the year, however, not a vessel was able to get in, and General Vaubois and his troops, in consequence, began to experience the miseries of famine and disease. Among the means taken to alleviate the sufferings of the garrison, was the ordering out of the city of a portion of the inhabitants. This was done from time to time, until the original number of 45,000 was reduced to barely 9000. On the 1st of November, 1799, Rear-admiral Lord Nelson, then with his flag on board the 80-gun ship *Foudroyant*, commanding the blockading force, sent in a summons to surrender. To which General Vaubois replied: "*Jaloux de mériter l'estime de votre nation, comme vous recherchez celle de la nôtre, nous sommes résolus de défendre cette forteresse jusqu'à l'extrémité.*"

So strictly had the island of Malta been blockaded since the arrival of the *Boudeuse*, that the French were kept in ignorance of the revolution of the 9th of November; until January, 1800, when an aviso, with despatches from the new government, and Moniteurs to the middle of December, contrived to enter the port. All was now joy and enthusiasm in Valetta; and the garrison, both officers and men, were so elated at the advancement of Buonaparte to be chief consul, that they rashly swore never to yield up the island to the enemies of France.

In the early part of February, Vice-admiral Lord Keith cruised off Malta with the

Gun-ship

100	Queen-Charlotte...	{ Vice-admiral (r.) Lord Keith, K.B.
		{ Captain Andrew Todd.
80	Foudroyant .....	{ Rear-admiral (r.) Lord Nelson.
		{ Captain Sir Edward Berry.
74	{ Audacious.....	•" Davidge Gould.
	{ Northumberland ...	" George Martin.
	{ Alexander .....	Lieutenant William Harrington, acting.
64	Lion.....	Captain Manley Dixon.

*Sirena*, Neapolitan frigate, and two or three sloops.

On the 15th Lord Keith received intelligence from Captain Shuldham Peard of the 32-gun frigate *Success*, cruising off the south-west end of Sicily, that a small French squadron was approaching the island, with the view of attempting to throw in a supply of troops and provisions. This squadron consisted of the 74-gun ship *Généreux*, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral

Perrée, who had been exchanged soon after his capture in the preceding June, 28-gun frigate *Badine*, two corvettes, and several transports, having on board about 3000 troops, with which they had sailed from Toulon on the 7th. To intercept and prevent the disembarkation of this force, Lord Keith, with the *Queen-Charlotte*, kept as close to the entrance of the harbour of Valetta as the batteries would admit, and directed by signal, the only mode of communication the weather would admit, the *Foudroyant*, *Audacious*, and *Northumberland* to chase to windward or in the south-east, and the *Lion* to look out off the passage between Goza and Malta. The *Alexander*, at this time, was under way on the south-east side of the island.

On the 18th, at daylight, the *Alexander* fell in with and chased M. Perrée's squadron in sight of Lord Nelson's three ships. At 8 A. M. the *Alexander* fired at and brought to the *Ville-de-Marseille* armed store-ship. At 1 h. 30 m. the *Badine* and smaller vessels tacked; but the *Généreux*, not being able to do so without coming to an action with the *Alexander*, bore up. The *Success* frigate being at this time to leeward, Captain Peard, with great judgment and gallantry, lay athwart the hawse of the French 74, and raked her with several broadsides. Presently afterwards, however, the *Success* became exposed to a broadside from the *Généreux*, and by it had one man killed, her master and eight men wounded. At 4 h. 30 m. P. M. the *Foudroyant*, followed closely by the *Northumberland*, got near enough to discharge two shots; whereupon the *Généreux* finding it impossible to escape from her pursuers, fired the usual ceremonious broadside, and struck her colours. Great praise was awarded to Lieutenant Harrington, who, in the absence of Captain Ball, serving with the allied forces on shore, commanded the *Alexander*, for his excellent management on first descrying the French squadron; and the spirited behaviour of Captain Peard did not escape his lordship's notice. The *Success*, indeed, had watched M. Perrée's squadron from the moment of its appearance off Sicily, and had immediately apprized Lord Keith of its approach.

One omission we regret to observe in Lord Nelson's letter: some notice of the loss sustained by the *Généreux* just previously to her surrender; and which loss, although of a single man, was, in all probability, the principal cause of that ship's comparatively feeble resistance. Rear-admiral Perrée, having received a severe splinter-wound in the left eye, said to those about him, "*Ce n'est rien, mes amis, continuons notre besogne.*" He then gave an order for some manœuvre, and had scarcely done so, when a round-shot took off his right thigh. This brave officer immediately fell insensible on the deck, and died a few minutes afterwards; deplored by his countrymen, and highly respected and esteemed by all the British officers, some of them

the most distinguished in the service, whom he had previously met either as enemies or friends.

Of the importance of the supplies on board the *Généreux* and her convoy to the French garrison in Valetta, some idea may be formed, by the following prices of the principal articles of food : a fowl 16 francs, a rabbit 12 francs, an egg 20 sous, a lettuce 18 sous, a rat 40 sous, and fish six francs per pound. In addition to this the typhus fever was making destructive ravages among the troops, and the only bouillé served to the sick in the hospitals was made of horse-flesh.\* In this emergency General Vaubois determined to despatch Rear-admiral Decrès, with the *Guillaume-Tell*, to announce to the first consul, that the place could not hold out longer than the month of June.

Shortly after the capture of the *Généreux* Lord Keith proceeded with the *Queen-Charlotte* to Leghorn; off which port that ship's fate was sealed in the distressing manner already detailed. In the early part of March Rear-admiral Lord Nelson, being indisposed (mentally, if not corporeally), retired to Palermo, and thence, by the way of Leghorn and Vienna, to England; leaving the blockading squadron off Malta in charge of Captain Troubridge of the *Culloden*. During the latter's temporary absence, the British naval force cruising off the island, at the latter end of March, consisted of the 64-gun ship *Lion*, Captain Manley Dixon, 80-gun ship *Foudroyant*, Captain Sir Edward Berry, 74-gun ship *Alexander*, Lieutenant William Harrington still acting for Captain Alexander John Ball, and the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Penelope*, Captain Henry Blackwood, accompanied by two or three sloops and smaller vessels.

On the 30th, at 11 P. M., the *Guillaume-Tell*, Captain Saulnier, bearing the flag, as already mentioned, of Rear-admiral Denis Decrès, taking advantage of a strong southerly gale and the darkness that had succeeded the setting of the moon, weighed and put to sea from the harbour of Valetta. At 11 h. 55 m. P. M. the *Penelope*, whose commander had been ordered to keep under way between where the *Lion* lay at an anchor and the harbour's mouth, discovered the *Guillaume-Tell* on her larboard or weather-bow, under a press of sail, steering with the wind on the starboard quarter. The *Penelope* immediately despatched the Minorca brig, Captain George Miller, with the intelligence to the commodore, and apprized the latter by signal, that the chase was on the starboard tack. As soon as the French 80 had passed on, the British frigate tacked and stood after her. Half an hour after midnight, having arrived close up with the chase, the *Penelope* luffed under the *Guillaume-Tell*'s stern, and gave her the larboard broadside. She then bore up under the lar-

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xiii., p. 142.

board quarter of the *Guillaume-Tell*, and gave her the starboard broadside, receiving in return only the 80-gun ship's stern-chasers.

Aware that, if he brought to, the ships then visible on the verge of the horizon would soon take part in the fight, Rear-admiral Decrès continued his course to the northward and eastward. The *Penelope*, whose rate of sailing exceeded that of her adversary, and whose manœuvres were directed by a practised seaman, continued pouring in her raking broadsides, with such effect that, just before the dawn of day on the 31st, the *Guillaume-Tell*'s main and mizen topmasts and main yard came down. The ship was thereby reduced, with the exception of her mizen, to her head-sails, and these were greatly damaged by the *Penelope*'s shot. From such a succession of raking fires, the *Guillaume-Tell* had also, no doubt, sustained a considerable loss of men; whereas the *Penelope*, whose object was to avoid exposing herself to a single broadside from so powerful an antagonist, had the good fortune to escape with only a slight damage to her rigging and sails. The frigate's loss, although not numerically great, included among the killed her master, Henry Damerell; and her wounded amounted to one midshipman (Mr. Sibthorpe), one seaman, and one marine.

At 5 A. M., or a little after, the *Lion*, who at 1 A. M., after having despatched the *Minorca* to the *Foudroyant* and *Alexander* to leeward, had slipped her cable and chased in the direction of the firing, arrived up with the chase, showing a rocket and a blue light every half hour as a signal to the ships astern. Steering between the *Penelope* and the crippled *Guillaume-Tell*, and so near to the latter, that the yard-arms of the two ships barely passed clear, the *Lion* ranged up on the larboard side of her opponent, and poured in a destructive broadside of three round shot in each gun. The *Lion* then luffed up across the bows of the *Guillaume-Tell*, the latter's jib-boom passing between the former's main and mizen shrouds. In a few minutes, to the advantage of the *Lion*, whose object, with so comparatively small a complement, was neither to board nor be boarded, the French 80's jib-boom was carried away; and the 64 gained a capital position athwart the *Guillaume-Tell*'s bows. Here, aided occasionally by the *Penelope*, the *Lion* kept up a steady cannonade, until about 5 h. 30 m. A. M.; by which time the *Guillaume-Tell*'s heavy shot had so damaged the *Lion*, that the latter became unmanageable and dropped astern, still firing, however, as did also the frigate, whenever an opportunity offered.

At 6 A. M., the *Foudroyant*, who since midnight had slipped and made sail from her anchorage about three miles north-east of Valetta lighthouse, arrived up with a crowd of sail, and, passing in that state close to the French ship's starboard side, so close that the *Foudroyant*'s spare anchor just passed clear of

the *Guillaume-Tell*'s mizen chains, Sir Edward Berry called upon the latter to strike, following up his demand with a treble-shotted broadside. To this the *Guillaume-Tell* replied in a similar manner, and with such effect as to cut away a great deal of the *Foudroyant*'s rigging. Having incautiously arrived up with so much sail set, the *Foudroyant* necessarily shot ahead, and could not, for several minutes, regain her position alongside of her opponent. That object being at length effected, the firing recommenced; and the *Guillaume-Tell*'s second broadside brought down the fore topmast, maintopsail yard, jib-boom, and spritsail yard of the *Foudroyant*. Having also had her foresail, mainsail, and staysails cut in tatters, the British 80 dropped from alongside, leaving the *Lion*, who now lay upon the *Guillaume-Tell*'s larboard side, and the *Penelope* upon the same quarter, occasionally firing at her.

At 6 h. 30 m., A. M., the French ship's main and mizen masts came down. By this time, having cleared away the wreck of her fallen spars and partially refitted herself, the *Foudroyant* had again closed the *Guillaume-Tell*, and, after the exchange of a few broadsides, nearly fell on board of her. At 8 A. M., the foremast of the *Guillaume-Tell* was shot away. At 8 h. 20 m. A. M., Cape Passero bearing north-half-east distant seven leagues, the *Foudroyant* and *Lion* being, one on her starboard, the other on her larboard quarter, and the *Penelope* close ahead, the *Guillaume-Tell*, rolling an unmanageable hulk on the water, with the wreck of her masts disabling most of the guns on the larboard side, and the violent motion from her dismasted state requiring the lowerdeck ports to be shut, hauled down her colours.

Both the *Foudroyant* and *Lion* were in too disabled a state to take possession of the *Guillaume-Tell*; that ceremony, therefore, devolved upon the *Penelope*. The damages of the *Foudroyant* were very severe: her mainmast, mizenmast, fore topmast, and bowsprit were wounded in several places; and her mizenmast was so much injured, that, in four hours after the action, it came down, wounding in its fall five men. The *Foudroyant* had also received, in her hull, several of the *Guillaume-Tell*'s shot. The masts of the *Lion* were likewise wounded, and her hull struck; but not to so great an extent as the *Foudroyant*'s. The damages of the *Penelope* were confined to her rigging and sails.

The loss sustained by the *Foudroyant*, out of a complement of 719 men and boys, amounted to eight seamen and marines killed, her commander (slightly), one lieutenant (John Aitkin Blow), her boatswain (Philip Bridge), three midshipmen (Edward West, Granville Proby, and Thomas Cole), and 58 seamen and marines, exclusive of the five that suffered by the fall of the mizenmast, wounded. The *Lion*, out of a crew on board of only about 300 men and boys, had one midshipman (Hugh Roberts) and seven seamen and marines killed, and one

midshipman (Alexander Hood) and 37 seamen and marines wounded. The *Penelope's* loss, of one killed and three, including one mortally wounded, has already appeared; making a total of 17 killed, and 101 wounded. The only French account, which has been published on the subject, represents the loss of the *Guillaume-Tell* at upwards of 200, in killed and wounded together. This was out of a complement, as deposed by her officers, of 919 men, being 81 less than the number stated in Captain Dixon's letter.

A more heroic defence than that of the *Guillaume-Tell* is not to be found among the records of naval actions. Its only compeer, in modern times at least, was fought in the same seas, and within less than a degree of the same latitude. If the British have their *Leander* and *Généreux*, the French have their *Guillaume-Tell* and a British squadron; and the defeat, in either case, was more honourable than half the single-ship victories which have been so loudly celebrated.

Nor, when the *Guillaume-Tell's* case is mentioned, must the conduct of the *Penelope* frigate be forgotten. Without Captain Blackwood's promptitude, gallantry, and perseverance; without those repeated raking fires, of the effects of which Admiral Decrès so justly complained, the *Guillaume-Tell* would most probably have escaped. The decided inferiority of a 64-gun ship, especially with two-thirds only of her crew on board, rendered the bold approach of the *Lion* creditable to Captain Dixon, his officers and men.

It was the *Foudroyant's* arrival that so turned the scale. This ship expended in the action, according to a return which has been published, the following quantity of powder and shot:

	No.
Powder, in barrels . . . . .	162
Shot, 32-pounders . . . . .	1200
" 24     " . . . . .	1240
" 18     " . . . . .	100
" 12     " . . . . .	200

Had the *Foudroyant*, single-handed, met the *Guillaume-Tell*, the combat would have been between two of the most powerful ships that had ever so met; and, although the *Foudroyant's* slight inferiority of force, being chiefly in number of men, was not that of which a British captain would complain, still the chances were equal, that the *Guillaume-Tell*, so gallantly manned, and so ably commanded, came off the conqueror.

As soon as the three crippled ships had put themselves a little to rights, the *Penelope*, as the most efficient, took the prize in tow, and proceeded with her to Syracuse. Subsequently the *Guillaume-Tell* arrived at Portsmouth; and, under the name of *Malta*, became, next to the *Tonnant*, the largest two-

decked ship belonging to the British navy. The principal dimensions of the two 80-gun ships were as follows :

	Length of first deck.		Extreme breadth.		Tons.
	ft.	in.	ft.	in.	
Foudroyant . . . . .	183	8½	50	7½	2062
Guillaume-Tell . . . . .	194	4	51	7½	2265

The loss of the *Guillaume-Tell*, the only remaining line-of-battle ship of the fleet of Vice-admiral Brueys at the battle of the Nile, was calculated still more to depress the drooping spirits of the garrison of Valetta. A fifth and a sixth summons were sent in by the commanding officer of the blockading force ; and by the last it was intimated, that a Russian fleet had arrived at Messina, on its way to co-operate in an attack upon the city. General Vaubois still refused to surrender ; saying : “ *Cette place est en trop bon état, et je suis moi-même trop jaloux de bien servir mon pays et de conserver mon honneur, pour écouter vos propositions.*”

By the beginning of August all the beasts of burden had been consumed, and dogs, cats, fowls, and rabbits, for want of nourishment, had also disappeared. Firewood began likewise to fail ; but this was remedied by breaking up the *Boudeuse* frigate. The cisterns were dried up, and the troops were dying from 100 to 130 a day. Being now convinced that he must soon capitulate, General Vaubois wished to save to the republic the two fine 40-gun frigates, *Diane* and *Justice*.

Accordingly, favoured by a dark night and a fair wind, the two French frigates, on the evening of the 24th, put to sea from Valetta harbour. They were, however, seen and immediately pursued by the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Success*, Captain Shulldham Peard, and the *Généreux* and *Northumberland* 74s, Captains Manley Dixon and George Martin ; which last-named officer had, since May, succeeded Captain Troubridge in the chief command. After a short running fight with the *Success*, the *Diane*, with only 114 of her crew on board, hauled down her colours ; but the *Justice*, under cover of the darkness, effected her escape, and subsequently arrived at Toulon. The *Diane* was a fine frigate of 1142 tons, and was afterwards added to the British navy under the name of *Niobe*, there being a *Diana* already in the service.

On the 3d of September General Vaubois held a council of war ; at which the French officers gave as decided a proof of their present wisdom, in unanimously concurring to treat for a surrender, as of their past folly, in having unanimously sworn that they never would do so. Accordingly, on the 4th, a flag of truce was sent to Major-general Pigot commanding the allied forces on shore ; and on the 5th the major-general and Captain Martin, on the part of the British, and

General Vaubois and Rear-admiral Villeneuve, on the part of the French, settled the terms of capitulation. These, alike honourable to both parties, were executed on the same day; and the fortress of Valetta and its dependencies were immediately surrendered to the British. Of the two 64s in the port, one only, the *Athénien*, was in a seaworthy state, and she was a remarkably fine ship of 1404 tons. The *Carthagénaise* frigate was in a similar state; to the *Dégo*, and therefore not worth removing.

We must not quit the subject of Malta without naming, as the principal person to whom the loyal inhabitants were indebted for the expulsion of their cruel invaders, Captain Alexander John Ball of the *Alexander* 74. This officer had served on shore during the greater part of the blockade, and, by the warmth of his attachment no less than the wisdom of his measures, had endeared himself to the Maltese. Captain Ball therefore was the fittest person to preside over them; and to that office, some short time after the surrender of the island, he was appointed by the British government.

When we last quitted the shores of Egypt we left the two commissioners from General Kléber, and those from the grand vizier, on board the *Tigre*, Captain Sir Sidney Smith, contending with a gale of wind. That gale prevented the ship from returning to Alexandria until the 17th or 18th of January. In the mean time, however, the conferences had been carried on; and the result was, that the parties landed and repaired to the newly captured fort of El-Arich, and there, on the 24th of January, signed a convention for the evacuation of Egypt by the French army. Or rather, a convention to that effect was signed by General Desaix and M. Poussielgue, as the plenipotentiaries of General Kléber, and by Mustapha-Rachid Effendi and Mustapha-Rasycheh Effendi, as the plenipotentiaries of his highness the Grand Vizier; but not by Sir Sidney Smith. On the 28th, at Salahieh, this treaty was ratified by General Kléber, and subsequently, we believe, by the grand vizier.

The convention consisted of 22 articles, the chief of which were, that the French army should evacuate Egypt, embarking at Alexandria, Rosetta, and Aboukir; that there should be an armistice of three months, or longer if necessary; that all subjects of the Sublime Porte prisoners among the French should be set at liberty; and that vessels containing the French army should have proper passports to go to France, and not to be molested by any of the belligerents.

The moment this convention was signed, Sir Sidney Smith sent a copy of it to his government by the hands of Major Douglas of the *Tigre*'s marines; and on the 25th of March, 1800, the convention was announced in the London Gazette as one by which it had been agreed "that the French troops now



in Egypt should evacuate the country, and should be allowed to return to France." This notice of the El-Arich treaty by the official organ of the British government implied an approval of the measure; but, long before its appearance in the Gazette, the convention had been disowned and denounced by a party, without whose entire concurrence it could not be carried into effect.

Having employed all the month of February in making arrangements for removing his army according to the terms of the treaty, General Kléber might well be surprised when, in the early part of March, he was informed by the captain of the *Theseus* 74, then cruising off Alexandria, that, by Sir Sidney Smith's orders, he could allow no other vessel\* to depart from the ports of Egypt. Soon afterwards came a letter from Sir Sidney himself, dated at the Isle of Cyprus on the 20th of February, informing the French general, that the commander-in-chief of the British fleet in the Mediterranean had received orders which opposed the immediate execution of the treaty of El-Arich. Almost immediately upon this communication followed a letter from Lord Keith himself, in which his lordship acquaints the French general, that he has received positive orders to consent to no capitulation with the French troops in Egypt and Syria, unless they lay down their arms and surrender as prisoners of war, abandoning all the ships and stores in the port and citadel of Alexandria; that, in case of such capitulation, the troops would not be allowed to return to France without exchange; that all ships having troops on board, and sailing from Egypt with passports signed by others than those who have a right to grant them, will be detained as prizes.

The instant he had read this letter, General Kléber determined to give battle to the grand vizier, who had already been making several hostile demonstrations: he, nevertheless, replied calmly to Lieutenant Wright, the bearer of it, "You shall know to-morrow the answer I mean to give to your admiral." That very night the French general had the letter of Lord Keith printed; and, the next morning, with "Proclamation" for a head, and with "Soldats! on ne répond à une telle insolence que par des victoires: préparez-vous à combattre!" for a postscript, issued it to his army.

Although, as we have elsewhere stated, Sir Sidney Smith did not affix his signature to the formal convention concluded at El-Arich, he appears to have signed, conjointly with General Desaix and M. Poussielgue, a preliminary document containing the basis of the treaty, and the third and last article of which runs in these words: "That the French army evacuate Egypt, with arms and baggage, whenever the necessary means for such evacuation shall have been procured, and to withdraw to the ports

\* Generals Desaix, Davoust, and a few other officers of distinction had already sailed for France.

which shall be agreed upon. This agreement bears date on board the *Tigre*, "8 Nivôse," or December 29, the very day on which the French commissioners repaired on board at Sir Sidney's invitation. It was natural, therefore, that Sir Sidney should feel highly mortified and indignant at the refusal of his superiors to ratify a treaty which he (it has never been contended unauthoritatively) planned and matured. His letter to M. Poussielgue, of date March 8, forcibly depicts the bitterness of his feelings on the subject.

In all the versions of this affair to which we have had access, it is stated that Lord Keith, in refusing to ratify the treaty, was merely complying with the instructions he had received from his government. Indeed, his own words to General Kléber are: "I inform you that I have received positive orders from his majesty to consent to no capitulation with the French army under your command in Egypt and Syria, unless &c." But what says Lord Keith, in a letter dated more than two months afterwards, and addressed to M. Poussielgue? "I have given no orders or authority against the observance of the convention between the grand vizier and General Kléber, having received no orders on this head from the king's ministers. Accordingly,\* I was of opinion that his majesty should not take part in it; but, since the treaty has been concluded, his majesty being desirous of showing his respect for his allies, I have received instructions to allow a passage for the French troops."

Upon the whole, therefore, we are disposed to acquit the British government of the chief blame in this most discreditable business, and to transfer it to Vice-admiral Lord Keith; who, doubtless, had a precedent to quote in the still more disgraceful breach of faith committed by Lord Nelson in Naples bay; and who might naturally feel somewhat personally affected at being, by Sir Sidney Smith's blightful interference, thus suddenly cut off from becoming a principal sharer in that golden harvest which the great expedition on foot was almost certain to reap.

Whatever, or whoever, may have been the cause of the rupture of the El-Arich treaty, that rupture stimulated the injured party, against every calculation of force and number, to wreak the most signal vengeance upon the Turks, who undoubtedly were not those by whom the breach of faith had been committed. Unluckily for them, however, they happened to be in immediate contact with the enraged French army; the grand vizier, with his host of turbans, having possessed himself of the different strongholds, the instant the French had quitted them on their way to the coast to embark under the terms of the treaty.

The first battle was fought on the 20th of March, at the village of Matarieh (built upon the ruins of the ancient Heliopolis),

\* "Although" appears to be the proper word, but thus it stands in a work (Brenton, vol. iii., p. 57) now before us, and the only authority on the subject to which, at this moment, we have the means of referring.

between the French army under General Kléber, stated at 10,000 men, and the Turkish army under the Grand Vizier Jussuf, stated at the enormous amount of from 60,000 to 80,000 men. After five days' fighting in the plains of the province of Charquieh, during which the Turks were driven from village to village, the French gained the entire victory; and the grand vizier, taking horse at Salalieh, fled across the desert with scarcely 500 followers, leaving his camp, artillery, and baggage to the conquerors. Of the loss on the French side we are not informed, but it was probably of trifling amount; while the loss of the Turks, including those left dead on the field, or different fields of battle, massacred by the Arabs, and who perished in the desert, is represented to have exceeded 50,000.

After the suppression of a revolt at Cairo, and the expulsion of a small British force under Lieutenant-colonel Murray, which had been disembarked from the 50-gun ship *Centurion*, and some smaller vessels at Suez, General Kléber, towards the end of the month of April, found himself again in tolerably quiet possession of the principal posts formerly occupied by the French army in Egypt.

It was not, it appears, until towards the middle of June, that General Kléber received any intimation of the desire of the British government to renew the convention which had been broken off in the manner we have related. Either feeling not disposed to trust a second time to those who had once deceived him, or fancying himself too firmly established in his possession to be easily ousted, the French general refused to negotiate; and instantly began strengthening the principal defences along the coast, and making the best arrangements in his power to repel the attack which, he considered it likely, would soon be made by the British.

An event, however, soon occurred, which the French Egyptian army had good reason to deplore. On the 14th of June, as General Kléber, accompanied by the architect Protain, was walking along a terrace belonging to his palace at Cairo, a stranger, indifferently habited in the oriental costume, rushed out of an adjoining gallery and stabbed the general with a poniard. Mortally wounded, General Kléber had only time to support himself against the wall of the terrace, and call out to a domestic whom he saw approaching, "A moi, guide, je suis assassiné!" M. Protain, in the mean while, having no arms but a small stick, was endeavouring to hold the murderer till some one arrived to secure him; but the latter, stabbing M. Protain badly, but not mortally, in six places, disengaged himself, and, having replunged his dagger into the heart of his first victim, fled into the gardens of the palace. On seeing the commander-in-chief fall, the guide, instead of running towards him, hastened to the house of General Dumas, where a large party of general officers was then assembled.

After a long search, a suspected individual was taken, named Soleyman-el-Halebi, a native of Syria, aged 24 years, and by profession a clerk or writer. When accused of the crime, he stoutly denied it; but the bastinado, applied to the soles of the poor wretch's feet produced a confession. Let us hasten to relate the horrid business that followed. The man was evidently a religious fanatic: indeed he is so described in the French accounts;\* and no greater proof of the fact is required, than that, although tortured to death in a manner which might have shaken the constancy of a North-American Indian, Soleyman died singing, in a loud and steady voice, the creed of his faith.

A few days before the French army, now under the command of General Aballah-Jacques Menou, assisted at this most disgraceful exhibition, their late commander-in-chief was buried with military honours in the suburbs of Cairo; and we must do him the justice to say, that General Kléber, among his enemies, no less than among his friends, bore the character of a brave officer and an honourable man. The character of his successor will be sufficiently developed, as in our next year's account we proceed in bringing to a close the French Egyptian campaign.

#### BRITISH AND SPANISH FLEETS.—ATLANTIC.

Some account has already been given of the operations, along the south-west coast of France, of a British squadron under the command of Captain Sir Edward Pellew. Early in the month of August Rear-admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, who commanded another detached squadron cruising in the bay of Biscay, taking Sir Edward under his command, made sail for, and on the 25th arrived in the bay of Playa-de-Dominos on the coast of Spain, with the

Gun-ship	
98	London . . . . Captain John Child Purvis.
74	Renown . . . . { Rear-admiral (b.) Sir J. B. Warren, bart., K.B.
	{ Captain Thomas Eyles.
74	Impétueux . . . . " Sir Edward Pellew, bart.
	Courageux . . . . " Samuel Hood.
	Captain . . . . " Sir Richard John Strachan, bt.

There were also four or five frigates and sloops besides a fleet of transports containing a strong body of troops, commanded by Lieutenant-general Sir James Pulteney; and which troops in conjunction with the ships of war, were to attack the defences that protected the following Spanish squadron, lying ready for sea in the harbour of Ferrol:

Gun-ship		Gun-ship	
112	Real-Carlos,	80	Argonauta,
	San-Hermenegildo,	74	{ San-Antonio,
96	San-Fernando,		{ San-Augustin.

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xii., p. 268.

On the same evening, after a fort of eight 24-pounders had been silenced by the fire of the *Impétueux* 74, *Brilliant* 28-gun frigate, *Cynthia* sloop, and *St.-Vincent* gun-boat, the troops were disembarked on the shores of the bay, along with 16 field-pieces, without the loss of a man. They were attended by a detachment of seamen from the ships of war, to carry scaling-ladders and drag the guns up the heights; a service which the seamen performed with their accustomed alacrity.

Scarcely had the British troops gained the summit of the first ridge, when the rifle-corps under Lieutenant-colonel Stewart fell in with, and drove back, a detachment of the enemy, with some loss, including among the wounded the lieutenant-colonel. At daybreak on the 26th, a considerable body of the enemy was repulsed, chiefly by the brigade under Major-general the Earl of Cavan. This advantage, with the comparatively slight loss of 16 killed and 68 wounded, gave the British the complete and undisturbed possession of the heights of Brion and Balon, which overlook the town and harbour of Ferrol. The general says, in his despatch, that he had now an opportunity of observing minutely the situation of the place, and of forming, from the reports of prisoners, an idea of the strength of the enemy. He did so, and requested the British rear-admiral to embark the troops and their cannon. All of which was done the same evening, in the ablest manner; and, as at the disembarkation, without the loss of a man.

If General Pulteney's "prisoners," in their reports, were as wide of the truth as Don Francisco Melgarejo's "French sailor," the Spaniards would not want men or guns to frighten away an invader. The sailor insisted that the British had landed 15,000 men, and that they had 1000 killed, including a lieutenant-general and a colonel, and 800 wounded. The Spaniards themselves declare, that they had, at no time, more than 4000 men under arms, including 500 sailors and some militia; whereas we find, by Lieutenant-general Pulteney's letter in the *Gazette*, that seven British regiments (one with both battalions) and a rifle-corps shared in the loss. The probability then is, that there were at least 8000 British, to combat 4000 Spanish troops. That they did not do so, was matter of just triumph to the latter. At all events the navy performed its part; and so would the army, or even two thirds of it, had "circumstances permitted it to act."

With his squadron and fleet of transports, Sir John afterwards proceeded to Gibraltar, and there formed a junction with a much larger force under the Mediterranean commander-in-chief. On the 2d of October Lord Keith sailed from Gibraltar with 22 ships of the line, 37 frigates and sloops, and 80 transports, having on board about 18,000 men, under the command of General Sir Ralph Abercromby. With this powerful force, the vice-admiral, on the 4th, came to an anchor in the bay of

Cadiz, and summoned the town to surrender, in order to get possession of the Spanish squadron at anchor in the harbour. The reply of Don Thomas de Morla, the governor of Cadiz, acquainting the two British commanders-in-chief that the plague was raging in the town and environs, put a stop at once to all hostile measures against the miserable inhabitants, and sent the expedition back to Gibraltar, to be employed against a different enemy in the manner we shall hereafter have to relate.

#### LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

Having given an account of the first engagement fought between an American and a French frigate, we shall offer no apology for inserting in these pages an account of the second. On the 1st of February, at 7 h. 30 m. A. M., the United States' 36-gun frigate *Constellation*, still commanded by Commodore Thomas Truxton,\* being about five leagues to the westward of Basseterre-road, Guadaloupe, working to windward, discovered in the south-east quarter, standing south-west, the French 40-gun frigate *Vengeance*, Captain Sébastien-Louis-Marie Pichot.

The American commodore immediately went in chase; and M. Pichot ran from him, for the reason, as alleged afterwards by some of the French officers, that the *Vengeance* had her decks encumbered with hogsheads of sugar, which she had brought from Guadaloupe, and was carrying to Europe. Let that have been as it may, at 8 P. M. the *Constellation* got within hail of the *Vengeance*, and received a fire from her stern and quarter guns. In a little time the former, having gained a position on the French frigate's weather quarter, opened a very destructive fire; and to which, from her position, the *Constellation* received a much less effective return, than if she had run fairly alongside. The mutual cannonade continued, in this manner, until nearly 1 A. M. on the 2d; when the *Vengeance*, owing to the damaged state of the *Constellation*'s rigging and masts, particularly her mainmast, was enabled to range ahead out of gunshot, and the battle ended.

The force of the *Constellation*, in guns, men, and size, has already been given.† The armament of the *Vengeance*, with the addition of four brass 36-pounder carronades, was the same as that of her sister-ship, the *Résistance*, captured in March, 1797;‡ and her complement may also be stated the same as the latter's, exclusive of about 60 passengers.

The loss sustained by the American frigate amounted to one officer and 13 seamen and marines killed, and two officers and 23 seamen and marines wounded. That of the *Vengeance* is represented, in the American accounts, at 150 in killed and

\* See vol. ii., p. 323.

† Ibid., p. 324.

‡ Ibid., p. 81.

wounded ; but, according to a published letter from one of her passengers, it amounted to only 20 men killed and 40 wounded.

The officer killed on board the *Constellation* was Mr. James Jervis, a young midshipman, who, with some of the men, fell overboard with the mainmast. "It seems this young gentleman," says Commodore Truxton, "was apprized of the mast going in a few minutes, by an old seaman ; but he had already so much of the principle of an officer ingrafted on his mind, not to leave his quarters on any account, that he told the men, if the mast went, they must go with it ; which shortly afterwards occurred, and only one man was saved."

Although, undoubtedly, the American frigate was the superior both in force and effectiveness, yet, had the *Constellation* made a prize of the *Vengeance*, no one can deny that it would have redounded to the honour of Commodore Truxton, and been a subject of fair triumph to so young a navy as that of the United States. But, if it be true, as the French captain is represented to have stated, that the flag of the *Vengeance* came down three times during the contest, what was the *Constellation* about that she did not attempt to take possession ? It would seem that the *Constellation*, notwithstanding she was to windward, persisted in remaining at too great a distance from her antagonist, to observe, in the dark, what the latter was doing. According to Captain Pichot's account, indeed ; the *Vengeance* lost all three masts by the *Constellation*'s fire ; and yet Commodore Truxton, although so minute in his "Journal" as to tell us that, previous to the action, he got "the large trumpet in the lee gangway ready to speak" the French frigate, takes no notice of the loss of her masts.

The most extraordinary circumstance, however, remains to be told. The *Vengeance*, M. Pichot declares, was compelled, owing to the inexperience of her crew, to remain stationary for three days, while jury-masts were erecting ; and, during the whole of that time, the *Constellation* lay to windward, with her fore and mizen masts still standing (her mainmast had fallen a few minutes after the firing had ceased), and yet did not bear down, or evince the least inclination, to renew the engagement. The *Constellation*, soon afterwards, made sail for and anchored in Port-Royal, Jamaica ; and the *Vengeance*, no less happy than surprised at such an escape, steered for Curaçoa, where she arrived in a very shattered state.

No sooner did the commodore's account of his rencontre reach the United States, than his fellow-citizens, particularly those of his own, or the federal party, set to work to bring to an issue on paper, that which had been left undecided on the ocean. They pronounced and published the action as a victory ; ate dinners, and drank themselves drunk, in honour of it ; and, when the commodore arrived in port, assailed him on all sides with addresses of congratulation, founded on assertions that the commodore's letter had never sanctioned, and from which,

although not possessed perhaps of a very extraordinary share, his modesty must have recoiled.

We formerly mentioned, that the merchants of London presented the commodore with a piece of plate for having captured the *Insurgente*. Such was actually the spirit of party in the United States, that the democrats abused Commodore Truxton, calling him *Tory*, &c., for having accepted it. About the middle of the year 1800 the commodore was promoted to the command of the 44-gun frigate *President*; but the moment the democrats came into power, on March the 4th in the succeeding year, he was displaced, and, as a proof how liberal republics can be, was never afterwards put in command. The more moderate among the democrats, however, did at length relent a little; and Commodore Truxton got appointed (of all places for a commodore!) sheriff of Philadelphia; in which office he realized an independency.

On the 5th of February, at 6 A. M., the British 16-gun ship-sloop *Fairy* (armed similarly to *Rattlesnake*, vol. ii., p. 348), Captain Joshua Sydney Horton, and 18-gun brig-sloop, *Harpy* (same force as *Racoon*, vol. ii., p. 369), Captain Henry Bazely, weighed and set sail from St.-Aubin's bay in the island of Jersey, with the wind a fresh breeze at north-west, to reconnoitre the port of St.-Malo, and discover if a French frigate, which on the preceding evening had chased the 14-gun brig *Seaflower*, Lieut. Murray, had got into that harbour. At 11 h. 30 m. A. M., Cape Frehel bearing south-east distant five or six miles, a large ship, evidently a frigate, was discovered in the south-south-west quarter, running down close alongshore to the westward, with a light breeze nearly aft, or from the south-south-east. This was the French 38-gun frigate *Pallas*, Captain Jacques Epron, from St.-Malo bound to Brest, and the same, as it appears, that had chased the *Seaflower*.

At about 20 m. P. M., seeing no chance of bringing the *Pallas* to action while she remained so close under the land, Captain Horton tacked and stood off, in the hope that the frigate would follow the two sloops to an offing. This the *Pallas* immediately did; and at 1 P. M. an engagement, within pistol-shot, commenced between her and the *Fairy* and *Harpy*, the latter close astern of her companion. The action, during which the *Harpy* obtained several opportunities of raking the *Pallas*, continued until 3 P. M.; when the French frigate ceased firing, and made all sail to the northward and eastward, having the wind now from the south-west.

So great were the damages which the *Fairy* and *Harpy* had received in their rigging and sails, that it was not until 3 h. 15 m. P. M. that the sloops were in a condition to make sail in chase. About this time the *Pallas*, observing two sail nearly ahead, or in the north-east by north, hauled up to the northward and westward. Captain Horton immediately made the signal for



the Harpy, who was the more advanced in the chase, to endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy. At 4 p.m. three sail, including the two already noticed as seen by the Pallas, were discovered by the two sloops. No doubt being entertained that the vessels approaching were friends, the Fairy made the signal for an enemy; which was repeated by the Harpy, both sloops firing guns every five minutes to enforce attention to it.

These ships, then working up from the northward with a light wind from the south-east by south, were the British 38-gun frigate Loire, Captain James Newman Newman, 20-gun ship Danaé, Captain Lord Proby, and 16-gun ship-sloop Railleur, Captain William James Turquand; and all of which had sailed from Plymouth on the 27th and 28th of January, purposely to intercept the Pallas and a corvette, expected to be on their way from St.-Malo to Brest. At 4 h. 15 m. p.m. the Pallas bore away large; and, in order to deceive her new pursuers and distract their attention, hoisted English colours, and endeavoured to repeat the signal made by the Fairy and Harpy. At 4 h. 30 m. p.m. Roche Douvre bore from the Fairy north-north-east distant six or seven miles; and at 5 h. 30 m. p.m. the Pallas bore west, and the Harpy west by south, the breeze now light from the south-east.

At 7 p.m. Captain Bazely received orders to go ahead, as far as signals were discernible between the two sloops, and make the private signal to the two ships, the Loire and Danaé, upon her lee bow. This was done, and subsequently the Fairy also made the private signal; but it was not answered by either the Loire, Danaé, or Railleur, which latter was considerably ahead and to windward of her two consorts. Notwithstanding this apparent remissness, Captain Horton was tolerably satisfied that the ships approaching were friends, and therefore stood on in chase of the Pallas. We may add to this, that Captain Newman also knew (although that is no excuse for not answering the private signal), that the two ships and brig in sight were the Pallas, Fairy, and Harpy; having learnt from Lord Proby, who had been detached for information to Jersey, upon what mission the two sloops had sailed.

At about 7 h. 45 m. p.m., observing ahead, and close under the Seven Islands, a ship approaching, which was the Railleur, the Pallas tacked; and at 8 p.m., while passing about three miles to windward of the Harpy, and at a still greater distance from the Loire, both on the opposite or larboard tack, was fired at, of course, without effect, by the Loire. The latter and the Harpy then tacked in chase; and at about 9 p.m. the Loire spoke the Fairy, who had also just tacked, and whose commander informed Captain Newman of the name and force of the Pallas, at that time "about a gun-shot and a half" upon the Fairy's weather quarter. Whether owing to bad management, bad sailing, or disabled rigging from her previous action with

the two sloops, the Pallas was gradually gained upon by the chasing ships, the Loire, Railleur, and Harpy especially.

At about 10 h. 30 m. P. M. the Loire had weathered her opponent so much as to be able to set her topgallant studding-sails, and at 11 P. M. arrived up with the Pallas. The Railleur, being ahead of the Loire, was directed to fire her broadside and drop astern. This the sloop did; and immediately afterwards, the nearest of the Seven Islands bearing south-west by south distant about 750 yards, the Loire commenced a close action with the Pallas, who opened a spirited fire in return. In a little time a battery upon the island, of several guns and a howitzer, began a smart fire upon the British ships, and did considerable damage to the Loire. In this way the action continued between the French frigate and shore-battery on one side, and the Loire, Railleur, Harpy, and Fairy on the other; the combatants all on the starboard tack, with the wind, as before, blowing moderately from the south-east.

At about 1 h. 30 m. A. M. on the 6th, the Harpy fetched close under the stern of the Railleur, then engaging the Pallas with great gallantry, and poured her broadside into the French frigate's quarter. This was repeated with such destructive effect, as to induce some one on board the frigate (especially as a man had been shot while ascending the mizen shrouds with a lantern to repeat the signal of surrender) to hail the brig with the exclamation, "Ne tirez pas encore, messieurs, nous sommes à vous." The Harpy then ceased her fire, as about the same time did the Loire, Railleur, and Fairy. The Loire and Harpy each lowered down a boat and sent her first lieutenant (Edmund Rayner and James Watson) to take possession of the prize. Conceiving, from a bustle abaft on board the Railleur, that a man had fallen into the water, Lieutenant Watson yawed out of his course: in consequence of this, the Loire's boat reached the Pallas a few minutes before the Harpy's; but the latter had the honour of conveying Captain Epron to the Loire.

The established complement of the Loire was 284 men and boys; but she had on board no more than 260, about 100 of whom had "volunteered" from the prison-ships, and ran from their quarters almost as soon as the action commenced. Of those 260 in crew, the Loire lost three seamen killed, and three midshipmen (Watkins Owen Pell, Francis William Eves, and John Allen Medway), 15 seamen, and one marine wounded. The Railleur, out of a complement of 76 men and boys, had one midshipman (William Prothers) and one gunner's mate killed, and three seamen and one marine wounded. The Fairy, out of a complement of 120 men and boys, had, in the day action, four seamen killed, her commander (slightly), purser (Mr. Hughes), and six seamen wounded, four of them badly; but in the night action the Fairy had only one seaman wounded. The Harpy, out of a crew the same as the Fairy's, had one seaman killed

*and three wounded in her first action, but escaped without any casualty in her second; making the total loss on the British side nine killed and 36 wounded.*

The official letter of Captain Newman does not mention a word of any loss having been sustained by the *Pallas*: a very improper omission, as it leads to an inference that the enemy's frigate struck her colours without having lost a man in the action. That such was not the case is clear, as well from the state of the ship's hull, which was pierced by shot in several places, as from the state of her lower masts, all three of which, just before daylight on the 7th, went over her side in a squall.

\*Captain Newman states that the crew of the *Pallas* numbered 350; but the officers of the latter swore, in the prize-court, that they had 362 men when the action, meaning, we presume, that with the two sloops, commenced. Hence the 12 men constituting the difference between the two statements, were, in all probability, killed in the preceding or day action. A greater loss than that must, we suppose, have been incurred in the night action, when the *Loire's* heavy broadsides came into play; but, for the reason already stated, we are unable to give the particulars.

Instead of exhibiting the usual comparative statement, we shall merely say, that, unaided by any of her consorts, the *Loire*, mounting 46 guns (long 18 and 9 pounders, with 32-pounder carronades), was more than a match for the *Pallas*; and that the latter's defence was highly creditable to her officers and crew.

The *Pallas* was a remarkably handsome frigate of 1029 tons, and had never before been at sea. She was of course purchased by government; and, under the name of *Pique*, long continued a favourite 36-gun frigate in the lists of the British navy.

For what, on one side at least, may be called a single-ship action, the details of the occurrences which led to the capture of the French frigate *Pallas* have given us considerable trouble, and are not yet drawn up to our entire satisfaction. Not, however, because there has been so little said or written on the subject, for few actions of the kind have given rise to so much discussion, as the pages of the *Naval Chronicle* can testify; but owing to the obscure and contradictory statements which have been published, all resting upon authority equally respectable. At all events, no one can deny that the conduct of Captains Horton and Bazely was highly gallant and praiseworthy. Nor must the efforts of the *Harpy* be disparaged simply because she was an 18-gun sloop. The *Harpy* was armed in the same manner as the *Pelican*, that had rendered herself so famous in beating off the *Médée*; and the former's 32-pounder carronades, in the close and raking position in which they were frequently fired, did considerable mischief to the *Pallas*, as Captain Epron himself was candid enough to acknowledge.

Although, owing to some omission in Captain Newman's letter, a little delay occurred in doing justice to the claims of Captain Bazely, that officer, as well as his brother commander, Captain Horton, was at length promoted to post-rank.

On the 1st of March, in the middle of the night, the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Néréide*, Captain Frederick Watkins, cruising off the Penmarcks, discovered to windward five ships and a schooner. As soon as she had made the necessary preparation for battle, the *Néréide* hauled up for the strangers; which, at daylight on the 2d, were seen to be all armed vessels, and were then lying to, as if determined to have a contest with the British frigate. Nor will it be considered that the French commodore had formed a very rash resolve, when the force of his squadron is stated.

The largest ship was the *Bellone*, of Bordeaux, measuring 643 tons, and mounting 24 long 8-pounders on the main deck, and six brass 36-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle; total 30 guns, with a complement of at least 220 men.\* The three remaining ships, also from Bordeaux, were the *Vengeance*, of 18 long 8-pounders† and 174 men, *Favorite*, of 16 long 6-pounders and 120 men, and *Huron*, of 16 long 4-pounders and 87 men; and the schooner was the *Tirailleuse*, of 14 long 4-pounders and 80 men; making a total of 94 guns and 681 men.

Just as the *Néréide* arrived within gun-shot of these seemingly pugnacious privateersmen, their parts failed them, and the four ships and schooner made all sail on different courses. The British frigate went in immediate chase, and continued the pursuit until night shut out the fugitives from her view. On the 2d, however, at daylight, the *Néréide* regained a sight of one of the ships; and, after a 12 hours' chase and a run of 123 miles, captured the *Vengeance*.

On the 5th of March, at 8 A.M., in latitude 50° 2' north, longitude 14° 43' west, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Phœbe*, Captain Robert Barlow, was borne down upon, and fired at, by the French ship privateer *Heureux*, of 22 long brass 12-pounders and 220 men. The latter, as it appeared, mistook the *Phœbe* for an Indiaman, and did not discover her mistake until she had arrived within point-blank musket-shot. The *Heureux* then wore upon the *Phœbe*'s weather bow, and hauled to the wind on the same tack; hoping, by a well-directed fire, to disable the *Phœbe*'s masts, rigging, and sails, and thereby effect her escape. The fire from the British frigate, however, was too powerful to be withstood by so comparatively inferior a foe, and the *Heureux* struck her colours.

\* In Captain Watkins's letter in the *Gazette*, 420; probably a typographical mistake.

† Ibid.; 12-pounders, but we know they were only 8-pounders.

The *Phœbe* had three seamen killed, or mortally wounded, and three slightly wounded; the *Heureux*, 18 men killed, and 25 wounded, most of whom lost limbs. The latter was a very complete flush-decked ship, coppered and copper-fastened, highly finished, and of large dimensions, measuring 598 tons. She was therefore readily purchased for the use of the British navy, and, under the same name, became classed as a 22-gun post-ship.

On the 15th of March the British 20-gun ship *Danaë*, Captain Lord Proby, while watching the French fleet in Brest, became lost to the service under the following discreditable circumstances. At 9 h. 30 m. P. M., Jackson, one of the captains of the foretop, and who had been secretary to Parker in the *Nore* mutiny, assisted by some prisoners and a part of the crew, rushed on the quarterdeck, knocked down the master, and cut him severely over the head. They then threw him down the main hatchway, and battened down the grating, placing over it the boats, filled with shot. By this means the remainder of the crew were prevented from retaking the ship. When the mutiny broke out, all the officers, except Lord Proby, the marine-officer, and the master, were in bed. On being informed by the marine-officer of what had happened, Lord Proby attempted to get up the after hatchway, but found it already guarded by nearly 20 men. One of them cut his lordship on the head; and no possibility existed of forcing the hatchway.

Lord Proby and the marine-officer then contrived to muster about ten cutlasses, four muskets, and some pocket-pistols. These were distributed among the most trustworthy of about 40 men; who, when the business commenced, were asleep in their hammocks. The hope then was that the mutineers would be forced to keep the sea; but the wind unfortunately changed, and they were enabled the next morning, the 16th, to fetch under Fort Conquête in Camaret bay, where they anchored the ship. Jackson then sent the jollyboat on board the French 16-gun brig-corvette *Colombe*, at anchor in the bay; and which brig on the 14th, with a convoy under her charge, had been chased in by the *Danaë* herself. At 2 P. M. the first lieutenant of the *Colombe*, accompanied by a detachment of soldiers, went on board the *Danaë*, and asked Lord Proby to whom he surrendered. His lordship replied, "To the French nation, but not to mutineers." Both vessels then steered for Brest, where they arrived on the 17th, after having been chased during several hours by the frigates *Anson* and *Boadicea*, Captains Philip Charles Durham and Richard Goodwin Keats; who, deceived by Jackson's hoisting the hoary and numerical signals, supposed the *Danaë* to be in chase of an enemy. Lord Proby had, however, thrown out of the cabin-window, and sunk with lead attached to it, the box containing the private signals.

The officers of the *Danaë* were landed at Brest; but the ship's company, including the mutineers, were, to the astonishment and chagrin of the latter, marched to Dinan prison. Vice-admiral Bruix, together with the commandant of marines and all the other French officers at the port, behaved with great politeness and attention to Lord Proby and his officers; the whole of the former expressing their utter detestation of the conduct of the mutineers. Captain Louis-Léon Jacob, formerly of the 36-gun frigate *Bellone*, captured with the *Hoché* in the year 1798, nobly offered to give louis d'ors for all the bank of England notes of the officers. Several of the latter, soon afterwards, were permitted to return to England on their parole.

On the 20th of March, in the evening, as the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Mermaid*, Captain Robert Dudley Oliver, and 16-gun ship-sloop *Peterel* (armed like the *Fairy*), Captain Francis William Austen, were cruising in the bay of Marseille, Captain Oliver directed the *Peterel* to keep close in-shore by way of deception, thereby to capture any vessels that might be running along the coast.

On the next morning some vessels of a convoy of 50 sail, from Certe bound to Toulon and Marseille, under the protection of an armed ship, brig, and xebec, were descried and chased, and two of them, a bark and bombard, both laden with wheat, captured. On the same afternoon, when near to Cape Couronne, the *Peterel* came to action with the three armed vessels; but which, after a short contest, observing the *Mermaid*, although at a great distance, beating up from to-leeward, made sail to get away. The ship and xebec, one, the *Cerf* of 14 long brass 6-pounders and about 90 men, the other, the *Lejoille* (named after the captain of the *Généreux*); commanded by the commodore of the division, Captain (de vais.) Pierre-Paul Raccórd, and mounting six long brass 6-pounders, and about 50 men, effected their escape by running on shore. The brig-corvette, which was the *Ligurienne* of 14 long 6-pounders and two 36-pounder carronades, all brass, and 104 men, Lieutenant François-Auguste Pelabond, after sustaining the fire of the *Peterel*, in a running fight of an hour and a half's duration, within 250 yards, and sometimes half that distance only, of the shore, struck her colours; at which time the *Peterel* was within six miles of the town of Marseille.

Although this service was performed under a heavy fire from a battery of four 24 or 18 pounders; and although, for a few minutes of the time, the sloop remained on a rock, which her stern had touched, the *Peterel's* damages were confined to a few shot-holes in her sails, and to the upsetting of four of her (12-pounder) carronades. Her first lieutenant, gunner, and 30 men being absent in prizes, the *Peterel* had on board but 89 men and boys; of whom she did not have a man hurt. The *Ligurienn*

had her commander and one seaman killed, and one seaman and one marine wounded.

Admitting the active interference of the battery on shore to be a fair set-off to the mere appearance of the *Mermaid* to leeward, this affair was very creditable to the officers and crew of the *Peterel*. Lieutenant Pelabond, had he lived, would doubtless have expressed his sentiments on the premature flight of his two consorts. As it was, the conduct of Captain Raccord, although among the members of his court-martial we observe the fighting names of *Bombart* and *Infernet*, was pronounced "irreproachable." One thing we are bound to state: the *Cerf* is there described as "une demie-chebeck," and not as a ship-corvette. The vessel, whatever may have been her rig or force, was, we believe, totally wrecked; but the *Lejoille* afterwards got off and reached *Marseille*.

The *Ligurienne* was a fine vessel of her class, well equipped with stores of all kinds, in excellent repair, and not two years old. She was built in a very peculiar manner, being fastened throughout with screw-bolts, so that she might be taken to pieces, and set up again, with ease; and was originally intended, according to the account given by the prisoners, to follow Buonaparte to Egypt. Screw-bolts were not qualifications required in a British cruiser; and therefore the *Ligurienne* being found unadapted in other respects, was not purchased into the service.

Before quitting Captain Austen, we shall relate another instance of his good conduct; and in which, without coming to actual blows, he performed an important, and not wholly imperilous service. On the 13th of August, at 10 A. M., as the *Peterel*, being then attached to the squadron of Sir Sidney Smith on the coast of Egypt, was standing in towards Alexandria, with the wind at north-north-west, a ship of the line, totally dismasted, was perceived aground between Aboukir island and the fort or castle. The *Peterel* immediately hauled to the wind, and stood in the direction of the grounded vessel; which was a Turkish 80-gun ship, of remarkable beauty commanded by Indjee-Bey.

At noon the *Peterel* anchored in four fathoms, about a mile and a half to the south-east of Aboukir island; and a number of djerms were seen to put off from the ship and pull towards the shore. At half-past noon three Turkish corvettes, that had come from the eastward, anchored about a mile outside of the *Peterel*. By this time the latter had hoisted out her pinnace; and in it was immediately despatched the master, Mr. John Thompson, with nine men, to endeavour to set the ship on fire, and prevent the French from obtaining any of the stores, guns, or ammunition.

The master was soon on board; and by 2 h. 30 m. P. M., he and his active party had completely set the ship in flames. In

another hour Mr. Thompson returned to the *Peterel*, bringing with him 13 Greeks, all that remained of the 80-gun ship's crew; one part, with the commander, having surrendered to the French, and the other part having managed to escape to the three corvettes. To the nearest of these, not one of which, from an alleged dread of being fired at from the shore, would afford the slightest assistance in preventing the French from plundering the wreck, Captain Austen sent the 13 Greeks. As a proof that the captain's promptitude had been of use, the French had already got out of the ship one of the quarterdeck guns, and were taking measures, when the *Peterel* entered the bay, to remove the remainder. At 5 p.m. the *Peterel* weighed, and stood back to the westward; and, not long afterwards, the captain pacha testified his sense of the service Captain Austen had performed, by presenting him with a handsome sabre and rich pelisse.

On the 5th of April, in the afternoon, as a British squadron, composed of the 74-gun ships *Leviathan*, Captain James Carpenter, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral John Thomas Duckworth, and *Swiftsure*, Captain Benjamin Hallowell, and the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Emerald*, Captain Thomas Moutray Waller, was cruising in the neighbourhood of the bay of Cadiz, 12 sail were discovered from the mast-head. Chase was given; and at 3 a.m. on the 6th, the *Emerald* crossed and captured a Spanish ship, of 10 guns and 70 men, part of a convoy of 13 ships and brigs, which had sailed on the 3d from Cadiz, bound to South America, under the protection of three frigates, two of which were the *Carmen*, Captain don Fraquin Porcel, and *Florentina*, Captain don Manuel Norates, both of the 34-gun or 12-pounder class.

At daybreak all the Spanish convoy had disappeared except a brig; and she was so near and the weather so calm, that the boats of the *Leviathan* and *Emerald*, under the orders of Lieutenant Charles March Gregory, second of the *Leviathan*, were detached in pursuit of her. After "a smart skirmish of forty minutes," but in which no loss appears to have been sustained on either side, the "*Los-Anglese*," or *Barcelona*, of 14 carriage-guns, six swivels, and 46 men, laden with bale goods, was captured by Lieutenant Gregory and his boat-party.

By the time this brig had been secured, three sail were seen, east, west, and south. The *Swiftsure*, being to leeward (the wind very light from the northward), was directed to chase south, and the *Emerald*, east; while the *Leviathan* herself steered to the westward. At noon the *Emerald* made the signal for six sail in the north-east. On this the *Leviathan* put about and stood after the *Emerald*, and at dusk saw nine sail from the mast-head.

It was at this time nearly calm; but at 11 p.m. a fresh breeze sprang up from the north-west. Profiting by it, the



Leviathan and Emerald steered north, in the hope soon to cross the strangers. At midnight three sail were seen; and at 2 A.M. on the 7th, two of them were ascertained to be frigates, standing to the north-north-west, and close together. The British 74 and frigate now steered a parallel course, proportioning their sail to that of the strangers, in order to be ready to commence the attack just before daybreak, the rear-admiral judiciously considering, that a fire commenced in the dark might alarm the convoy and lead to their escape.

At dawn of day the Leviathan and Emerald bore down upon the Carmen and Florentina, who had evidently mistaken them for a part of their convoy. On being hailed by the Leviathan, the weathermost frigate crowded sail to get off; as did also her consort, then close upon her bow. A volley of musketry failing to induce the nearest frigate to strike, the Leviathan gave a yaw and fired all her guns before the gangway, in the hope to bring down some of the frigate's masts and yards, but without effect. In a few minutes, however, the Emerald having in a very spirited as well as judicious manner, closed with the leewardmost frigate, the two became so disabled in their sails and rigging, that after firing a few straggling and ineffectual shot, and just as the Leviathan had gained a position to discharge her broadside into both frigates, they hauled down their colours.

The Emerald immediately proceeded in chase of the third frigate, but, appearing to lose ground in the pursuit, was recalled and ordered to secure as many as she could of the convoy; four of the largest of which, before dark, fell into her hands. In the mean time the Leviathan lay by the two Spanish frigates, until they were in a state to make sail; which was not until two hours after the surrender. The 74 then stood after the remaining frigate; but the latter had by this time so increased her distance, that the Leviathan gave up the pursuit, and proceeded with her prizes to Gibraltar.

As a proof that the Carmen and Florentina had not struck their colours without making an honourable resistance, the first, out of a crew of 340, had one officer and 10 men killed, and 16 men wounded; the second, out of a crew of 314, one officer and 11 men killed, her captain, first lieutenant, and 10 men wounded. Each frigate was laden with 500 quintals of quicksilver, for the use of the mines at Lima. The Carmen measured 908, and the Florentina 902 tons, and both were added to the British navy as 12-pounder 36-gun frigates.

On the 12th of April Captain Joseph Baker, of the 16-gun ship *Calypso*, being off Cape Tiberon, despatched the master, Mr. William Buckley, in the six-oared cutter, with 10 men, properly armed and provided, and a swivel in her bow, to cruise for two days under the cape, in order, if possible, to intercept some of the small-craft that usually navigate within a mile of the shore. On the following day, the 13th, at 11 A.M., Mr.

Buckly perceived, and immediately pulled towards, a schooner lying becalmed under the land. As the boat approached within hail, the schooner desired her to keep off, and, finding the order not attended to, opened upon her a fire of musketry. Heedless of this, the British in the boat boarded, and after a short but smart conflict on the deck carried, the French privateer-schooner *Diligente*, of six carriage-guns, 30 stands of arms, and 39 men actually on board. In this very gallant boat-attack, the British had only one man wounded; the French, seven, and those dangerously.

On the 21st of April, at 6 h. 30 m. A. M., the British hired lugger *Lark*, of 14 guns (twelve 12-pounder carronades and two fours), and 50 men and boys, Lieutenant Thomas Henry Wilson, cruising off the *Vlie* passage into the *Texel*, discovered and chased a French cutter-privateer, which, after the exchange of a few broadsides, ran herself on shore; but, as the *Lark* was unable to get near enough to destroy her, this privateer eventually got off and reached in safety the *Texel* road.

On the 25th, at 2 P. M., the *Lark* chased and soon came up with another French cutter-privateer, which, after engaging the lugger for some time, ran on shore upon the *Vlie* island. Here the cutter, which was the *Imprenable*, Captain Sparrow, of 12 long 3, and two long 8 pounders, and a crew of 60 men, defended herself pretty well for nearly an hour; at the end of which her men began escaping to the shore, under the cover of a party of troops estimated at about 100.

Seeing this, Lieutenant Wilson put off in the *Lark's* small boat, and directed the master, Mr. Thomas Geltins, to follow in the large boat. With his handful of men, and in the face of a smart fire of musketry from the shore, to which by this time all the French crew had escaped, Lieutenant Wilson boarded the *Imprenable*. Finding his endeavours to get the cutter afloat greatly impeded by the musketry from the troops, the lieutenant detached the master in the large boat to dislodge them from the sand-banks behind which they had taken shelter. This done, the British succeeded, without the slightest loss, in getting off the privateer, and carried her into Yarmouth roads. To add to the value of this gallant exploit, the *Imprenable* had been a great pest to British commerce in the North Sea.

On the 10th of June Rear-admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, cruising off the *Penmarcks* with the *Renown* and *Defence* 74s, Captains Thomas Eyles and Lord Henry Paulet, and *Fisgard* and *Unicorn* frigates, Captains Thomas Byam Martin and Philip Wilkinson, detached the boats of the squadron to attempt to cut out or destroy a convoy of brigs and *chasse-marées* lying at *St.-Croix*, a small harbour within the *Penmarck* rocks, and known to be laden with wine and provisions for the *Brest* fleet.

In the evening the boats, eight in number, namely, two from the *Renown*, commanded by Lieutenant Henry Burke, two

from the *Fisgard*, by Lieutenant William Dean, and Lieutenant of marines Mark A. Gerrard, two from the *Defence*, by Lieutenant Thomas Stamp, and two from the *Unicorn*, by Lieutenant William Price, assembled on board the *Fisgard*, then at anchor as near as possible to the shore. At 11 P. M., favoured by the darkness, Lieutenant Burke proceeded to execute the service intrusted to him. The freshness of the wind prevented the boats from reaching the enemy's anchorage until after daylight on the 11th; when, in opposition to a heavy battery, three armed vessels, and a constant fire of musketry from the shore, the British captured one gun-boat, *Nochette*, mounting two long 24-pounders, two *chasse-marées*, one of six, the other of 10 guns, and eight merchant vessels. The remainder of the convoy, amounting to 20 sail, escaped capture by running upon the rocks.

This spirited little affair cost the British only three seamen and one marine wounded. Among the officers not already named, who distinguished themselves on the occasion, were acting Lieutenant Henry Jane of the *Renown*, master's mate John Fleming, and Lieutenant Killogrivoff, a volunteer from the Russian service.

On the night of the 23d of June the same British squadron, with the exception of the *Unicorn*, having anchored off the *Glénans*, the boats, under the immediate direction of Captain Martin, proceeded to attack a French corvette mounting 28 guns, a brig of 18, lugger of 16, and cutter of 10 guns, lying at anchor, in company with several sail of merchant vessels, in *Quimper* river. At daybreak on the 24th the boats arrived off the entrance of the river; and, for their protection in ascending it, two divisions of marines were landed, that on the right commanded by Lieutenant Henry Burke of the *Renown*, and that on the left, by Lieutenant Mark A. Gerrard, of the *Fisgard's* marines. The boats, under Lieutenant Robert Yarker, in the mean time, pulled with all expedition to the attack, but soon found that the vessels had retired to an inaccessible distance up the river. Lieutenant Yarker then landed, and stormed, carried, and blew up, a battery mounted with two or three 24-pounders. Two other small forts, with their magazines, were also blown up by the British before they returned to their ships, and that without the occurrence of a single casualty.

Having received information that a French corvette, with a large convoy from *Sable-d'Olonne* bound to *Brest*, was lying within the island of *Noirmoutier*, Sir John on the 1st of July anchored in *Bourneuf* bay, with the intention of detaching the boats of his three ships against this force, consisting of the armed ship *Thérèse*, of 20 guns, a lugger of 12 guns, and a cutter and two schooners, each of six guns, moored within the sands at the bottom of the bay, in a strong position of defence, and under the protection of six batteries at the south-east end of *Noirmoutier*, besides flanking guns at every projecting point.

Having assembled on board the *Fisgard*, the boats pulled off in the evening, in three divisions, containing between them 192 officers, seamen, and marines, under the orders of Lieutenant Burke, assisted by Lieutenants of marines John Thompson and Charles Henry Ballinghall, of the *Renown*, Lieutenant William Dean, and lieutenants of marines Mark A. Gerard, of the *Fisgard*, and William Garrett and Hugh Hutton, of the *Defence*. At midnight the British in the boats boarded, and, after much resistance and loss on the part of the French, carried the ship and the three other armed vessels, together with 15 sail of merchantmen; all, as well as the armed vessels, laden with flour, corn, provisions, bale-goods, and ship-timber, for the fleet at Brest. Finding it impossible to bring off his prizes, Lieutenant Burke caused them to be effectually destroyed.

In high glee at having performed this essential service without any loss, the British now proceeded on their return; but unfortunately, in attempting to pass over the sand-banks, the boats took the ground, and in less than ten minutes, lay perfectly dry. In this helpless situation, Lieutenant Burke and his party became exposed to a continual fire from the forts on Noirmoutier island, and from about 400 French soldiers. Notwithstanding so formidable an opposition, the British commenced an attack upon some other vessels afloat near them, in the hope to secure one sufficiently large to carry them all off. This they accomplished, and, with great intrepidity and exertion, drew her upwards of two miles over the sands, until she floated; by which time the men were nearly up to their necks in water. It appears that 92 officers, seamen, and marines (several of them, including Lieutenants Burke, Thompson, and Ballinghall, wounded) were now taken prisoners; but that the remainder of the party, numbering in all 100, forced the French to retreat, and then got back to their ships by means of the boats they had taken. This was a very gallant, and, but for the latter half of it, would have been a very successful and important, boat-service.

On the 27th of June a British squadron, composed of the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Andromeda*, Captain Henry Inman, 28-gun frigate *Nemesis*, Captain Thomas Baker, one 20-gun ship, two ship-sloops, one bomb-vessel, and 11 fire-ships, gun-brigs, hired cutters, and luggers, assembled off Dunkerque, to attempt the destruction of the four French frigates, *Poursuivante*, of the 44-gun or 24-pounder class, *Carmagnole*, of the 40-gun, and *Désirée* and *Incorruptible*, of the 38-gun class; and which four frigates had long been blockaded in that port.

Contrary winds and a succession of unfavourable tides afforded no opportunity of making the attack until the 7th of July. On that evening the ship-sloop *Dart* (sister vessel to the *Arrow* already described\*), Captain Patrick Campbell, followed

\* See vol. ii., p. 344; but the *Dart* appears to have mounted two additional carronades on her quarterdeck, or 80 in all.

by the Biter and Boxer gun-brigs, Lieutenants William Norman and Thomas Gilbert, and the four fire-ships Wasp, Captain John Edwards, Falcon, Captain Henry Samuel Butt, Comet, Captain Thomas Leef, and Rosario, Captain James Carthew, with the cutters and small-craft attending them, entered Dunkerque roads. At about midnight the Dart and her companions got sight of the French ships. Soon afterwards one of the latter hailed the Dart, and asked whence she came. The answer was, "De Bordeaux." The Frenchman then desired to know what convoy that was astern, meaning the gun-brigs and fire-ships. The reply was, "Je ne sais pas."

This conversation ended, the Dart continued to pass on unmolested, until she arrived alongside of the innermost frigate but one, when that frigate opened upon her a very heavy fire. This the Dart was enabled to return with 15 double-shotted 32-pounders, discharged in much quicker repetition than common, owing to the carronades being mounted on the non-recoil principle. The Dart then ranged on, and boarded the innermost frigate, the *Désirée*, by running her bowsprit between the latter's foremast and forestay, having previously let go a stern-anchor to check her own way. The first lieutenant, James M'Dermeit, at the head of a division of seamen and marines, immediately boarded the French frigate on the forecastle, carrying all before him, but not without being badly wounded in the arm. He then hailed the Dart, to say he had possession of the ship; but as he feared the crew would rally, and he was wounded, he requested that an officer might be sent to take charge. Having cut her stern-cable, the Dart had just swung alongside the *Désirée*; on whose quarter Lieutenant William Isaac Pearce instantly leaped with a second division of men. This officer completely repulsed the French crew, who were rallying at the after hatchway. Lieutenant Pearce then cut the frigate's cables, got the *Désirée* under sail, and steered her over the banks that could not have been passed half an hour later in the tide.

In this dashing enterprise, which was concluded in about 15 minutes, the Dart had only one seaman killed, her first lieutenant, already named, one master's mate (James Hall), and nine seamen and marines wounded; while the loss sustained by the *Désirée*, a fine new frigate of 1015 tons, was supposed to have amounted to full 100 in killed and wounded together, including nearly the whole of the officers present. The established complement of the *Désirée* was from 300 to 350 men; but it does not appear that the frigate had all her crew on board. The exact number that was on board we are, however, unable to state; especially as, from some unexplained cause, no head-money certificates were signed, or at least recorded.

The four fire-ships were admirably conducted, and not abandoned by their officers until completely in flames: on board the Comet, indeed, the captain and one seaman were wounded by

the explosion. By alacrity, however, in cutting their cables, during which they were exposed to the fire, within pistol-shot of the Dart, and of the gun-brigs Biter and Boxer, the three remaining French frigates escaped before the wind, and ran out of the road to a short distance down the channel that passes within the Braak sand. One of them here got on shore, but at daylight on the 8th got off; and all three ships subsequently regained their anchorage.

During the attack the hired 14-gun cutter Kent, Lieutenant Robert Baron Cooban, found employment for some French gun-boats that would otherwise have annoyed the attacking vessels. In this cannonade the Kent had one seaman wounded; and the 12-gun hired cutter Ann, Lieutenant Robert Young, and the gun-brig Biter, Lieutenant Samuel Norman, had each one seaman, and the latter her commander, wounded, in the service which they were respectively rendering. The better to direct the enterprise, Captain Inman, with 30 volunteers from the Andromeda, had embarked on board the hired lugger Vigilant, Mr. William Dean, master, and proceeded with the other vessels into Dunkerque roads. Captain Inman, very humanely, sent the prisoners, many of whom were dreadfully mangled, to Dunkerque on their parole. For this he received the thanks of Commodore Castagnier. If *all* the prisoners were thus sent away, the reason is explained why there were no head-money certificates.

For his skill and gallantry in laying on board and capturing the *Désirée*, Captain Campbell was advanced to post-rank, and appointed to the 20-gun ship *Ariadne*: in point of rank, certainly a step forward, but, from the Dart to the *Ariadne* nearly two steps backwards, as respected the relative force and effectiveness of the two vessels. As the least reward that could be bestowed upon an officer who had behaved so gallantly and suffered so severely, Lieutenant M'Dermeit was promoted to the rank of commander; and we should, we confess, have been gratified at seeing Lieutenant Pearce among the newly made commanders of the year.

We sincerely hope that those careful gentlemen, the established pilots, got their deserts, for having pusillanimously abandoned the charge of their ships when their services were most required. We wish we knew their names, in order to hand them down with becoming infamy. Fortunately the master of the Ann cutter, Mr. Henry Moor, was competent to take charge of the Dart; and Mr. James Wheatland, mate of the Ann, also volunteered his services. These, with some men obtained out of smugglers, enabled Captain Campbell to send a pilot to each gun-brig and fire-vessel.

The *Désirée* was afterwards added to the British navy as a 36-gun frigate, and Captain Inman, very deservedly, was appointed to commission her. One mistake we are bound to rectify: it is as to the French gun-force of the *Désirée*, as well

as of one of the other frigates in her company. In his letter to Captain Inman, Captain Campbell states the maindeck guns of both the *Désirée* and *Incorruptible* to have been "24-pounders;" and every one of our contemporaries, relying on such good authority, have assigned the *Désirée* guns of that caliber. But this French frigate, in fact, was armed the same as No. 6 in the table at p. 54 of the first volume, except in having two 8-pounders more, and two carronades fewer, than the number there specified.

In the latter end of July, while the 14-gun cutter *Viper*, commanded by acting Lieutenant Jeremiah Coghlan, and attached to Sir Edward Pellew's squadron, was watching Port-Louis, it occurred to the former young officer, that he might succeed in boarding one of the cutters or gun-vessels, which were constantly moving about the entrance of that harbour. His first step was to request of Sir Edward Pellew a ten-oared cutter, with 12 volunteers. Having obtained the boat and men, Mr. Coghlan, on the night of the 26th, placed in her a midshipman of the *Viper*, Mr. Silas Hiscutt Paddon, and six seamen, making with himself a total of 20. With this ten-oared cutter, a boat from the *Viper*, and another from the *Amethyst* frigate, Mr. Coghlan, set out to board a French gun-brig, mounting three long 24, and four 6 pounders, full of men, moored with springs on her cables, lying in a naval port of difficult access, within pistol-shot of three batteries, surrounded by several armed small-craft, and not a mile from a French 74 and two frigates.

Undismayed by such formidable appearances, regardless of the early discovery of his approach, as evinced by the gun-brig's crew being at quarters, or even of the lost aid of the two other boats, which in spite of all the endeavours of their respective crews, could not keep pace with the cutter,—in the very teeth of all these obstacles, Mr. Coghlan and his handful of men boarded the gun-brig on the quarter. Owing to the extreme darkness of the night, the leader of this resolute band jumped into a trawl-net hung up to dry. In this helpless situation Mr. Coghlan was pierced through the left thigh with a pike: several of his men were also hurt; and the whole were forced back into the boat.

Unchecked in ardour, the British hauled their boat farther ahead; and, again boarding the gun-brig, maintained against 87 men, 16 of whom were soldiers, an obstinate conflict, during which many of the British were knocked overboard, and the whole, a second time, beat back to their boat. Notwithstanding this, however, the assailants returned to the charge with unabated courage; and, after killing six men, and wounding 20, among whom was every officer belonging to her, Mr. Coghlan and his truly gallant comrades carried the *Cerbère*. His own loss on this splendid occasion was one man killed and eight wounded, himself in two places, and Mr. Paddon in six. With

the aid of the two other boats, the British towed out their prize, under a heavy but ineffectual fire from the batteries.

The language of Sir Edward Pellew, in his letter to Earl St.-Vincent, describing the affair, is so very energetic and appropriate, that we cannot do better than transcribe his words: "I trust I shall stand excused by your lordship for so minute a description, produced by my admiration of that courage, which, hand to hand, gave victory to a handful of brave fellows over four times their number, and of that skill which formed, conducted, and effected so daring an enterprise." The officers and men of Sir Edward's squadron, to mark their sense of such distinguished bravery, gave up the *Cerbère* as a prize to the conquerors; and Earl St.-Vincent was so much pleased with Mr. Coghlan's intrepidity, that he presented him with a handsome sword. Moreover, the young man obtained, what his aspiring mind valued above all other gifts, a confirmation of his rank as lieutenant; and that, although he had not quite served the time, which the regulations of the navy required, and which had never been dispensed with, we believe, previous to this gallant affair.

On the 4th of August, soon after daylight, the British 64-gun ship *Belliqueux*, Captain Rowley Bulteel, being off the coast of Brazil with a fleet of outward-bound Indiamen under her protection, discovered four sail in the north-west or leeward quarter, steering about north by east. These were the French 40-gun frigate *Concorde*, Commodore Jean-François Landolphe, 36-gun frigates *Médée*, Captain Jean-Daniel Coudin, and *Franchise*, Captain Pierre Jurien, and a captured American schooner fitted out as a tender. This squadron had sailed from Rochefort on the 6th of March, 1799; and, after committing serious depredations upon the coast of Africa, had refitted at Rio de la Plata.

At 7 A. M., hoping to pick up a prize or two, the French commodore hauled his wind, tacked, and stood towards the convoy; which, to facilitate the junction, bore down. At noon, when a nearer approach brought into full view the China ships with their two tiers of ports and warlike appearance, the French ships bore up under a press of sail, and by signal separated.

The *Belliqueux* immediately steered for the *Concorde* as the largest ship; and at 5 h. 30 m. P. M., after a partial firing of about 10 minutes' duration, by which no one on either side appears to have been hurt, compelled the French commodore, with a crew, as asserted, of 444 men, to haul down his colours. In the mean time four of the Indiamen, the *Exeter*, Captain Henry Meriton, Bombay-Castle, Captain John Hamilton, Coutts, Captain Robert Torin, and *Neptune*, Captain Nathaniel Spens, all 1200-ton ships, had been ordered by signal to proceed in chase; the first two, of the *Médée*, and the other two, of the *Franchise*.



According to Captain Bulteel's letter in the *Gazette*, the *Médée*, with a crew of 315 men, was captured at 7 p.m. by the *Bombay-Castle* and *Exeter*; but the following somewhat different, and, we must add, not very consistent account, appears in the work of a contemporary: "The chase was long, and at midnight Captain Meriton, of the *Exeter*, found himself coming very fast up with the enemy, while the *Bombay-Castle*, another *Indiaman*, commanded by Captain Hamilton, was still very far astern. The position was critical, and the British officer, with great presence of mind, formed his determination; running alongside of the Frenchman with all his ports up, he commanded him to surrender to a superior force; with this order, supposing himself under the guns of a ship of the line, the French captain instantly complied. Meriton gave him no time for deliberation, but sent an officer and brought him on board, and he delivered his sword to the English captain, in due form, on the quarterdeck. The *Bombay-Castle* was still at a great distance, but on her coming up, the prisoners were quickly taken out and divided. By this time the French captain began to recover from his surprise, and looking very attentively at the little guns on the quarterdeck, asked Captain Meriton what ship it was to which he had surrendered? Meriton drily answered, 'To a merchant-ship:' the indignant Frenchman begged to be allowed to return with his people to the frigate and fight the battle again."\*

The remaining French frigate, the *Franchise*, by throwing overboard a part of her guns, together with her anchors, boats, and booms, and by the timely approach of night, effected her escape; as did also the armed schooner. Owing to the late period at which the *Concorde* and *Médée* (both of which were armed precisely according to the establishment of their respective classes, already so frequently adverted to) arrived in a port of England, and to the turn which affairs had then taken, neither frigate was purchased for the use of the British navy.

On the 20th of August, at 8 h. 30 m. a.m., the British 38-gun frigate *Seine*, Captain David Milne, cruising in the *Mona* passage with the wind easterly and very light, saw, right ahead, standing to the northward on the starboard tack, the French frigate *Vengeance*, Captain Pichot (the *Constellation*'s late antagonist), not many days from *Curaçoa*, bound to France. The *Seine* immediately made all sail in chase. At 10 a.m., the wind having come more northerly, so as to prevent the *Vengeance* from weathering *Cape Raphaël* on the *St.-Domingo* shore, the French ship tacked, and steered south-south-east under all sail. At noon, or soon after, the wind shifted back to the eastward, but was still very light; and both ships continued under a crowd of canvass. At 4 p.m. the *Vengeance* began firing her stern-

\* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 341.

chasers. At 11 h. 30 m. P. M. the Seine, having gained so in the chase as to be close on her opponent's quarter, fired several broadsides at her; but the Vengeance still stood on, firing in return all the guns she could bring to bear. This greatly damaged the rigging and sails of the Seine, and compelled her, at about midnight, to drop astern.

The remainder of the night was occupied in reeving fresh rigging, and preparing to renew the combat; each ship carrying every sail she could set. On the 21st, at 7 h. 30 m. A. M., the Seine got again within gun-shot, and at 8 A. M. close alongside, of the Vengeance. The action now recommenced, and continued, with unabated fury, until 10 h. 30 m. A. M.; when the Vengeance, having lost her foremast, mizenmast, and main topmast, all of which had fallen in-board, and being terribly shattered in her hull, surrendered. This was made known by an officer, who hailed the Seine from the end of the French ship's bowsprit.

The Seine lost none of her masts, but had her mainmast badly wounded, and received several shot in her remaining masts and hull. Her loss, out of a complement of 281 men and boys, amounted to her second lieutenant (George Milne) and 12 seamen killed, and one lieutenant of marines (Archibald Macdonald), her master (Andrew Barclay), captain's clerk (Mr. Horne), 22 seamen, three marines, and one boy wounded. The loss of the Vengeance, Captain Milne merely says, "has been very great." As 291 were the number of prisoners received out of her, and 326, according to the deposition of her officers in the prize-court, the number of persons on board when the action commenced, we may fairly set down the killed at 35; and the wounded, if in the usual proportion, were probably about 70 or 80.

The Seine, late the French frigate of that name taken by the Jason and Pique in June, 1798,\* carried two long nines and eight 32-pounder carronades more than the establishment of her class.† The force of the Vengeance has already, on more than one occasion, been referred to.‡ Captain Milne calls the eights of the Vengeance twelves; but no French frigate, not even the Forte of 1401, nor the Egyptienne of 1430 tons, mounted a heavier caliber than 8-pounds on the quarterdeck and fore-castle. Moreover the Vengeance, as Captain Milne admits, was a ~~sister~~ vessel to the Résistance; and the latter, as has already been shown, carried 8-pounds.§ In calling the 36-pounder carronades 42s, Captain Milne has only erred as other captains have done; but, in adding, "The weight of metal I have

\* See vol. ii., p. 220.

† For which see letter Z in the small table at p. 91 of the first volume.

‡ See vol. i., p. 341, and vol. ii., p. 80.

§ See vol. ii., p. 81.

mentioned in French pounds," he has given the French a caliber they never possessed. With respect to "shifting guns on the main and quarter decks," it appears, that the *Vengeance* had every broadside port already filled. But even admitting that the *Vengeance* fought a gun on one broadside which she transported from the other, the *Seine* did the same; as appears from the following extract of a letter from Sir David Milne to Sir Robert Seppings, one of the surveyors of the navy. "In *La S——e* I had the quarter-galleries formed into ports, and in action that ship fought a gun there, by transporting it on (from) the other side."\* Having, as we hope, cleared up these points, we can, with more confidence, present the following as the

## COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		SEINE.	VENGEANCE.
Broadside-guns .....	{ No.	24	26
	{ lbs.	434	498
Crew.....	No.	281	326
Size.....	tons	1146	1180

Considering the inferiority in effectiveness between the French and the English ship's eight carronades to have been compensated by the former's tier of swivels along the gangway, we may pronounce this to have been as pretty a frigate-match as any fought during the war. There is on the face of the statement, undoubtedly, a numerical superiority in favour of the French ship, but far too slight for a British ship to notice; above all, not such as to justify the captor in saying, "Your lordship will perceive the *Vengeance* is superior in size, guns, and number of men to his majesty's ship I have the honour to command." It is sufficient to say, that this was an action which, both in the conduct and the result, did great credit to Captain Milne, his officers, and ship's company; and, let us be just in adding, it was one, also, in which M. Pichot, on finding that to run would not avail him, made a manful resistance, surrendering only when his ship was reduced to an unmanageable hulk.

As soon as the prisoners were removed and the wreck of the masts cleared, the *Seine*, taking her prize in tow, proceeded with her to Jamaica. On the 25th, in the morning, the mainmast of the *Vengeance*, having been badly wounded, fell over the side. On the 27th in the evening, the two ships, the prize with nine feet water in the hold, anchored in the harbour of Port-Royal. Shortly afterwards, as was fully his due, Lieutenant Edward Chetham, first of the *Seine*, was promoted to the rank of commander.

The *Vengeance* was purchased for the use of the British navy, and became classed with the frigate that had captured her; but, owing to her damaged state and the heavy cost of repairs at Jamaica, the ship never again quitted port. As the exaggerated

\* Sir Robert Seppings's Letter to Lord Melville upon Circular Sterns, p. 13.

account given of the size of the *Vengeance*, namely, that she was as large as a British 64, tended greatly to mislead the public as to the merits of the action which had led to her capture, we beg to be allowed to digress a little, to show how the mistake arose.

When a captured vessel is purchased by government, it is at so much a ton, according to the age and condition of the prize. Hence the ship's measurement must be taken before the sum can be fixed. In the case of the *Vengeance*, the master-shipwright, shipwright's assistant, and boatswain, belonging to Port-Royal yard, took her dimensions and computed her tonnage, but in such a way that they made the sister-ship of one that was 1182, measure 1370 tons. As the *Vengeance* was prevented from coming home to be properly measured, no way remains to prove the erroneous calculation of the dock-yard officers, but by analogy. For instance, in the year 1803 the same officers measured, among many other ships, the French prize-frigates *Clorinde*, *Surveillante*, *Vertu*, and *Créole*, and the 74-gun ship *Duquesne*. The following little table will show that, in their way of performing the task, the Port-Royal dock-yard officers could not have made a ship of 1180 tons measure less than 1370.

	Tons.		Tons.
<i>Clorinde</i> , measured at Jamaica	1375	Measured in England.....	1161
<i>Surveillante</i> ,	1235	"	1094
<i>Vertu</i> ,	1245	"	1073
<i>Duquesne</i>	2151	"	1903
<i>Créole</i> ,	1267	{ Foundered on her way home, but was known to be similar in size to <i>Vertu</i> ..... }	1073
<i>Vengeance</i> ,	1370		
		Actual measurement of <i>Résistance</i> , afterwards <i>Fisgard</i>	1182

Consequently, the average rate per ton, at which these six French ships were purchased, being 10*l.* 10*s.* for the *Clorinde*, 12*l.* 10*s.* for the *Surveillante* and *Duquesne*, 7*l.* for the *Vertu*, 8*l.* 10*s.* for *Créole*, and 6*l.* 5*s.* for the *Vengeance*, government paid 11,137*l.* 10*s.* more than they had agreed to give.

On the 29th of August, while the British squadron, already mentioned as under the command of Sir John Borlase Warren in the 74-gun ship *Renown*, was, with several transports in company, proceeding along the coast of Spain to its ulterior destination, a large French ship-privateer, alarmed by the appearance of so formidable a force, was seen to run into Vigo, and to anchor at a spot near the narrows of Redondela, and close to some batteries. In the evening a division of boats, 20 in number, from the ships of the squadron, placed under the orders of Lieutenant Henry Burke of the *Renown*, proceeded to attack the privateer; which was the *Guépe*, mounting 18 long 8-pounders, and manned with 161 men.

At about 40 minutes past midnight the boats got alongside of

the ship; the crew of which had previously cheered, to show that they were prepared. Notwithstanding this, and that the Guêpe's commander, Citizen Dupan, had laid over the hatches to keep his men to their quarters, the British resolutely boarded, and in 15 minutes carried the vessel; with the loss of three seamen and one marine killed, three lieutenants, 12 seamen, and five marines wounded, and one seaman missing, probably drowned.

Among the wounded officers was the gallant leader of the party, Lieutenant Burke, an officer who had previously distinguished himself on more than one similar occasion; and who, immediately after this additional proof of his gallantry, obtained the rank of commander. The two other wounded Lieutenants were John Henry Holmes and Joseph (misnamed in the Gazette James) Nourse, both of the *Courageux*. The loss on board the Guêpe, as a proof how obstinately she had been defended, amounted to 25 men killed and 40 wounded, including among the mortally wounded, her brave commander. This formidable French privateer had been fitted out at Bordeaux, and was stored and provisioned, in the most complete manner, for a four months' cruise.

On the 3d of September, at about 8 P. M., eight boats from the 74-gun ship *Minotaur*, Captain Thomas Louis, and armed en flûte (late 12-pounder 32-gun) frigate *Niger*, Captain James Hillyar, placed under the orders of the latter, assisted by Lieutenants Charles Marsh Schomberg, and Thomas Warrant, Midshipmen James Lowry, and Richard Standish Haly, and Lieutenant of marines John Jewell, proceeded to cut out or destroy two Spanish armed ships, or corvettes, at anchor in Barcelona road; one, the *Concepcion*, alias *Esmeralda*, the other, the *Paz*, each described as mounting 22 long 12 and 8 pounders, and laden with stores, reported, but which did not prove to be the case, for the relief of Malta.

At the time these eight boats were detached upon the service, one of them was boarding a Swedish galliot bound into the port; and, to join this boat and give directions to her commander, Captain Hillyar pulled, in the first instance, for the galliot. On arriving alongside the latter, the British boats hooked on, and they and the Swedish galliot of course stood together towards the mole of Barcelona.

Having approached within about three quarters of a mile of the nearest battery, and being reminded, by two shots which passed over the galliot, that it was time to retire from under the shelter of a neutral vessel, Captain Hillyar and his party pulled away towards the object of attack. Shortly afterwards the outermost of the two Spanish armed ships, the *Esmeralda*, discharged her broadside at the boats, but without effect, her shot falling short. Pushing on with their accustomed alacrity, the British were alongside the *Esmeralda* before the ship could

reload her guns. This was at 9 P.M.; and in a few minutes afterwards, but not without a smart struggle, Captain Hillyar and his party boarded and carried the *Esmeralda*.

The announcement of this victory, by the cheers of the British, was the signal for the Spaniards in the other ship to cut their cable, and endeavour to run close under the battery at the mole-head; but the ship canted the wrong way, and the British being alert in their movements, the *Paz*, before 10 P.M., in spite of a heavy fire from four strong batteries, 10 gun-boats, two schooners, each armed with two long 36-pounders, and a fort upon Mount *loni* which threw shells, shared the fate of her consort. At about 11 P.M. the two prize-ships, and the boats that had taken them, covered as they stood to the offing by two men of war, were brought off in safety; with a loss to the British of only two seamen and one marine killed, the *Minotaur's* master, Mr. Reid and four seamen wounded. On board the *Paz*, one seaman was killed and four wounded; and on board the *Esmeralda*, two seamen were killed, and 17 wounded.

Each of the captured ships is represented to have measured about 400 tons, and to have been laden with provisions and stores supposed for *Batavia*. Besides which they were to have taken on board between them 300 *Batavian* troops from the island of *Majorca*. Admitting the crew (for no number is stated in the gazette letter) to have amounted only to 50 men, we have a ship of 400 tons, carrying, besides a cargo of provisions, 200 men, and mounted with "22 brass guns, 12 and 9 pounders." We must therefore be permitted to consider, that the guns of the *Esmeralda* were only 8 and 6 pounders; and that even the majority of the guns were of the lesser caliber. Still the exploit, performed as it was in the very teeth of a force both afloat and ashore so very superior, reflected the highest honour upon the victorious party.

It is true that some altercation took place between the courts of Spain and Sweden relative to the alleged seizure of the gal liot to surprise the ships; but it led to nothing except, for a while, to mislead public opinion as to the merits of the case. A contemporary states that the capture of the *Paz* and *Esmeralda*, "led to the promotion of Captain Hillyar and Lieutenant Schomberg."\* If so, the operation as regards Captain Hillyar at least, was rather a tardy one; for he was not, we find, made post until February, 1804, rather more than six months after the senior lieutenant who had served under him at *Barcelona* attained the same rank.

On the 10th of September, as the British privateer-brig, *Rover*, of *Liverpool*, *Nova-Scotia*, armed with 14 long 4-pounders and 54 men and boys, under the command of Captain *Godfrey*, was cruising near *Cape Blanco* on the Spanish Main, the

\* *Brenton*, vol. iii., p. 24.

Spanish schooner *Santa-Ritta*, mounting 10 long 6-pounders and two English 12-pounder carronades, with about 85 men, and accompanied by three gun-boats also under Spanish colours, and which, as well as the schooner, had the day before been equipped by the governor of Puerto-Caballo, on purpose to capture the *Rover*, came out from near the land to fulfil their orders. The light breeze which had been blowing having died away, the schooner and two of the gun-boats, by the aid of a number of oars, gained fast upon the brig; keeping up as they advanced a steady fire from their bow-guns, which the *Rover* returned with two guns pointed from her stern, and, as her opponents drew near, with her small-arms also.

Apprized, by their motions, that the schooner intended to board on the starboard quarter, and the two gun-boats (the third appeared to keep aloof) on the opposite bow and quarter, the *Rover* suffered them to advance until they got within about 15 yards of her: she then manned her oars on the larboard side, and, pulling quickly round, brought her starboard broadside to bear right athwart the schooner's bow; upon whose decks, then filled with men ready for boarding, the brig poured a whole broadside of round and grape. Immediately after this, her active crew passed over to the guns on the opposite side, and raked the two gun-boats in a similar manner. The *Rover* then commenced a close action with the *Santa-Ritta*, and continued it for an hour and a half; when finding her opponent's fire grow slack, the *Rover*, by the aid of a light air of wind, backed her head-sails, and brought her stern in contact with the schooner's side. The British crew then rushed on board of, and with scarcely a show of opposition carried, the *Santa-Ritta*. The two gun-boats, seeing the fate of their consort, sheered off, apparently in a very shattered state.

Notwithstanding this long and hard-fought action, the *Rover* had not a man hurt; while, on board the *Santa-Ritta*, every officer, except the commander of a detachment of 25 soldiers, was killed: the whole of the killed, as found on the deck, amounted to 14, and the wounded to 17. The prisoners including the latter, numbered 71. These, being too many to be kept on board, were all, except eight, landed; the *Rover's* captain having previously taken from them the usual obligation not to serve again until exchanged. This was an achievement that did great honour to Captain Godfrey, his officers, and crew; and proved how well the hardy sons of British America could emulate their brother-tars of the parent country.

On the 8th of October, at 8 A.M., the British schooner *Gipsy* (tender to the 74-gun ship *Leviathan*, Captain James Carpenter, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Duckworth), of 10 long 4-pounders and 42 men, commanded by Lieutenant Coryndon Boger, cruising off the north end of Guadeloupe, chased and soon overtook an armed sloop; which, on the schooner's firing a

shot at her, hoisted French colours and began cannonading in return. During one hour and a half the two vessels continued warmly engaged at close quarters; when the Gipsy, receiving great annoyance from the musketry of her opponent, hauled a little further off. Here the Gipsy kept up a sharp fire with round and grape shot, and at 10 h. 30 m. A.M. compelled the sloop, which was the Quidproquo, of eight guns, 4 and 8 pounders, and 98 men, commanded by M. Tourpie, represented to have been formerly a capitaine de vaisseau, to strike her colours. Eighty of the 98 men were Guadeloupe chasseurs; and it was to save his people from their powerful musketry that the Gipsy's commander, with so much judgment, had hauled off to a long-gun range.

The Gipsy had three seamen killed, and nine, including Lieutenant Boger, wounded; the Quidproquo, her captain and four seamen killed, and 11 wounded. Although upon a small scale this action was not the less creditable to those who, by their skill and bravery, had brought it to a successful termination.

On the 9th of October the honourable East India company's ship Kent, of 26 guns (20 long 12, and six long 6 pounders), commanded by Captain Robert Rivington, being off the Sandheads, on her way from England to Bengal, fell in with the French ship-privateer Confiance, of 20 or 22 long 8-pounders, commanded by M. Surcouff, a very able and experienced officer. An action immediately ensued, and was maintained with great bravery by the Indiaman, for one hour and 47 minutes; during which the two vessels were frequently foul of each other. At length the Kent was carried by boarding; her crew, besides their inferior numbers, being very ill-supplied with weapons of defence, while the assailants were all armed with sabres, pikes, and pistols. After having given decided proofs of his bravery, Captain Rivington received, at the moment of boarding, a musket-shot through his head.

Besides the loss of her captain, the Kent had 13 men killed, including four or five of her passengers, and 44 men wounded, including also several passengers. The loss on board the Confiance does not appear to have been recorded. It is, indeed, to be regretted, that on these interesting occasions some capable person does not take the pains to collect and publish the particulars. Many highly creditable actions between merchant ships and enemy's privateers are either given to the public with such marks of doubt, that an historian is fearful of admitting them into his pages; or they are so summarily stated, that the account, when the most is made of it, amounts to little more than that one vessel was captured by another.

The Confiance was a ship of 490 tons, and had, it is said, a complement of 250 men. The Kent was a new ship, of 820 tons, and had probably about 90 or 100 men in crew, exclusive of 38 male and three female passengers. Seven or eight of



those passengers had been taken from the *Queen Indiaman*, when she was consumed by fire at St.-Salvador. So long and manful a resistance with such limited means, was very honourable to the officers, crew, and passengers of the *Kent*. In the following month M. Surcouff arrived with his prize at the Isle of France.

We may remark, in passing, what an advantage the *Kent* would have derived, had she mounted on her quarterdeck and forecastle, a tier of 18 or 24 pounder carronades, instead of long sixes. A few discharges of grape from the former would probably have induced the *Confiance* to keep at long-shot, and then the *Kent's* 12-pounders, well-plied, would either have captured or repulsed her.

Having already recorded two actions fought between American and French ships of war, we will here give a brief account of the third; the last, indeed, of any consequence, which occurred during the short interruption in the amicable relations of the two countries. On the 12th of October, in latitude  $22^{\circ} 50'$  north, longitude  $51^{\circ}$  west, the United States, 32-gun frigate *Boston* (of the same long-gun force, we believe, as *D* in the table at p. 91 of the first volume, with 12 carronades, 32-pounders, in addition), Captain Little fell in with the French ship-corvette *Berceau*, of 22 long eights and two English 12-pounder carronades, Lieutenant Louis-André Senes. An action ensued, and continued, with mutual spirit, for two hours; when the *Berceau*, having had her masts reduced to a tottering state, and being dreadfully shattered in hull, struck her colours to the *Boston*; whose masts, rigging, and sails, were also considerably wounded and cut.

Out of a crew of about 320 men and boys, the *Boston* lost her purser and 11 seamen and marines killed or mortally wounded, and eight others wounded who recovered. The precise loss of the *Berceau* does not appear in Captain Little's letter. We are only enabled to state, that, out of a crew of about 200, exclusive of 30 passengers, it was very considerable in both killed and wounded; and that, among the former, was her captain. We may add, also, that the fore and main masts of the *Berceau* fell over the side soon after her surrender.

Who can read of a two hours' resistance under such a disparity of force as, without the aid of a comparative statement, it is clear must have existed between these two ships, without being surprised that no account of this action is to be found in any French publication. Is it, then, French victories only that French ears can listen to, or French patriotism record? Too true it is. The most insignificant triumph is puffed up to the skies, while an unsuccessful action, no matter how resolutely and ably fought, is passed over in silence. This will never make a navy. Much credit is due to the American captain for his candour (not the less estimable for its rarity on his side of the

Atlantic\*) in publicly acknowledging, that "the captain of the Berceau fought his ship gallantly, so long as she was in a situation capable of being defended." Captors, did they but know their true interest, always gain by such acts of fairness. The public places a greater reliance upon their remaining statements; and, after all, is there not more honour in conquering a brave than a cowardly enemy?

As soon as she had cleared away the wreck of the Berceau's masts, and properly secured her own, the Boston took her prize in tow, and on the 14th of November anchored with her in Nantucket road. A treaty of peace had, since the 30th of September, been signed at Paris between France and America; and the Berceau, after being thoroughly repaired and refitted, was restored to the French government.

On the 27th of October, late in the evening, the boats of the British 38-gun frigate *Phaëton*, Captain James Nicholl Morris, placed under the orders of her first Lieutenant, Francis Beaufort, supported by Lieutenant George Huish, Lieutenant of marines, Duncan Campbell, and midshipmen Augustus Barrington Hamilton and Anthony Collings Stanton, proceeded to attack the Spanish national polacre-ship *San-Josef*, mounting two long 24-pounders in the bow, two long brass 18-pounders for stern-chasers, and four 12 and six 4-pounders, all brass, on her sides, having on board 34 seamen (out of a crew of 49, a boat's crew being absent) and 22 soldiers or marines, and lying moored under the protection of five guns mounted upon the fortress of Fuengirola, near Malaga.

The launch, with an 18-pounder carronade in her, not being able to keep up with the barge and two cutters, Lieutenant Beaufort was proceeding with only the latter, when he was unexpectedly fired at by a French privateer-schooner, which had entered unseen in the night, and lay in a position to flank the ship. The three boats, however, still advanced; and on the 28th, at 5 A.M., in the face of an obstinate resistance of musketry and sabres, boarded, carried, and brought off the polacre.

In this gallant affair one seaman was killed alongside. Lieutenant Beaufort was first wounded in the head, and afterwards received several slugs through his left arm and in his body; Lieutenant Campbell received several slight sabre-wounds; and Mr. Hamilton was shot through the thigh while in the boat; notwithstanding which he gallantly boarded with the rest. A seaman also was wounded; making the loss, on the part of the British, one killed and four wounded. Of the *San-Josef's* crew, six men were found badly, and 13 slightly, wounded.

Being a fine fast-sailing little vessel, the *San-Josef* was immediately commissioned as a British sloop of war under the name of *Calpé*, the ancient name of Gibraltar. It would have

\* The Boston writers, for instance, in their account of this very action, declared that the two ships were "of nearly equal force,"

gratified us to be able to state, that the officer, who as the conductor of the enterprise had so gallantly and effectively co-operated, as well as so seriously suffered, in capturing the vessel, an officer "in whom," says Captain Morris, "I have ever found a most capable and zealous assistant," had been appointed to command her. But Vice-admiral Lord Keith, the Mediterranean commander-in-chief, chose to appoint to the Calpé an officer who, whatever may have been his merit in other respects, was both junior to Lieutenant Beaufort, and an utter stranger to the transaction at Fuengirola.

Among the few vessels in the British navy to which the non-recoil principle of mounting the carronade had been extended, was the Milbrook, a schooner of 148 tons, whose sixteen 18-pounders were so fitted, and whose commander, Lieutenant Matthew Smith, put such confidence in the plan, that he ventured, as we shall presently show, to attack a ship mounting double his number of guns. The carronades of the Arrow and Dart sloops were also fitted upon the non-recoil principle; and it is related of the latter of these vessels, that, when the British troops landed in Holland, in August, 1779, she fired one of her forecastle 32-pounders 68 times without breaking the breeching, or injuring the carriage, or even the paint that covered, or the pitch in the seams of it. The Eling schooner, armed with 18-pounders, is represented to have fired, on the same occasion, 400 round shot from her aftermost carronade, without doing the slightest injury on board, or even breaking a single pane of glass in the cabin skylight.

All this, if true (and the statement is officially founded), would appear to refute most of the objections made to non-recoil guns: that they destroy the upperworks, break the breechings, dismount themselves, and expose the men, who are obliged to load outside the bulwarks, to the enemy's fire. The last is certainly a very serious objection, and one, we believe, which yet keeps its ground. But we must not, in digressing, forget Lieutenant Smith and his exploit.

On the 13th of November, early in the morning, the Milbrook, then lying becalmed off the bar of Oporto, descried a French ship, wearing a pendant, and, to all appearance, a frigate of 36 guns. Having under his protection two brigs of a Newfoundland convoy, and observing several other vessels in the offing, which, if as he conjectured English merchantmen, were equally an object of desire to the Frenchmen, Lieutenant Smith got out his sweeps, and pulled towards the enemy. At 8 A. M. the schooner received a broadside from the ship, which was the celebrated French privateer Bellone, of Bordeaux. Before the Bellone could bring her second broadside to bear, the Milbrook had fired three broadsides, and by the time the former had fired her third, the schooner had discharged eleven broadsides. Such was the rapidity of firing where no time was lost by running out the guns.

The carronades of the *Milbrook* were seemingly fired with as much precision as quickness ; for the *Bellone*, from broadsides fell to single guns, and showed, by her sails and rigging, how much she had been cut up by the schooner's shot. At about 10 A.M. the ship's colours came down ; and Lieutenant Smith used immediate endeavours to take possession of her. Not having a rope left wherewith to hoist out a boat, he launched one over the gunwale ; but, having been pierced with shot in various directions, the boat soon filled with water. At this time the *Milbrook*, having had 10 of her guns disabled, her masts, yards, sails, and rigging wounded and shot through, and all her sweeps cut to pieces, lay quite unmanageable, with her broadside to the *Bellone*'s stern. In a little while a light breeze sprang up, and the *Bellone*, hoisting all the canvass she could set, sought safety in flight.

Out of the 47 men of her crew, the *Milbrook* had eight seamen and one marine severely, and her master (Thomas Fletcher, but who would not quit the deck), surgeon's mate (I. Parster), and one seaman, slightly wounded. The loss sustained by the *Bellone*, as rumoured at Vigò, into which port she was compelled to put, amounted, out of a crew probably of 250 or 260 men, to 20 killed, her first and second captains and 45 men wounded.

The guns of the *Bellone*, as already has been stated, consisted of 24 long French 8-pounders and six or eight brass 36-pounder carronades. The ship, therefore, was almost quadruply superior to the *Milbrook* ; and Lieutenant Smith, by his gallantry and seamanlike conduct, not only preserved from capture a valuable convoy, but added, in no slight degree, to the naval renown of his country. This became appreciated in the proper quarter, and Lieutenant Smith was promoted to the rank of commander. Also the English factory at Oporto, to evince their sense of the service performed by the *Milbrook*, voted Lieutenant Smith their thanks, accompanied by a piece of plate of 50*l.* value.

There was another British schooner, armed much in the same manner as the *Milbrook*, and cruising on the same station, whose commander, although not afforded an opportunity of repulsing a ship like the *Bellone*, distinguished himself greatly by his activity in capturing privateers, and in protecting British convoys from their depredations. The serviceable and far from inglorious career of the *Netley*, Lieutenant Francis Godolphin Bond, began in the months of November and December of the preceding year ; and, on one occasion in particular, Lieutenant Bond captured a Spanish privateer, with more men in her than he had on board as a crew.

We shall pass over several cases in which the *Netley* captured Spanish privateers and retook their prizes, to relate one instance of decided gallantry on the part of her commander and crew. On the 7th of November in the present year, being off the rock

of Lisbon, Lieutenant Bond received information that a Spanish privateer-schooner was lurking in the neighbourhood, and that the vessels of the Newfoundland convoy, being dispersed, were daily expected to approach the Tagus. Having, in the evening, stood in close to the shore, the Netley, after dark, discovered the above privateer, and a brig-prize which she had that morning made, at anchor. Despatching her boat to take possession of the brig, the Netley gallantly ran on board of, and, dropping her anchor, carried, without the discharge of a shot or the loss of a man, the Spanish privateer San-Miguel, alias l'Alerta, of nine guns, described as 18 and 6 pounders, and 65 men. With these her two prizes, the Netley, on the 8th, anchored in the Tagus.

On the 17th of November the British 74-gun ship Captain, Captain Sir Richard John Strachan, 32-gun frigate *Magicienne*, Captain William Ogilvy, and hired armed cutter Nile, Lieutenant George Argles, and lugger Soworow, Lieutenant James Nicholson, cruising off the entrance of the Morbihan, to intercept a French convoy, discovered the French 20-gun ship-corvette *Réolaise*, the commodore of a convoy, endeavouring to get under the protection of the batteries. The Nile, by her skilful management, prevented the corvette from reaching the north shore; and the latter, upon the *Magicienne's* approach, ran into Port-Navalo; where she took the ground, and struck her colours.

Captain Ogilvy immediately despatched the boats of the *Magicienne*, under the orders of Lieutenants George Skottowe and the Honourable Edward Rodney, to endeavour to board and bring off or destroy the corvette; but the *Réolaise* rehoisting her colours, and making sail, fired upon the boats and ran further into the port. On seeing this the *Magicienne* recalled her boats. Lieutenant Rodney, however, being determined not to return empty-handed, gallantly captured, with his single boat, a merchant vessel from under one of the batteries.

Being resolved to attempt the destruction of the corvette, Sir Richard sent the boats of his little squadron, under the orders of Lieutenant William Hennah, assisted by Lieutenants Charles Clyde and Richard William Clarke (the latter, of the Marlborough, a portion of whose men were also present\*), and also, we believe by the two lieutenants already named of the *Magicienne*. The enterprise, thus intrusted to Lieutenant Hennah, was conducted with great judgment and gallantry; and, notwithstanding a heavy fire from the shore on all sides, the *Réolaise* was boarded and destroyed. To add to the value of this exploit, it was performed with no greater loss to the British than one seaman killed and seven wounded.

On the 7th of December the Nile cutter, while cruising off the mouth of the river Vilaine in Quiberon bay, discovered a convoy of 15 or 16 vessels coming round the point of Croisic;

\* See p. 6.

but, having just before detached the *Lurcher* cutter, Lieutenant Robert Forbes, to cruise off the Morbihan, Lieutenant Argles, instead of going in chase, permitted the French vessels to approach nearer to the point of St.-Gildas, in order to have the assistance of his consort in overtaking and capturing them.

In the evening the Nile stood out from the shore and made the necessary signals to the *Lurcher*, who, being to windward, turned all the vessels and they made for the Vilaine. At 8 P.M., just as the battery on Pointe Saint-Jacques was hailing her, the Nile captured one small vessel, and manning her, sent her along-shore; by which means, before 4 A.M. on the 8th, five more vessels were taken. The whole coast was by this time alarmed, and the battery of Notre-Dame at the entrance of the river Peners kept up so brisk a fire as to send three shot through the last vessel boarded; but the British, notwithstanding, brought her off with only one man slightly scratched by a splinter. The *Lurcher*, in the mean while, had succeeded in taking three more of the convoy, making nine in the whole. This enterprise reflects great credit upon the commanders and crews of the two cutters; and shows what serious annoyance may be done to an enemy, even by such small vessels as the Nile and *Lurcher*, when under the guidance of an active and intelligent officer.

On the 10th of December, the British armed brig Admiral-Pasley, of 16 guns, 14 of them 12-pounder carronades, with 40 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant Charles I. Nevin, being off Ceuta on her passage from England to Gibraltar with despatches, was attacked in a calm by two Spanish gun-vessels of the largest class. After an engagement of an hour and a half, during the greater part of which the gun-vessels kept entirely out of range of the Admiral-Pasley's paltry carronades, while the former, with their heavy long guns were cutting the brig to pieces, the Admiral-Pasley, having previously thrown overboard her despatches, hauled down her colours.

As a proof that the Admiral-Pasley had not been given away, her loss amounted to three seamen killed, her commander (in three places), master (Mr. Gibbs, badly), and eight seamen wounded. The captors carried their prize first to Ceuta, and afterwards to Algeiras. Here we have an example showing, in the clearest manner, the unfairness of pronouncing upon the merits of an action until its particulars are known. Fortunately for the Admiral-Pasley's commander, the court-martial that sat upon him took cognizance of all the circumstances; and, although captured in a 16-gun brig by two Spanish gun-boats, Lieutenant Nevin was honourably and deservedly acquitted.

#### COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS.—WEST INDIES.

On the 11th of September, while the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Néréide*, Captain Frederick Watkins, was cruising

off the port of Amsterdam, in the island of Curaçoa, the Dutch inhabitants of the latter, tired out with the enormities of the band of 1500 republican ruffians that were in possession of the west part of the island, sent off a deputation to claim the protection of England. On the 13th the capitulation, surrendering the island to his Britannic majesty, was signed in form, by the governor, Johan Rudolph Lausser, on the one part, and by Captain Watkins, of the *Néréide*, on the other. The vessels, large and small, lying in the harbour of Amsterdam, numbered 44; but no ships of war were among them.

In one of his despatches announcing this event, Captain Watkins speaks of the "activity and spirited conduct" of Lieutenant Michael Fitton,\* commanding the *Active* schooner, then in company with the *Néréide*. Among the many occasions which called forth that eulogium, one, although it did not end decisively, may merit a place here. The *Active* was a schooner of about 80 tons, tender to the *Abergavenny* 54, the flag-ship at Jamaica, and carried eight 12-pounder carronades, with a crew of about 45 men and boys. The service upon which the *Active* had been ordered by Captain Watkins, was to watch the mouth of the harbour of Amsterdam, while the *Néréide* cruised in the offing. This the schooner continued to do for several days, standing in frequently so near, as to be just out of range of the long 18s and 24s on Fort Fiscadera, and in full view of five or six French privateers lying moored close to the walls of it, and one of which was the *Quidproquo*, already mentioned as captured by the *Gipsy*.† Upon these privateers Lieutenant Fitton looked with a longing eye, till he could resist no longer. Observing that, at a certain hour every day, the officers went on shore at the fort to dine; and aware that, owing to his daily practice of standing across and across without molesting them, the privateersmen or garrison paid very little attention to the *Active*'s manœuvres, Lieutenant Fitton resolved to afford them an unexpected treat. Having seen the boats pass as usual, and being in perfect readiness, the *Active* stood close in, and bringing her broadside to bear, opened the contents of it right into the sterns of the cluster of privateers.

Instantly all was bustle on board the latter and in the fort and the boats, in their hurry back, became also exposed to a destructive fire from the schooner; some of whose 12-pounder shot, so well and closely directed as they were, could not have fallen harmless even in the fort itself. The instant he saw the guns of the latter in motion (and the people in charge of them appeared not very brisk), Lieutenant Fitton crowded sail away, in such a direction, however, as to expose no wider mark to the enemy than the *Active*'s stern. This, as he anticipated, the artillerists at the fort failed to hit; although some of the shot

\* See vol ii., p. 353.

† See p. 53.

pierced the schooner's sails, and a few others fell near enough to dash the spray on board. As the smallest of the five or six privateers had, undoubtedly a larger number of men than the *Active*, any attempt by her to cut them out would have been madness in her commander. Probably the privateers were of opinion that the *Néréide*, who with her boats might easily have executed the service, would shortly make the attempt; for, in a few days afterwards, they took advantage of a clear coast, and made sail, each laden with a cargo of plunder. Nor was Lieutenant Fitton in a situation to intercept any one of these mischievous freebooters, the *Active* having sailed for Jamaica with the captain of the *Néréide*'s despatches.



## STATE OF THE BRITISH NAVY.

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THE abstract of the British navy, for the commencement of the present year,\* shows a considerable increase in its line-of-battle total; but the number of line-cruisers in commission remains the same as in the last abstract, and the lower totals exhibit, in reference to the latter, a very slight improvement in their numbers. As one cause of this, the "Captured column, owing chiefly to the reduced state of the Dutch, and the blockaded state of the French and Spanish navies, does not amount to half what it did in the preceding year.†

A very slight diminution occurs in the wrecked and foundered cases of the British navy in the year 1800; and the accidental losses of that year, including the melancholy loss by fire, ended the lives of upwards of 1300 British officers, seamen, and marines. All four of the foundered vessels belonged to the sloop-classes, and three of them had been French privateers. The number of cruisers employed in watching the enemy's ports, the boldness and perseverance with which their commanders performed that arduous duty, and the frequent gales of wind which occurred during the winter months of the year, render eleven wrecked cases, out of so many ships as were then at sea, no extraordinary number.‡

The carronade still maintained, and more than maintained its ground. On the 21st of February, 1800, an admiralty-order had issued; directing that in future all ships of 24 and 20 guns should be fitted on the main deck for 32-pounder carronades, in lieu of the long nines they had hitherto carried. This was giving the ships a great increase of force, without the necessity of detaching so many men to the guns; a 9-pounder long gun, requiring seven men to fight it, but a 32-pounder carronade only six. Hence a greater number remained to handle the small-

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 9.

† See Appendix, No. 8.

‡ See Appendix, No. 9.

arms, and, a very important duty in action, to attend to the rigging and sails, and to work the ship in a proper manner. A few active seamen, promptly sent to repair a shroud or stay, will frequently save a mast; and a manœuvre, the success of which may decide the fate of a battle, often depends upon alacrity in splicing the old, or in reeving the new running-rigging.

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year, 1801, including among the flag-officers all that were promoted on the 1st of January, in consequence of the union of Great Britain and Ireland, as established by act of parliament on that day, was,

Admirals	. . . . .	46
Vice-admirals	. . . . .	39
Rear-admirals	. . . . .	59
„	superannuated	29
Post-captains	. . . . .	516
„	„	18
Commanders, or sloop-captains	. . . . .	391
Lieutenants	. . . . .	2135
„	retired, with rank of commanders	48
Masters	. . . . .	517

and the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of that year, was 120,000 for the first three lunar months, and 135,000 for the remaining ten.\*

Although no Dutch navy existed capable of giving alarm to the British, Holland's northern neighbours, with Russia at their head, confederated together, to force England, either by diplomacy or war, to abandon a long recognised right, that of searching the ships of neutrals for contraband of war. This sudden uproar in the north arose out of a circumstance, of which we will here present a summary.

On the 25th of July, 1800, at 6 P. M., a British squadron, of three frigates, the Arrow sloop, and a lugger, fell in with the Danish 40-gun 18-pounder frigate Freya, Captain Krabbe, having under her convoy two ships, two brigs, and two galliots. Captain Thomas Baker, of the 28-gun frigate Nemesis, the senior British officer, hailed the Freya, to say he should send his boat on board the convoy. Captain Krabbe replied that, if such an attempt were made, he would fire into the boat. Both threats were put into execution; and an action ensued, which, with so decided a superiority against her, ended of course in the Freya's submission. This affair, unhappily, did not pass off without loss. The Nemesis and Arrow had each two seamen killed and several wounded. The Freya had also two men

killed and five wounded, two of the latter badly. The English vessels, accompanied by the Danish frigate and her convy, then proceeded to, and anchored in, the Downs; where the Freya, by the order of Vice-admiral Skeffington Lutwidge, the commander in chief on that station, still kept flying the Danish ensign and pendant.

As, besides this fracas, a somewhat similar circumstance had occurred in the Mediterranean, the British government lost no time in despatching Lord Whitworth to the court of Denmark, to place the business on an amicable footing. To give additional weight to his lordship's arguments, he was accompanied by a squadron of four sail of the line, (to which six more were afterwards added), three 50-gun ships, and several frigates and smaller vessels, under Vice-admiral Archibald Dickson, in the 74-gun ship Monarch. On the 29th of August Lord Whitworth terminated the negotiation with the Danish minister, Count Bernstorff; and a convention was mutually signed, agreeing that the Freya and convoy should be repaired at English expense, and then released; that the right of the British to search convoys should be discussed at a future day in London; that Danish vessels should only sail under convoy in the Mediterranean, to protect them from the Algerines, and should be searchable as formerly; and that the convention should be ratified by the two courts in three weeks.

Russia, although the ally of England, took offence at the attack upon the Freya, and particularly at the passage through the Sound of a British squadron. The first overt act of the Emperor Paul's displeasure, was to sequester all British property in his dominions; the next, was to place his army and navy upon a war-establishment. On the 22d of September, however, about three weeks after it had been ordered, the sequestration was taken off. But on the 5th of November, the news of the capture of Malta having excited fresh anger in the breast of the emperor, an embargo was again laid on all the British shipping in the ports of Russia, amounting, at this time, to about 200 sail. This was followed, in December, by a convention between Russia and Sweden, agreeing to the re-establishment of an armed neutrality between those powers. Denmark also, at the instigation of the first of these powers, and of Prussia, was induced to join the confederacy.

The menacing attitude thus assumed by the three principal northern powers requiring to be met in a corresponding way by England, the latter, on the 12th of March, despatched from Yarmouth roads, under the command of Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, in the London 98, with Vice-admiral Lord Nelson in the St. George 98, as his second, a fleet of 15, afterwards augmented to 18, sail of the line, with as many frigates, sloops, bombs, fire-ships, and smaller vessels, as made the whole amount to about 53 sail: on board a division of which fleet had em-

barked, the 49th regiment under Colonel Isaac Brock, two companies of the rifle-corps, and a detachment of artillery, the whole under the command of Colonel Stewart.

The nominal or paper force of the three powers against which this fleet was destined to act, was Russia 82, Denmark 23, and Sweden 18 sail of the line, besides, between them all, about 89 frigates, corvettes, and brigs, and nearly twice the number of armed small-craft. But Russia, even as late as October in the present year, did not possess more than 61 sail of the line; of which number 31 were in commission in the Baltic, and the remainder in the Mediterranean and Black seas. Those 31 ships were divided between Petersburg, Archangel, Cronstadt, and Revel. Perhaps the effective number, or that which might be brought to act as a fleet, did not exceed 20 sail of the line; and these were badly equipped, ill-appointed, and worse manned. The Swedes, at one time, had 11 sail of the line at Carlscrona ready for sea, and, by all accounts, in tolerably fighting trim. The Danish fleet at Copenhagen consisted, in the middle of March, of 10 sail of the line ready for sea, exclusive of about the same number in an unserviceable state.

This makes 41 Russian, Swedish, and Danish effective ships of the line, instead of 88, the number stated by several writers to have been afloat in this quarter. It must have been a very happy combination of circumstances that could have assembled in one spot 25 of those 41 sail of the line; and against that 25, made up, as the number would be, of three different nations, all mere novices in naval tactics, 18, or, with a Nelson to command them, 15 British sail of the line, were more than a match. Without this explanation, it might seem the height of rashness in the British government to send to the Baltic so apparently small a force.

In the hope that Denmark, in spite of her hostile demonstrations, would prefer negotiation to war, the Honourable Nicholas Vansittart, with full powers to treat, had, about a fortnight previous to the sailing of the fleet, departed for Copenhagen in the 32-gun frigate *Blanche*, Captain Graham Eden Hamond. Adverse winds kept the British fleet from reaching the Naze of Norway until the 18th; and still heavier gales, during the two succeeding days, scattered the vessels, especially the small-craft, in all directions. To collect these, the admiral, on the 21st, anchored at the entrance of the Sound, within sight of Koll point, on the Swedish shore. Some of the smaller vessels were unable to rejoin; and the Blazer gun-brig was driven under the Swedish fort of Warberg, and there captured. In the height of the bad weather the 74-gun ship *Russel* parted company, by signal, to take the *Tickler* gun-brig in tow; and, during the dark and hazy night that ensued, was only saved from being wrecked herself, by the great exertions of her officers and crew.

On the 23d the *Blanche* returned to the fleet, having on board, with Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Drummond, the British chargé d'affaires at Copenhagen; and from the Danish government, instead of a reply of accommodation, came, as was to be expected, one of open defiance. Much valuable time had thus been lost, and the Danes were taking advantage of it in strengthening their means of defence; the formidable appearance of which had already excited the surprise of the British envoy.

The pilots, who, not having to share the honours, felt it to be their interest to magnify the dangers of the expedition, occasioned a few more days to be dissipated in inactivity. In the course of these Admiral Parker sent a flag of truce to the governor of Elsinour, to inquire if he meant to oppose the passage of the fleet through the Sound. Governor Stricker replied, that 'he guns of Cronenburg castle would certainly be fired at any British ships of war that approached. At length, at 6 A.M. on the 30th, the British fleet got under way, and, with a fine breeze at north-north-west, proceeded into the Sound, in line ahead; the van division commanded by Lord Nelson in the *Elephant* 74, into which ship, as a lighter and more active one than the *St. George*, he had, the preceding day, shifted his flag; the centre division, by the commander-in-chief; and the rear division, by Rear-admiral Graves. At 7 A.M. the batteries at Elsinour commenced firing at the *Monarch*, who was the leading ship, and at the other ships, as they passed in succession. The distance, however, was so great, that not a shot struck the ships; nor did any but the van-ships fire in return, and these only two or three broadsides. The seven bomb-vessels, however, threw shells; 200 of which were stated to have fallen in Cronenburg and Helsingén, and, among other damages, to have killed two, and wounded 15 men. The bursting of a 24-pounder on board the *Isis*, whereby seven men were killed and wounded, was the only casualty that attended the British in their passage through the Sound.

As the strait at Elsinour is less than three miles across, a mid-channel passage would undoubtedly have exposed the ships to a fire from Cronenburg castle on the one side, and from the Swedish city of Helsingén on the other; but the latter, the batteries of which, instead of being a subject of dread as the pilots had given out, mounted only eight guns of a light caliber, did not make even a show of opposition. On observing this, the British inclined to the Swedish shore, passing within less than a mile of it; and thus avoided a fire which, as coming from nearly 100 pieces of cannon, could not fail to have been highly destructive.

About noon, or soon after, the fleet anchored at some distance above the island of Huén, which is about 15 miles from the city of Copenhagen. The commander-in-chief, Vice-admiral Lord Nelson, and Rear-admiral Graves, accompanied by Captain Donett, and the commanding officer of the troops, then pro-

ceeded, in the Lark lugger, to reconnoitre the enemy's defences. They were soon ascertained to be of the most formidable description. This led, in the evening, to a council of war: at which, as usual, much was urged to forego, or at least delay the attack; but Lord Nelson prevailed, and offered, with 10<sup>th</sup> of the line and all the small-craft, to carry the business through in a proper manner.

Admiral Parker, to his credit, cheerfully accepted the offer, and granted to his enterprising second two sail of the line more than he had asked; that is, two 50-gun ships, which, in these northern parts, are considered as of the line, partly because of their light draught of water as two-decked ships, and partly because a similar description of vessel is usually to be found in the opposite line. The detachment thus intrusted to Vice-admiral Lord Nelson, by the time the whole had joined, consisted of the

Gun ship			
74	{ Elephant . . .	{ Vice-adm. (b.) Lord Nelson, K. B.	
		{ Captain Thomas Foley.	
	{ Defiance . . .	{ Rear-adm. (w.) Thomas Graves.	
		{ Captain Richard Retalick.	
	{ Edgar . . .	" George Murray.	
	{ Monarch . . .	" James Robert Mosse.	
	{ Bellona . . .	" Sir Thos. Boulden Thompson.	
	{ Ganges . . .	" Thos. Francis Fremantle.	
	{ Russei . . .	" William Cuming.	
	{ Agamemnon . .	" Robert Devereux Fancourt.	
64	{ Ardent . . .	" Thomas Bertie.	
	{ Polyphemus . .	" John Lawford.	
54	{ Glatton . . .	" William Bligh.	
50	{ Isis . . .	" James Walker.	
Gun frig.			
38	{ Amazon . . .	" Henry Riou.	
36	{ Désirée . . .	" Henry Inman.	
	{ Blanche . . .	" Graham Eden Hamond.	
32	{ Alcène . . .	" Samuel Sutton.	
24	{ Jamaica . . .	" Jonas Rose.	
sh.slps.	{ Arrow . . .	" William Bolton.	
	{ Dart . . .	" John Ferris Devonshire.	
br.slps.	{ Cruiser . . .	" James Brisbane.	
	{ Harpy . . .	" William Birchall.	
<i>Bomb-vessels, Discovery, Explosion, Hecla, Sulphur, Terror, Volcano, and Zebra.</i>			
<i>Fire-ships, Otter and Zephyr.</i>			
<i>Gun-brigs, Cutters, &amp;c.</i>			

The force at Copenhagen was not the only obstacle to be surmounted; the approach to it was by a channel extremely intricate, and little known. To increase the difficulty of navigating it, the Danes, very judiciously had removed or misplaced the buoys. On the same night, therefore, on which Sir Hyde had come to the happy decision of intrusting the affair to Lord Nelson, the latter, accompanied among others by Captain Brisbane of the Cruiser, proceeded in his boat to ascertain and

rebuoy the outer channel, a narrow passage lying between the island of Saltholm and the Middle Ground. This was a very difficult, as well as a very fatiguing duty, and the vice-admiral rejoiced greatly when he had accomplished it. An attack from the northward was at first meditated: but a second examination of the Danish position on the 31st, and a favourable change of wind determined the vice-admiral to commence his operations from the southward.

On the morning of the 1st of April the British fleet weighed, and shortly afterwards reanchored off the north-western extremity of the Middle Ground, a shoal which extends along the whole sea-front of the city of Copenhagen, leaving an intervening channel of deep water, called the König-Stiefe, or King's Channel, about three quarters of a mile wide; and in which channel, close to the town, the Danes had moored their block-ships, radeaus, prames, and gun-vessels. The distance of the anchorage from the city of Copenhagen was about six miles. In the course of the forenoon, Lord Nelson, embarking on board the Amazon with some chosen friends, reconnoitred for the last time, the position he was about to attack; and soon after his return at 1 P. M., the signal to weigh appeared at the Elephant's masthead: a signal, which was received by the different ships' companies with a shout that must have been heard at a considerable distance. Immediately afterwards the vice-admiral's squadron, amounting in the whole to 36 sail of square-rigged vessels got under way and set sail, in two divisions, with a light but favourable wind; leaving Admiral Parker at anchor with the

Gun-ship

		{ Admiral (b.) Sir Hyde Parker.	
{ London . . . .		{ Captain William Domett.	
98	St.-George . . . .	"	Robert Waller Otway.
	Warrior . . . .	"	Thos. Masterman Hardy.
	Defence . . . .	"	Charles Tyler
74	Saturn . . . .	"	Lord Henry Paulet.
	Ramillies . . . .	"	Robert Lambert.
	Raisonable . . . .	"	Jas. William Taylor Dixon.
64	Veteran . . . .	"	John Dilkes.
		"	Arch. Collingw. Dickson.

The ships of Lord Nelson's detachment, preceded by the Amazon, entered the Upper Channel; coasting along the edge of the right-hand shoal or Middle Ground, until they had reached and partly rounded its southern extremity. Here, off Draco point, at about 8 P. M., just as it grew dark; the detachment anchored; the north-westernmost British ship being then distant about two miles from the southernmost ship of the Danish line.

The same north-westerly wind, which had blown so fair passing along the outer channel, was now as foul for advancing by the inner one. This, however, occasioned no delay; for in so difficult a navigation, daylight was as fully indispensable as a

fair wind. Part of this night, as many others had been, was passed in active service. Captain Hardy proceeded in a small boat, to examine the channel between the British anchorage and the Danish line, and actually approached near enough to sound round the first ship of the latter; using a pole, lest the noise of throwing the lead should lead to a discovery. On his return, at about 11 P. M., Captain Hardy went on board the Elephant, and reported the depth of water up to the Danish line. This assurance of the practicability of the channel was gratifying news to Lord Nelson, and prevented him from sleeping during the remainder of the night.

We will now endeavour to give a description of the formidable force, which was to be the object of the morning's attack. It consisted of two-decked ships, chiefly old and in a dismantled state, frigates, prames, and radeaus, mounting altogether 628 guns, as particularized in the following table:

Deno- mina- tion.*	Name.	Description of Vessel.	Guns.						Men. ‡
			36† pds.	24 pds.	18 pds.	12 pds.	8 pds.	To- tal.	
B. S.	Provesteen ..	An old three-decker cut down, dis- mantled and condemned. . . . .	28	28	—	—	—	56	No. 515
"	Wagner..	An old two-decker; quarter-deck cut down, condemned . . . . .	—	48	—	—	—	48	361
Pr.	Rensburg ..	A prame for the transport of cavalry, with masts and sails . . . . .	—	20	—	—	—	20	216
"	Nyburg ..	Ditto . . . . ditto . . . . .	—	20	—	—	—	20	309
B. S.	Jutland ..	An old two-decker condemned; with- out poop or masts . . . . .	—	24	—	24	—	48	396
Rad.	Suersishen ..	Square floating battery, with masts	—	—	20	—	—	20	117
B. S.	Cronburg ..	An old condemned frigate; cut down and dismantled . . . . .	—	23	—	—	—	23	196
Rad.	Hajen ..	A square battery like the Suersishen	—	—	20	—	—	20	155
B. S.	Dannebrog ..	An old condemned two-decker, cut down and dismantled . . . . .	—	24	—	24	14	66	336
sm.-ves.	Elwen ..	A small repeating vessel, rigged ..	—	6	—	—	—	6	80
Rad.	Grener's float	Old and without masts . . . . .	—	24	—	—	—	24	120
Pr.	Aggerstans ..	An old cav. transport, without masts	—	20	—	—	—	20	213
gun-sh.									
74	Zealand ..	A two-decker cond. and unrigged ..	—	30	30	—	14	74	539
B. S.	Charl.-Amelia	A condemned Indiaman . . . . .	—	26	—	—	—	26	238
Rad.	Sohesten ....	A square battery like the Suersishen	—	18	—	—	—	18	126
gun-sh.									
60	Holstein ..	A two-decker, newly repaired . . . .	—	24	—	24	12	60	400
B. S.	Indosforethen	An old condemned two-decker, cut down and dismantled . . . . .	—	26	—	26	12	64	390
Frigate.	Hielpern..	A good completely rigged ship or frig.	20	—	—	—	—	20	265
Total.....			48	360	70	98	52	628	4849

These 18 vessels were moored in a line from a mile to a mile and a half in extent; flanked at the north end, or that nearest the town, by two artificial or pile-formed islands, called the Trekroner batteries, one of thirty 24, the other of thirty-eight 36 pounders, with furnaces for heating shot; and both of which

\* B. S. stands for *block-ship*, Pr. for *prame*, and Rad. for *radeau*.

† For the mode of equalizing the Danish and English calibers, see vol. i., p. 42.

‡ Believed to be exclusive of soldiers and artillerymen.



batteries were commanded by the two two-decked block-ships *Mars* and *Elephanten*.

The entrance into the harbour and docks, which latter lie in the heart of the city, was protected by a chain thrown across it; also by some batteries on the northern shore, and particularly by the *Trekroner* or Crown batteries already described. In addition to this, the two 74-gun ships *Dannemark* and *Trekroner*, a 40-gun frigate, two 18-gun brigs, and several armed xebecs, with furnaces for heating shot, lay moored in advantageous positions off the harbour's mouth. Along the shore of *Amag\** island, a little to the southward of the floating line of defence were several gun and mortar batteries; thus making the whole line of defence, in front of Copenhagen, cover an extent of between three and four miles. The Danish naval commanding officer was Commodore Olfert Fischer, who had his broad pendant on board the *Dannebrog* 62; nor was there a want of men, both skilful and brave, to work the Danish guns either afloat or on shore. One spirit, indeed, seemed to animate all Denmark, and that was to repel the invaders by every possible means.

The day of the 2d of April opened, as the British had hoped it would, with a favourable or south-easterly wind. The signal for all captains on board the flag-ship was hoisted almost as soon as it could be seen; and at 8 A.M. the several captains were made acquainted with the stations assigned them. As circumstances, which will be mentioned in their place, prevented the plan's being strictly followed, it may suffice to state, that all the line-of-battle ships were to anchor by the stern abreast of the different vessels composing the enemy's line, and for which purpose they had already prepared themselves with cables out of their stern-ports. The *Amazon*, *Blanche*, *Alcmène*, *Arrow*, and *Dart*, with the two fire-ships, placed under the immediate directions of Captain Riou, were to co-operate in the attack upon the ships stationed at the harbour's mouth, and to act otherwise as circumstances might require. The bomb-vessels were to station themselves outside the British line, so as to throw their shells over it; and the *Jamaica*, with the brigs and gun-vessels, was to take a position for raking the southern extremity of the Danish line. A similar station was assigned to the *Désirée*. It was also intended that the 49th regiment under Colonel Stewart, and 500 seamen, under Captain Fremantle of the *Ganges*, should storm the principal of the *Trekroner* batteries, the instant that the cannonade from the ships had silenced its fire.

At 9 A.M. the pilots and several of the masters were ordered on board the *Elephant*. Their hesitation and indecision, about the bearings of the shoal and the line of deep water, might well provoke a more patient man than Lord Nelson. At 9 h. 30 m. A.M., however, the signal was made to weigh in succession. The

\* Spelt *Amag* by Southey, and other authors.

Edgar led. The *Agamemnon* was to have followed ; but, having anchored rather outside, than off, the end of the great shoal, she could not weather it, and was obliged again to bring up, in six fathoms' water. Here the current was so strong against her, that, although the ship afterwards re-weighed, and continued for a long time to warp with the stream and kedge anchors, the *Agamemnon* was compelled a second time to bring up, nearly in the spot from which she had last weighed. In the mean time the *Polyphemus*, by signal, had followed the *Edgar*; and the *Isis* steered after the former. Owing to the unskilfulness or unsteadiness of her master, Mr. Alexander Briarly, who had undertaken the office of pilot, the *Bellona*, in spite of a fair wind and ample room, hugged the Middle Ground too closely, and grounded abreast of, and about 450 yards distant from, the rear of the Danish line. Following closely, the *Russel* also grounded, with her jib-boom almost over the *Bellona's* taffrail.

In compliance with the wish of the pilots, each ship had been ordered to pass her leader on the starboard side, from a supposition that the water shoaled on the larboard shore; whereas Captain Hardy had proved, that the water kept deepening all the way to the enemy's line. The *Elephant* was next to the *Russel*; and Lord Nelson, as soon as he perceived the state of that ship and the *Bellona*, ordered the helm to be put a-starboard, and passed to the westward, or along the larboard beam, of those ships; as, very fortunately, did all the ships astern of the *Elephant*.

At the same moment that Lord Nelson's detachment weighed, Admiral Parker's eight ships did the same; and the latter took up a new position somewhat nearer to the mouth of the harbour, but still at too great a distance to do more than menace the north wing of defence. A nearer approach, indeed, with both wind and current against the ships, was impracticable; in sufficient time, at least, to render any active service in the engagement.

At 10 A. M. the cannonade commenced; and, for nearly half an hour, the principal British ships engaged were the *Polyphemus*, *Isis*, *Edgar*, *Ardent*, and *Monarch*. At about 11 h. 30 m. A. M. the *Glatton*, *Elephant*, *Ganges*, and *Defiance*, got to their stations; as did several of the frigates and smaller vessels, and the action became general. The *Désirée* was of great service in raking the *Provesteen*, and drawing off a part of her heavy fire from the *Polyphemus* and *Isis*; particularly from the latter, who bore the brunt of it, as her heavy loss will presently show. Owing to the strength of the current, the *Jamaica*, with the gun-vessels, could not get near enough to be of any service in the action; nor were the bomb-vessels able to execute much. The absence of the *Russel*, *Bellona*, and *Agamemnon*, occasioned several of the British ships to have a greater share of the enemy's fire, than had been allotted to them, or than they were well able to bear. Among the many sufferers on this account

was the Amazon who, with the four other ships intrusted to Captain Riou, had most gallantly taken a position (the three frigates in particular) right against the Trekronen batteries.

At the end of a three hours' cannonade, few if any of the Danish block-ships, prames, or rideaus, had ceased firing; nor could the contest be said to have taken on either side a decisive turn. It was at this time that, in consequence, as is understood, of the pressing solicitations of the captain of the fleet, founded upon information received a full hour before that signals of distress were at the mast-heads of two British line-of-battle ships (the Bellona and Russel), and the signal of inability on board a third (the Agamemnon), coupled with the imperfect view which the London's distance from the scene of action enabled Sir Hyde himself to take of the relative condition of the parties in it; observing, also, the zig-zag course and necessarily slow progress of the Defence, Ramillies, and Veteran, which had been detached as a reinforcement to the vice-admiral, the commander-in-chief was persuaded to throw out the signal for discontinuing the engagement.\*

The manner in which Lord Nelson received this signal is very forcibly depicted in a popular biographical work. "About this time," says Mr. Southey, "the signal-lieutenant called out that No. 39 (the signal for discontinuing the action) was thrown out by the commander-in-chief. He continued to walk the deck, and appeared to take no notice of it. The signal-officer met him at the next turn, and asked if he should repeat it. 'No,' he replied, 'acknowledge it.' Presently he called after him to know if the signal for close action was still hoisted; and, being answered in the affirmative, said, 'Mind you keep it so.' He now paced the deck, moving the stump of his lost arm in a manner which always indicated great emotion. 'Do you know,' said he to Mr. Fergusson, 'what is shown on board the commander-in-chief? Number 39!' Mr. Fergusson asked him what that meant. 'Why, to leave off action.' Then, shrugging up his shoulders, he repeated the words—'Leave off action? Now d—n me if I do! You know, Foley,' turning to the Captain, 'I have only one eye,—I have a right to be blind sometimes:—and then putting the glass to his blind eye, in that mood of mind which sports with bitterness, he exclaimed, 'I really do not see the signal.' Presently he exclaimed, 'D—n the signal! keep mine for closer battle flying! That's the way I answer such signals. Nail mine to the mast.'"+

\* It is but common justice towards Sir Hyde Parker to state, that he made the signal "to discontinue the action," in order that Lord Nelson might withdraw from the contest, if, owing to the different ships unable to reach their stations, some being *a-ground*, he felt his force insufficient to maintain the attack; and it was evident that Sir Hyde's division could not proffer the least assistance: the signal was made with a generous intention, and Mr. Southey has added a note similar to this in his second edition of his Life of Nelson.—Ed.

† Southey's Life of Nelson, vol. ii., p. 124.

Thus, the signal to discontinue the action was answered only, not repeated, on board the *Elephant*; and, although the *Defiance* repeated it, Rear-admiral Graves would not suffer the signal to be hoisted any where but at the lee maintopsail yard-arm, and still kept No. 16, the signal for close action, flying at the main topgallantmast head. The frigates and sloops now hauled off from the *Trekroner* batteries, and, by doing so, were probably saved from destruction. It was while unavoidably presenting her stern to those batteries, that the *Amazon* had her gallant captain shot in two, and sustained the principal part of her loss.

At 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the fire of the Danes slackened; and, at a little before 2 P. M., it ceased along nearly the whole of the line astern of the *Zealand*. Some of the prames and light vessels had also gone adrift; but few, if any of the vessels, whose flags had been struck, would suffer themselves to be taken possession of. They fired at the boats as the latter approached, and the batteries on *Amag* island aided them in this irregular warfare. "This abuse," says Mr. Southey, "from the nature of the action; the crews were continually reinforced from the shore: and fresh men, coming on board, did not inquire whether the flag had been struck, or, perhaps, did not heed it; many, or most of them, never having been engaged in war before, knowing nothing, therefore, of its laws, and thinking only of defending their country to the last extremity."

At all events it greatly, and very naturally, irritated Lord Nelson; who, at one time, had thoughts of sending in the fire-ships to burn the surrendered vessels. As a preliminary measure, however, his lordship wrote the celebrated letter to the Crown Prince of Denmark, wherein he says: "Vice-admiral Lord Nelson has been commanded to spare Denmark, when she no longer resists. The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag; but, if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, he must set on fire all the prizes that he has taken, without having the power of saving the men who have so nobly defended them. The brave Danes are the brothers, and should never be the enemies of the English." A wafer was then given him, but he ordered a candle to be brought from the cockpit, and sealed the letter with wax, affixing a larger seal than he ordinarily used. "This," said his lordship, "is no time to appear hurried and informal."

This letter was carried on shore, with a flag of truce, by Captain Sir Frederick Thesiger (a young commander acting as one of Lord Nelson's aides-de-camp), who found the crown prince at the sallyport. In the mean time the destructive cannonade, still kept up by the *Defiance*, *Monarch*, and *Ganges*, and the near approach of the *Defence* and *Ramillies* (the *Veteran* far astern), silenced the fire of the *Indosforethen*, *Holstein*, and the ships next to them in the Danish line. But the great *Trekroner*, having had nothing but frigates and sloops

opposed to it, and that only for a time, was comparatively uninjured. This battery therefore continued its fire; and, as about 1500 men had been thrown into it from the shore, was considered too strong to be stormed. It was now deemed an advisable measure to withdraw the fleet out of the intricate channel while the wind continued fair; and preparations were making for that purpose, when the Danish Adjutant-general Lindolm came, bearing a flag of truce: upon sight of which the Trekroner ceased firing; and the action, after having continued five hours, during four of which it had been warmly contested, was brought to a close.

The message from the crown prince was to inquire the particular object of Lord Nelson's note. The latter replied, in writing, that humanity was the object; that he consented to stay hostilities; that the wounded Danes should be taken on shore; and that he should take his prisoners out of the vessels, and burn or carry off his prizes as he should think fit: his lordship concluded with a hope, that the victory he had gained would lead to a reconciliation between the two countries. Sir Frederick Thesiger, who had returned with the Danish adjutant-general, was again sent with the reply; and the latter was referred to the commander-in-chief for a final adjustment of the terms.

The opportunity afforded by this delay, the London being nearly four miles distant, was not lost by Lord Nelson; and the leading British ships, all of which were much crippled in their rigging and sails, weighed or slipped in succession. The *Monarch* led the way, and touched upon the shoal; but the *Ganges*, taking her amidships, pushed her over it. The *Glatton*, drawing less water, passed clear; but the *Defiance* and *Elephant* grounded about a mile from the *Trekroner*; and, in spite of the exertions of their active crews, there remained fixed for many hours. The *Désirée*, also, at the opposite end of the line, having gone to assist the *Bellona*, became fast on the same shoal as the latter. The *Bellona*, however, was soon got afloat by resources of her own. An experienced quartermaster, observing the *Isis* in the act of slipping, suggested to the first lieutenant that, if a boat were sent to pick up that ship's cable, they might haul off by it. The hint was taken, and the *Bellona* quickly freed herself from the shoal.

Soon after the *Elephant* had grounded, Lord Nelson quitted her, and followed the Danish adjutant-general to the London. While the conference is holding, we will proceed to show, as well as we are able, at what expense England had brought Denmark to so subdued a tone. Taking the ships in the order in which they stand in a list at a subsequent page, the *Désirée* had one lieutenant (Andrew King) and three seamen wounded; the *Russel*, five seamen and one marine wounded; the *Bellona*, nine seamen and two private marines killed, and her captain (leg

amputated), two lieutenants (Thomas Southey and Thomas Wilks), one master's mate (James Emmerton), four midshipmen (John Anderson, Edward Daubenny, William Sitford, and William Figg), 48 seamen, 10 private marines, one captain (Alexander Sharp) and five privates of foot wounded: the greater part of this loss, unfortunately, arose from the bursting of two of her lowerdeck guns, owing, as is understood, to their having been overcharged. The Polyphemus had one midshipman (James Bell), four seamen, and one marine killed, and her boatswain (Edward Burr), 20 seamen, and four marines wounded; the Isis, her master (Daniel Lamond), two midshipmen (George McKinlay and Thomas Ram), 22 seamen, one lieutenant (Henry Long) and four privates of marines, one lieutenant and two privates of foot killed, and one lieutenant (Richard Cormack), three midshipmen (Reuben Pain, Simon Frazer, and Charles Jones), 69 seamen, 13 privates of marines, and two privates of foot wounded; the Edgar, her first lieutenant (Edmund Johnson), 24 seamen, one lieutenant (Benjamin Spencer) and two privates of marines, and three privates of foot killed, and two lieutenants (Joshua Johnson and William Goldfinch), five midshipmen (Thomas Gabagan, William Whimper, John James Ridge, Peter Procter, William Domett), 79 seamen, 17 privates of marines, and eight privates of foot wounded; the Ardent, one midshipman (George Hoare), and 29 seamen and marines killed, and 64 seamen and marines wounded; the Glatton, one pilot and 17 seamen and marines killed, one lieutenant (William Tindall), one master's mate (Robert Thompson), one midshipman (John Williams), and 34 seamen and marines wounded; the Elephant, one master's mate (Henry Yaulden), four seamen, three privates of marines, one captain and one private of foot killed, and two midshipmen (Robert Gill and Hugh Mitchel), eight seamen, one private of marines, and two privates of foot wounded; the Ganges, her master (Robert Stewart) and five seamen killed, one pilot wounded, and one seaman missing; the Monarch, her captain, 35 seamen, 12 privates of marines, and eight privates of foot killed, one lieutenant (William Minchin), her boatswain (William Joy), five midshipmen (Henry Swimmer, William John Bowes, Thomas Harlowe, George Morgan, and Philip le Vesconte), 101 seamen, one lieutenant (James Marrie) and 34 privates of marines, and one lieutenant and 20 privates of foot wounded; the Defiance, one lieutenant (George Gray), one pilot, 17 seamen, three privates of marines, and two privates of foot killed, her boatswain, one midshipman (James Galloway), one captain's clerk, one pilot, 36 seamen, five privates of marines, and seven privates of foot wounded; the Amazon, her captain, one midshipman (Honourable George Tucket), one captain's clerk (Joseph Rose), 10 seamen, and one marine killed, two masters' mates (James Harry and Philip Horn), 16 seamen, and five marines wounded; the Blanche, six seamen

and one marine killed, and seven seamen and two marines wounded; the *Alcmène*, five seamen killed, and one lieutenant (Henry Baker), her boatswain (Charles Church), one master's mate (George Augustus Spearing), one pilot, 12 seamen, one lieutenant and two privates of marines wounded; and the *Dart*, her first lieutenant (Richard Edward Sandys) and two seamen killed, and one seaman wounded: making, including among the killed the one missing in the Ganges, a total of 255 killed, and 688 wounded.

Thus say the official returns; but it would appear that these take no notice of the slightly wounded. As one instance, the *Ardent*, besides her 64 in the returns, had 40 wounded who were able to go to quarters. The whole of the slightly wounded, according to the testimony of officers in the fleet, would have swelled the wounded total to at least 950, and the total of killed and wounded to upwards of 1200. More than half of the wounded, enumerated in the returns, are also represented to have died of their wounds. If this be correct, the loss may be stated thus: killed and mortally wounded 350; recoverably and slightly wounded 850.

Even the smallest in amount, of the two returns of loss here given, could only have resulted from good and steady firing; and, truly, the British ships displayed the marks of it in their hulls, lower shrouds, and lower masts, rather than, as on most occasions, in their upper masts, running rigging, and sails. The *Glatton*, indeed, had her fore topmast shot away; but it does not appear that any other ship's topmast, or even topgallantmast, came down during the action. Most of the ships had a part of their guns rendered useless. Of the *Ardent's* maindeck 42-pounder carronades, more than half were disabled; as were seven of the *Glatton's* 52, and two of her 68-pounders. It has already been stated, that a part of the *Bellona's* heavy loss arose from the bursting of two of her guns: a similar accident, it is believed, occurred a second time (see p. 66) on board the *Isis*. Both of these ships were very old, the one having been built in 1760, and the other in 1774; and their guns were probably the same originally established upon them.

The damages sustained by the Danish ships, or floating-hulls, may be summed up by stating, that the greater part of them were literally knocked to pieces. To this condition they would undoubtedly have been reduced, in much less time than four hours, the duration of the general cannonade, had the pilots permitted the British ships to take a closer position to their Danish opponents, than from 300 to 400 yards; in which case the heavy carronades of the *Glatton* and *Ardent* would have produced their full effect. With respect to the Danish loss, we are unable to particularize it. Commodore Fischer reckoned his killed and wounded, according to the lowest estimate, at between 1600 and 1800 men; including 270 lost by the *Danne-*

brog alone. In the British accounts, the Danish alleged loss by shot is mixed up with the loss by prisoners taken; and the whole is made to amount to about 6000 men.

The following table, besides showing how the Danish vessels were disposed of, places the British ships, from the Polyphemus downwards, in the order in which they anchored; nor does the station of each of the latter, in reference to her opponent or opponents in the Danish line, materially vary from what it really was. A column for the official numerical loss, and another, to the best of our ability, for the surviving first lieutenant, of each British ship engaged, have also been added:

DANISH.	How disposed of.	BRITISH.	LOSS.		First Lieutenants.
			K.	W.	
Provesteen....	{ Taken and burnt, having been forsaken when the guns were useless.	Désirée..	...	4	Andrew King.
		Russel....	...	6	Samuel Bateman.
		Bellona...	11	72	John Delafons.
		Polyphemus .....	6	25	Edward Hodder.
Wagner.....	{ Driven on the shoals, and burnt by the British.	Isis .....	33	88	Robert Tinkler.
Rensburg.....					
Nyburg.....	Escaped; afterwards sank.	Edgar.....	31	111	Joshua Johnson.
Jutland.....	{ Taken and burnt by the British.	Ardent...	30	64	Andrew Mott.
Suersishen....					
Cronburg.....					
Hajen .....					
Dannebrog ....	Caught fire, and blew up after the action.				
Elwen .....	{ Escaped.	Glatton...	18	37	Rob. Brown Tom.
Grenier's float					
Aggerstans....	Ditto, and afterwards sank.	Elephant	10	18	Wm. Wilkinson.
Zealand.....	Driven under the Trekroner battery, and taken; afterwards burnt.				
Charl. Amelia	{ Taken, and afterwards burnt.	Ganges...	7	1	William Moroe.
Sohesten.....					
Holstein .....	Ditto; put in sailing condition and carried away.	Monarch	56	164	John Yelland.
Indosforethen	Ditto, and afterwards burnt.				
Hielpern ?...	Escaped.	Defiance	24	51	David Mudie.
		Amazon.	14	23	Jos. Ore Masfield.
		Blanche..	7	9	Thos. M'Culloch.
		Alcmène	5	19	Rt. Wal. Dunlop.
		Dart.....	3	1	Richard Hawkes.
			253	688	



Although, as, without reckoning the two prames which sank in shoal water while escaping and were probably recovered, the British had captured or destroyed 13 out of the 18 floating-batteries that formed the Danish line to the southward of the Trekroner islands, the victory was to them; yet the Danes, viewing Lord Nelson's message to the crown prince as the first overture to a cessation of hostilities, solaced themselves with the belief, that the affair, at the most, could only be considered as a drawn battle. Whatever name the contest went by, it fully succeeded, as we shall presently have to show, in attaining the object for which it had been commenced.

No nation could behave better, no men could fight more bravely, than the Danes did on this occasion; but Commodore Fischer, nevertheless, was a little in error in regard to his report to the crown prince. That account states, that the British line, reckoning from the *Defiance*, did not stretch further northward than the *Zealand*, and therefore did not engage more than two-thirds of the Danish line of defence; while the *Trekroner* battery, and the block-ships *Elephanten* and *Mars*, with the frigate *Hielpern*, did not come at all into action. This is disproved by the single fact, that the *Defiance* had her mainmast, mizenmast, and bowsprit, badly wounded by the very first broadside fired from the *Trekroner* battery. Not only, then, was the latter engaged, but the *Defiance* must have been stationed nearly abreast of it, to have suffered as she did. It will be creditable to Captain-lieutenant Lillenschild to suppose, that it was the fire of the *Defiance*, and not the want of an antagonist, which drove his ship, the 36-pounder frigate *Hielpern*, out of the line. As to the *Elephanten* and *Mars*, they properly belonged to the north wing of defence; and many of their heavy shot, no doubt, fell among the frigates and sloops, appointed, owing to the unavoidable absence of more able ships, to act against this formidable quarter of the Danish position.

Commodore Fischer assures his countrymen, that the British had two ships to his one, and therefore were doubly superior in force. Let us, without being over-minute, submit this assertion to proof. Dismissing from the calculation the whole of the Danish north wing, and the frigates and sloops opposed to it; also the bomb-vessels (for they really were useless), the two ships aground,\* the *Quintus* redoubt and five adjacent batteries on *Amag* island, and the *Jamaica* and the little fry with her, we have five 74-gun ships, two 64s, one 54, one 50, and one 36-gun frigate, to oppose to the 18 block-ships, prames, radeaus, and

\* These were only partially effective. Although abreast of the *Polyphemus*, the *Russel*, lying obliquely, or with her stern to the westward, was to fire athwart the bows of that ship; while the *Bellona*, with her six utmost guns on each deck, fired astern of the *Isis*, and with her six foremost ones (leaving the two midship guns on each deck unemployed), ahead of her. Doubtless many shot from both grounded ships struck the *Polyphemus* and *Isis*.

other vessels, which have already been named. Taking the Danish guns from the Danish accounts, we submit the following statement as not materially incorrect.

BRITISH.			No.	DANISH.			No.
Long guns.		No.		Long guns.		No.	
32 pounders	.....	140		36 pounders	.....	48	
24 "	.....	74		24 "	.....	360	
18 "	.....	192		18 "	.....	70	
12 "	.....	22		12 "	.....	98	
9 "	.....	114		8 "	.....	52	
6 "	.....	6					
			548				628
Carronades.				Carronades.			
68 "	.....	28					
42 "	.....	26					
32 "	.....	54					
24 "	.....	8					
18 "	.....	36					
			152				
Total . . .			700	Total . . .			828

This, although something less than a "two-to-one" superiority, is sufficient to entitle Commodore Fischer, and the brave officers and men under his command, to great credit for the obstinate defence they made. As an instance of individual courage and devotion on the part of the Danes, and of most noble feeling on the part of Lord Nelson, we transcribe from the pages of a respectable periodical work the following anecdote: "During the repast (at the palace) Lord Nelson spoke in raptures of the bravery of the Danes, and particularly requested the prince to introduce him to a very young officer, whom he described as having performed wonders during the battle, by attacking his own ship immediately under her lower guns. It proved to be the gallant young Welmoes, a stripling of seventeen. The British hero embraced him with the enthusiasm of a brother, and delicately intimated to the prince that he ought to make him an admiral; to which the prince very happily replied, 'If, my lord, I were to make all my brave officers admirals, I should have no captains or lieutenants in my service.' This heroic youth had volunteered the command of a *prame*, which is a sort of raft, carrying six small cannon, and manned with 24 men, who pushed off from the shore, and in the fury of the battle placed themselves under the stern of Lord Nelson's ship, which they most successfully attacked, in such a manner that, although they were below the reach of the stern-chasers, the British marines made terrible slaughter amongst them: 20 of these gallant men fell by their bullets, but their young commander continued knee-deep in dead at his post, until the truce was announced."\*

\* Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv., p. 396.

Having taken some notice of the Danish accounts of this battle, we must not behave so disrespectfully as to neglect bestowing a word or two upon the English accounts. According to the misplaced "Note," which we formerly quoted from Admiral Ekins's work,\* Lord Nelson attributed the grounding of the *Bellona* and *Russel* to his not having ordered his ships, in so intricate and shallow a navigation, to cut instead of to weigh. It is certainly the first time we ever heard that the Vice-admiral was in this respect to blame: but we are convinced that, of all other men, Lord Nelson was the most-likely to acknowledge an error, if he thought he had committed one.

Although Admiral Ekins has not considered it necessary to give any account of the Copenhagen affair, another contemporary has entered into it with rather more than his usual conciseness. Captain Brenton has also given a "Plan of the battle;" but, as is often the case, the engraved and the letter-press descriptions do not correspond. One important instance will suffice. The *Bellona* and *Russel* are placed in the plan, within a ship's length or so of their actual stations; but the letter-press tells us, that those ships were "much exposed to the fire of the Crown batteries;"† which Crown batteries, as rightly laid down in the same plan, are to the northward of the northern extremity of the Danish line, or perhaps about two miles and a half from the nearest of the two grounded ships, the *Bellona*. The fact is, neither ship received or could receive a shot from the *Trekroner*, although they both received several from the *Wagner* and *Provesteen*; and a Danish 36-pound shot, from one of the batteries on Amag island, went through the centre of the *Bellona*'s mainmast.

In almost all the published unofficial accounts, a mistatement also occurs respecting the *Agamemnon*. Lord Nelson in his letter says: "The *Agamemnon* could not weather the shoal of the middle and was obliged to anchor;"‡ but Captain Brenton tells us, that "the *Agamemnon* grounded on the starboard quarter of the *Bellona*," and Mr. Southey (but who, by-the-by, is very poor authority in naval matters) declares that she was "immovably aground."§

The night of the 2d of April was employed by the British in bringing out their shattered prizes, and in floating their grounded ships. By the morning of the 3d the whole of the latter, except the *Désirée* were got off. During the five days that the negotiation was pending, all the prizes, except the 60-gun ship *Holstein*, were set on fire and destroyed. The generality of these were not worth carrying away; but Sir Hyde's

\* See vol. ii. p. 181.

† Brenton, vol. ii., p. 545.

‡ Ibid. p. 542.

§ Southey's *Life of Nelson*, vol. ii., p. 118.

reason for extending the order to the Zealand, a much larger and finer ship than the Holstein, is not very clear.

On the 9th, after some altercation as to the duration of the armistice, one was agreed upon for 14 weeks; and Denmark engaged to suspend all proceedings under the treaty of armed neutrality, which she had entered into with Sweden and Russia. The prisoners, also, were to be sent on shore, and accounted for in case hostilities should be renewed. Moreover the British fleet had permission to provide itself, at Copenhagen and elsewhere along the coast, with all things requisite for the health and comfort of the seamen.

On the 12th, having despatched home the Holstein, Monarch, and Isis, with the wounded men, Admiral Parker sailed from Copenhagen road with the remainder of the fleet, except the St.-George and one or two frigates, and directed his course along the difficult channel of the Grounds, between the islands of Amag and Saltholm. This was both a tedious and a dangerous navigation, as most of the men of war had to trans-ship their guns into merchant vessels; and even then, several of the former got on shore. The whole of the ships at length extricated themselves; and, to the astonishment of Danes, Swedes, Russians, and Prussians, entered the Baltic by this route.

The British admiral's first object was to attack the Russian squadron at Revel, before the breaking up of the frost should enable it to effect a junction with the Swedish squadron at Carlsrona; but, in his way thither, hearing that a Swedish squadron, reported at nine sail of the line, was at sea, Sir Hyde steered for the northern extremity of the island of Bornholm. The Swedish admiral, however, whose force consisted of only six sail of the line, conceiving himself no match for a British admiral with 16, sought refuge behind the forts of Carlsrona. Here a negotiation was opened between Sir Hyde Parker, and the Swedish Vice-admiral Cronstadt; which, on the 22d, ended in an agreement by his Swedish majesty to treat for the accommodation of all existing differences.

By this time Lord Nelson had joined the admiral, and had his flag again flying on board the Elephant. How he had got thither merits to be related. On the 18th the St.-George, having removed her guns to an American vessel, and, by the excellent management of Mr. Briarly, of the Bellona, whose local experience was very great, succeeded in passing the Grounds, was ready to follow Sir Hyde; but a contrary wind detained her. On the following evening Lord Nelson received intelligence from the admiral, of the Swedish fleet's having been seen by one of his look-out frigates. Instantly he quitted the St.-George, and, embarking in a six-oared cutter, with Mr. Briarly, set off to join the admiral, although the latter was at a distance of 24 miles, in the very teeth of the wind and current. "The moment he received the account," says Mr. Briarly, "he ordered a boat to

he manned, and, without even waiting for a boat-cleak (though you must suppose the weather pretty sharp here at this season of the year), and having to row about 24 miles with the wind and current against him, jumped into her, and ordered me to go with him, I having been on board that ship (the *St.-George*) to remain till she had got over the Grounds. All I had ever seen or heard of him could not half so clearly prove to me the singular and unbounded zeal of this truly great man. His anxiety in the boat for nearly six hours, lest the fleet should have sailed before he got on board one of them, and lest we should not catch the Swedish squadron, is beyond all conception. I will quote some expressions in his own words. It was extremely cold, and I wished him to put on a great coat of mine which was in the boat: 'No, I am not cold; my anxiety for my country will keep me warm. Do you think the fleet has sailed?' 'I should suppose not, my lord.'—'If they have, we will follow them to Carlsrona in the boat, by God!' " The distance to which place, Mr. Briarly goes on to state, was about 50 leagues. At midnight, Lord Nelson reached the *Elephant*; and Mr. Briarly returned to the *St.-George*, to conduct her to Kiøge bay.

On the 23d a lugger joined the fleet, then not far from Carlsrona on its way to the gulf of Finland, with despatches from Count Van der Paklen, the Russian ambassador at Copenhagen, containing overtures of a pacific nature from Alexander I., who now, by the decease of the Czar Paul, had become invested with the imperial sceptre. This induced Sir Hyde to return with the fleet to Kiøge bay; where, on the 5th of May, he was found by a vessel that brought despatches recalling him from the command. Shortly afterwards Admiral Parker sailed for England in the *Blanche*, leaving the command of the fleet to Vice-admiral Lord Nelson. Almost the first signal made by the new commander-in-chief was, to hoist in all the launches and prepare to weigh. On the 7th the fleet, by the addition of the *St.-George* now augmented to 17 sail of the line, a 54 and a 50 gun ship, besides a few frigates and smaller vessels, set sail from Kiøge bay. On the 8th, after having by a flag of truce informed Vice-admiral Cronstadt, that although Sir Hyde Parker had consented not to interrupt the Swedish navigation, he should act against the Swedish fleet if he found it at sea, Lord Nelson left Captain Murray, with the *Edgar*, *Russel*, *Saturn*, *Agamemnon*, *Ardent*, *Raisable*, *Glatton*, and a frigate to cruise off Carlsrona; while, with the remaining 11 sail of the line, one frigate, and two brigs, the vice-admiral hastened to the gulf of Finland.

On the 14th Lord Nelson anchored in Revel roads; but no Russian squadron was in that quarter. The bay had been clear of firm ice since the 29th of April, at which time Sir Hyde Parker, with the fleet, was lying inactive at Kiøge, and the Russians had subsequently sawed through the ice in the mole,

and on the 3d had sailed for Cronstadt. A communication with the shore now took place ; and the Emperor Alexander repeated his friendly intentions, but expressed surprise at the appearance of the British admiral at Revel. On the 17th the latter quitted the road ; and on the 19th the Russians and Swedes took off the embargo that had been laid on British vessels in their ports. Thus were the amicable relations between England and these two powers once more restored.

On the 6th of June, after having been at anchor some days off Rostock, Lord Nelson returned to Kiøge bay, and on the 13th received the sanction of the admiralty to an application which, on account of the bad state of his health, he had made to return to England. On the 17th or 18th Vice-admiral Sir Charles Morice Pole, in the 32-gun frigate *Æolus*, arrived to take the command ; and on the 19th Lord Nelson quitted the Baltic in the *Kite* brig. Vice-admiral Pole remained on the station until the latter end of July ; when, there being no longer any occasion for so powerful a fleet in the Baltic, he was ordered home. Although his command had been short and pacific, Vice-admiral Pole found means to increase the high opinion that his predecessor had gained for the British navy in these inland seas, by carrying safely through the intricate channel of the Great Belt, against an adverse wind, a fleet of line-of-battle ships, two of which were three-deckers.

For the successful result of the Copenhagen battle, and the gallantry displayed in it by Lord Nelson and his associates, the thanks of both houses of parliament were voted to the admirals, captains, officers, and men of Sir Hyde Parker's fleet. Owing to some political considerations, having reference, we believe, to the ties that existed between the crowned heads of England and Denmark, the only mark of royal approbation bestowed upon the conquerors was the investment of Rear-admiral Graves with the order of the bath. This infraction of the usual custom did not, however, extend to the promotion of the junior class of officers, all the lieutenants of the ships engaged, and perhaps a few others, being made commanders, and Captains Devonshire, Brisbane, and Birchall, post-captains.

#### BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

The continental war having ceased, by a treaty of peace concluded at Luneville on the 9th of February between France and the Emperor of Germany, the first-consul began, more seriously than ever, to entertain hopes of being able to plant his victorious legions upon British ground. "Tous les moyens propres à entretenir la haine de la nation contre la Grande-Bretagne fut employés avec activité et avec succès. Les autorités, les orateurs du gouvernement, les écrivains publicistes, rivalisèrent de

zèle pour prêcher cette espèce de croisade contre l'éternelle ennemie de la France."\*

The port of Boulogne was to be the central rendezvous of the grand flotilla; and on the 12th of July Buonaparte issued an order for the assemblage there of nine divisions of gun-vessels, and of the same number of battalions of troops, besides several detachments of artillery to serve the guns on board the flotilla. Of which flotilla Rear-admiral René-Madeleine La Touche-Tréville was appointed the commander-in-chief, with directions to exercise the troops in ship-working, in firing the guns, in boarding, and in getting in and out of the vessels.

These preparations, exaggerated as they were by the French journals, spread no slight degree of alarm on the shores of England, and caused corresponding preparations, in the defensive way, to be made by the British government. Among other measures taken to calm the public mind, was the appointment of Vice-admiral Lord Nelson to the chief command of the defence constructing and collecting along the coast from Orfordness to Beachy Head.

On the 30th of July the vice-admiral hoisted his flag on board the 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Medusa*, Captain John Gore, at anchor in the Downs; and on the 3d of August, having under his charge about 30 vessels, great and small, Lord Nelson, by orders from the admiralty, of which Earl St.-Vincent was now at the head, stood across to Boulogne; the port whence, as already stated, the main attempt was to be made, and which the French, informed by their secret intelligence that an attack would be made, had recently been fortifying with great care.

On the 4th the English bomb-vessels threw their shells amidst the French flotilla, consisting of 24 brigs, lugger-rigged flats, and a schooner, moored in a line in front of the town. The effect of the bombardment was, by the English account, the sinking of three flats and a brig, and the driving of several others on shore; but the French declare that only two gun-boats were slightly damaged, and that not a man was hurt on board the flotilla. Nor did the British sustain any greater loss than one captain of artillery and two seamen wounded by the bursting of a French shell.

On the night of the 15th of August, Lord Nelson despatched the armed boats of his squadron, formed into four divisions, under the respective commands of Captains Philip Somerville, Edward Thornborough Parker, Isaac Cotgrave, and Robert Jones, and accompanied by a division of mortar-boats, under Captain John Conn, to attempt to bring off the French flotilla, which had been much strengthened since the last attack. At about 11 h. P.M. the boats put off from the *Medusa*, in the most

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xiv., p. 18.

perfect order; but the darkness of the night, co-operating with the tide and half-tide, separated the divisions.

The first division, under Captain Somerville, on getting near to the shore, was carried by the current considerably to the eastward of Boulogne bay. Finding it impracticable to reach the French flotilla in the order prescribed, Captain Somerville ordered the boats to cast each other off and make the best of their way. By this means, at a little before the dawn of day on the 16th, some of the leading boats got up to and attacked a brig, lying close to the pier-head; and, after a sharp contest, carried the vessel, but were prevented from towing her off, owing to her being secured with a chain, and owing to a heavy fire of musketry and grape-shot, opened as well from the shore as from three luggers and a second brig, lying within half pistol-shot of the first. Thus compelled to abandon their prize, and the daylight putting a stop to further operations, the boats of the first division pushed out of the bay. The persevering efforts of the officers and men of this division had cost them dearly; their loss amounting to one master's mate (Alexander Rutherford), 14 seamen, and three marines killed, four lieutenants (Thomas Oliver, Francis Dickenson, Jeremiah Skelton, and William Basset), one captain of marines (George Young), one master's mate (Francis Burney), one midshipman (Samuel Spratley), 29 seamen, and 19 marines wounded; total, 18 killed and 55 wounded.

The second division, under Captain Parker, was more successful than the first in meeting less obstacles from the current, and at about half an hour past midnight got to the scene of action. One subdivision of the boats, led by the captain, immediately ran alongside of a large brig, the *Etna*, moored off the Mole head, wearing the broad pendant of Commodore Bienne Pévieux. Nothing could exceed the impetuosity of the attack; but a very strong netting, traced up to the brig's lower yards, baffled all the endeavours of the British to board, and an instantaneous discharge of her great guns and small-arms, the latter from about 200 soldiers stationed on the gunwale, knocked back into their boats nearly the whole of the assailants. The second subdivision, under Lieutenant Williams, carried a lugger, but, in attacking a brig, the *Volcan*, met with a repulse, and was obliged to retire with the other subdivision. The loss sustained by the British, in the two subdivisions, proved with what obstinacy the contest had been maintained. It amounted to two midshipmen (William Gore and William Bristow), 16 seamen, and four marines killed, Captain Parker himself (mortally), two lieutenants (Charles Pelly and Frederick Langford), one master (William Kirby), one midshipman (the Honourable Anthony Maitland), Mr. Richard Wilkinson, commander of the Greyhound revenue cutter, 30 seamen, and six marines wounded total, 21 killed and 42 wounded.



The third division, under Captain Cotgrave, displayed the same gallantry, and experienced nearly the same opposition as the two others had done; and was equally compelled to retire without effecting the object. The loss of this division amounted to one midshipman (Mr. Berry), and four seamen killed, one gunner, 23 seamen, and five marines wounded; total, five killed and 29 wounded. The fourth division of boats, under Captain Jones, not being able, owing to the rapidity of the tide, to get to the westward of any part of the enemy's line, put back to the squadron.

The French say they captured four of the English boats, and ran down several others; and that their loss amounted to only 10 men killed and 30 wounded: whereas that of the British amounted altogether to 44 killed, and 126 wounded. Of course the French boasted, and certainly not without reason, of the successful opposition they had made to the persevering assaults of the British.

The appellation of gun-brig, and of flat or raft, convey, without some explanation, a very imperfect idea of the description of vessels of which the Boulogne flotilla was composed. The brigs were vessels of from 200 to 250 tons, armed with from four to eight heavy long guns, generally 24 and 18 pounders, and in some instances, 36-pounders. The account of a comparatively small lugger-flat, taken at Havre in the early part of the present year, may suffice for the generality of those at Boulogne. This flat drew but three and a half feet water, had very stout bulwarks, and carried 30 men in crew, besides 150 soldiers; she was armed with one 13-inch mortar, one long 24-pounder, and four swivels, and had also abundance of small-arms.

This was the last affair with the invasion-flotilla, except a spirited little boat attack performed in the neighbourhood of Etaples. On the 20th of August, in the evening, as the British 24-gun ship *Jamaica*, Captain Jonas Rose, accompanied by four or five brig-sloops and gun-vessels, lay at anchor off the above-named French port, a large fire was seen, and a heavy cannonade heard, in the south-south east. Captain Rose immediately got under way with his little squadron, and at 10 P. M., while running down to the spot, spoke Captain George Sarradine, of the brig-sloop *Hound*. From the latter, Captain Rose learnt that the light proceeded from a cargo of pitch and tar belonging to a vessel wrecked sometime before, and which the boats of the *Hound*, and of the *Mallard* gun-vessel, had set on fire; that six flat-boats had come out from St.-Valery to attack the British, but had been driven on shore and then lay upon the beach.

Being resolved to attempt the capture or destruction of these French boats, Captain Rose, on the morning of the 21st, despatched upon that service the boats of the *Jamaica*, *Gannet*, and *Hound* sloops, and *Tigress* and *Mallard* gun-vessels, under the orders of Lieutenants James Agassiz and Henry Le Vesconte.

The squadron at the same time stood in to cover the boats from the fire of the military and of five field-pieces, posted behind some sand-hills on the beach. In spite of this opposition, the British succeeded in bringing off three of the French boats, and would have brought off the others, had they not been scuttled: they were, however, damaged as much as the time would admit. The loss of the British on this occasion amounted to no more than one seaman killed, and one midshipman (Thomas Hamblin), and three seamen wounded. The captured flats were each about 45 feet long and 18 or 20 broad, and mounted one brass 8-inch howitzer.

After his repeated promises to send supplies and reinforcements to the army he had left in Egypt, Buonaparte must have felt sorely aggrieved that almost all his endeavours to do so had been frustrated by the vigilance of British cruisers: even the offer of large rewards to the equippers of merchant vessels or privateers that should first reach a port of Egypt with provisions and military stores, served only to augment the number and enhance the value of Lord Keith's prizes.

Hitherto the efforts to relieve the Egyptian army had been confined to such frigates and smaller vessels, as might be able to escape from Toulon or some other French Mediterranean port; but, no sooner did the first-consul learn the real destination of the army under General Abercromby, than he contemplated the forwarding of a reinforcement upon a grander scale. That reinforcement was to consist of seven two-deckers, the élite of the Brest fleet, having on board 5000 troops under the command of General Sahuguet.

The officer intrusted with the charge of this secret and hazardous mission was one of the ablest at this time belonging to the republic, Rear-admiral Ganteaume; and the following were the ships of which his squadron was composed:

<i>Gun-ship</i>		
80	Indivisible . . . .	{ Rear-admiral Honoré Ganteaume.
	Indomptable	{ Captain Antoine-Louis Gourdon.
	Formidable	Commodore ——— Moncousu.
	Desaix	Captain Joseph Allary,
74	Constitution	* Commodore Jean-Anne Clurisy-Pallière.
	Jean-Bart .	Captain Gilbert-Amable Faure.
	Dix-Août .	„ François-Jacques Meynne.
		„ Jacques Bergeret.
<i>Gun-frigate</i>		
40	Créole .	Pierre-Paul Gou
36	Bravoure .	Louis-Auguste
<i>Lugger, Vautour.</i>		

On the 7th of January this squadron sailed from Brest, and anchored in the road of Bertheaume; and about the same time, in order to draw the attention of the British cruisers in a different direction, the French ships at anchor in the minor ports of the Channel and bay of Biscay made demonstrations of putting to sea. In the hope to profit by this ruse, Rear-admiral Gan-

teau, on the 8th, got under way, and stood through the passage du Raz; but here, contrary to his expectation, he was discovered and chased by a division of the Channel fleet under the command of Vice-admiral Sir Henry Harvey. This obliged the French admiral to regain the coast; and he soon afterwards came to an anchor at the mouth of the river Vilaine. Thence, in order that the British might be led to suppose he had no other object in view than the other French squadrons in motion at this time, M. Ganteau subsequently departed, steering for the road of Brest; where he anchored, as if the service he had been detached upon was executed.

Here lay the French admiral, waiting for a northerly gale of wind, to blow the British blockading force off the coast. On the 23d a storm arose, favourable alike in direction and violence; and late on that night the squadron of M. Ganteau weighed and put to sea. The only safe passage under such circumstances, that of Iroise, was now entirely free from British cruisers; but such was the violence of the gale that, besides carrying away the topmasts of several of the ships, it separated the *Indivisible* and *Créole* from the rest of the squadron.

On the 27th of January, at 9 P. M., Cape Finisterre bearing east half-north distant 25 leagues, the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Concorde*, Captain Robert Barton, while steering to the eastward, discovered by the light of the moon seven large ships, about two miles to windward, under easy sail, standing to the westward. These were the *Indomptable*, *Formidable*, *Desaix*, *Constitution*, *Jean-Bart*, *Dix-Août*, and *Bravoure*, under the orders of Commodore Moncousu.

One of the 74s and the frigate immediately bore up in chase; whereupon the *Concorde*, casting off a Swedish ship she had in tow, made sail ahead. In a little time the line-of-battle ship, hauling up again, steered to rejoin her squadron; while the *Bravoure* continued bearing away in chase of the *Concorde*. As soon as she had reached what was considered to be a distance of about six miles from the French squadron, the *Concorde* hove to, and, by the usual mode of signalling, presently convinced herself that the ship in chase of her was not a friend.

After a mutual hail, an order to strike to a French frigate, and a volley of musketry, the *Bravoure* ranged up on the *Concorde*'s lee side, and gave and returned a heavy fire; until, passing on, she shot so far ahead as to bring the *Concorde* on her larboard quarter. In this position the latter kept her opponent warmly and closely engaged, for about half an hour; when the fire of the *Bravoure* ceased, and almost at the same instant one of her boats and some other wreck fell from her stern and larboard quarter. Captain Barton now concluded that his antagonist, having discontinued the action, had surrendered; but presently the *Bravoure* was observed making sail, and soon stood away before the wind. The damaged state of the *Concorde*'s running

rigging delayed her in chasing; and, at 3 A. M. on the 28th, she lost sight of the *Bravoure*. At daylight, however, the *Concorde* again discovered the French frigate; but the appearance of the latter's squadron to windward compelled Captain Barton, not only to relinquish the pursuit of the *Bravoure*, but to attend to the safety of the *Concorde*.

The latter's loss in the action, out of a crew on board of not more than 224 men and boys, amounted to four men killed and 19 wounded, one of them mortally. The loss on board the *Bravoure*, out of a complement of about 320 men and boys, is officially stated to have been 10 men killed, including her third lieutenant and pilot, and 24 wounded, including her captain, who had the misfortune to have half his hand carried away by a grape-shot.

The guns of the *Concorde* have already appeared; but owing to the bursting of one of her 28\* maindeck 12-pounders on the 10th of the preceding August, whereby nine men were killed and five badly wounded, and another 12-pounder was disabled, the frigate mounted on the present occasion but 40 guns. The *Bravoure* appears to have mounted 42 guns, two more than the establishment of her class, on account of having, like the *Concorde* herself previous to her accident, 28 twelves on the main deck. In point of force, therefore, the *Concorde* and *Bravoure* were tolerably well matched; but, in practical gunnery, the relative execution shows that, if the two combatants had been left to themselves, the British frigate, without some extraordinary chance in her opponent's favour, must have come off the conqueror.

A writer in the French work so frequently quoted by us declares, that the two frigates did meet by themselves, but that Captain Dordelin, by closing with the intention to board, "frightened away Captain Barton," "*effraya le capitaine ennemi.*"† The latter assertion appears to be founded upon a statement, although not quite so forcibly expressed, in the despatch of Rear-admiral Ganteaume; but who, be it understood, is merely reciting the report made to him by Commodore Moncousu, as the substance of the information received by the latter from Captain Dordelin himself. It is Captain Dordelin, therefore, who vaunts of his own prowess; who declares that he compelled the *Concorde* to run away, that her guns were 18-pounders, and that he heard "groans and cries" proceeded from her after the discharge of his first broadside. Crediting the statement, M. Ganteaume strongly urges the minister of marine to promote M. Dordelin from a *capitaine de frégate* to a *capitaine de vaisseaux*; but the first-consul appears to have seen further into the business than M. Ganteaume, and did not promote the *Bravoure's* captain to

\* See vol. i., p. 201. We omitted to mention, that the *Concorde* differed from her class in mounting 28, instead of 26 guns on the main deck; but the total of her guns is there correctly stated at 42.

† *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xiv., p. 151.

that rank until two years and eight months (September 24, 1808) had elapsed since the date of the action upon the merits of which M. Dordelin founded his pretensions.

After this exploit by one of his squadron, Commodore Moncousu pursued his way towards the Straits; and on the 30th, off Cape Spartel, the first appointed rendezvous, effected his junction with Rear-admiral Ganteaume; who, on the preceding evening, after a long chase, had captured the British ship-sloop, or fire-ship, Incendiary, Captain Richard Dalling Dung. Imitating the example of some British admirals and captains, M. Ganteaume described his prize as "of," when he should have said, "pierced for," 28 guns. The Incendiary, we believe, mounted only sixteen 18-pounder carronades; but the Spitfire, and one or two others of the Incendiary's class, were established with 24 guns, for which, by opening their maindeck ports, they had ample room.

After destroying his prize, Rear-admiral Ganteaume stood towards the Straits; and, on the morning of the 9th of February, passed through them into the Mediterranean under a press of sail. The only sea-going ship at this time at Gibraltar, the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Success, Captain Shuldhham Peard, immediately weighed and steered after the French squadron. Having no doubt that M. Ganteaume's destination was Egypt, Captain Peard intended, if he could, to pass him on the passage, and apprise Lord Keith of his expected arrival. On the 10th, in the morning, the Success came up with the French ships off Cape de Gata, where the second rendezvous had been appointed, and passed them in the night. During the whole of the 11th and 12th, owing chiefly to light and variable winds, the French squadron kept sight of the Success. Soon after dark the wind began to blow fresh from the southward; and, as the Success went occasionally at the rate of nine knots an hour, Captain Peard flattered himself that he should see no more of his pursuers. At daylight on the 13th, however, the leading French ships were close up with the British frigate. Finding escape impossible, Captain Peard, with great judgment, put back to the westward, not only to retard the French admiral in his progress, but to expose him to the risk of meeting any British force that might have been detached in pursuit. At noon the wind fell; and at 3 p. m., after two or three of the line-of-battle ships had got within musket-shot and opened their fire, the Success hauled down her flag.

Learning from his prisoners, among whom were the officers and crew of the Sprightly cutter, Lieutenant Robert Jump, captured and scuttled on the 10th, that Admiral Lord Keith, and Rear-admiral Sir Richard Bickerton were already, where they did not arrive until more than a fortnight afterwards, upon the coast of Egypt with a great force, and that Rear-admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, with a force about equal to his own,

might be hourly expected in pursuit from the westward, Rear-admiral Ganteaume steered for the gulf of Lyons, and on the 19th anchored with his squadron in the road of Toulon. After a captivity of only five days, during which every attention was paid to their comfort by Rear-admiral Ganteaume and those about him, all the British officers and men were permitted to depart in a cartel for Port-Mahon; where, on the morning of the 26th, they safely arrived.

It is now time to see what steps had been taken, in consequence of the escape of this French squadron from Brest, by the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, Admiral Earl St. Vincent. On the 3d of February the *Concorde* anchored at Plymouth with the account of her engagement with the *Bravoure*; and, in a day or two afterwards, Rear-admiral Sir Robert Calder, with seven sail of the line, two frigates, and a brig, was detached from the Channel fleet in pursuit of M. Ganteaume: not, however, to the Mediterranean, but, owing to a lack of information on the subject, to the West Indies.

Nothing can afford a stronger proof of the national confidence, as well as fairness, in naval warfare, than the sending in pursuit of an enemy's squadron a British squadron of the same numerical force; but we cannot help asking, what was the use of selecting six of the fastest two-deckers from the Channel fleet, when the flag-officer in command of them was to take his passage in a three-decker? The question of force offers no obstacle, for both the *Cæsar* and the *Malta* were fully equal to the *Prince-of-Wales*. The total number of three-deckers possessed by France at this time was six; and of these two only were in a serviceable state; whereas England had actually at sea 18 three-deckers, 13 of which, at this very time, were cruising off Brest. The superior accommodations of a three-decker have, we know, been alleged as a reason for retaining so many of them in the service, especially to carry flags; but, in a fighting ship, the comfort of the commanding officer, whether admiral or captain, ought always to be a secondary consideration.

The only British force, in a situation to molest Rear-admiral Ganteaume, was the squadron of Rear-admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, composed of the 80-gun ship *Gibraltar*, Captain William Hancock Kelly, 74-gun ships *Renown* (flag), Captain John Chambers White, *Dragon*, Captain John Aylmer, *Généreux*, Captain Manley Dixon, and *Hector*, Captain John Elphinstone, 64-gun ship *Haerlem*, with only a portion of her lowerdeck guns on board, Captain George Barlow, and two or three frigates and smaller vessels.

It was on the 8th of February, while cruising off Cadiz with a part of this squadron, that the rear-admiral received the first intelligence of the squadron of M. Ganteaume. Sir John immediately steered for Gibraltar; and, arriving there on the

morning of the 10th, learnt that the French squadron had, 24 hours before, passed into the Mediterranean. On the 13th Sir John, with his squadron, quitted Gibraltar, and steered for Minorca, having previously despatched two frigates to reconnoitre the ports of Carthage and Toulon; and on the 20th he anchored in the harbour of Port-Mahon. On the 24th, having thoroughly refitted his squadron, Sir John sailed on a cruise; but, experiencing during the same night a heavy gale of wind, was obliged to put back with several of his ships damaged, and on the 27th reanchored at Mahon.

On the 4th of March the rear-admiral again set sail, but with only five of his squadron, having left the *Généreux* behind, as some protection in the event of an expected attack upon Minorca by the Spaniards and French. On the 7th Sir John spoke two vessels, who informed him that the King of Naples had concluded an armistice with General Murat. Upon this intelligence the rear-admiral steered for Palermo, to protect the British interests in Sicily, as well as to effect a junction with the 74-gun ship *Alexander*, Captain Alexander John Ball, and 64 *Athénien*, Captain Sir Thomas Livingstone. On the 18th, when off the island of Maritimo, the *Athénien* joined; as on the 22d, off the small island of Calita, did the *Alexander*.

With his force thus augmented to seven sail of the line, including two 64s, Sir John stood back towards Toulon, to blockade M. Ganteaume in the road; but on the 25th the brig-sloop *Salamine*, Captain Thomas Briggs, joined from Captain Dixon at Mahon, bringing information that the French admiral, with seven sail of the line, three frigates, and three merchant vessels, had on the morning of the 19th again put to sea. No sooner, in fact, did the first-consul receive the mortifying account, as well of the arrival of M. Ganteaume at Toulon before his mission had been fulfilled, as of the capture of the frigate *Africaine*, on her way to the coast of Egypt, than he despatched from Paris his aide-de-camp, Gérard Lacuée, with orders that Rear-admiral Ganteaume should sail immediately for Alexandria; and that, should he find the port blockaded by a superior force, he was to disembark the troops at any practicable spot to the westward of Alexandria, between Tripoli and Cape Rasat. With this object in view, Rear-admiral Ganteaume accordingly sailed, but on the same night experienced so heavy a gale of wind, that one of his line-of-battle ships lost her main-mast and put back, some of the other ships were greatly damaged, and one of the merchant vessels, having also parted company, was fallen in with and captured by the British frigate *Minerve*.

On the 25th at daybreak, when about 14 leagues south-west of the island of Toro, Sir John Warren obtained a distant sight of M. Ganteaume's weatherbeaten squadron, counted by the *Mercury* at 10 sail, being three short of its original number.

Chase was immediately given; and, before evening, some of the British ships had gained upon the enemy; but the slow sailing of the Gibraltar and Athénien induced the rear-admiral to order the remainder of the squadron to shorten sail, and at dark, or soon afterwards, every French ship disappeared. Nor was the enemy again seen; as, while Sir John was hastening to the southward and eastward, M. Ganteaume had stood back to the northward, and shortly afterwards reanchored in Toulon.

Buonaparte sent orders to M. Ganteaume to make a third attempt to reach Egypt. Accordingly, on the 27th of April, the persevering French admiral again set sail with his seven line-of-battle ships and two frigates, besides one corvette and two store-ships. Finding, when at Leghorn, into which port he had put by the way, to co-operate in the siege of Porto-Ferrajo, that the formidable, Indomptable, and Desaix, as well as the frigate Créole, were too short-manned to proceed on the voyage, Rear-admiral Ganteaume ordered them back to Toulon; and, with four two-deckers, one frigate, one corvette, and four store-ships, stood away for the Straits of Messina. These he passed on the 25th of May; and on the 5th of June, while on his way to the coast of Egypt from off Brindisi, where he had expected to be joined by three Neapolitan frigates, M. Ganteaume fell in with and chased, but could not overtake, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Pique, Captain James Young.

On the 7th, being only about 70 leagues to the westward of Alexandria, the French admiral detached the corvette Héliopolis to reconnoitre the Egyptian coast, and ascertain the exact situation of the hostile fleet. On the 9th, at daylight, the Héliopolis arrived close off Alexandria; and, after a distant chase by the Kent and Hector 74s and Cruelle cutter, succeeded in entering the port. The fact is that, in consequence of the information brought to Lord Keith by the Pique on the evening of the 7th, the British squadron, on the morning of the 8th, made sail to the westward, in search of the hourly expected French squadron. So that, when the Héliopolis arrived in sight of Alexandria, the chief part of the blockading force was abreast of the Arab's tower, or about four leagues to the westward.

The non-return of the Héliopolis leaving scarcely a doubt that she had been captured by the British fleet, Rear-admiral Ganteaume, conformably to his instructions, searched to the westward of Alexandria for a convenient spot to disembark the troops, and found it, as he conceived, at a small town situated about 180 leagues to the eastward of Tripoli, and a dependance upon that regency; with which, as well as with the regency of Tunis, Buonaparte had just concluded a treaty. Having come to an anchor off Bengazi, the squadron began making preparations to land the troops; but, so spirited and effectual was the opposition of the inhabitants, that the attempt was found impracticable. Just at this moment the squadron of Lord Keith,



or some of the advanced ships belonging to it, have in sight to the eastward. The French admiral immediately cut his cables, and crowded sail from the coast; leaving two of his store-ships, which could not keep up with him, to be captured by the British 28-gun frigate *Vestal*, and one or two smaller vessels, then far ahead of their companions.

On the 24th, at 3 h. 30 m. A. M., Cape Derna on the coast of Barbary bearing south-west distant about seven leagues, the British 74-gun ship *Swiftsure*, Captain Benjamin Hallowell, then, with the wind at north-west, steering towards the island of Malta, to reinforce the squadron under Rear-admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, discovered the squadron of M. Ganteaume hull-down to leeward.\* From previous information Captain Hallowell concluded that the ships were those of M. Ganteaume, and made all sail to escape. At 5 h. 30 m. the *Jean-Bart* and *Constitution*, by signal from the admiral, tacked and stood on until they fetched into the *Swiftsure*'s wake. At 8 A. M., the remaining three French ships, having fore-reached considerably, tacked also, until they arrived upon the lee quarter of the *Swiftsure*, when they tacked again.

Such was the very superior sailing of the French ships, that by 2 P. M. the *Indivisible*, *Dix-Août*, and *Créole*, had arrived nearly within gun-shot. Observing that the ships astern were also fast coming up, Captain Hallowell determined to bear down and engage the three nearest, in the hope to disable one of them, and effect his escape to leeward. Accordingly, at 3 P. M., the *Swiftsure* bore down under all sail, steering to pass astern of the rearmost of the three French ships; whereupon all of the latter tacked and stood towards her. In half an hour the *Indivisible* and *Dix-Août*, standing on in close order, opened their fire within half gun-shot, and, by their superior rate of sailing, baffled every effort of the *Swiftsure* to get to leeward. In this way the action was maintained until 4 h. 37 m. P. M.; when, the *Constitution* and *Jean-Bart* being within gun-shot on the *Swiftsure*'s starboard quarter, and closing fast, the *Indivisible* almost on board of her on the larboard bow, and the *Dix-Août* as near on the larboard quarter, the British ship struck her colours.

The masts, yards, rigging, and sails of the *Swiftsure*, were completely cut to pieces; but, it having been the principal object of the French to dismantle the ship, her loss, out of a crew at quarters, owing to 59 being sick and 86 of her best men having been taken from her by Lord Keith, of not more than 450 men and boys, amounted to only two men killed, and one lieutenant (Lewis Davis) and seven men wounded, two of them mortally. That the *Swiftsure* did not act quite so tenderly towards her antagonists, appears by the French admiral's return of loss; according to which, the *Indivisible* had four men killed and wounded, and the *Dix-Août* six men killed and 23

wounded. M. Ganteaume manned his prize by detachments from the ships of his squadron; and, after labouring at her for six days, in the most favourable weather (a tolerable proof of the state to which she had been reduced), succeeded in placing her in a condition to accompany him to Toulon: where, on the 22d of July, the squadron safely arrived.

In his public letter, Captain Hallowell, much to his credit, as well as to the credit of his captors, speaks in the highest terms of the treatment which himself, his officers, and men, experienced from the officers of M. Ganteaume's squadron, and from the French admiral in particular. On the other hand, M. Ganteaume's report of the conduct of the Swiftsure's captain, has called forth the following panegyric from a French naval writer, "Le capitaine Hallowell, se défendit avec opiniâtreté, et n'amena son pavillon que lorsqu'il se vit en danger de couler bas."\* It is almost unnecessary to state, that Captain Hallowell and the late officers and crew of the Swiftsure, on their return to England, were most honourably acquitted for the loss of their ship.

Having, by a treaty concluded on the 28th of March, upon his own terms, got Naples to cede to him Porto-Longone, and the whole of the Neapolitan part of the isle of Elba, the first consul of France determined to possess himself of the remaining, or Tuscan portion of the island, including the strong fortress of Porto-Ferrajo, but the garrison of which did not exceed 400 men.

On the 2d of May General Tharreau, with about 1500 men, disembarked at Porto-Longone from the opposite port of Piombino; and, after vainly summoning, and as vainly trying to corrupt, Carlo de Fisson, the Tuscan governor, the French general commenced his investment of the place. The only British force off the port at this time were two frigates, the *Phoenix* and *Mermaid*, under the orders of Captain Lawrence William Halsted, of the former. But these soon afterwards departed on some other service, and the harbour of Porto-Ferrajo was blockaded by the French 28-gun frigate *Badine*, and subsequently by the following French\* squadron:

Gun-frigate

38	Carrère . . . .	Captain Claude-Pascal Morel-Beaulieu.
36	Bonvoure . . . .	" Louis-Auguste Dordelin.
32	Succès . . . .	" Jac.-Fr.-Ignace Bretel, senior officer.

Towards the latter end of July, to render still more critical the state of the small garrison of Porto-Ferrajo, General Watrin, at the head of 5000 men, landed on the island to supersede General Tharreau in the command; and, in pursuance of the orders he had received from General Murat in Tuscany, the

\* *Wintours et Conquêtes, tome xiv., p. 127.*

newly-arrived French general began the most active preparations for reducing the fortress.

On the 1st of August Rear-admiral Sir John Warren, with the *Renown* and squadron, arrived off the island, and, chasing the *Bravoure* and *Succès* into Leghorn, raised the blockade of Porto-Ferrajo.

On the 3d, at 2 h. 30 m. P. M., the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Phoenix*, Captain Lawrence William Halsted, 18-pounder 40-gun frigate *Pomone*, Captain Edward Leveson Gower, and 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Pearl*, Captain Samuel James Ballard, cruising off the west side of the island of Elba, discovered the *Carrère*, on her passage from Porto-Ercole to Porto-Longone, with 300 barrels of powder on board, and a convoy of small vessels in charge laden with ordnance-stores and provisions.

At 8 h. 10 m. P. M., after the interchange of a few shot from bow and stern chasers, and a resistance alongside of about 10 minutes' duration, the *Carrère* hauled down her colours to the *Pomone*, the only British ship near enough to open a fire. Out of her complement of about 320 men and boys, the *Pomone* lost her boatswain (Thomas Cook) and one quartermaster killed, and one lieutenant of marines (Charles Douglas, loss of a leg) and one seaman mortally, and two other seamen slightly wounded. The loss on board the *Carrère* is not stated in Captain Halsted's letter; but, according to the French account, it was tolerably severe. The whole of the convoy appear to have escaped, and one or two of the vessels to have got into Longone.

The *Carrère* was a fine Venetian-built frigate of 1013 tons, and mounted the same guns as those assigned to her class, in the small table at p. 54, vol. i., except that she had only two carronades, and therefore but 40 guns in all, and that her 8-pounders were brass. Her complement, as deposed to by her officers, was 352. The *Carrère* became added to the British navy as an 18-pounder 36-gun frigate, but her reign as a cruising ship was a short one.

Finding, towards the end of August, that the *Phoenix* was at anchor alone off Piombino, a port on the main land of Tuscany, distant about seven miles from the north-east extremity of Elba, General Watrin sent orders to Captain Bretel at anchor in Leghorn mole, to get under way with his two frigates, and endeavour to capture the British frigate. Accordingly, on the evening of the 31st, the *Succès* and *Bravoure* put to sea upon that service.

On the 2d of September, very early in the morning, these two frigates, just as they were about to enter the Piombino channel, fell in with and chased the British 38-gun frigate *Minerve*, Captain George Cockburn; who, at 6 h. 30 m., made the signal for an enemy to the *Phoenix*, then at anchor in the south-east in company with the *Pomone*, who had rejoined two days before. The two last-named frigates, getting quickly under way, bore up

in chase under all sail; and at 9 A.M. descried the *Succès* and *Bravoure* to the northward, steering back towards Leghorn, pursued by the *Minerve*.

At about 10 h. 30 m. A.M., finding herself dropping astern of her consort, the *Succès* ran aground on the shore of Vada; and, upon receiving a shot from the *Minerve* in passing, hauled down her colours without firing a single gun in return. While the *Minerve* stood on in chase of the *Bravoure*, the *Pomone* took possession of the *Succès*, or, as now again entitled to be called, the *Success*. The wind, shifting to the northward, frustrated every attempt of the *Bravoure* to reach Leghorn; and the French frigate, after missing stays, and vainly attempting to wear, got on shore under the Antignano battery, about four miles to the southward of the mole. Here the three masts of the *Bravoure* soon went by the board, and the ship became totally lost. Owing to the height of the surf and the approach of night, and to the enemy on shore firing upon the boats, Lieutenant William Kelly, first of the *Minerve*, who had been sent to board the *Bravoure*, was not able to bring away more than a few prisoners.

By the exertions of Lieutenant Charles Thompson of the *Phoenix*, and the officers and men under his orders, the *Success* was at length got afloat without receiving any material injury, and was restored to her rank in the British navy. This capture of one, and destruction of a second French frigate, was performed without any loss on the part of the British. A contemporary, with his accustomed inaccuracy in regard to the force of ships, calls the *Bravoure* "an 18-pound frigate,"\* although Captain Halsted, in his letter to Sir John Warren, expressly states that the *Bravoure* mounted "twenty-eight 12-pounders on the main deck, with 283 men." In adding that the *Bravoure* was "of 46 guns," Captain Halsted must of course have adopted the report of Captain Cockburn; but, according to a document now before us, the *Bravoure* was pierced, exclusive of two pairs of bow-chase ports, for no more than 40 guns; although, by filling every port on her main deck, we have elsewhere assigned her 42.†

Shortly after these French frigates, hitherto so annoying to the garrison of Porto-Ferrajo, had thus been disposed of, Lieutenant-colonel George Airey, whom General Fox had recently sent to supersede Captain Gordon in the command of the few British troops in the fortress, applied to Rear-admiral Sir John Warren, who had arrived off Porto-Ferrajo on the 12th of September, for a detachment of marines and seamen from the squadron, to assist in an attack upon some of the French batteries, those especially which shut up the port. This was acceded to, and arrangements were forthwith made for an active co-operation on the part of the squadron, which consisted of the

\* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 54.

† See p. 89.

Renown, Gibraltar, Dragon, Alexander, Généreux, Stately, of the line, Pomone and Pearl frigates, and brig-sloop Vincejo.

On the 13th, at daybreak, the Dragon and Généreux, for the purpose of creating a diversion, opened a fire upon a round tower at Marciana; and on the 14th, a little before daylight, 449 marines and 240 seamen, commanded by Captain George Long of the Vincejo, along with a party of Tuscans, peasants, pioneers, &c., amounting in the whole to about 1000 men, were landed in two divisions under the personal direction of Captain John Chambers White, of the Renown. The attack was made, and several of the French batteries were destroyed, and 55 prisoners, including three captains and two subalterns, brought off; but, the force being found insufficient to complete the whole business, the allied detachment was compelled to retire with a loss altogether of 32 killed, 61 wounded, and 105 missing. Of this number the navy lost a very large proportion; namely, Captain Long, while gallantly leading on his men to storm a narrow bridge, two seamen, and 12 marines killed; one officer, 17 seamen, and 20 marines wounded, and one officer, 12 seamen, and 64 marines missing; total loss to the navy, 15 killed, 33 wounded, and 77 missing.

By the aid of a well-penned despatch, General Watrin makes this repulse of the allied British and Tuscans, "cover the troops of the republic with glory. He augments the assailants to 3000 men, and their loss to 1200, exclusive of 300 prisoners, and declares that his batteries wholly dismasted a frigate, and sank seven of the British boats. But, in spite of all these strong incentives to success on the part of his troops, the French general could make no impression upon Porto-Ferraio; of which Lieutenant-colonel Airey, notwithstanding he lost the aid of Sir John Warren and his squadron on the 22d of September, continued to maintain possession until the treaty of Amiens relieved him from his charge. The important operations of this year upon the coast of Egypt now demand our attention.

In our account of the last year's proceedings of the British and Spanish fleets, we noticed the assemblage at Gibraltar of a powerful naval and military force, under the respective commands of Admiral Lord Keith and General Sir Ralph Abercromby.\* On the 31st of January, after having stopped a short time at Minorca and at Malta, the bulk of the British force intended to act against the French in Lower Egypt, anchored in the fine harbour of Marmarice on the coast of Kammeria, in Asia Minor. The fleet here assembled consisted of full-rigged line-of-battle ships, frigates, and sloops, amounting to 50, 44, and frigates, in number from 25 to 26, including the following squadron:

Admiral Lord Keith  
50. Emdroyant . . . . . Captain John Harvey

Gun-ship

Kent	Rear-Admiral (w.) Sir R. Bickerton, Bt.
Apex	Captain William Hope.
74 Minotaur	" Hon. Alex. Inglis Cochrane.
Northumberland	" Thomas Louis.
Tigre	" George Martin.
Swiftsure	" Sir William Sidney Smith.
	" Benjamin Hallowell.

As soon as news reached him that this powerful British armament had assembled at the island of Malta, Buonaparte could no longer be in doubt respecting its destination. We have already shown what efforts were made to get a squadron to Egypt from Brest. The port of Toulon also lent its aid; but, as no seagoing line-of-battle ships were now there, it could only be by frigates. Two of these, the *Egyptienne* and *Justice*, each having on board a quantity of troops and munitions of war, anchored on the 3d of February in the old or western port of Alexandria. The number of French troops at this time in Upper and Lower Egypt, founded upon the returns published in the *Moniteur*, consisted of nearly 21,000 fighting men. Here were also about 900 sick, about 1000 sailors, 400 or 500 Greek auxiliaries, and perhaps 1000 or 1200 persons in civil employment; and the commander-in-chief of the whole was, as already mentioned (see p. 25), General Abdallah-Jacques Menou, a man very unfit for the station, and not at all liked by the army.

After a considerable delay, arising from a twofold cause, the tardiness of the Turks and the badness of the weather, the British and Turkish men of war and transports, having on board, in the whole about 16,000 men, set sail from Marmorice, and on the 1st, with the exception of the Turkish division consisting of several gun-boats and ketches, which in a westerly gale had bore up for Marje, Cyprus, and other neighbouring ports, arrived in sight of the minarets of Alexandria.

Just as Lord Keith and his fleet gained a sight of Alexandria, the French frigate *Régénérée*, with 200 troops and a company of artillery on board, besides a quantity of military stores, slipped into the western port. This frigate, in company with the *Affiance*, had sailed from Rochefort on the 13th of February, and since parted from her consort, of whose fate we shall hereafter have to give some account. A contemporary states that the *Régénérée* kept company with the British fleet during a whole day, answering every signal that was made; but we doubt the assertion, no mention being made of it in the French accounts. On the night of the 1st, morning of the 2d, the brig-corvette *Lodi* also got into Alexandria from Toulon.

On the same day the British fleet brought up in Aboukir Bay. Too much of that day elapsed, however, before all the ships could get to anchor, or accomplish the disembarkation previously to the approach of night; and a succession of strong northerly gales, attended by a heavy swell, then set in, and lasted

until the evening of the 7th.\* Preparations were instantly commenced, and at 2 A. M. on the 8th the troops began embarking in the boats, the total number of which was upwards of 320. At 3 A. M. the signal was made for the boats to rendezvous near the brig-sloop *Mondovi*, Captain John Stewart, at anchor about a gun-shot from the shore; but, such was the extent of the anchorage occupied by so numerous a fleet, and so great the distance of many of the ships from any one given point, that it was not until 9 A. M. that the signal could be made for the boats to advance towards the shore.

This was then accomplished, under the direction of Captain Cochrane of the *Ajax*, assisted by Captain James Stevenson of the *Europa*, George Scott of the *Stately*, John Larmour of the *Diadem*, Charles Apthorp of the *Druid*, and John Morrison of the *Thisbe*, and by the several agents for transports present in the fleet. The right flank of the boat-flotilla was protected by the armed cutter *Cruelle*, Lieutenant David M'Gie, and gun-vessels *Dangéreuse* and *Janizary*; and the left by the armed cutter *Entreprenante*, schooner *Malta*, and gun-vessel *Negresse*, besides two armed launches, one on each flank; in place of the Turkish gun-boats, which, as already mentioned, had parted from the fleet. The launches, containing the field-artillery as well as a detachment of seamen to co-operate with the army, moved under the direction of their commanding officer, Captain Sir William Sidney Smith, assisted by Captains Peter Ribouleau of the *Astrée*, Daniel Oliver Guion of the *Eurus*, John G. Saville of the *Experiment*, John Burn of the *Blonde*, and James Hillyar of the *Niger*. The bomb-vessels *Tartarus* and *Fury*, Captains Thomas Hand and Richard Curry, were advantageously posted for throwing shot and shells at the enemy, and the sloops *Peterel*, *Cameleon*, and *Minorca*, Captains Charles Inglis, Edward O'Bryen, and George Miller, were moored as near as possible to the beach, with their broadsides sprung towards it.

The force which the French were enabled to bring to the spot, to oppose the disembarkation of the British troops and seamen, in number just 7000 men, consisted of the whole garrison of Alexandria (except the invalids and seamen), amounting, according to the French accounts, to 1500 infantry and 180 cavalry, exclusive of several detachments from *Bedaia* and elsewhere, numbering altogether at least 2500 men. These French troops were under the command of General Brissot, who, with great judgment, had stationed a part of his men with 15 pieces of heavy artillery, upon an almost inaccessible hill, which commanded the whole space of disembarkation, and others, with field-pieces and mortars, in the different excellent positions which the ground afforded.

No sooner did the boats arrive near to the shore, than a heavy fire of grape-shot and musketry from behind the sand-hills seemed to threaten them with destruction, while the castle of

Aboukir on their right flank maintained a constant and harassing discharge of large shots and shells; but the ardour of the British officers and men was not to be damped. No moment of hesitation intervened. The beach was arrived at, and a footing obtained; the troops advanced, and the enemy was forced to relinquish all the advantageous positions he had held. The boats returned without delay for the second division; and, before the evening of the 9th, the whole army, with a proportion of stores and provisions, was landed.

A detachment of 1000 seamen, placed under the orders of Captain Sir William Sidney Smith, formed part of the landed force. The duty of these was to drag the cannon up the heights; a service they performed with their usual alacrity and perseverance, and in which, and in disembarking the army, they sustained a loss of 22 seamen killed, three lieutenants (John Bray, George Thomas, and Francis Collins), one master's mate (Richard Ogleby); three midshipmen (John Finchley, John Donellan, and Edward Robinson, the latter mortally), and 63 seamen wounded, and three seamen missing. The loss sustained by the army, on the same occasion, amounted to four officers, four sergeants, 94 rank and file killed, 26 officers, 34 sergeants, five drummers, 450 rank and file wounded, and one officer, one sergeant, one drummer, 32 rank and file missing; making a grand total of 124 killed, 585 wounded, and 38 missing. The loss sustained by the French, when they were driven from the hill, is stated by them at 400 in killed and badly wounded; but it was believed to have exceeded that amount: they left behind them eight pieces of artillery, one of which was a 24-pounder besides a great number of horses.

On the 12th the British army moved forward, and came in sight of the French army; which, having been reinforced by a body of 4400 troops under General Lanusse, including upwards of 1000 cavalry commanded by General Bron, now amounted to about 7000 men. The French were formed upon an advantageous ridge, having their right on the canal of Alexandria, and their left towards the sea. On the following day, the 13th, a battle was fought, in which the detachment of seamen under Sir Sidney Smith, and of marines under Lieutenant-colonel Walter Smith, emulated the brave troops with whom they were associated. The British gun-boats on the lake of Aboukir, commanded by Captains Frederick Lewis Maitland and James Hillyar, were also particularly useful in annoying the right flank of the French army. At length, after a sharp struggle, the French were repulsed at all quarters, with the loss, as admitted by themselves, of 750 killed and badly wounded; and the British took up a position at the village of Bedah, distant about a league from the town of Alexandria, having on their right the sea, on their left the canal of Alexandria (then dry) and Lake Madiéh, and in front a sandy plain.



The loss sustained by the British in this last encounter was, on the part of the navy, one midshipman (Mr. Wright) and five seamen killed, and 19 seamen wounded; on the part of the marines, two lieutenants (Paul Hussey and John Linzee Spea), and 22 rank and file killed, one major (William Minto), one captain (Robert Torkington), two lieutenants (Richard Parry\* and George Peebles), two sergeants, two drummers, 27 rank and file wounded; and on the part of the army, six officers, six sergeants, one drummer, 143 rank and file, 21 horses killed, 66 officers, one quartermaster, 61 sergeants, seven drummers, 946 rank and file, five horses wounded, and one rank and file missing; grand total, 186 killed, 1135 wounded, and one missing.

On the 18th of March the castle of Aboukir, mounted with ten guns and two heavy mortars, and garrisoned, the French say, with 300 men under chef de bataillon Vinache, after a bombardment of two days, surrendered on honourable terms to a detachment of the army under Colonel Dalhousie. Whatever may have become of the rest of the garrison, the prisoners taken did not amount to more than 150 officers and men.

On the same day, in an affair of patrols between the cavalry of the two armies, the British sustained a loss of one quartermaster, seven rank and file, and 18 horses killed, one officer, six rank and file, and 12 horses wounded, and one quartermaster, 12 rank and file, and seven horses missing. On the same day, also, a Turkish squadron, of two 74s, four frigates and corvettes, and a few smaller vessels, anchored in Aboukir bay. It was likewise on the same day that Generals Friant and Lanusse despatched a vessel to France, with information of the actual state of the French army: and the commander was directed to look out on his passage for the squadron of M. Ganteaume, whose intended arrival the Régénérée had announced, and to inform him of the position of the British fleet. This despatch-vessel appears to have arrived safe at Toulon; but, for the reasons elsewhere stated, she did not, in her way thither, meet M. Ganteaume.

Although it was on the 4th of March that General Menou had become officially apprized of the arrival of the British expedition in the bay of Aboukir, he did not, it appears, set out from the head-quarters at Cairo until the 11th, nor arrive at the camp under the eastern walls of Alexandria before the evening of the 18th. The reinforcement he brought with him augmented the French force at Alexandria, according to the *Moniteur*, to 14,000 men, exclusive of cavalry, artillery, and guides; but the French historians say, to only 9730 men, including 1380 cavalry, with

\* This gallant officer is the same mentioned in the cutting out of the *Brindavi*. His wounds might have entitled him to a pension, but the liberality of government was asleep on this occasion.

46 pieces of cannon. The effective force of the British army at Bedah is represented not to have exceeded 10,000 men, including only 300 cavalry, with, according to the French, 12 pieces of movable artillery, and 30 pieces in the different redoubts thrown up to protect the encampment. This is taking the numbers, except in the case of the British artillery, which we believe to be overrated, as each party has represented his own to be; but, according to the statement on the opposite side, the British force was 16,000, or the whole that had been landed, and the French force between 11,000 and 12,000, an amount considerably less than is admitted by the Moniteur.

On the 21st, at about an hour before daylight, the French attacked the British with great impetuosity; but, after an obstinate and sanguinary contest, were repulsed, with a loss estimated by themselves at 800 killed, 200 wounded (a small proportion), and 400 prisoners; but other accounts represent the French loss on this day, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at nearly 3000 men. Among the killed were Generals Lanusse, Roize, and Baudot, and, among the wounded, General Destaing and several other distinguished officers.

The loss on the part of the British was also unusually severe: it amounted to 10 officers, nine sergeants, 224 rank and file, and two horses killed, 60 officers, 48 sergeants, three drummers, 1082 rank and file, and three horses (a sufficient proof of the small quantity of cavalry present) wounded, and three officers, three sergeants, and 28 rank and file missing. Among the mortally wounded was the commander-in-chief, by a musket-shot at the upper part of the thigh; and among the remaining wounded were Major-general Moore and Brigadier-general Hope, both in the head, but not dangerously.

The marines, having been appointed to the duty of Aboukir castle and its vicinity, were not present in this action; but the seamen, under their gallant leader, Captain Sir Sidney Smith, shared in it, and sustained a loss of one master's mate (Mr. Krebs) and three seamen killed, Sir Sidney himself, but not badly, Lieutenant Lewis Davis of the *Swiftsure*, and 48 seamen wounded; making the grand total of the British loss in the Battle of Canopus, as the French have named it, amount to 247 killed, 1243 wounded, and 34 missing.

General Sir Ralph Abercromby, at his own request, was conveyed on board the *Foudroyant*, where he breathed his last on the 28th of March, leaving as his successor in the command of the British army, Major-general John Hely Hutchinson, who thus feelingly and eloquently expresses himself on the subject of General Abercromby's death: "Were it permitted for a soldier to regret any one who has fallen in the service of his country, I might be excused for lamenting him more than any other person; but it is some consolation to those who tenderly loved him, that as his life was honourable, so was his death glorious. His

memory will be recorded in the annals of his country, will be sacred to every British soldier, and embalmed in the recollection of a grateful posterity."

On the 26th a second Ottoman squadron arrived, having on board about 5000 Turks and Albanians. This made the Turkish force at anchor in the bay of Aboukir, including the Sultan-Selim three-decker, of 110 guns, amount to six sail of the line, and eight frigates and corvettes; all tolerably fine vessels, but in bad hands. On or about the 3d of April the Turkish troops were landed, and shortly afterwards, with a division of 800 British troops and eight pieces of cannon under Colonel Spencer, were sent to attack the town and castle of Rosetta, which commands the western branch of the Nile. After a fatiguing march across the desert, the allied troops succeeded, with little or no opposition from the few French troops, apparently not more than 800, there stationed, in gaining possession of this important post; which, besides giving to the British the unmolested navigation of the Nile, enabled them to open a communication with the friendly inhabitants of the Delta, and thus obtain supplies of provisions for the numerous mouths they had to feed.

On the 16th, at 11 h. 30 m. A. M., the castle of Jullien, situated on the banks of the Nile, and defended by 15 pieces of cannon, four armed djerms moored under its walls, and a garrison of nearly 400 men, part of the troops which had retired from Rosetta, was attacked, on the side of the Nile, by a division of British and Turkish gun-boats, commanded by Captain Richard Curry of the bomb-vessel *Fury*, and on the land-side by the British division of Colonel Spencer's corps, including the principal part of the artillery. Two other divisions, it appears, were sent against the tower of Abou-Mandhour and the village of Gehdid. These were soon reduced; but it took until the 19th, at 6 A. M., before the castle of Jullien surrendered. This the garrison, numbering 368 men, did upon honourable terms, after a brave defence, in which they lost about 40 men in killed and wounded.

In the pocket of General Roize, left dead on the field of battle at Canopus, was found a letter from General Menou at Cairo, expressing a fear that the British had, or would, cut the canal of Alexandria, and thus let the waters of the Mediterranean, or those more immediately of Lake Madieh, into the basin of the ancient Lake Mareotis, which for ages past had been dry, except that a considerable portion of it, at certain seasons especially, was impassable owing to the swampy nature of its bed. The hint was taken, and on the 15th of April the cut was made; but, although the first rush of water, from its volume and impetuosity, was awfully grand, some time elapsed before the whole area of the lake became covered. As soon as that was accomplished, the troops under General Menou, shut up in

Alexandria, and numbering, according to the French accounts, 6000 men, became separated from the 4000 under General Lagrange, intrenched at El-Aft, and the 5000 under General Belliard, in garrison at Cairo. If to these numbers, short as they are of the returns published in the *Moniteur*, be added; the loss known to have been already sustained, together with the several detachments in Upper Egypt, particularly the garrisons of Salalieh, Belbeis, Suez, Lesbeh, and Bourlos, our previous enumeration of the French force spread over this country will not be considered immoderately estimated.

On the 26th of April, having left Major-general Coote in command of the army before Alexandria, Major-general Hutchinson arrived at Rosetta, to press in person the operations against the French in the interior of the country. On the 5th of May Major-general Hutchinson, with the combined British and Turks, in number about 8000, marched along the banks of the Nile towards the position of General Lagrange at El-Aft, accompanied on the river by a division of British and Turkish gun-boats under the command, since the occupation of Rosetta and the expected arrival of Rear-admiral Ganteaume upon the coast (when Sir Sidney Smith returned to the Tigre), of Captain James Stevenson, assisted by Captain John Morrison, Richard Curry, and James Hillyar.

On the 7th, having previously destroyed their gun-vessels with all the provisions and stores on board of them, the French abandoned El-Aft and retreated towards Rahmanieh. On the same evening the allied troops entered El-Aft, and on the 9th advanced to Rahmanieh, where General Lagrange had taken post, with an apparent intention of making a stout resistance. At 10 A. M. Captain Curry, with four flats and three armed launches, commenced an attack upon the French forts at Rahmanieh, and continued in action with them until 4 P. M., when his division was relieved by the Turkish gun-boats. In this creditable affair the navy sustained a loss of Lieutenant Hobbes and three seamen killed and seven seamen wounded. During the same night the French general retreated towards Cairo, leaving in the fort his sick and wounded, about 110 in number, under the command of chef de brigade Lacroix. A detachment of 50 cavalry from Alexandria were taken at the same time that Rahmanieh surrendered. The possession of this important post effectually cut off all communication between Alexandria and the interior of Egypt; and in gaining it the allied forces suffered no greater loss than one drummer, four rank and file, and 10 horses killed, and four officers, one sergeant, one drummer, 18 rank and file, and 18 horses wounded.

Continuing their march towards the capital of Egypt, which General Lagrange with his division had entered on the 13th, the allied forces, on the 14th, fell in with and captured a French armed vessel and 16 djerms, conveying wine, spirits, clothing,

about 5000*l.* sterling in specie, some heavy pieces of ordnance, and about 150 troops, from Cairo to Rahmanieh. Having entered the Nile by the canal of Menouf, which joins the Damietta and Rosetta branches, the French commanding officer knew nothing of the retreat of General Lagrange and the surrender of Rahmanieh. On the 17th a division of cavalry and infantry under Brigadier-general Doyle, from previous information furnished by the Arabs, intercepted a body of 550 camels escorted by 560 French under the command of chef de brigade Cavalier, going from Alexandria, which they had quitted on the 14th, towards the province of Bahireh, to procure provision, of which the garrison of Alexandria were now in great want. Finding himself likely to be overpowered, M. Cavalier very properly quitted his sluggish charge, and with his troops took to the desert. Here the French officer was overtaken by a party of British cavalry, and surrendered upon honourable terms.

On the same day on which this surrender took place, the small garrison, about 200, of the fort of Lesbeh, on the Damietta branch of the Nile, invested on the land-side by a Turkish force, and near the Bogaz of Damietta by a flotilla of British gunboats, abandoned the post and retired upon Bourlos. This post the two garrisons, numbering together about 700 men, also evacuated, and embarked on board five small vessels, in the hope to be able to reach the new or north-eastern port of Alexandria. Four of these vessels were captured and carried into Aboukir bay; but the fifth, after being chased in vain by a Turkish corvette, succeeded in reaching the coast of Italy.

Owing to delays from various causes, among others perhaps the non-arrival of more than about 300 of the troops expected to join from the borders of the Red Sea, the allied British and Turkish forces marching towards Cairo, which is distant about 164 miles from Rosetta, did not until the 20th of June arrive at Embabeh, a village distant a mile and a half from the fortress of Giseh, on the banks of the Nile directly opposite to Cairo, and in which fortress General Belliard had stationed a garrison. On the 22d, while preparations were making to besiege Cairo and its different forts by the allied forces (of which a numerous army under the grand vizier, now formed a part), General Belliard sent a flag of truce to Lieutenant-general \* Hutchinson, offering to capitulate upon honourable terms. These were soon settled and drawn up, and on the 27th were signed by the respective parties. By the terms of the treaty the French troops, of which there were, in effective men, 8000, besides 1000 sick, and about half as many in a convalescent state, were to be conveyed to a port of France.

Before we descend the Nile to bring the campaign to a con-

\* Promoted some time before, but we are uncertain when

clusion, some account must be given of the British and native troops from Bombay, amounting to about 6000, which, according to the original plan of proceeding, were to have co-operated with those disembarked on the shores of the Mediterranean.

On the 21st of April the British 50-gun ship *Leopard*, Captain Thomas Surridge, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral John Blankett, anchored in the road of Suez, with two or three frigates and sloops, and about the same number of transports. On the 22d, at daybreak, an officer and a party of the 86th regiment landed from the *Leopard*, and took possession of the town of Suez, which the French garrison had previously evacuated. At 8 A. M. the British union jack was hoisted at the flag-staff on shore. In a day or two afterwards the transports disembarked their troops; and on the 14th of May Lieutenant-colonel Lloyd, of the 86th regiment landed from the *Leopard*. On the 6th of June, every thing being in readiness, Lieutenant-colonel Lloyd, with his detachment numbering about 320 men, set out to march across the desert to Cairo, a distance, by the regular route, of about 60 miles, but by the route intended to be taken, in order to avoid meeting a superior force of the enemy, somewhat more. On the occasion of the departure of the British detachment upon this hazardous service, the *Leopard* fired a salute of 11 guns.

On the 13th the *Leopard* and vessels in her company sailed from Suez, and on the 15th anchored in the bay of Kosseir; where were lying the 50-gun ship *Romney*, Captain Sir Home Riggs Popham, and 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Sensible* (armed en flûte, we believe), Captain Robert Sauce, with several transports. These, since the 9th, had landed Major-general Baird, with the second division of the Bombay troops: the first division, under Lieutenant-colonel Murray, had arrived and disembarked since the 14th of May.\* Some time between the 10th and 15th of June the two divisions set off upon their march across the desert, by the valley of Kuittah, and on the 30th arrived at Kéné, or Kenneh, on the banks of the Nile; but, owing to the difficulty of procuring boats to descend that river, Major-general Baird did not effect his junction with Lieutenant-general Hutchinson until several days after the surrender of Cairo. Lieutenant-colonel Lloyd had joined since the 11th or 12th; but his journey had been a most painful and distressing one, 23 of his detach-

\* A contemporary has made a sad jumble of the proceedings of the British squadron in the Red Sea. According to Captain Brenton (vol. iii., p. 78), Rear-admiral Blankett died as soon as he was joined by Sir Home Popham, and Captain Surridge thereupon "left the direction of the naval forces under the able management" of the latter. So far from this having been the case, the Rear-admiral died on the 14th of July, when the *Leopard* and *Romney*, sailing in company, were about to cast anchor in Mocha road on their return to Bombay.

ment, including three officers, having perished in the desert with thirst.

The last division of the French troops taken prisoners at Cairo and at other places, the whole of which amounted to nearly 13,500 men, having, by the 10th of August, sailed from the bay of Aboukir, and Lieutenant-general Hutchinson having arrived from Cairo at his head-quarters before Alexandria, immediate measures were taken to reduce that remaining stronghold of the French in Egypt, and thus accomplish the ultimate object of the expedition.

On the night of the 16th about 5000 troops under Major-general Coote, embarked on Lake Mareotis, in the boats of the men of war and transports, and in a quantity of djerms which had been assembled for the purpose, and, escorted by the flotilla of gun-vessels still under the orders of Captain Stevenson, proceeded to a position to the westward of the town of Alexandria. Early on the morning of the 17th the detachment disembarked with a slight opposition; previous to which the French had set fire to their flotilla of 18 gun-boats, which had been stationed opposite to Pompey's pillar, under the protection of a battery of three long 18-pounders. The slight opposition experienced by the British is acknowledged by the French to have been mainly owing to the spirited demonstration which Captain Sir Sidney Smith, with some sloops of war and armed boats, made upon the town of Alexandria from the sea.

On the night of the 18th a combined military and naval attack was made upon the small fortified island of Marabou, which protects the entrance to the western or great harbour of Alexandria. The naval force consisted of the armed launches of the squadron, under the command of Captain Cochrane of the *Ajax*. Finding it in vain to hold out longer, the commandant of Marabou, chef de brigade Etienne, capitulated on the 21st; and on the same evening Captain Cochrane, with the ship-sloops *Cynthia* and *Bonne-Citoyenne*, brig-sloops *Port-Mahon* and *Victorieuse*, and three Turkish corvettes, entered the harbour: soon after which, to prevent the further progress of the British to the eastward, the French sank several merchant vessels, having previously moved their two 64s, frigates, and corvettes, from Cape Figuiers close up to the town at the extremity of the harbour.

On the morning of the 26th four batteries on each side of the town were opened against the intrenched camp of the French; and on the 27th, in the evening, being thus pressed on all sides, General Menou sent an aide-de-camp to Lieutenant-general Hutchinson to request a three days' armistice, in order to give time to prepare a capitulation. This was acceded to; and on the 2d of September Alexandria surrendered. By the terms of the treaty the garrison, consisting of upwards of 8000 soldiers,

and 1300 sailors, were to be conveyed to France at British expense, as had already been the case with the garrison of Cairo.

This concluding operation of the campaign was effected after a loss to the British army, in the four or five skirmishes which had immediately preceded it, of only 13 rank and file killed, and six officers, four sergeants, one drummer, and 113 rank and file wounded, and to the British navy, in the attack upon Marabout, of one midshipman (Mr. Hull, of the *Ajax*) and one seaman killed, and two seamen wounded; thus making the general loss on the part of the British in the Egyptian campaign, as far as it has been officially reported, 330 killed, 1872 wounded, and 39 missing. That of the French, commencing at the disembarkation of the British troops in Aboukir bay, may be stated at from 3000 to 4000 men in killed alone; an amount, great as it may appear, considerably below what some of the English writers have declared it to have been.

The French ships of war found in the old or western harbour were the *Causse* 64, the frigates *Egyptienne*, *Justice*, and *Régénérée*, and two small ex-Venetian frigates, of whose names we are uncertain. The *Dubois* appears to have been broken up. The *Héliopolis* was probably one of the ex-Turkish corvettes restored to the captain pacha; and the *Lodi*, since the middle of May, had been despatched to France, with General Reynier, sent home by General Menou. This remarkably fine brig, in spite of the numerous British cruisers at that time in the Mediterranean, accomplished her passage in safety, arriving on the 28th of June at the port of Nice.

In the division of the ships between the British and Turkish naval commanders-in-chief, the latter received the *Causse*, *Justice*, and one of the Venetian frigates; and the former, the *Egyptienne*, *Régénérée*, and the other Venetian frigate. What became of the latter frigate we are unable to say; but the *Régénérée*, a ship of 902 tons, and a very fast sailer, was added to the British navy as a 12-pounder 36-gun frigate, by the name of *Alexandria*. The *Egyptienne* was also added to the British navy, by her own name; and, from her size and qualifications, claims a more particular notice.

Of the two new ships of the line which Buonaparte, in his letter to the Directory of April, 1798,\* contemplated to have ready by the ensuing September, one, as already stated, was the *Spartiate*, just ready to be, if not actually launched. The other ship either had already been, or then was, so altered in her construction, that, instead of becoming a 74 of about 1700 tons French, or 1900 English, she was launched on the 18th of July, 1799, as a frigate of 1430 tons English. This had been done, by throwing in her stem and stern until they were perpendicular,

\* See vol. ii., p. 112.



and proportionably contracting the breadth of her frame. The ship, thus reduced in length and breadth, was pierced for 15 guns of a side on the main deck, and 10 on the quarterdeck and forecastle, or 50 guns in the whole. But, when ready to be fitted for sea, the foremost maindeck port was found too much in the bend of the bow to admit a gun: hence the *Egyptienne* (as, considering her first destination, the ship was appropriately named) received on board 28, instead of 30, long 24-pounders for her main deck, 12 long 8-pounders and two 36-pounder brass carronades for the quarterdeck, and four long 8-pounders and two 36-pounder brass carronades for the forecastle; total 48 guns, with a complement, as alleged, of 400, but, we rather think, of 450 men and boys.

Conformably to this arrangement of her guns, the *Egyptienne*, when, about six months after her capture, the British admiralty ordered her to be armed, was established with 28 long 24-pounders on the main deck, 12 carronades, 24-pounders, and two long 9-pounders on the quarterdeck, and four carronades and two long guns of the same two calibers on the forecastle, total 48 guns; with a complement, upon the prevalent economical scale of the British navy, of 330 men and boys. A contemporary, whose mistakes respecting the armaments of ships, English as well as foreign, we are almost tired of correcting, says thus of the frigate in question: "The *Egyptienne*, a frigate of sixteen hundred tons, taken at Alexandria, in Egypt, in 1800, carried on her maindeck sixteen long thirty-two pounders on each side, and on her quarterdeck and forecastle sixteen forty-two pound carronades, and four long twelve-pounders."\*

As we have done on most other occasions, so we must here, give some account of the honours and rewards bestowed upon the conquerors. The thanks of parliament were voted to both commanders-in-chief. Lieutenant-general Hutchinson was made, and no one can say undeservedly, first a knight of the bath, and then a peer of Great Britain; and Lord Keith was raised from a peer of Ireland to a peer of Great Britain: not certainly for any active exertions in bringing the campaign to a close, nor, we presume, for doing what any clever agent for transports might have done as well, disembarking the troops; but as the head of the naval part of the expedition, without the aid of which, it is clear, the campaign itself could not have been undertaken.

We are unable to state what officers of the navy gained steps in rank; but undoubtedly those serving on shore with the army, and on board the flotilla upon the Nile and the neighbouring lakes, well merited the promotion they may have obtained. The following is the handsome manner in which the commander-in-chief of the army speaks of their exertions: "The labour and fatigue of the navy have been continued and excessive; it has not

been of one day or of one week, but for months together. In the bay of Aboukir, on the new inundation, and on the Nile, for 160 miles, they have been employed without intermission, and have submitted to many privations with a cheerfulness and patience highly creditable to them and advantageous to the public service."

We cannot dismiss the Egyptian campaign without observing, that all the benefit derived from its successful termination, the removal of the French army from Egypt, might have been attained 18 months before, had Lord Keith not refused to ratify the treaty entered into by Sir Sidney Smith. What blood and treasure would then have been saved! Treasure, indeed, could it but be known how the British government was defrauded by jobbers, contractors, and agents of one sort or the other. At all events, the infraction of the treaty of El-Arich, how much soever others may have suffered by it, eventually benefited him, whose consent alone had been wanted to carry that treaty into effect. We now gladly quit the shores of Egypt and its military warfare, to resume our narrative of naval operations; and, in particular, to give some account of the proceedings of the French and their allies the Spaniards at the opposite extremity of the Mediterranean.

#### BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS.

Very soon after the conclusion of the treaty of Luneville, the First Consul of France began using every means in his power to detach from England the few powers that were on friendly terms with her. With Naples, Buonaparte succeeded; but, although by the intrigues of his brother Lucien with the famous Godoy, the Prince of Peace, Spain was induced, on the 27th of February, 1801, to declare war against her neighbour, and although a powerful French army had crossed the Bidassoa, Portugal remained firm. The subsequent irruption of a Spanish army into the province of Alentejo, however, altered the tone of the prince-regent; and on the 6th of June, at Badajos, the latter concluded a treaty of peace with Spain, and agreed, not only to cede to her the conquered province of Alentejo, but to expel the English from the ports of Portugal. The effect produced upon Buonaparte by this separate concession to Spain, and the measures taken by England to prevent either France or Spain from reaping any solid advantage from their sinister attempts upon her ancient ally, we shall advert to hereafter.

Some time in the month of March, by his secret and corrupt influence at the court of Madrid, Buonaparte got King Charles to make over to France, either by sale or hire, six sail of the line lying in the port of Cadiz; and which ships were to be there manned by French crews, and then, as was understood, to co-operate with a Spanish naval force, in entering the Tagus and.

sacking Lisbon. This was a plan which, as far as respected the British property in the port, a French admiral, of whom honourable mention has already been made in these pages, recommended as a feasible enterprise for the Brest fleet, when it put to sea in the beginning of the year 1795. "I propose," says M. Kerguelin, "to conduct the fleet of the republic to Lisbon, to anchor in front of the capital, within musket shot of the city and the palace of the king; to send ahead of the fleet a frigate with a flag of truce, announcing that the fleet of the republic comes not to do harm to the Portuguese, although the allies and slaves of England, but to require that all the British storehouses and ships be forthwith delivered up, under a penalty of having the city rased to its foundation. This enterprise would gain for France 200 millions, in cash or British merchandise; England would receive a terrible shock, which would produce bankruptcies and a general consternation; our fleet, without being buffeted about the sea,\* would return to Brest, loaded with riches and covered with glory; and France would once more astonish Europe with a new triumph."†

We formerly noticed the return to Toulon from Leghorn of three ships of Rear-admiral Ganteaume's squadron, on account of the paucity of hands to work them.‡ These three ships, the *Indomptable* and *Formidable*, of 80 guns, Captains Monconseu and Lalonde, and *Desaix*, of 74 guns, Captain Christy-Palliére, along with the ex-Venetian 38-gun frigate *Muiron*, Captain Jules-François Martinencq, were placed under the orders of Rear-admiral Durand-Linois, with directions to proceed to Cadiz, and there effect a junction with Rear-admiral Dumanoir-le-Pelley and his six newly-made French sail of the line. These nine ships, with a Spanish squadron of six more under Vice-admiral don Juan Joaquin de Moreno, were then, as a case more urgent than that of despoiling Lisbon, to carry a reinforcement to Egypt; not, we believe, wholly from Toulon, but principally from the Neapolitan ports of Ancona, Manfredonia, Brindisi, and Otranto; at which several ports there were assembled, in the month of June, as many as 32,000 French troops.

On the 13th of June Rear-admiral Linois, with his squadron of three sail of the line and one frigate, having on board a small detachment of troops, under Brigadier-general Devaux, put to sea from the road of Toulon, bound to Cadiz; off which port, by the last advices, were cruising two British 74s only, and occasionally but one. On the next day the French admiral chased away some British frigates, left cruising in the gulf of Lyons by Rear-admiral Sir John Borlase Warren; who, with the *Renown* and squadron, was then about to enter the har-

\* Alluding to the storm from which the Brest fleet suffered so much in January, 1795. See vol. I., p. 236.

† For the original see Appendix, No. 11.

‡ See p. 62.

bour of Valetta, island of Malta, to revictual, preparatory to his pursuit of M. Ganteaume, of whom he had just received intelligence. Delayed by head winds, M. Linois was not able, until towards the end of the month, to double Cape de Gata.

On the 1st of July the French ships, then working against a strong west-north-west wind, were seen from Gibraltar; where the only British vessel of war at anchor was the 14-gun polacre-sloop Calpé, Captain the Honourable George Heneage Lawrence Dundas. On the 2d M. Linois captured a small British brig employed as a packet to Minorca; and on the 3d, when more than two thirds through the Straits, the French admiral was so fortunate as to capture, but not until she had resorted to every manœuvre to escape which her skilful commander could devise, the 14-gun brig-sloop Speedy, Captain Lord Cochrane. Learning now that Cadiz was blockaded by a superior force, Rear-admiral Linois, with his squadron and prizes, bore up for Algeziras. On the 4th, at about 10 A. M., he rounded Cabrita point in sight of the Calpé at her anchorage, and at 5 P. M. came to with his ships in front of the town of Algeziras, still in full view of the British at the rock.

At this time the British squadron stationed off Cadiz consisted of the

Gun-ship			
80	Cæsar . . . . .	{	Rear-admiral (b.) Sir James Saumarez.
		{	Captain Jahleel Brenton.
74	Pompée . . . . .	"	Charles Sterling.
	Spencer . . . . .	"	Henry D'Esterre Darby.
	Venerable . . . . .	"	Samuel Hood.
	Superb . . . . .	"	Richard Goodwin Keats.
	Hannibal . . . . .	"	Solomon Ferris.
	Audacious . . . . .	"	Shuldhham Peard.

*Frigate* Thames, and *brig* Pasley.

On the 5th of July, at 2 A. M., Lieutenant Richard Janvarin, who had been despatched from Gibraltar by Captain Dundas of the Calpé, joined the Cæsar in a boat, and informed Sir James of the appearance off the rock of the squadron of M. Linois, endeavouring to get to the westward. The British squadron in Cadiz bay consisted now of only six sail of the line, the Superb having, since the 1st of the month, been detached to watch the entrance of the Guadalquivir, a river about 18 miles to the northward.

Sir James and the ships with him immediately tacked off shore. At daylight another despatch vessel from Gibraltar boarded the Thames, with intelligence of the French squadron's having put into Algeziras. The frigate was immediately despatched by the Rear-admiral to recall the Superb, then in the north by east with her topgallants just above the horizon, and direct Captain Keats to follow the squadron to Algeziras. At 8 A. M. the Cæsar made the signal to prepare for battle, and for anchoring by the stern; and immediately afterwards bore away for the gut, with a moderate breeze from the northward and westward. In the mean time the Superb, to whom at about

5 h. 15 m. A.M. the Thames had made the signal of recall, lay nearly becalmed, in company with the Pasley brig.

Towards 10 A.M. the squadron also became becalmed; but, having got into the strength of the current, the ships continued drifting so fast to the eastward, as very soon to be entirely out of sight of the Superb, Thames, and Pasley.

At about 4 P.M. a light air sprang up from the west-north-west; and the Cæsar and squadron, recently joined by the Plymouth lugger from Gibraltar, took immediate advantage of it. At 9 P.M. the weather again fell calm, and continued so until 3 A.M. on the 6th. A light breeze then sprang up from the same quarter as before, and the ships crowded sail through the Straits. Owing to the local experience of Captain Hood, it had been arranged that the Venerable should lead to the attack; but it was not, we believe, intended that any of the ships should anchor, unless, from a sudden fall in the wind, or any other circumstances, compelled to do so. At 4 A.M., the ships then standing on in line ahead thus, Venerable, Pompée, Audacious, Cæsar, Spencer, and Hannibal, Cape Tariffa bore from the Pompée north-east distant three miles. At 7 A.M. the Venerable, opening Cabrita point, made the signal for seeing the French ships, which were then warping further in shore, to get completely under the protection of the batteries that defended the road. The signal was immediately made by the Cæsar, to engage the enemy on arriving up with him in succession.

Of the defensive means possessed by the French admiral, we will now endeavour to give a description. The road of Algeziras is open and shallow, with sunken rocks in different parts of it. Upon a point of the coast, at the distance of rather more than a mile and a half south-east of the town, stands Fort Santa-Garcia; and, about the third of a mile from the town, in the same direction, another tower or fort. Directly in front of the point on which this latter tower stands, and at the distance from it of rather more than a quarter of a mile, is a small island, named Isla-Verda, upon which is a battery mounting seven long 24-pounders. About three quarters of a mile, or rather less, to the northward of the town, stands the battery of San-Iago, mounting five long 18-pounders, and close to the northern extremity of this battery, near the water's edge, is the tower of Almirante, but in what manner mounted we are unable to say. There are also several forts on the northern shore of Gibraltar bay, but at too great a distance to afford any protection to the road of Algeziras, except perhaps by throwing shells. The road, however, is admirably protected by the flanking fire of the San-Iago and the island batteries. There were also, at this time in the road, 14 heavy gun-boats; a description of force peculiarly advantageous, when an enemy is likely to be baffled by light and variable winds, and perplexed with an intricate and dangerous navigation. The road thus defended by nature and art, M. Linois moored

his three ships in line ahead thus: the *Formidable* abreast, or nearly abreast, of the *San-Iago* battery, the *Desaix* about 500 yards astern and to the southward of the flag-ship, and the *Indomptable* about the same distance astern of the *Desaix*. The *Muiron* took her station a little within and to the northward of *Isla-Verda*. Three of the gun-boats were anchored about a quarter of a mile to the south-west of the last-named island; four others between *Fort San-Iago* and the *Formidable*, and the remaining seven off a point of land about half a mile to the northward of the tower of *Almirante*.

At about 7 h. 50 m. A.M., just as the *Pompée* with a fresh breeze had shortened sail and hauled round *Cabrita*, the battery at the point fired several shot at her, but without effect. At 8 A.M. the *Venerable* lay becalmed at a considerable distance on the starboard bow of the *Pompée*; and in a few minutes afterwards that ship and the *Audacious*, who was on the *Pompée*'s starboard quarter, passed the *Venerable* to windward. At this time the *Cæsar* and two remaining ships were upwards of three miles astern, using every endeavour to get up.

Hauling close up for the tower of *Santa-Garcia* and the island battery, the *Pompée*, at 8 h. 30 m., received the fire of the *Muiron*, and successively of the *Indomptable*, *Desaix*, and *Formidable*. It now falling calm, the *Pompée* fired a broadside at each of the two latter ships; and at 8 h. 45 m. dropped her anchor so close to the *Formidable*'s starboard bow that the latter's buoy was on the *Pompée*'s off or starboard side. As soon as she had clewed up her sails, and tautened her springs, the *Pompée* opened a heavy fire upon the *Formidable*; but who very soon, by warps from the shore, increased her distance.

At about 8 h. 50 m. the *Audacious*, and in five minutes afterwards the *Venerable*, baffled also by the want of wind, dropped their anchors; the one abreast of the *Indomptable*, but not so near as her captain wished, and the other, from unavoidable causes, at a still greater distance from the quarter of the *Formidable*. A furious cannonade now ensued between these three British ships, and the four French ships, gun-boats, and batteries. In less than half an hour from its commencement, and when the *Formidable*, for some cause or other, had suspended, not to say ceased, her fire, the *Pompée*, owing to the strength of the current, swang with her head towards her opponent's broadside. In this situation, the *Pompée* could only ply her starboard guns at the batteries of *San-Iago* and *Almirante*, and at the gun-boats moored in front of them; all of which kept up in return a very destructive fire.

At about 9 h. 15 m. A.M. the *Cæsar* got up; and, as she made the signal for the ships to anchor in the best manner for mutual support, dropped her anchor ahead of the *Audacious*. After sending a spring on board of the *Venerable*, which ship was on her starboard quarter, the *Cæsar* opened her heavy broadside upon the *Desaix*. The *Hannibal*, about five minutes afterwards,

got also into action, anchoring within hail of the *Cæsar*, and rather upon her starboard bow. The *Spencer*, baffled as much as any of her companions and to leeward of the whole of them, could not get much nearer than was sufficient to expose her to the heavy fire of the Spanish batteries, from which, towards the latter part of the action especially, hot shot, as well as shells, were thrown.

At a few minutes past 10 A. M. the *Hannibal* was hailed by the *Cæsar*, but no person on board the former appears to have heard distinctly what was said. Soon afterwards a boat with an officer came on board the *Venerable*, bearing the rear-admiral's orders, that Captain Ferris should "go and rake the French admiral;" no doubt with the intention of supporting the *Pompée*, who just at that time was in a very critical situation.

Cutting her cable and casting herself by the spring, the *Hannibal* immediately made sail to the northward, with what wind there was, still blowing from the west-north-west. Having stood, in the direction of Rio Palmenos, into a quarter less six, the *Hannibal* tacked for the *Formidable*; but about 11 A. M., just as she had arrived abreast of the tower of *Almirante*, and was in the act of hauling more closely in shore, to cross the hawse of the French ship, nearly within hail of whom she then was, the *Hannibal* took the ground. In this distressing situation, the *Hannibal* with as many of her foremast guns as would bear, opened a fire upon the *Formidable*, and directed the remainder, with evident effect, upon the tower of *Almirante*, battery of *San-Iago*, and gun-boats. The ship appearing to swing a little, an effort was made, by letting go an anchor and heaving a strain upon it, to get her afloat, but without effect. With some difficulty, owing to the signal-halliards having been shot away, the *Hannibal* apprized the admiral of her situation; and shortly afterwards one boat came from the *Cæsar* and another from the *Venerable*. Finding that no assistance could be afforded by them, Captain Ferris sent back the *Venerable's* boat, and sent the *Cæsar's* officers and men in one of the *Hannibal's* cutters, their pinnace having been sunk alongside by a shot.

The light westerly breeze, by which the *Hannibal* had so gallantly steered to her present unfortunate situation, appears to have been very partial, as the other British ships all the while lay nearly becalmed. Soon after the *Hannibal* had grounded, however, a light breeze sprang up from the north-east. Hoping by this means to get further from the reach of the British ships, some of whom were observed preparing to take advantage of it and approach nearer, M. Linois threw out the signal for his ships to cut and run themselves on shore, "*de couper les câbles pour s'échouer.*"\* The French ships did so; but, the wind suddenly falling, they were a long time in wearing. The *Formidable* brought up again with her larboard broadside to the enemy; but

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xiv., p. 160.

the *Desaix* grounded upon a shoal directly in front of the town, and the *Indomptable* upon one to the north-east of *Isla-Verda*, with her larboard bow presented to the sea.

Desirous to take advantage of this state of the French ships, as well as of the breeze which had just sprung up, the *Cæsar*, making the signal for the squadron to do the same, cut her cables; and, wearing round the *Audacious* and *Venerable*, soon brought her broadside to bear upon the *Indomptable*; into whose bows, with her fore topsail to the mast, the *Cæsar* poured several destructive fires. At a little before noon the *Audacious*, having likewise cut, passed between the *Cæsar* and *Indomptable*; and shortly afterwards the latter's fore topmast came down. The *Venerable* and *Spencer*, in compliance with the signal, cut their cables, and strove their utmost, but with little effect on account of the calm that immediately ensued, to co-operate in the attack upon the southernmost French ships and island battery. The *Venerable*, indeed, had her mizen topmast shot away just as she was in the act of wearing. The *Pompée* after remaining nearly an hour without being able, on account of her position, to bring a gun to bear, had also cut, and was now being towed out of action by the boats of the squadron.

Scarcely had the *Audacious*, in her new station, brought her broadside to bear with effect, ere the calm frustrated her intentions; and that ship and the *Cæsar*, without the power of returning a shot, lay exposed to a heavy fire from the guns of the island battery. To add to their perilous state, both ships were drifting upon the reef that was near it. Again, a fine breeze raised the hopes of the British; but no sooner had the ships prepared to take advantage of it, than it again died away.

Frustrated thus, as much by the unfavourable state of the weather as by the serious opposition experienced from the enemy's batteries and shipping, and being prevented, by the destruction of most of the boats and the absence of the remainder in towing the *Pompée*, to storm the island, as had been intended, with the marines of the squadron, Sir James Saumarez, at 1 h. 35 m. p. m. (by the *Cæsar*'s log, but at 1 h. 20 m. by the log of the *Audacious*), discontinued the action. The *Cæsar* and *Audacious* then cut their cables and springs, and, profiting by a light breeze which had just sprung up from the shore, made sail on the starboard tack, in company with the *Venerable* and *Spencer*; leaving, and being compelled to leave, the dismantled and shattered *Hannibal* as a trophy in the hands of the enemy.

As this action is one in which the want of a diagram is particularly felt, we have done the best in our power to supply the deficiency. The coast, the soundings, and the positions of the French ships, and of the *Hannibal* when aground, are taken from a French chart; and the positions of the British ships, except that of the *Spencer*, which we have marked at hazard,





liam Grave), six seamen, and two marines killed, her boatswain (George William Forster), 17 seamen, one boy, and six marines wounded, and one master's mate (Richard Best) and seven seamen missing; probably drowned in one of her boats. The main-mast had been shot through in five places, and all her other masts and yards were more or less injured: several shot had also entered her hull. Her two barges, large cutter, launch, and jollyboat, had been cut to pieces; and her small cutter or pinnace, as already stated, had been sunk as it lay alongside the Hannibal. The Pompée had her master (Robert Roxburgh), one midshipman (Mr. Steward), 10 seamen, and three marines killed, three lieutenants (Richard Cheeseman, Arthur Stapledon, and Thomas Innes), two master's mates (Messieurs Curry and Hillier), one midshipman (I. Hibberd), 53 seamen, and 10 marines wounded. In point of damages, the Pompée was even in a much worse state than the Cæsar, not having a mast, yard, spar, shroud, rope, or sail, but which was more or less injured by the enemy's shot: had it not been, indeed, for the aid of several small-craft and boats from Gibraltar, the Pompée would probably have shared the fate of the Hannibal. The Spencer had one first-class volunteer (R. Spencer), and five seamen killed, one midshipman (Joseph Chatterton), 23 seamen, and three marines wounded. Her principal damages were confined to her rigging and sails. The Venerable had one midshipman (William Gibbons) and seven seamen killed, two midshipmen (Silvester Austin and Martin Collins), 20 seamen, and three marines wounded. The Hannibal had her captain's clerk (David Lindsey), 68 seamen, one lieutenant of marines (James D. Williams), and five private marines killed, one lieutenant (John Turner), her master (John Wood), one midshipman (William Dudgeon), 44 seamen, one lieutenant of marines (George Dunford), and 14 private marines wounded, and six seamen missing, who had probably gone overboard with one of the masts. The Audacious had eight seamen killed, and one lieutenant of marines (Robert I. W. Day), 25 seamen, and six private marines wounded: her damages were not material. This makes the total loss in the British squadron, 121 killed, 240 wounded, and 14 missing.

The loss incurred by the French and Spaniards amounted, according to their own published accounts, on the part of the latter, to 11 men killed, exclusive of several wounded, and on the part of the former, to 306 killed, including the captains, Moncousau and Lalonde, besides 280, or rather, if the Madrid Gazette account is to be relied on, nearly 500 wounded. The French ships suffered considerably in their masts and hulls; and five Spanish gun-boats were sunk, and two materially damaged. The forts, also, received considerable injury from the fire of the British ships. How then would it have been,

had the weather permitted the latter to bestow that fire with full effect?

One would suppose it difficult to raise a doubt as to the gallantry, whatever may have been thought of the prudence, of the attack upon Algeziras; yet the French, in their version of the affair, made it appear one of the most brilliant exploits which their navy had ever performed. It was no less than that "three French sail of the line and a frigate were attacked by six English sail of the line and a frigate; that the English were completely beaten, and took refuge in Gibraltar, leaving in the possession of the French the Hannibal, of 74 guns; and that another ship of the line struck, but was afterwards towed off by a great number of English gun-boats."

Fortunately for the cause of truth, the Spaniards, as well as the French, had a little self-love to gratify. "The action," says the Madrid Gazette-Extraordinary, "was very obstinate and bloody on both sides; and likewise on the part of our batteries, which decided the fate of the day." And, in another place, "The fire of our batteries was so hot and well supported, that the enemy suffered most from them; and particularly, it is to that of San-Iago we owe the capture of the English ship; for, her bold manœuvre, of attempting to pass between the French rear-admiral's ship, the Formidable, and the shore, made her take the ground; and, notwithstanding the utmost exertion to get her afloat, it was found impossible to move her: then the fire from the battery very soon dismasted her, and compelled her to strike."

We must, however, do the French the credit to state, that it was their soldiers and artillerymen, disembarked from the ships, that occasioned the Spanish batteries to be so admirably served as they were towards the middle and latter part of the action. With respect to the supposed striking of the *Pompée*, it may be explained by the fact, as noted down in that ship's log, that her colours were shot away, but they were quickly rehoisted. We might be disposed to remark upon the ostentatious manner, in which the victory of "three unaided French ships of the line over six British," was announced at the Paris theatres; but that we should perhaps be reminded of what had occurred, nearly two years before, upon an occasion of much less importance, at one of the principal theatres of London.\*

Being aware of the relationship which subsisted between a contemporary and the distinguished officer who was the flag-captain of Sir James Saumarez in this action, we naturally turned to our contemporary's account, in the expectation of seeing that account so fully and accurately drawn up, as to afford some ground for the assertion, that none but a naval officer can write a naval history. For such we take to be the meaning of the following passage in Captain Brenton's Preface: "Other writers

on the subject, not having the advantage of professional knowledge, have fallen into errors natural enough to them, but which prove their incompetency to the task they had undertaken. It has indeed been the misfortune of our service, that its history has generally been written by men, who, however qualified by classical education, have wanted those indispensable requisites which can only be acquired by professional habits, local knowledge, and constant attention: hence it has arisen that many important events connected with the navy have been improperly stated," &c.\*

This writer informs us, that the Venerable "was directed by the admiral to anchor between the batteries of Algeziras and Green Island."† Had the "local knowledge" of Captain Hood been of a par with our contemporary's, the Venerable would have bought experience at a dear rate; but, according to the letter of Sir James Saumarez, although Captain Hood was to lead the squadron, "it was not intended he should anchor" at all, much less anchor where there was less water than his ship drew; nor, as far as we can learn, was any signal to anchor made until the *Cæsar* herself was compelled to bring up. The latter ship is represented to have anchored "immediately" after the *Audacious*; whereas there was an interval of at least 25 minutes. The French, indeed, describe the attacking force as composed of two divisions of three ships each; and so far they are right.

As to the plate given to illustrate the action, it is so full of mistakes, and, in many parts, so totally at variance with the letter-press, that we shall pass it by as unworthy of any further remark. We cannot, however, leave unnoticed the statement, that, "at about twelve o'clock, Captain Ferris hauled down his colours and surrendered;" nor the charge against the Hannibal's captain, conveyed in these words: "Nothing could exceed the decision and intrepidity of Captain Ferris, although the result of his manœuvre was unfortunate: it is, however, due to Sir James Saumarez to state, that the squadron did not withdraw from action until the Hannibal had surrendered. A contrary assertion is made in the narrative of Captain Ferris; an unaccountable error, proving that the most correct officers may sometimes be deceived, and the more to be lamented in this instance, as bearing the sanction of an official document."‡

Our complaint against captain Ferris is, that his account of the time, which intervened between the "ships driving out of the bay" and the surrender of the Hannibal, is not very clearly expressed. The captain might with propriety have stated, that the Hannibal did not strike her colours until nearly half an hour after Sir James Saumarez, from unavoidable causes undoubtedly,

\* Brenton, vol. i., p. vii. † Ibid., vol. iii., p. 89. ‡ Ibid., vol. iii., p. 35.

had discontinued the action and, made sail for Gibraltar. Such was the fact. Not a word is there to contradict it either in the rear-admiral's official letter, or in the *Cæsar's* log; but there is ample proof in confirmation of it, as we will now proceed to show. No time whatever, beyond the day of the month, and that only by inference, appears in the letter of Sir James Saumarez; but the log of the *Cæsar* says: "At 12 h. 30 m. made signal for Hannibal being aground;" that is, about half an hour according to our contemporary, after the Hannibal had "surrendered." "At 1 h. 35 m.," says the flag-ship's log, "action ceased; which, be it observed, is even fifteen minutes later than the log of the *Audacious* dates the same incident: whereas the "Narrative" of Captain Ferris fixes the time of the Hannibal's surrender at "nearly two o'clock." \*

A French account now before us also says: "*L'Annibal, échoué près du Formidable, essayant en même temps le feu de la batterie Saint-Jacques et celui du vaisseau françois, amena son pavillon à deux heures du soir.*"\* Of the four logs we have been able to get a sight of, the only one which notices the surrender of the Hannibal is the *Venerable's*. That says: "At two, observed the Hannibal cease firing and hoist the colours reversed." But there is another witness to the truth of Captain Ferris's statement. The *Calpé* in her log says: "At half-past one, the Hannibal grounded under a very heavy battery, and was much shattered. At 4, she hauled her colours down, which the enemy kept again flying. Sent boats to save the people, which were all detained. Standing off and on, ships and forts firing on us. Half-past 6 bore up for the bay, and found the squadron at anchor, and the *Cæsar* and *Pompée* in the mole." The mistake in the *Calpé's* absolute time is of little consequence, provided the relative time corresponds; and that it does tolerably well. It is clear, also, that the squadron had all anchored at Gibraltar when the *Calpé* returned, and the *Cæsar* and *Pompée*, had even gone into the mole. So much, therefore, for the assertion of Captain Brenton, that "the squadron did not withdraw from action until the Hannibal had surrendered;" as well as for the "unaccountable error" of Captain Ferris in having, in a manner the least offensive that can well be imagined, stated the contrary.

On the following morning, the 7th, Captain Brenton of the *Cæsar*, was despatched with a flag of truce, to endeavour to negotiate the exchange of Captain Ferris, his officers and men. After some correspondence between Sir James and the French admiral, the latter permitted Captain Ferris, with all his officers and wounded men, to depart on their parole; and granted the

same privilege to Captain Lord Cochrane and the officers of the *Speedy* brig.

Thus it stands in the first edition of this work, and so we yet believe the fact to be ; but the brother of the officer who carried the message, says thus : " Sir James Saumarez sent his captain over to Algiers with a flag of truce to the French admiral proposing an exchange of prisoners, which M. Linois declined, alleging that it was not in his power to consent to such a measure, without first receiving the sanction of the minister of marine at Paris, to whom he had despatched a courier immediately after the termination of the action."\* At all events both Captain Ferris and Lord Cochrane, with their respective officers, the sole object, we believe, of Captain Jahleel Brenton's mission, were in England in the month of August.

It would be almost superfluous to state the result of the court-martial which was afterwards held upon Captain Ferris, and the late officers and ship's company of the *Hannibal*. The court, of which Rear-admiral Holloway was president, sat on board the *Gladiator*, in Portsmouth harbour, on the 1st of September. After the most honourable acquittal that a brave man could desire, Captain Ferris had his sword returned to him by the president, with the following address : " Captain Ferris, I have great pleasure in returning this sword to you, as I feel assured, if ever you have occasion to unsheath it again, it will be used with the same gallantry which you so nobly displayed in defending his majesty's ship *Hannibal*."

We formerly mentioned the transfer by Spain to France, for immediate employment, of six ships of the line at anchor in Cadiz harbour.† On the 13th of June, in the morning, the two French 40-gun frigates *Libre* and *Indienne*, after a few hours' chase by the 74-gun ships *Venerable* and *Superb*, the only British force then off the port, anchored in the road of Cadiz from Brest, having on board Rear-admiral Dumanoir-le-Pelley, Commodore Le Ray, and a number of other officers, as well as of seamen, for the Franco-Spanish ships equipping in the port. The remainder of the crews, not already arrived by these and other conveyances, were daily expected from Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort.

The first step taken by Rear-admiral Linois, after getting his grounded ships and prize afloat, and which, notwithstanding the belief of Sir James Saumarez, that " the whole were rendered entirely unserviceable," he soon did, was to send an express overland to Admirals Massaredo and Dumanoir at Cadiz, imploring them to come or send a squadron to his assistance, before the British could get their ships repaired for renewing the attack ; adding, in his second despatch to the Spanish commander-in-chief, " I have just received advice that the enemy

\* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 36.

† See p. 111.

intends burning us at our anchorage: it is in your power to save for the republic three fine ships of the line and a frigate, by merely ordering the Cadiz squadron to come and seek us."

Even these urgent calls would in all probability have failed in their effect, had not Rear-admiral Dumanoir been on the spot to unite his solicitations with those of Rear-admiral Linois. Thus pressed, Admiral Massaredo, on the afternoon of the 8th, ordered Vice-admiral Don Juan Joaquin de Moreno, with five Spanish and one Franco-Spanish sail of the line, three frigates, and a lugger, to anchor in the outer road ready for a start by the land-wind of the next morning. This movement was seen by the *Superb*, then with the *Thames* and *Pasley* cruising off the port.

How these vessels happened to be here, when the *Superb* had been ordered to follow the squadron to Algeziras, may require some explanation. About three hours after the latter ship, still lying nearly becalmed, had lost sight of the rearmost of the ships with Sir James, an American vessel from the Mediterranean gave information that she had seen a French squadron of three sail of the line come out of Algeziras bay, and had left the ships well towards the African shore, standing out of the Straits. Inclining to think that the French admiral, if met by Sir James, as the American master had no doubt would be the case, would run direct for the Mediterranean; considering that, by the delay which had unavoidably happened, the *Superb* had lost all chance of joining the admiral in time to be of any service; and having not the slightest apprehension of the result of a contest at sea between three French and six British sail of the line, Captain Keats judged it to be the wisest plan to return off Cadiz, and, with his 74, frigate, and brig, watch the motions of the immeasurably superior force at anchor in that port.

On the 9th, at daylight, the Franco-Spanish squadron put to sea, all except the *Saint-Antoine* 74, which either got aground, or, not being able to fetch out, came again to an anchor. The remaining five sail of the line, three frigates, and a lugger, made sail towards the Gut, preceded by the *Superb*, *Thames*, and *Pasley*. Early in the afternoon the brig came crowding into Gibraltar with the signal for an enemy flying; and at 3 P.M., while the Spanish squadron was hauling round Cabrita point, the *Superb* and *Thames*, by signal from the *Cæsar*, came to an anchor in Gibraltar bay. Shortly afterwards the squadron from Cadiz was seen from the rock to cast anchor in the road of Algeziras. On the next morning the *San Antonio*, or, as her recent change of ownership entitled her to be called, *Saint-Antoine*, anchored with Rear-admiral Moreno's squadron.

That the object of this reinforcement was to conduct in safety to Cadiz the squadron of M. Linois was well known at the rock; and nothing could surpass the exertions of the British officers and men to get their damaged ships ready for sea. The *Pompée*

was in too bad a state to leave any hopes that she could be got ready in time: her men, therefore, were turned over to assist in the repairs of the other ships. "The *Cæsar*," says Captain Edward Brenton, "lay in the mole, in so shattered a state, that the admiral gave her up also; and, hoisting his flag on board the *Audacious*, expressed his intention of distributing her men to the effective ships. Captain (Jahleel) Brenton requested that his people might remain on board as long as possible, and, addressing them, stated the admiral's intentions in case the ship could not be got ready: they answered, with three cheers, 'All hands to work day and night, till she is ready.' The captain ordered them to work all day, and watch and watch all night; by these means they accomplished what has, probably, never been exceeded. On the 8th they warped her into the mole and shipped the lower masts; on the 9th they got their new main-mast in. On the 11th the enemy showed symptoms of sailing, which only increased, if possible, the energies of the seamen. On Sunday the 12th, at dawn of day, the enemy loosed sails; the *Cæsar* still refitting in the mole, receiving powder, shot, and other stores, and preparing to haul out.

"At noon the enemy began to move: the wind was fresh from the eastward, and as they cleared the bay, they took up stations off Cabrita point, which appeared to be the rendezvous, on which they were to form their line of battle. At one o'clock the enemy's squadron was nearly all under way; the Spanish ships *Real-Carlos* and *Hermenegildo*, of 112 guns each, off Cabrita point: the *Cæsar* was warping out of the mole. The day was clear; the whole population of the rock came out to witness the scene; the line-wall, mole-head, and batteries, were crowded from the dock-yard to the ragged staff; the *Cæsar's* band playing, 'Come cheer up my lads, 'tis to glory we steer;' the military band of the garrison answering with 'Britons strike home.' The effect of this scene it is difficult to describe: Englishmen were proud of their country; and foreigners, who beheld the scene, wished to be Englishmen. So general was the enthusiasm among our gallant countrymen, that even the wounded men begged to be taken on board, to share in the honours of the approaching conflict."\*

At 3 P.M., just as, in her way out of the mole she passed under the stern of the *Audacious*, the *Cæsar* rehoisted the flag of Sir James Saumarez, and made the signal for the squadron to weigh and prepare for battle. This was promptly done; and the squadron, consisting of the *Cæsar*, *Venerable*, *Superb*, *Spencer*, and *Audacious* of the line, 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Thames*, Captain Askew Paffard Holles, 14-gun polacre-sloop *Calpé*, Captain the Honourable George Heneage Laurence

\* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 39.



Dundas, hired armed brig *Louisa*, and Portuguese frigate, *Caslette*, Captain Crawford Duncan.

As soon as they had got from under the lee of the rock, the British ships formed in line ahead on the larboard tack, with the wind from the eastward. At 7 P.M. they wore together, and stood on the starboard tack, under easy sail, watching the combined squadron, which, at about 7 h. 45 m. P.M., cleared Cabrita point; except the *Hannibal*, who, having only topmasts for lower masts, still remained astern, in spite of all the efforts of the *Indienne* frigate by whom she was in tow. The frigate and her charge eventually returned to Algeziras, leaving the following as the force of the combined squadron:

#### SPANISH.

Gun-ship			
112	{	Real-Carlos.....	Captain Don J. Esquerra.
		Hermenegildo.....	" Don J. Emparan.
96		San-Fernando.....	" Don J. Malina.
80		Argonauta.....	" Don J. Harrera.
74		San-Augustin.....	" Don R. Jopete.
<i>Frigate, Sabina.</i>			

#### FRENCH.

86	{	Formidable.....	Captain Anable-Gilles Troude.
		Indomptable.....	"
74		Saint-Antoine.....	Commod. Julien Le Ray.
		Desaix.....	" Jean-Anne Christy-Palliére.
<i>Frigates, Libre and Muiron; lugger Vantour.</i>			

It appears that it is the invariable custom for a Spanish admiral, when in the presence of the enemy, to shift his flag from a line-of-battle ship to a frigate.\* Accordingly, while the squadron was lying to off Cabrita point, Vice-admiral Moreno shifted his flag from the *Real-Carlos* to the *Sabina*; and by the Spanish admiral's desire, but with much reluctance on his part, Rear-admiral Linois quitted the *Formidable* and repaired on board the same frigate.

At 8 P.M., or a little after, the British squadron bore away in chase; and, at about 8 h. 40 m., Sir James hailed the *Superb*, who was close astern of the *Cæsar*, and directed Captain Keats to make sail ahead, and attack the sternmost of the enemy's ships, none of which were then visible. In an instant all sail was set upon the *Superb*; and, passing the *Cæsar*, she regained a sight of the hostile squadron. At 10 P.M. the wind freshened, and the *Cæsar* and *Venerable* were then the only ships of her own squadron seen by the *Superb*. At 11 P.M. the *Superb* had so increased her distance, that the *Cæsar* was full three miles

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xiv, p. 164.

astern, and the Venerable no longer visible. At 11 h. 20 m. P.M., observing a Spanish three-decker, the Real-Carlos, about a point before her larboard beam, and a three and a two decker, the San-Hermenegildo and Saint-Antoine, in a range with and on the larboard side of the former, the Superb shortened sail; and, when about 300 or 350 yards from the Real-Carlos, opened a fire upon her from her larboard guns. At the third broadside the Real-Carlos, whose fore topmast had just been shot away, was observed to be on fire. The Superb instantly ceased engaging the Spanish ship; and the latter continued her course before the wind. Shortly afterwards the Real-Carlos came suddenly to the wind, and then dropped astern in evident confusion, she and her two nearest companions firing their guns in all directions.

The total destruction of her first opponent being now no longer doubtful, the Superb again made sail, and at 11 h. 50 m. P.M. came up with and brought to action the Saint-Antoine. After a contest of about 30 minutes, part of which was close and fought upon a wind, the French 74 ceased firing, and hailed repeatedly that she surrendered. Shortly afterwards the Cæsar and Venerable came up in succession, and, deceived by the Saint-Antoine's broad pendant, which, owing to the halliards having been shot away and got entangled amongst the rigging, still remained flying, fired into her; as did also the Spencer and Thames. In a few minutes the discovery was made that the Saint-Antoine had already surrendered, and the firing at her ceased.

At about 15 minutes past midnight the Real-Carlos blew up, but not until she had fallen on board of, and set in a similar blaze, the San-Hermenegildo, who, having in the dark mistaken the Real-Carlos for a foe, had been engaging her; and who, in another quarter of an hour, exploded also. Thus, melancholy to relate, out of 2000 men composing the united crews of these Spanish first-rates, two officers and 36 men that got on board the Superb, and 262 who were fortunate enough to reach the Saint-Antoine and some of the other ships of their squadron,\* were all that escaped destruction.

The loss on board the Superb, in her action with the Saint-Antoine (for in her short one with the Real-Carlos, she does not appear to have sustained any), amounted to one lieutenant (Edmund Waller) and 14 seamen and marines wounded, most of them severely. The Saint-Antoine, in crew and supernumeraries, had on board 730 men, of whom about 200, including those saved from one of the two three-deckers, were Spaniards. The loss on board the Saint-Antoine, except that Commodore Le Ray was wounded, has not been enumerated; but, from the half-an hour's close cannonade of so well directed

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xiv., p. 103.

plined a ship as the *Superb*, it must have been very severe.\* The latter, accompanied by the *Carlotta*, *Calpé*, and *Louisa*, remained with the *Saint-Antoine*, while the rest of the squadron stood on in chase.

During the latter part of the night it came on to blow very hard; and on the 13th, at 4 A.M., the only ships in company with the *Cæsar* were, the *Spencer* far astern, the *Venerable* and *Thames* ahead, and the French 80-gun ship *Formidable*, at some distance from and upon the lee bow of the latter, standing towards the shoals of Conil, with a light air from off the land. Sail was immediately made by the *Cæsar* and her three consorts; but the easterly wind soon afterwards failing, the *Venerable* and *Thames*, who were nearer in shore, were the only ships in a situation to chase with any prospect of success; and, as the *Formidable* had only jury topmasts, they came up with her fast. At 5½ A.M. the French ship hoisted her colours, and at 5 h. 15 m. commenced firing her stern-chase guns at the *Venerable*; but the latter, for fear of retarding her progress, did not fire in return until five or six minutes afterwards, when the light and baffling airs threw the two ships broadside-to, within musket-shot of each other.

At 5 h. 30 m. the *Venerable's* mizen topmast was shot away; and at 5 h. 45 m. the *Thames*, by signal, hauled up and poured a raking broadside into the *Formidable*; who fired from her stern-chasers in return, but without effect. At 6 h. 45 m., by which time the French 80 and British 74 had gradually approximated to a pistol-shot distance, the mainmast of the latter came down by the board. Her standing and running rigging being also cut to pieces the *Venerable* fell from alongside her opponent. Profiting by the circumstance, the *Formidable* continued to stand on; but owing to the almost calm state of the weather, increased her distance so slowly, as to give considerable annoyance to the *Venerable* by the fire from her stern-chasers. At 7 h. 50 m. A.M. the *Venerable's* foremast fell over her side, and almost at the same instant the ship herself, driven by the strength of the current, struck upon the rocky shoals off San-Pedro, situated about 12 miles to the southward of Cadiz. Having thus effectually rid herself of this her principal opponent, the *Formidable* continued her course to the northward, under all the sail she could spread, in the hope to reach Cadiz before the enemy's two remaining line-of-battle ships in sight, the nearest of which, the *Cæsar*, was still at a

\* Although when first fitted, and at this time (1825), carrying 24-pounders on her main deck, the *Superb* mounted only 18-pounders in her action with the *Saint-Antoine*, her previous commander, Captain John Sutton, from an idea that the ship was crank, having induced the admiralty to issue an order for the exchange.

† Misprinted "seven" in the Gazette.

considerable distance, could approach within gun-shot. At 8 A. M., just as the mizenmast of the Venerable had shared the fate of the other masts, the gig of the Cæsar, with Captain Brenton on board, reached the ship (over which the stern-chase shot of the Formidable were still flying), with discretionary orders to Captain Hood, to withdraw his crew and destroy the Venerable, should the combined squadron, which appeared so inclined, evince an intention of attacking her; and the Thames had been ordered to close for the purpose of receiving the people. Captain Hood, however, requested the rear-admiral to depend upon his exertions to save the Venerable, notwithstanding her critical and almost hopeless situation. Just as the Cæsar's boat had quitted the Venerable on her return, the appearance of the Audacious and Superb to the southward induced the Spanish admiral to haul up for Cadiz, where he and his ships were soon safely moored.

In her smart encounter with a ship so decidedly superior to her in force as the formidable, the Venerable had her master (John Williams), 15 seamen, and two marines killed, one lieutenant (Thomas Church), her boatswain (John Snell), two midshipmen (George Massey and Charles Pardoe), 73 seamen, and 10 marines wounded. The Thames does not appear to have had a man hurt; and we do not believe that any of the Formidable's shot even struck her. The loss sustained by the Formidable herself, according to her captain's official report, amounted to 20 men killed, or mortally wounded, but the remaining wounded M. Troude has seemingly omitted to enumerate. The Sabina frigate had also one man killed and five wounded; but whether from the fire of the British ships, or of the two unfortunate three-deckers that blew up, it is difficult to ascertain.

The British had now leisure to devote the whole of their attention to the only remaining object, the safety of the Venerable. Fortunately for her gallant officers and crew, the weather continued calm; and at 2 P. M., by the assistance of the Thames who had anchored near, and of the boats of the Cæsar and Spencer, the Venerable was hove into deep water. The Thames then took the dismasted 74 in tow, and stood with her towards the flag-ship in the offing. At 6 P. M. the Venerable cast off the Thames, and was taken in tow by the Spencer, who made sail with her towards the Gut. Having cleared away the wreck of her masts, the Venerable now got up a main top-gallantmast for a foremast, the driverboom for a mainmast, and a studding-sail-boom for a mizenmast. Soon after dark a main top-gallant-sail was set for a foresail, and before daylight on the 14th a mizen topsail for a mainsail. So that by 8 A. M., the Venerable had made herself sufficiently manageable to cast off the ship of the line that was towing her, and take again to the frigate. Even this state of comparative seaworthiness had not been accomplished without great exertions on the part of her

officers and crew; yet a contemporary states that, at sunset on the preceding day, which was little more than five hours after she lay a dismasted hulk upon the rocks, the Venerable was "in such efficient order as to be fit for action had an enemy appeared."\*

For the service rendered to the country, by the prompt and effective manner in which the combined squadron under Vice-admiral Moreno and Rear-admiral Linois was chased and attacked by the British squadron under Rear-admiral Sir James Saumarez, the latter, with the captains, officers, and crews of the ships under his orders, received the thanks of parliament; and Sir James himself, for his conspicuous gallantry in going in pursuit of a force so decidedly superior, was created a knight of the bath, with a pension of 1200*l.* per annum. The first lieutenant of the *Cæsar*, Philip Dumaresq, was made a commander. The first lieutenants of the *Superb* and *Venerable*, the two ships that bore the brunt of the action, were Samuel Jackson and James Lillicrap; and they also received that step in rank which was so justly their due.

The *Saint-Antoine*, which, on account of the miserable fate of the two Spanish three-deckers, was the only trophy carried off by the British, became afterwards added to the navy of her captors; but, being an old 74 of only 1700 tons, the ship never quitted Portsmouth after she arrived there. By way of perpetuating an acknowledged error in the official letter of Captain Keats to Sir James Saumarez, the *Saint-Antoine*, both in Steel's lists and in the navy-office books, continued, and in the latter still continues to be called the *San-Antonio*.

Although from a desire to be impartial we invariably, if in our power, consult the accounts on both sides of the question, and are frequently enabled to extract, even on the subject of British naval history, much useful information from an account drawn up by a Frenchman or Spaniard, the best French account we can find of the proceedings of the combined squadron under Vice-admiral Moreno and Rear-admiral Linois is so amusingly extravagant, that, if only as a relief to the dry matter-of-fact detail of these pages, we are induced to subjoin a translated extract: "At 4 o'clock in the morning he (Captain Troude) perceived in his wake four vessels which he knew were enemies: they were, in fact, a part of the English squadron: the *Cæsar*, commanded by Admiral Saumarez, the *Venerable*, *Superb*,† and frigate *Thames*. The brave Troude prepared for action, and strengthened his lower batteries by men from above of the quarterdeck and fore-castle. \*He was soon overtaken by the *Venerable* and *Thames*: the first discharged her broadside into the starboard quarter, and the *Formidable* bore up on close this adversary: a most spirited combat ensued, yard-arm and yard-

\* Buxton, vol. iii., p. 42.

† The *Spencer* is here meant.

arm; and frequently at no greater distance than the sponge of the gun. The French captain ordered three round-shot to be put into each gun. The Thames cannonaded him astern, but the latter's stern-chasers replied to her fire. The two other enemy's ships (now comes the inventive part of the story) successively arrived up; and, not being able to double the Formidable to windward, they took their stations upon her larboard quarter. One of the first broadsides of the French ship carried away the Venerable's mizen topmast, and soon afterwards her mainmast: the English vessel bore up; but Troude followed her in this movement to rake her astern, at the same time that he cannonaded the Cæsar, who, finding herself close ahead of the Venerable, could not return the fire: not a French shot was lost. In this position the Venerable lost her foremast. Troude now directed the whole of his fire at the Cæsar, whom he closed as much as possible. After an engagement of half an hour, although the English ship, being able to carry more sail, ran past the Formidable and obliged the latter to manœuvre to keep alongside of her opponent, the Cæsar abandoned the combat, bore up in confusion, hauled on board her larboard tacks, and joined the Venerable, to whom the Thames was affording succour. It remained still to fight the Superb, who was on the larboard bow of the French ship; but the English ship bore up, passed under the lee of the Formidable out of gun-shot, and rejoined the other vessels. At 7 o'clock in the morning Captain Troude was master of the field of battle. He got upon deck the remainder of his shot, sufficient still for another hour's action; refreshed his gallant crew, who had so well seconded him, and repaired his rigging: his sails were in tatters, the land-wind had ceased, and he found himself becalmed, within gun-shot of the English squadron, the boats of which were occupied in giving assistance to the Venerable. This ship had now lost her mizenmast, and the current drove her upon the coast. At 10 o'clock, the wind having freshened, the Thames attempted to take the Venerable in tow, but not being able to get her afloat, she was wrecked between the Isle of Léon and the point of San-Roche."\*

The French government believed, or affected to believe, all this fanfaronade, and therefore could do no less than reward the Formidable's commanding officer. This was done forthwith; and, from a very young capitaine de frégate, M. Amable-Gilles Troude was promoted to a capitaine de vaisseau, by commission dated on the 14th of July, 1801, the very day on which, with the aid of his pen, if not of his sword, he had added much to his own and his country's renown.

\* For the original extract, see Appendix, No. 12.

## LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

On the 3d of January, the British 38-gun frigate *Melpomène*, Captain Sir Charles Hamilton, being off the bar of *Sénégal*, the latter resolved, with the concurrence of Lieutenant-colonel Frazer, the commandant of the garrison of *Gorée*, to attempt to carry by surprise a French 18-gun brig-corvette and an armed schooner at anchor within it; in order, by their means, as vessels of a less draught of water than the frigate, to get possession of the battery that commanded the entrance to the river, and eventually of the settlement itself.

Accordingly, at 9 h. 30 m. P. M., five boats, containing 55 volunteers from the *Melpomène*, five from the crew of a transport in company, and Lieutenant Christie and 35 men from the African corps, being 96 in all, placed under the orders of Lieutenant Thomas Dick, assisted by Lieutenant William Palmer, and by Lieutenant William Vyvian of the marines, quitted the *Melpomène* upon the service intrusted to them. Having passed in safety the heavy surf on the bar with the flood-tide, also the battery at the point, without being discovered, the boats, at 11 h. 15 m., arrived within a few yards of the brig; when the latter, by a single discharge of her two bow-guns, killed Lieutenant Palmer and seven men, and sank two of the best boats. Notwithstanding this, the three remaining boats pulled alongside of, boarded, and, after a 20 minutes' severe contest, carried, the French brig-corvette *Sénégal*, of 18 long 8 and 12 pounders (the latter carronades probably) and about 60 men, commanded by Citizen Renou.

In the mean time the schooner had cut her cable, and run for protection nearer the battery; the fire from which, and from some musketry on the southern bank of the river, frustrated every attempt upon the former, although Lieutenant Dick had turned the guns of the brig against her. Having effected as much as he could, Lieutenant Dick cut the cables of the brig, and made sail with her down the river; but, owing to the ebb-tide's having made, and no one on board being acquainted with the navigation across the bar, the *Sénégal* grounded. After several vain attempts to get off the prize, Lieutenant Dick and his party quitted her; and, with the three boats, succeeded in making his way to the ship, across a tremendous surf, and under a heavy fire of grape-shot and musketry from the adjoining batteries. The brig afterwards sank up to her gunwales, in the position on which she had grounded. The loss sustained by the British in this spirited, although but partially successful affair, amounted to one lieutenant (William Palmer), one lieutenant of marines (William Vyvian), one midshipman (Robert Main), six seamen, one marine, and one corporal of the African corps killed, one master's mate (John Hendric), one surgeon's

mate (Robert Darling), 10 seamen, one corporal and four privates of marines, and Lieutenant Christie of the African corps wounded; total, 11 killed and 18 wounded.

On the 6th of January the British 28-gun frigate *Mercury*, Captain Thomas Rogers, cruising in the gulf of Lyons, fell in with a convoy of about 20 sail of vessels, bound from Cette to Marseilles, under the escort of two or three French gun-boats. The weather being nearly calm, Captain Rogers despatched his boats (but how commanded does not appear in the gazette-letter) to attack the convoy; 15 of which, including two ships and four brigs, and all deeply laden with brandy, sugar, corn, wine, oil, and other merchandise, were brought off with very little resistance and no loss, the gun-boats having all fled upon the *Mercury's* approach.

On the 20th, the island of Sardinia bearing east-south-east distant 40 leagues, and the wind blowing fresh, the *Mercury* fell in with, and after a nine hours' chase captured, without loss or resistance, the French 20-gun ship-corvette *Sans-Pareille*, of 18 brass 8-pounders and two brass 36-pounder carronades, and (the London Gazette says, "fifteen," but the French captain's deposition in the prize-court) 155 men, commanded by Lieutenant Gabriel Renaud, from Toulon the day preceding, bound to Alexandria, with a full cargo of shot, arms, medicines, and supplies of every kind, for the French army. Although described as quite a new vessel, and well-found with stores of every description, the prize does not appear to have been added to the British navy.

On the 15th of January, while the 20-gun ship *Daphne*, Captain Richard Matson, 18-gun ship-sloops *Cyane* and *Hornet*, Captains Henry Matson and James Nash, and schooner-tender *Garland*, were at an anchor in the harbour of the Saintes, a convoy of French coasters, in charge of an armed schooner, was observed standing across towards Vieux-Fort, island of Guadeloupe. At midnight the *Garland* schooner, accompanied by two boats from each of the three ships, under the command of Lieutenants Kenneth Mackenzie and Francis Peachey, was despatched to attempt the capture or destruction of the convoy. The whole of the vessels, however, except one, succeeded in getting under the guns of Basse-terre. That one, having anchored near Vieux-Fort, was boarded and brought off under a heavy but apparently harmless cannonade.

On the 17th in the afternoon, the French schooner *Eclair*, of four long 4-pounders, twenty 1½ pounder brass swivels, and 45 men, the escort of the convoy in question, was observed to put into the Rivieres, and anchor under the protection of one principal battery and two smaller flanking ones. Lieutenants Mackenzie and Peachey volunteered to attempt cutting her out. For this purpose the first-named officer, with 25 seamen and marines, went on board the *Garland*; and at 5 A.M. on the



18th, which was as early as the breeze would permit, the *Cyane*, tender, and boats stood across to Trois-Rivières. On arriving at the anchorage, the *Garland* ran the *Eclair* on board, and Lieutenants Mackenzie and Peachey, with 30 men, boarded and carried the French schooner in the face of the batteries,

This gallant exploit was not performed wholly without loss, the British having had one seaman and one marine killed, and a sergeant of marines and two seamen wounded. In defending herself, which she appears to have done in a very manful way, the *Eclair* lost one seaman killed, two drowned, and her captain, first and second lieutenants, and six men wounded. The schooner had recently sailed from Rochefort; and, although mounting only four guns, was pierced for, and, being 145 tons, was well able to carry, 12 guns, the number she afterwards mounted in the British service.

Late in the month of December, 1800, the British 8-gun schooner *Active*, Acting-lieutenant Michael Fitton, having returned to Port-Royal from a long cruise, needed a thorough repair. To employ to advantage the intervening time, Captain Henry Vansittart, of the *Abergavenny* 54, of which ship the *Active* was the tender, allowed Lieutenant Fitton to transfer himself and crew to one of the *Active*'s prizes, the late Spanish privateer *N.-S. de los Dolores*; a felucca of about 50 tons, mounting one long 12-pounder on a traversing carriage, with a screw to raise it from the hold when wanted for use. Having embarked on board of her, and stowed as well as he could his 44 officers and men, Lieutenant Fitton, early in January, 1801, sailed out on a cruise upon the Spanish Main.

In her way along the coast, for every part of which her commander was a pilot, the tender, whose rig and appearance were an admirable decoy, destroyed two or three enemy's small-craft; such as, although not worth sending in, were precisely the kind of vessels which had recently been committing such serious depredations on West India commerce. It may be observed here, that small, swift-sailing, armed vessels, properly commanded and appointed, are the only description of cruisers which can operate with effect against the hordes of tiny, but well-manned, and, to a merchant vessel, formidable privateers, that usually swarm in the West India seas. The *Active* herself had perhaps captured or destroyed more of these marauders than any frigate upon the station; and it need not be urged at what a comparatively trifling expense.

A succession of stormy weather, and the leaky state of the felucca's deck, by which chiefly 22 of the men had been made sick, induced her commander to steer for, and take possession of, a small key near Point Canoe on the Spanish Main. Here Lieutenant Fitton erected a tent, landed his men and stores, and, after making the best disposition his means would admit to resist an attack, examined the state of his vessel. The main

beam, on which the gun rested, was found to be badly sprung. This was irreparable. The vessel's rigging was decayed, and he had no cordage; her sails were split and torn, and he had neither canvass, nor even sail-twine. Being, however, a man of resources, Lieutenant Fitton reduced and altered the shape of the sails, the seamen using for twine what they unravelled from the remnant pieces. He then rigged the tender as a lugger, and re-embarked his men, gun, and the few stores he had left.

In this ineffective state, the tender bore up for Carthagena; her commander intending to coast down the Main to Porto-Bello, in the hope of being able to capture or cut out some vessel that might answer to carry his crew and himself to Jamaica. On the 23d of January, early in the morning, as the tender was hauling round Cape Rosario, a schooner was discovered, to which she immediately gave chase. The schooner, which was the Spanish garda-costa Santa-Maria, of six (pierced for 10) long 6-pounders, 10 swivels, and 60 men, commanded by Don Josef Coréi, a few hours only from Carthagena, bore down to reconnoitre the lugger. The latter having her gun below, and as many of her men hid from view as the want of a barricade would permit, the garda-costa readily approached within gun-shot. Although he could have no wish to contend with so powerful an adversary, Lieutenant Fitton could not resist the opportunity of showing how well his men could handle their 12-pounder. It was soon raised up, and was discharged repeatedly, in quick succession, with evident effect.

After about 30 minutes' mutual firing with cannon and musketry, the Santa-Maria sheered off, and directed her course for the isle of Varus, evidently with an intent to run on shore. Her persevering though one gun opponent stuck close to her, plying her well with shot, great and small; but the tender was unable, as her commander wished, to grapple the schooner, because the latter kept the weathergage. At length the Santa-Maria grounded; and Lieutenant Fitton, aware that, if the schooner landed her men in the bushes, no attempt of his people would avail, eased off the lugger's sheets, and ran her also on shore, about 10 yards from the Santa-Maria. The musketry of the latter as she heeled over greatly annoying the tender's men, who had no barricades to shelter them, Lieutenant Fitton leaped overboard; and, with his sword in his mouth, followed by the greater part of his crew similarly armed, swam to, boarded, and after a stout resistance carried, the Spanish schooner.

In this splendid little affair, the tender lost two seamen killed and five wounded; and of her small crew, numbering originally but 45, many were too sick to attend their quarters. Four or five, also, who were in the sick list, heedless alike of the doctor's injunctions and their own feeble state, had, when the boarding call was made, sprung over the side with their comrades; and one or two of them nearly perished, in consequence of their

inability to struggle with the waves. The loss on board the *Santa-Maria*, as acknowledged by her officers, amounted to five men killed and nine wounded, including her commander, who, poor fellow, had both his hands carried away by a grape-shot.

It took some hours ere the tender, with the help of the prize's anchors and cables (her own having parted in a gale four days before), was again got afloat; and, before that could be effected, the 12-pounder, then in a disabled state, was obliged to be thrown overboard. The Spanish inhabitants having collected along and opened a fire from the shore, and the prize having grounded too fast to be got off, Lieutenant Fitton set the *Santa-Maria* on fire; but not until he had taken out of her what was most wanted for his own vessel, and had landed as well the living of her crew, for whom, being without a 'tween-decks, he had no room, as, from a respect to the scruples even of an enemy, the five that were dead. Having thus destroyed a Spanish *garda-costa* of very superior force, the *Abergavenny's* tender sailed back to Jamaica, and on the fourth day reached Black-River with scarcely a gallon of water on board.

On the 26th of January, at 8 A. M., in latitude 45° north, longitude 12° west, the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Oiseau*, Captain Samuel Hood Linzee, fell in with and chased the French 36-gun frigate *Dédaigneuse*, bound from Cayenne to Rochefort with despatches. The *Oiseau* continued the pursuit alone until noon on the 27th; when, Cape Finisterre in sight, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigates *Sirius* and *Amethyst*, Captains Richard King and John Cooke, joined in the chase. But so well did the *Dédaigneuse* maintain her advantage, that it was not until 2 A. M. on the 28th, that the *Sirius* and *Oiseau* got near enough to receive a fire from her stern-chasers.

After a running fight of 45 minutes, and a loss of "several" men killed and 17 wounded, among the latter her captain (not named in the official letter) and fifth lieutenant, the French frigate, when about two miles from the shore near Cape Belem, hauled down her colours. The only British ship struck by the shot of the *Dédaigneuse* was the *Sirius*; and she did not have a man hurt, but had her rigging and sails a trifle damaged, and her main yard and bowsprit slightly wounded. The *Dédaigneuse*, a fine little frigate of 897 tons, was afterwards added to the British navy under the same name as a 12-pounder 36.

On the 29th of January, at noon, the British 24-gun ship *Bordelais*, Captain Thomas Manby, while cruising to windward of Barbadoes, discovered, in chase of her to windward, two men-of-war brigs and a schooner. The *Bordelais* immediately shortened sail to comply with their wishes; and, at sunset, the French national brigs, *Curieux*, of 18 long 8-pounders and 168 men, Captain Georges Radelet, and *Mutine*, of 16 long 6-pounders and 156 men, and the schooner *Espérance*, of six 4-pounders and 52 men, got within gun-shot. At 6 P. M., having more

round, the Bordelais was enabled to bring the Curieux to action, at about 10 yards' distance. Scarcely had the Bordelais opened her heavy metal upon the Curieux, than the latter's two consorts abandoned her. When it is known that the Bordelais was a ship of 625 tons, mounting twenty-two 32-pounder carronades and 2 long nines, with a complement of 195 men, the surprise will be great that the Curieux alone should, for 30 minutes, sustain an action with her; and that, too, at a distance so favourable to a carronade-battery.

On being taken possession of after having hailed that she had struck, the Curieux's deck was found, as might indeed be expected, strewed from end to end with the dying and the dead. The captain had had both his legs shot off, and survived but a few hours; and the brig's killed and wounded, in the whole, amounted to about 50. The Bordelais, on the other hand, escaped with only one man killed, and seven wounded; including among the latter Lieutenant Robert Barrie, who did not quit his quarters, Master's Mate James Jones, and Midshipman John Lions.

It was not in the killed and wounded only, that the French brig afforded proofs of the obstinacy of her resistance: her hull had been so pierced with shot, that, in about half an hour after she was taken possession of, the Curieux was found to be sinking. Already had 120 prisoners been received from her; and every exertion was now made to save the wounded. So zealous were Lieutenant Archibald Montgomery and his 20 men in performing this service, that, at 8 P.M. the vessel foundered under them, close alongside of the Bordelais. The floating wreck buoyed up all those brave men except two midshipmen, Messieurs Spence and Auckland, and five seamen; who consequently perished, with the whole, if not the greater part, of the brig's wounded.

Nothing could exceed the gallantry of Captain Radelet, unless it was the pusillanimity of his two brother-officers, Captains Raybaun and Haymond; and whose vessels, on account of the three hours' delay which had taken place in endeavouring to save the crew of the prize, in shifting the prisoners, and in repairing the Bordelais' rigging and sails, effected their escape. These two French brigs and schooner had been fitted out by Victor Hugues at Cayenne, principally to intercept the outward-bound West India fleet. It is but fair to mention, that a French "Etat général de la Marine," of 1803, does not contain the names of the two gentlemen represented to have been the commanders of the Mutine and Espérance. The probability therefore is, that they were not officers belonging to the French avy.

On the 18th of February, at about 2 P.M., latitude 28° 24' south, and longitude 18° 17' west, the British 18-gun brig-sloop Penguin (sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two long-sixes),

Captain Robert Mansel, standing to the south-east with a fresh breeze at north, discovered in the west-north-west three warlike-looking ships apparently in chase of her. At 2 h. 45 m., finding the private signal not answered, the brig, having previously shortened sail, cleared for action, to be ready to receive the leading ship; which had edged away towards her, and, showing 12 ports of a side, appeared to be a corvette of at least 20 guns, while her two consorts, apparently armed merchantmen, and either her convoy or prizes, kept their wind.

At 3 h. 45 m. the corvette, as if not liking the Penguin's appearance, tacked and rejoined her consorts; whereupon the Penguin tacked also, and stood after them. At 5 h. 10 m. p. m. the Penguin arrived nearly within gun-shot of the sternmost ship, when the corvette, firing a shot, hoisted French colours, as did the others. All three ships then formed in line, and bore down for the brig's larboard quarter. The Penguin again tacked to close, and presently afterwards received and returned the fire of the three ships as they passed in succession. Being desirous to obtain the weathergage, the Penguin stood on; and at 6 h. 15 m. p. m., having got into the wake of the French ships, the brig a third time tacked.

Immediately on this the corvette hauled to windward, and her two friends or prizes astern bore away and steered different courses: one of these ships, however, soon afterwards hauled up again as close as she could lie. In a few minutes the Penguin arrived nearly abreast and to leeward of this ship; when the latter, relying upon her weight and size, steered for the British brig's beam, with the intention of running her down. Two or three heavy and well-directed broadsides from the Penguin, poured in just as the ship approached near, caused the latter to let fly her top-gallant sheets, and haul down the French flag.

Scorning to stay to take possession of so unworthy an antagonist, when a ship more than equal to herself remained to be subdued, the Penguin stood on close hauled, and at about 7 h. 25 m. observed the corvette upon her larboard and weather quarter. In five minutes afterwards, just as the brig was about to recommence the engagement, her fore topmast came down; and, to add to the misfortune, it fell over on the larboard side, and temporarily disabled the fore yard. Seeing the unmanageable state of her opponent, the French corvette, at 7 h. 45 m., bore close down; and a spirited action ensued, during which, until towards the latter part when the Penguin managed to get her starboard broadside to bear, the brig's fore topgallant sail and rigging frequently caught fire from the explosion of her guns. Notwithstanding this, the Penguin maintained the contest with so much vigour and effect, that, at 8 h. 30 m., the French ship sheered off and hauled to the wind on the larboard tack.

After several attempts to wear in pursuit, the *Penguin* found it impracticable; and the corvette and her two consorts were presently out of sight. Although the action had lasted so long, the very high firing of the corvette, some of whose missiles were iron bars from eight inches to a foot long, occasioned the *Penguin's* principal damages to be in her rigging and sails; and, from the same cause, the brig's loss amounted to only one man killed and a few wounded. Having in the course of the night repaired her rigging and got up another topmast, the *Penguin*, at daylight on the 19th, again saw her three opponents, and chased them into the island of Teneriffe.

For the sake of Captain Mansel, and the officers and crew of the *Penguin*, we regret not to have succeeded in discovering the name and other particulars of the ship, which they had so gallantly fought and so fairly beaten. If the vessel was a national corvette, she probably was one of those which Buonaparte had sent to Cayenne or the Seychelles with banished persons; but, supposing the ship to have been a privateer, her evident size and force, and the knowledge that some of the French privateers, cruising at this particular period, were a match for a British 28-gun frigate, will prevent that from operating as the slightest disparagement, to the *Penguin's* action.

On the 19th of February, at 4 P. M., the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Phœbe*, Captain Robert Barlow, being about two leagues to the eastward of Gibraltar, beating up for that port with a light breeze at west, discovered on the African shore, nearly abreast of the fortress of Ceuta, a strange ship under a press of sail, steering directly up the Mediterranean. The *Phœbe*, having her head to the northward, immediately tacked and stood for the stranger; who, however, made no alteration in her course. At 7 h. 30 m. P. M. the *Phœbe*, by her superiority of sailing, closed the stranger upon the larboard quarter; and the latter, finding an action inevitable, shortened sail. Having done the same, and being unable from the darkness to discern her colours, the *Phœbe* fired a shot over the strange ship, to induce her to bring to. Almost immediately afterwards the French 40-gun frigate *Africaine*, Commodore Saulnier, with 400 troops, six brass field-pieces, several thousand stands of arms, and a great quantity of ammunition (but not "implements of agriculture," as erroneously stated in the official letter), which she had embarked at Rochefort (and, having sailed with and since parted from the 36-gun frigate *Régénérée*, similarly freighted, was conveying to Egypt), altered her course to port; and, as soon as she could bring her broadside to bear, discharged it at the *Phœbe*, but with little or no effect.

Having altered her course so as to keep parallel with her opponent, and got quite near to her, the *Phœbe* poured in a well-directed, and, as it proved, most destructive broadside.

The two ships with their heads to the northward, then continued the engagement within pistol-shot distance, until 9 h. 30 m. P.M.; when the *Africaine* being nearly unrigged, having five feet water in the hold, her decks literally encumbered with dead, and the greater part of her guns dismantled, struck her colours. Her masts were all badly wounded, and, had there been any swell, would have fallen over her side. The *Phœbe*'s masts were also much injured, and chiefly owed their stability to the smoothness of the sea. Her rigging and sails, too, were scarcely in better plight than those of the *Africaine*.

Although her net complement, including 18 boys, was 261, the *Phœbe* had sailed from Cork seven men short, and since manned and sent to Gibraltar, one recaptured brig with seven, and one detained brig with eight men; so that her crew on board was reduced to 239. Of this number the *Phœbe* had only one seaman killed, and her first lieutenant (John Wentworth Holland), master (Thomas Griffiths), and 10 seamen wounded.

The loss on board the *Africaine* was truly dreadful. The total number of persons on board of her were 715; of which number 315 composed the ship's regular crew, and the 400 were troops and artificers of various descriptions. Of her 715 in crew and supernumeraries, the *Africaine* had Commodore Saulnier, one brigadier-general, two captains in the army, eight petty-officers, three surgeons (actually killed in the cockpit, while dressing the wounded!) and 185 seamen, marines, artillerymen, troops, and artificers killed, and one general of division (Desforneaux), one general of battalion, one general of cavalry, one aide-de-camp, one major of battalion, her first lieutenant, or capitaine de frégate (Jean-Jacques Magendie, in the head), five other lieutenants, two volunteers, two lieutenants of grenadiers, one lieutenant of foot, three petty officers, and 125 seamen, marines; artillerymen, troops and artificers wounded; making a total of 200 killed, and 143 wounded, the greater part of them mortally. A return to this effect, signed by Captain Magendie, was delivered to Captain Barlow; but the former stated in the return, that it probably fell short of the real loss sustained, especially in killed.

The force of the *Phœbe*, whose guns were in number 44, has already appeared.\* That of the *Africaine* consisted, according to the return signed by Captain Magendie and subjoined to the official letter, of 26 long 18-pounders on the main deck and 18 long 8-pounders† on the quarterdeck and forecastle: total 44 guns also. If her eight 32-pounder carronades gave the *Phœbe* a slight preponderance in broadside weight of metal, the decided superiority in number of men, even of her regular crew, gave the *Africaine* a still greater advantage in that very essential point; an advan-

\* See vol. ii., p. 98, and vol. i., p. 527.

† Misprinted in the *London Gazette* "18 de 9," instead of "18 de 8."

tage which would have been in the proportion of nearly three to one, could the whole of the *Africaine's* crew and supernumeraries, in the event of boarding for instance, have been in a situation to act. But, as a combat to be decided by great guns only, an allowance is requisite, and a considerable one too, for that which a mere confrontation of figures can never explain, the lumbered state of the French ship's decks; an inconvenience which the troops themselves, by their valour, their mistaken valour, contributed to increase. Although their musketry could be of little or no avail in the dark, yet, upon the same erroneous principle that so augmented the loss among the soldiers on board one of the British ships at Copenhagen, they considered it as a point of honour to remain on deck and be mowed down by scores.

Circumstanced as he was, Commodore Saulnier acted as wisely in endeavouring to avoid a contest, as, when it actually began, did the officers, ship's company, soldiers, and all that were on board the *Africaine*, heroically, in defending their ship until she was reduced to a sinking state, and they to half their original number; all by the heavy, the searching, the irresistible broadsides of the *Phœbe*.

With ships so damaged in masts and rigging, and with so many prisoners on board, Captain Barlow had still a most anxious duty to perform. To increase the difficulties of his situation, the westerly breeze freshened. For four days the *Phœbe* and her prize persevered in working to windward; but on the fifth day, having made very slow progress and feeling for the sufferings of the wounded, Captain Barlow bore up for Minorca. On arriving off the south end of Majorca, the two frigates got becalmed; and it was not until a fortnight after the action, that the *Phœbe* and *Africaine* dropped their anchors in the harbour of Port-Mahon.

For his gallantry and good conduct in capturing the *Africaine*, Captain Barlow was most deservedly rewarded with the honour of knighthood; and the *Phœbe's* first lieutenant, already named, was as justly promoted to the rank of commander. Her second and third lieutenants were Frederick Bedford and Edmund Heywood, and her lieutenant of marines, Thomas Weaver; of all whom, as well as of his officers and crew generally, Captain Barlow in his official letter speaks in the highest terms.

The *Africaine*, a fine new frigate of 1069 tons, was of course purchased for the use of the British navy; and, having the ports for the requisite number of guns on the main deck, became classed as a 38-gun frigate. Probably because there was an *Africa* already in the British service, the name of the *Africaine* was changed to *Amelia*; under which name the *Phœbe's* prize long continued to be an active cruiser.

On the 22d of March, while the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigates *Andromache*, Captain Israel Pellew, and *Cleopatra*,



Captain Robert Lawrie, were cruising off Punta de Mulas, on the north-east coast of the island of Cuba, a convoy of 25 Spanish vessels known to be richly laden, were seen at an anchor in the bay of Levita, protected by three armed galleys, or gun-vessels, armed with long 24 and 18 pounders. The two captains considering it practicable to capture or destroy this convoy by the aid of their boats, the latter under the command of Captain Lawrie himself, at about 9 h. 30 m. p.m., proceeded to execute the service.

Soon after midnight the boats arrived within gun-shot of the galleys, and were received, quite unexpectedly, with a heavy and destructive fire of grape, langridge, and musketry. In spite of this opposition, the British gallantly pushed on, and boarded several of the vessels; but from the heavy loss they sustained, could only bring off one of the galleys. That loss consisted of the first lieutenant of the *Andromache* (Joseph Taylor), one master's mate (William M'Cuin), one midshipman (William Winchester, both of the *Cleopatra*), and six seamen killed, and 12 seamen wounded. Some of the boats had also been sunk by the enemy's shot. The loss among the Spaniards on board the captured gun-vessel was nine killed and several wounded.

On the 3d of April, at daybreak, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Trent*, Captain Sir Edward Hamilton, while lying at an anchor among the rocks off the Isles of Bréhat, discovered a ship, with French colours flying, under the protection of an armed cutter and lugger, making sail with the flood from the anchorage of Bréhat towards Plampoul. The boats of the frigate, under the orders of Lieutenant George Chamberlayne, assisted by Lieutenants Robert Scallon and John Bellamy, lieutenant of marines Walter Tait, and Mr. Thomas Hoskins the master, instantly proceeded to endeavour to secure the ship.

With the seeming intention of defending what proved to be a prize recently made, the French sent many boats from the shore; and these, assisted by the lugger, took the ship in tow. The intrepid advance of the *Trent's* boats, however, caused the shore-boats and lugger to cast off the ship, and prepare to defend themselves. A sharp conflict now ensued; at the end of which the French lugger and boats, although protected by five batteries, were subdued and chased upon the rocks. Shortly afterwards the ship was boarded by the first lieutenant and the lieutenant of marines; which latter, however, lost his right leg on the occasion. This, with two seamen killed, appears to have been the extent of the loss on the British side. The ship proved to be an English merchant vessel; but, as the French had all quitted her and taken the crew with them, no particulars could be obtained. Two men were found dead upon her decks, and several are supposed to have been drowned in attempting to escape from the British when they boarded.

On the 19th of April, at 8 h. 30 m. a.m., the British 30-gun

frigate Sibylle, Captain Charles Adam, observing signals flying on St.-Anne's island, one of the Seychelles, hoisted French colours; and at 9 A. M., having rounded the island, discovered in Mahé roads, close in-shore, a frigate with her foremast out, accompanied by several small-craft. The Sibylle immediately backed her main topsail, cleared for action, and got springs on the anchors: she then filled, and set the foresail. At 10 A. M. the French 36-gun frigate Chiffonne, Captain Pierre Guieysse, fired a shot and hoisted her colours. At 10 h. 15 m. A. M., having passed through a winding and intricate channel formed by various dangerous shoals, and discoverable only by the change of colour in the water as seen by a man stationed at the mast-head, the Sibylle anchored within about 200 yards of the French frigate; not being able to get nearer, on account of a shoal that lay on the Chiffonne's larboard or outermost bow.

At 10 h. 25 m. A. M., having dropped her best bower under foot, so as to bring her best broadside to bear, and substituted English for French colours, the Sibylle opened her fire, receiving in return a fire from the Chiffonne, as well as from a battery erected in a raking position on the neighbouring shore. The cannonade continued with tolerable spirit until 10 h. 42 m. A. M., when the Chiffonne struck her flag, cut her cable, and drifted upon a reef. While an officer and party went to take possession, the Sibylle veered away her cable, so that her broadside might bear upon the battery, which still continued its fire. No sooner, however, did a lieutenant and a few of the Sibylle's men land upon the beach, than the battery also struck its colours.

At the surrender of the frigate, a great number of her crew took to the boats and escaped on shore; and the men at the battery also escaped. The latter was found to consist of four of the frigate's fore-castle guns, mounted on a plank platform, defended by fascines, and provided with a furnace for heating shot. The Sibylle's force in guns and men has already appeared.\* Of the latter, she had only two seamen killed, and one midshipman slightly wounded. The Chiffonne appears to have been armed the same as the generality of French 36-gun frigates, and had a complement of 296 men; of whom the Sibylle's fire killed 23, and wounded 30. About 100, including those stationed in the battery, escaped: the remainder were made prisoners.

Although the Chiffonne was certainly no match for the Sibylle, the dangerous circumstances, under which she had been approached and attacked, entitle the officers and crew of the British frigate to a considerable share of credit. The Chiffonne, with 32 banished Frenchmen on board, had sailed from Nantes on the 14th of April, 1800, and had since, agreeably to her orders, landed them upon the Seychelles. The prize was a fine frigate of 345 tons, and was afterwards purchased for the use of

the British navy; in which, under her French name, she-classed as a 12-pounder 36.

The British 14-gun brig-sloop *Speedy*, Captain Lord Cochrane, during one of her cruises in the Mediterranean, had so annoyed the Spaniards by cutting up their coasting trade, that the government despatched armed vessels in pursuit of her from several ports. Early in April one of the seekers of the British brig, the 32-gun xebec *Gamo*, by means of closed or hanging ports, decoyed the *Speedy* within hail, and then, drawing them up, discovered her heavy battery. Against a vessel that appeared to mount 26 guns, and to be numerously manned, the *Speedy*, whose 14 guns were only 4-pounders, resolved not to risk an engagement until she had tried the effect of a ruse. To escape was out of the question, as the xebec sailed two feet to the *Speedy*'s one. The *Speedy* therefore passed for a Danish brig of war, and, in addition to the colours at her gaff-end, exhibited on the gangway a man dressed in a Danish officer's uniform; who also, in the short interchange of hailing that ensued, conversed in Danish, or, which was the same thing, in what passed for Danish.

Not quite satisfied as to the national character of the *Speedy*, the *Gamo* sent her boat with an officer. The latter, before he well got alongside, was informed, kindly informed, that the brig had lately quitted one of the Barbary ports; and he was at the same time reminded, of what he well knew, that a visit would undoubtedly subject the Spanish ship of war to a long quarantine. This was enough; and, after a few mutual salutations and wavings of the hand, the two vessels parted company; one glad at having escaped the plague, the other equally glad, one might suppose, at having escaped capture. The truth is, however, that the *Speedy*'s officers and crew were all impatient to combat their superior foe; and Lord Cochrane promised them, if ever he met her again, as he had no doubt he should, to give full scope to their wishes.

On the 6th of May, at daylight, being close off Barcelona, the *Speedy* descried a sail standing towards her. Chase was given; but, owing to light winds, it was nearly 9 A.M. before the two vessels got within mutual gun-shot. The *Speedy* soon discovered that the armed xebec approaching her was her old friend the *Gamo*. Being then close under the latter's lee, the former tacked and commenced the action. The *Speedy*'s fire was promptly returned by her opponent, who, in a little while, attempted to board; but, the instant she heard the command given, the brig sheered off. The attempt was again made, and again frustrated. At length, after a 45 minutes' cannonade, in which the *Speedy*, with all her manœuvring, could not evade the heavy broadsides of the *Gamo*, and had sustained, in consequence, a loss of three seamen killed and five wounded, Lord Cochrane determined to board. With this intent the *Speedy*

ran close alongside the Gamo; and the crew of the British vessel, headed by their gallant commander, made a simultaneous rush from every part of her upon the decks of the Spaniard. For about 10 minutes the contest was desperate, especially in the waist; but the impetuosity of the assault was irresistible: the Spanish colours were struck, and the Gamo became the prize of the Speedy.

The Speedy's gun-force has already been stated at 14 long 4-pounders. Her number of men and boys at the commencement of the action was 54. Of these the brig lost, in the boarding attack, only one seaman killed, her first lieutenant, Richard William Parker (severely, both by musketry and the sword), her boatswain and one seaman wounded; making, with her loss in the cannonade, three killed and eight wounded. The Gamo mounted 22 long Spanish 12-pounders on the main deck, with eight long eights and two "heavy carronades," probably 24-pounders, on the quarterdeck and forecastle. Her crew amounted to 274 officers, seamen, boys, and supernumeraries, and 45 marines, total 319; of which number she had her commander, Don Francisco de Torris, the boatswain, and 13 men killed, and 41 men wounded.

The Gamo's was a force which was enough to alarm, and abler hands, might easily have subdued such a vessel as Speedy. A crew of 280 or 300 was the lowest number of men that a ship, of the evident force and size of the Gamo, could be supposed to have on board; and yet Lord Cochrane, at the head of about 40 men, and, deducting the boys, the helmsman (who was Mr. James Guthrie, the surgeon), the eight killed and wounded, and one or two others, leaped into the midst of them. He and his 40 brave followers, among whom were Lieutenant Parker, midshipman the Honourable Archibald Cochrane, and the boatswain, found 319, or, allowing for some previous loss and for six or eight boys, 300 armed men to struggle with. But the British broadsword fell too heavily to be resisted; and the Spaniards were compelled to yield to the chivalric valour of their opponents.\* Accustomed as is the British navy to execute deeds of daring, Lord Cochrane's achievement has hitherto found in these pages but three compeers, the Surprise and Hermione, the Dana and Désirée, and the Viper and Cerbère; to which let

\* During the action, and after Lord Cochrane had boarded the Gamo, he practised another ruse. The crew of the Speedy being nearly overpowered by the great superiority, in point of numbers, of her adversary, were once on the point of giving way, Lord Cochrane, with the greatest coolness, hailed the Speedy, ordering fifty more men to be sent on board, although, at the time, his vessel certainly did not contain more than three. The expected reinforcement to their adversaries, cooled the little courage remaining in the Gamo's crew, and having already experienced the bold daring of the first fifty men, they were by no means anxious to cope with fifty more, and consequently surrendered.

us now add, as the next in chronological order, the *Speedy* and *Gamo*.

With so many prisoners in his charge, Lord Cochrane had still an arduous duty to perform, but his judgment and presence of mind overcame every difficulty; and, in the course of a few days, the *Speedy* brig and her lofty prize were safe at anchor in the harbour of Port-Mahon. For the gallantry he had so successfully displayed in capturing the *Gamo*, Lord Cochrane, as soon as the account reached England, was promoted to post-rank; and the *Speedy*'s only lieutenant, Richard William Parker, was also, we believe, made a commander.

On the 9th of June, in the morning, the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Kangaroo*, Captain George Christopher Pulling, and 14-gun brig-sloop *Speedy*, Captain Lord Cochrane, discovered a Spanish convoy, lying at an anchor under the battery of Oropeso, a small seaport of Old Castile. The armed vessels protecting it consisted of a xebec of 20 guns, and three gun-boats, and the battery was a large square tower, which appeared to mount 12 guns. The two commanders resolved, at once, to attack this force with their brigs. Accordingly, at noon, the *Kangaroo* and *Speedy* came to an anchor, within half-gun shot of the enemy, and a brisk cannonade ensued; but which, by 2 P.M., had considerably decreased on the part of the vessels and battery. Encouraged, however, by a felucca of 12 guns and two gun-boats that came to their assistance, the Spaniards recommenced firing, and by 3 h. 30 m. P.M. had their 20-gun xebec and two of their gun-boats sunk by the fire of the two brigs; in a little while another of the gun-boats shared the same fate. The tower and the remaining three gun-boats continued to annoy the brigs with their shot, until about 6 h. 30 m., when the fire of the tower slackened. The *Kangaroo* soon afterwards cutting her cable to get to a nearer position, the gun-boats fled; and, by 7 P.M., the tower was completely silenced.

The *Kangaroo* and *Speedy* continued until midnight to be annoyed by a heavy fire of musketry from the shore; but, in the mean time, the boats of the two brigs, under the orders of Lieutenant Thomas Foulerton, first of the *Kangaroo*, assisted by Lieutenant Benjamin Warburton, of the *Speedy*, and by midshipmen the Honourable Archibald Cochrane, William Dean, and Thomas Taylor, had succeeded in bringing out three brigs laden with wine, rice, and bread. On the return of the boats from this service, Lord Cochrane himself, with his wonted zeal, took them under his command, and went in-shore again, in the hope of bringing away more, but found all the remainder either sunk, or driven on the beach. It was fortunate for the tower, that the ammunition of the two brigs was by this time expended, for the two enterprising captains would have razed it to its foundation; as indeed, only the day previous, they had the adjacent tower of Almanara, mounting two brass 8-pounders.

The loss of the British, in the attack upon this Spanish convoy, consisted of one midshipman (Thomas Taylor), killed by a musket-shot in one of the boats, and two lieutenants (Thomas Foulerton and Thomas Brown Thompson), seven seamen, and one marine wounded; all belonging to the Kangaroo, although, as Captain Pulling handsomely acknowledges, the Speedy, from situation and distance, was equally exposed to the enemy's fire. At the demolition of the tower of Almanara, however, the Speedy did not wholly escape, Lord Cochran himself having received a bruise, and been a little singed; as were also two of his men.

The British 28-gun frigate Mercury, Captain Thomas Rogers, having on the 25th of May, while cruising in the Adriatic, captured a small vessel just out of Ancona, received intelligence that the late British bomb-vessel Bull-dog, which, about three months before, under the command of Captain Barrington Dacres, had entered the port unapprized of its being in possession of the French, was lying in the mole, laden with supplies for the French army in Egypt, and ready for sea. Captain Rogers immediately made sail for Ancona, with the determination of attempting to cut out the Bull-dog; and, soon after dark the same evening, the Mercury anchored off the mole. At 10 h. 30 m. p.m. the boats of the latter, under the orders of Lieutenant William Mather, quitted the frigate; and, at about midnight, surprised and carried the Bull-dog, without even having been hailed by the sentinels on the mole, to which, while the ship was riding with three cables ahead, her stern had been secured by the two ends of a bower cable. The seamen presently cut all the cables, and the boats began to tow away their prize; but the alarm had now spread, and the British became exposed to a heavy fire of cannon and musketry from the mole.

As there was a favourable light breeze, and the sails were set, the Bull-dog, in rather less than an hour, got without the reach of the batteries. Unfortunately, however, the wind died away to a perfect calm, and the current carried the prize along the coast close to the shore; from which a crowd of boats, some of them gun-boats, came out to attack her. Having the hatchways to guard, to prevent the French crew from rising, and being without a sufficient force to resist the gun-boats, which were fast approaching, and had already several times raked the ship, Lieutenant Mather reluctantly abandoned his prize; but not until he had made three ineffectual attempts to set her on fire.

The loss of the British on this occasion amounted to one seaman and one marine killed, and four seamen wounded. That of the French on board the Bull-dog is stated to have been 20 in killed, wounded, and drowned. As soon as she descried the prize standing out of the mole, the Mercury weighed and steered towards her; but the calm so retarded the progress of the

frigate, that the Bull-dog was towed back to her former station at the mole long before the Mercury could get near her. The Bull-dog afterwards succeeded in putting to sea, but was taken on her passage to Egypt by the 24-gun ship, *Champion*, Captain Lord William Stuart.

On the 23d of June, in the morning, the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Corso*, Captain William Ricketts, chased among the rocks in the small islands of Tremiti, lying in the gulf of Venice, and inhabited by a few renegadoes only, a pirate tartan, the *Tigre*, of eight 6 and 12 pounders and a crew of 60 French and Italians. Upon the appearance of the Mercury soon afterwards, the pirate landed the greater part of her crew; who, with a 4-pounder and musketry, posted themselves upon a hill to defend their vessel, which lay aground close to them with hawsers fast to the shore.

Being resolved to make an effort to stop the further career of this band of robbers, Captain Rogers despatched upon that service the boats of the frigate and brig, under the orders of Lieutenant William Mather, assisted by Lieutenant Wilson of the marines. Notwithstanding that they were exposed to a smart fire of cannon and musketry, both from the vessel and the hill, the boats gallantly rowed in; and while Lieutenant Mather with the seamen boarded the *Tigre*, Lieutenant Wilson with the marines landed to drive away the banditti from the hill: the Mercury and Corso, at the same time overawed the pirates by occasionally firing such of their guns as would bear. The marines succeeded in their object without the loss of a man, and took several prisoners; and the seamen, with equal good fortune, hove the tartan off the rocks and brought her out, together with a quantity of plunder, consisting of bales of cotton and other goods, which the *Tigre* had taken from vessels of different nations.

In the summer of this year, the three British frigates, *Doris*, Captain Charles Brisbane, *Beaulieu*, Captain Stephen Pointz, and *Uranie*, Captain George Henry Gage, by the orders of Admiral Cornwallis, who since the 21st of the preceding February had succeeded Earl St.-Vincent (appointed first lord of the admiralty) as commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, were stationed off the point of St.-Mathieu, to watch the motions of the French and Spanish fleets in Brest harbour. In the month of July, while the above frigate-squadron was lying at anchor about three miles to the south-south-east of St.-Mathieu's light-house, and in full view of the combined fleet, the French 20-gun ship-corvette *Chevrette* was discovered also at an anchor, under some batteries in Camaret bay; a position in which the French considered their vessel almost as secure as if she was in the road of Brest. It will, nevertheless, not be thought surprising; that the British resolved to attempt cutting her out. Accordingly, on the night of the 20th, the boats of the *Beaulieu* and *Doris* (the *Uranie* not then present) manned entirely by volunteers, and placed under the orders of Lieutenant Woodley Lozack, of the

Ville-de-Paris, purposely sent by the admiral to take the command, proceeded on the enterprise; but, the boats not pulling alike, and the leading ones being too zealous to slacken their efforts, the detachment separated. In consequence of this accident some of the boats returned; while the remainder, having reached the entrance of Camaret bay, where they expected to be joined by their companions, lay upon their oars until day-break on the 21st. The service being one that required darkness for its success, the boats now pulled back to their ships; but the mischief was done; they had been discovered from the Chevrette and the shore, and so much of the plan as contemplated a surprise was defeated.

As a proof of this, on the same morning, the Chevrette got under way, and, after running about a mile and a half further up the bay, moored herself close under some heavy batteries, one in particular upon a point of land off her larboard and inner bow. The corvette then took on board a body of soldiers, sufficient to augment her number of men to 339, had the arms and ammunition brought upon deck, and loaded her guns almost up to their muzzles with grape-shot. The batteries, also, prepared themselves; temporary redoubts were thrown up upon the adjacent points, and a gun-vessel, armed with two long 36-pounders, was moored as a guard-boat at the entrance of the bay. Having thus profited by the discovery of the morning, the Chevrette displayed, in defiance a large French ensign above an English one. This was plainly seen by the three frigates, and served but to inspire their crews with increased ardour to engage, and with redoubled determination to reverse the position of the flags.

At about 9 h. 30 m. P. M. the boats of the three frigates, joined by the barge and pinnacle of the Robust 74, numbering 16 in the whole, and containing between them about 280 officers and men, still under the command of Lieutenant Losack, proceeded a second time, to attempt the daring service of cutting out the Chevrette. Shortly afterwards Lieutenant Losack, with his own and five other boats, proceeded in chase of a boat from the shore, supposed to be a look-out boat belonging to the Chevrette, and therefore proper to be secured. The remainder of the boats, as they had been ordered, lay upon their oars or pulled gently, awaiting their commanding officer's return. Lieutenant Losack not returning so soon as expected, the next officer in command, Lieutenant Keith Maxwell, of the Beaulieu, considering that the boats had at least six miles to pull, and that the night was already far advanced, resolved, notwithstanding that the force was reduced to more than a third, or to less than 180 men, to proceed without him. He did so; and gave orders that, while one party was engaged in disarming the enemy's crew on deck, the smartest topmen of the Beaulieu should fight their way aloft, and cut loose the sails with their sabres; and that others, who were named, should cut the cable: and he appointed one of



the ablest seamen in the boats, Henry Wallis, quartermaster of the *Beaulieu*, to take charge of the corvette's helm. Many other suitable arrangements were made; and the nine boats, in high glee, hastened to the attack.

At about 1 A. M. on the 22d the boats came in sight of the *Chevrette*; who, after hailing, opened a heavy fire of musketry and grape upon the assailants. This was presently seconded by a fire of musketry from the shore. In the face of all this, however, the British pulled undauntedly towards the ship. The *Beaulieu's* boats under the command of Lieutenant Maxwell, assisted by Lieutenant James Pasley, and Lieutenant of marines James Sinclair, boarded the vessel on the starboard bow and quarter; the *Uranie's*, under Lieutenant Martin Neville, one of the *Robust's*, under midshipman Robert Warren, and one of the *Deris's*, under Lieutenant Walter Burke, on the larboard bow. The attempt to board was most obstinately resisted by the Frenchmen, armed with fire-arms, sabres, tomahawks, and pikes; and who, in their turn, boarded the boats. Notwithstanding this formidable opposition, and that, in their attempts to overcome it, the British had lost all their fire-arms, the latter, with their swords only, effected the boarding. Those who had been ordered to go aloft, fought their way to their respective stations; and, although some were killed, and others desperately wounded, the remainder gained the corvette's yards. Here the seamen found the footropes strapped up; but, surmounting every obstacle, the intrepid fellows quickly performed the service upon which they had been ordered. Thus in less than three minutes after the ship had been boarded, and in the midst of a conflict against numbers more than trebly superior, down came the *Chevrette's* three topsails and courses. The cable, in the mean time, having been cut outside, and a light breeze having sprung up from the land, the ship began drifting out of the bay.

No sooner did the Frenchmen see the sails fall, and their ship under way, than some of them leaped overboard; while others dropped their arms, and sprang down the hatchways. The British thereupon got possession of the quarterdeck and fore-castle; which, although but five minutes had elapsed since the assault had commenced, were nearly covered with dead bodies. Those of the corvette's crew, that had fled below, still maintained a smart fire of musketry from the main deck and up the hatchways, but were at length overpowered and compelled to submit. In her way out, during a short interval of calm, the *Chevrette* became exposed to a heavy fire of round and grape from the batteries; but a light breeze from the north-east soon drove the ship out of gun-shot. It was at about this time that the six boats under Lieutenant Losack joined company; and Lieutenant Maxwell, of course, was superseded in the command.

The British had one lieutenant of marines (James Sinclair), one midshipman (Robert Warren), seven seamen, and two marines killed, two lieutenants (Martin Neville and Walter

Burke, the latter mortally), one master's mate (William Phillips), three midshipmen (Edward Crofton, Edward Byrn, and Robert Finnis), 42 seamen, and nine marines wounded, and one marine drowned in the Beaulieu's barge, which was sunk by the enemy's shot; total, 11 killed, 57 wounded, and one drowned or missing. The loss sustained by the Chevette was far heavier. The corvette had her captain, two lieutenants, three midshipmen, one lieutenant of troops, and 85 seamen and troops killed, one lieutenant, four midshipmen, and 57 seamen and troops wounded; total, 92 killed and 62 wounded.

It is such daring feats as these that ennoble the character of the British navy; and long will be remembered, long held up as an example for imitation, the cutting out of the Chevette. A few of the many instances which this enterprise afforded, of individual heroism, have already been recorded in the pages of a naval periodical work. We have selected the following:

Lieutenant Sinclair, of the marines, was killed in the act of defending Mr. Crofton, midshipman of the Doris, who in his efforts to get on board the corvette was wounded in two places. Mr. John Brown, boatswain of the Beaulieu, after forcing his way into the Chevette's quarter-gallery, found the door planked up, and so securely barricaded, that all his efforts to force it were ineffectual. Through the crevices in the planks he discovered a number of men sitting on the cabin deck, armed with pikes and pistols; and with the fire of the latter was frequently annoyed while attempting to burst in. He next tried the quarter, and after an obstinate resistance gained the taffrail. The officer who commanded the party was at this time fighting his way up a little farther forward. For an instant, while looking round to see where he should make his push, Brown stood exposed a mark to the enemy's fire; when, waving his cutlass, he cried, "Make a lane there," he gallantly dashed among them, and fought his way forward till he reached his proper station the fore-castle; which the men, animated by his example, soon cleared of the enemy. Here Mr. Brown remained during the rest of the contest, not only repulsing the French in their frequent attempts to retake his post, but attending to the orders from the quarter-deck, and assisting in casting the ship and making sail, with as much coolness as if he had been on board the Beaulieu.

Henry Wallis, who, as already stated, had been appointed to take charge of the corvette's helm, fought his way to the wheel; and, although severely wounded in the contest and bleeding, this brave seaman steadily remained at his post, steering the Chevette until beyond the reach of the batteries. Wallis had been seven years in the Beaulieu, and was ever among the foremost in a service of danger. "If a man had fallen overboard he was always fortunately in the way, and either in the boat or the water: during the time he belonged to the ship nearly a dozen men were indebted to him for their lives, which he had saved by

plunging overboard, sometimes even in a gale of wind, at the utmost hazard of his own.\*

The Chevrette, when attacked, was bound with a cargo of stores to Sénégal, and thence to the island of Guadeloupe; she was a similar ship to the Bonne-Citoyenne; but, owing we believe, to the probable successful termination of the pending negotiation between the two countries, more than to any thing else, the Chevrette was not purchased for the use of the British navy. Lieutenant Losack, on account of some misunderstanding respecting the actual commanding officer at the cutting out of the corvette, was promoted to the rank of commander. On the 9th of August, however, upon some facts coming to his knowledge, Admiral Cornwallis ordered a court of inquiry to be held on board the Mars. The result was, that Lieutenant Keith Maxwell received from the admiralty immediate promotion to a commander's rank, and from the public at large that share of credit which, had it not been for the official investigation of his claims, he might never have obtained.

On the 27th of July, at 1 A.M., in latitude 43° 34' north, and longitude 11° 42' west, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Immortalité*, Captain Henry Hotham, fell in with an enemy's cruiser of a very extraordinary appearance, a ship with four masts; which the former immediately chased, and at 7 h. 30 m. A.M., the 38-gun frigate *Arethusa*, Captain Thomas Wolley, in sight, captured. The prize proved to be the *Invention*, French privateer, nine days from Bordeaux, on her first cruise, having only been launched since the beginning of the month.

The *Invention* had been designed by her commander, M. Thibaut, and was peculiar in more respects than her masts, her length being 147 feet, with only 27 feet in breadth of beam. Her force consisted of 24 long 6-pounders on a single deck, and two 12-pounder carronades, either on her poop or topgallant fore-castle, with a crew of 210 men and boys. Her four masts were at nearly equal distances apart, the first and third of the same height, the second stouter and higher, and the fourth much smaller. She had four topgallant yards rigged aloft, and was accounted a good sea-boat and sailer.

On the 10th of August, while the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Unicorn*, Captain Charles Wemyss, and 16-gun brig-sloop *Atalante*, Captain Anselm John Griffiths, were cruising in Quiberon bay, the six-oared cutter of the latter, with eight men commanded by Mr. Francis Smith, midshipman, in the face of a brisk discharge of grape and canister from the French national lugger *Eveille*, mounting two long 4-pounders, and four large swivels, and of a cross-fire from two small batteries on the shore, ran up towards, boarded, and carried the vessel, the French deserting her at the moment and escaping to the shore,

which was only a musket-shot distant." To add to the value of this very gallant little exploit, it was achieved without a single casualty.

On the night of the 20th of August Captain Thomas Byam Martin, cruising off Corunna with the frigates *Fisgard*, *Diamond*, and *Boadicea*, sent Lieutenant Philip Pipon, with the boats of the squadron, to attack the Spanish vessels in the port. The boats immediately pulled for and entered the harbour; and Lieutenant Pipon and his party succeeded in boarding and carrying the *Neptuno*, a new ship pierced for 20 guns, belonging to his catholic majesty, a gun-boat mounting one long Spanish 24-pounder, and a merchant ship; all moored within the strong batteries that protect the port, and lying so near to them, that the sentinels on the ramparts challenged the boats' crews, and opened upon them a heavy fire. Notwithstanding this opposition, the British officers and men, with their accustomed coolness and perseverance, proceeded to execute the remainder of their task, and brought all three vessels safe out of the harbour without sustaining the slightest loss. For his gallantry and address on this occasion, Lieutenant Pipon, early in the following year, was promoted to the rank of commander.

On the 2d of September, at 11 h. 30 m. A. M., the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Victor* (sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two sixes), Captain George Ralph Collier, being off the Seychelle islands, discovered and chased a strange man-of-war brig. At 5 h. 30 m. P. M., proving the better sailer going off the wind, the *Victor* was enabled to bring to close action the French brig-corvette *Flèche*, of 18 long 8-pounders, commanded by Lieutenant Jean-Baptiste Bonnavie. The latter's 8-pounders being no match for the former's 32-pounder carronades, the *Flèche*, after receiving and returning two broadsides, hauled her wire and endeavoured to escape. Having had her driver toppin lift, maintopmast-stay, and her principal braces on the starboard side shot away, the *Victor* was unable to wear quick enough to check the progress of her opponent; who, by the time the two vessels tacked, at 7 P. M., was half a mile to windward: and, even when the *Victor* had repaired her rigging, the *Flèche* convinced her that, in sailing by the wind, the advantage was the reverse of what it had been when going before it.

In the little interchange of firing which had ensued, the *Victor* had a master's mate and one seaman slightly wounded; with, besides damaged rigging and sails, one shot through the foremast, and a few in the hull. The *Victor* continued to pursue the *Flèche*, and during the night was frequently within gun-shot; but the latter would not allow the British vessel a second time to close. The chase continued all day of the 4th. At sunset the *Flèche* was four or five miles to windward of the *Victor*, and, by daylight on the 5th, was no longer to be seen.

Judging, from the course which the brig was steering when first seen, that her destination was the Seychelle islands, Captain Collier pushed for them; and, at 3 h. 30 m. p. m., the Victor descried her late opponent standing in for the anchorage of Mahé. The Victor proceeded under easy sail till 7 p. m., which was just as it grew dark, and then anchored in 11 fathoms. The ship not having a pilot, and no one on board being acquainted with the channel, the master, Mr. James Crawford, though ill of a fever, volunteered to sound it. Accordingly, in the course of the night, a boat, in which Mr. James Middleton, the master's mate who had been wounded, also embarked as a volunteer, proceeded on the service; and, notwithstanding they were repeatedly fired at by a boat from the French brig, these officers would not desist until they had completely performed the duty upon which they had been detached.

Daylight on the 6th showed the Flèche lying at the mouth of the basin or inner harbour, with springs on her cables, and a red flag at her fore topgallantmast-head, the signal of defiance, as afterwards understood. It was not merely the strength of their position, or the difficulty of approaching it, that had actuated the French officers to hoist this foolish signal: the Flèche now mounted the whole of her guns; which had not, it appears, been the case in the skirmish of the 2d. Soon after daylight the Victor weighed and made sail towards the channel; the narrowness and intricacy of which, added to the unfavourable state of the wind, compelled her to use warps and her staysails only.

So fine an opportunity was taken due advantage of by the Flèche, and the Victor became exposed to a raking fire, until, shoaling her water, the latter, at about 9 p. m., came to with the best bower. The British sloop soon recommenced warping, and continued it until 11 h. 45 m. p. m.; when, letting go the small bower with two springs, the Victor brought her broadside to bear, and instantly commenced firing. Between the two vessels an incessant cannonade was maintained until 2 h. 20 m. a. m. on the 7th, when the Flèche was discovered to be sinking. In a few minutes afterwards the latter cut her cable, cast round, and grounded at the bow on a coral reef. An officer and party were sent from the Victor to board her; and immediately the French crew commenced setting fire to their vessel. Another party from the sloop quickly followed the first; and the British then took possession and struck the colours of the French brig. Scarcely, however, had they succeeded in extinguishing the flames, than the Flèche fell on her larboard bilge into deeper water, and sank.

Out of her 120 men and boys, the Victor, in this second and, for the present, decisive affair, had not a man hurt. This was rather extraordinary, as several shot had struck her hull, some

between wind and water, and her rigging and boats had also been a good deal cut. The loss on the part of the *Flèche*, out of an alleged complement, of 145 (including four lieutenants, besides her commanding officer), from the number of dead and wounded reported to have been found on her fore-castle, was supposed to be very severe; but Captain Bonnavie acknowledged to having had only four men killed: the wounded he did not enumerate.

Like the *Chiffonnee*, the *Flèche* had brought from Nantes, about four months back, and since deposited on one of the Seychelle islands, 35 banished Frenchmen. Some of her men had been left sick at the Isle of Bourbon; but, to compensate for their loss, 20 of the late *Chiffonnee's* crew had assisted in serving the guns. Had the action been carried on wholly at close quarters, the heavy metal of the *Victor* would certainly have rendered her too powerful to be an equal match for the *Flèche*; but, in that respect, the French brig had managed to give herself the advantage by keeping her adversary at long-shot. Great credit was therefore due to the officers and crew of the *Victor*, for their gallantry, skill, and perseverance; but the *Flèche* was not eventually lost, the French having afterwards weighed and, we believe, refitted her.

On the 31st of July, in the evening, the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Sylph*, Captain Charles Dashwood, cruising off Santander, or San-Andero, on the north coast of Spain, with a light air from the southward, chased an armed schooner standing to the north-east; but, before there was a possibility of arriving up with her, a large frigate, then judged to be Spanish, but afterwards believed to be French, was descried under the land advancing towards the brig, and to which frigate the schooner fled for refuge.

Finding it impracticable to gain the wind of the strange frigate, whose hull, at sunset, was clearly discernible, the *Sylph* shortened sail, hove to, and prepared for battle. At 11 P.M. the frigate arrived within half-gun shot; when, having in the usual manner ascertained the ship's hostile character, the brig opened her fire. Soon afterwards the frigate approached within hail, and a spirited cannonade was kept up for one hour and 20 minutes; when, having had her sails and almost all her running rigging cut to pieces, and one carronade dismounted, and having received several shot between wind and water, the *Sylph* edged away to repair her damages. Perceiving, however, that the frigate either was unable or unwilling to make sail in pursuit, the *Sylph*, as soon as she was out of gun-shot, hove to.

On the 1st of August, at daybreak, the *Sylph* discovered her late opponent, with her fore yard upon deck, about seven miles off in the north-west, which was now to windward, the wind having shifted to that quarter in a squall during the night.

Seeing the frigate in this apparently disabled state, the *Sylph* made sail in chase; but, on account of a severe wound in her mainmast and a rising sea, the brig was obliged, instead of tacking, to wear, which retarded her progress. While the *Sylph* was thus slowly advancing, the frigate swayed up her fore yard, wore, and made all sail for the land, but still without hoisting any colours. As the brig's mainmast was every moment expected to go over the side, as she was then making a foot and a half of water per hour from shot-hole leaks, and as the stranger was evidently a frigate of 14 guns of a side on her main deck, Captain Dashwood felt it to be his duty to wear and stand to the northward; having already sustained a loss, by the preceding night's action, of one seaman killed, and one midshipman (Lionel Carey) and eight seamen wounded, three of them dangerously.

Before we submit any remarks upon the alleged name and force of the *Sylph*'s antagonist in this to her very creditable action, we will relate another contest in which, about a month afterwards, the brig was engaged almost in the same spot.

The damages the *Sylph* had received rendering her return to port indispensable, Captain Dashwood was directed by Admiral Cornwallis, under whose orders he was cruising, to proceed to Plymouth. Having here undergone a complete refit, the *Sylph* sailed to rejoin the commander-in-chief off Ushant, and by the latter was ordered to resume her station off the north coast of Spain. On the 28th of September, in the afternoon, Cape Pinas bearing south distant 42 leagues, the *Sylph* chased a ship in the north-west; and, although before sunset the discovery was made that the stranger was a French frigate of the same apparent force as the one which the brig had formerly engaged upon this coast, Captain Dashwood gallantly resolved to do his utmost to bring her to action.

Being desirous, as before, to gain the wind of an antagonist so decidedly superior, the *Sylph* made all sail for that purpose; and the French frigate seemed equally determined to frustrate the attempt. At 7 h. 30 m. P.M., however, after various manœuvres, during which the two vessels crossed each other three times, and exchanged, at a very short distance, as many heavy broadsides, the *Sylph* obtained a station within pistol-shot upon the frigate's weather bow. A severe conflict now ensued, and continued without intermission for two hours and five minutes, when the frigate wore and made sail on the opposite tack; leaving the *Sylph* with her standing and running rigging cut to pieces, and main topmast badly wounded, but, on account of the skilful manner in which the brig was manœuvred, and the unskilful manner in which the frigate's guns (admitting them to have been such as supposed) were fought, with so trifling a loss as one person slightly wounded, Mr. Lionel Carey, who had been wounded in the former action.

The following is the concluding passage of Captain Dash-

wood's letter to Admiral Cornwallis on the subject of this second action: "Having received certain information since my return to this station, that the ship, which the Sylph was engaged with some time since, was the French frigate *l'Artémise*, of 44 guns and 350 men; so I can with equal truth pronounce this to be the same, from the many corresponding observations which I made. She had then 20 men killed and 40 wounded, and was obliged to return to St.-Andero to refit; and from the disordered state which she was in when making off, I have the strongest reason to suppose she has now met with a similar fate, particularly as a number of lights and men were seen hanging over her bows, from which I infer she must have received considerable damage; and I think there is every probability of some of his majesty's frigates falling in with her, as I unluckily parted with the *Immortalité* a few hours before." Some additional information is contained in the following note to a passage of this letter: "The French journals of that period also stated, that the captain was tried by a court-martial, and condemned to be shot, for his conduct on that occasion; which sentence Buonaparte approved, and ordered to be carried into execution."\*

We wish it were in our power to adduce some stronger evidence than that contained in the two extracts above given, as to the identity of the ship twice so gallantly engaged by the Sylph. The old *Artémise*, it will be recollected, was blown up at the battle of the Nile:† consequently this must have been a new ship of that name; and, as the French had very wisely discontinued building any more 12-pounder frigates, the *Artémise* of 1801 must have been a 40-gun frigate carrying 18-pounders, and mounting in the whole at least 44 guns. Had the improbability that such a ship would retreat from an 18-gun brig, or, in an action of more than two hours' continuance, do no more execution than cut away a few ropes, send a shot through a topmast, and slightly wound one man, struck the compiler from the "French journals" as forcibly as it has us, he would have quoted the passage entire, and have given a name and a date to the journal which contained so important an admission in favour of the Sylph's commander and crew. Even the name of the French captain "condemned to be shot" is not given; and not only have we been unable to discover in the *Moniteur*, or in any other French paper, a single paragraph calculated to throw light upon the subject, but, out of the many lists of French frigates occasionally before us, we have no recollection of the name of the *Artémise* until it occurs in an English account of her destruction in September, 1808.

On returning to Plymouth after his first action, Captain Dashwood wrote an official account of it to Admiral Cornwallis, and appears to have made an immediate application to the first

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 456.

† See vol. ii., p. 172.



lord of the admiralty for a post-commission; to which application the following, as we think, very sensible reply was transmitted by Earl St. Vincent: "I have read your official letter with all the attention such a recital merits; but until the board receive official information of the force, and the nation to which the vessel belongs, which the Sylph was engaged with, an adequate judgment cannot be formed of the merits of the action."\* The circumstances, stated in the official account of the second rencontre, very properly removed all doubt as to the ship engaged having been very superior in force to the Sylph; and on the 2d of the following November Captain Dashwood, "for his meritorious conduct in the above actions," was promoted to post-rank. The first lieutenant of the Sylph, upon both these highly creditable occasions, was Samuel Burgess; but who, although highly commended by Captain Dashwood in each of his letters, remained a lieutenant for 15 years longer.

On the 13th of September, in the afternoon, the British 18-gun ship-sloop Lark, Acting-commander lieutenant James Johnstone, being close off the island of Cuba, fell in with and chased the Spanish privateer-schooner Esperanza, of one long 8 and two 4 pounders, and 45 men; which, for shelter, ran within the Portillo reefs. Lieutenant Johnstone immediately despatched the Lark's yawl and cutter, with 16 men in each, under the orders of Lieutenant James Pasley, assisted by Mr. M'Cloud, midshipman, to attempt to cut her out. At about 10 h. 30 m. p. m. the two boats found the privateer at anchor, waiting the attack; and, on their near approach, received a fire from her that severely wounded several of the men. In spite of this, however, the British boarded, and, after a short but severe contest, carried the schooner. In this well-conducted and gallant boat-attack, the British sustained a loss of one seaman killed, Mr. M'Cloud, and 12 seamen wounded; within two of half the party. The loss on board the Esperanza was represented to have been 21 killed and six wounded; including, among the former, the captain, Josef Callie, and all his officers. Considering the unquestionable gallantry of this enterprise, we regret to see the name of James Pasley in the list of lieutenants of the present day.

On the 21st of July, soon after daylight, the island of Cabrera bearing north-east distant six or seven leagues, the British hired brig Pasley, mounting fourteen 12-pounder carronades and two long sixes, with a crew of 54 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant William Woodbridge, fell in with a Spanish man-of-war xebec; of 22 guns; which at 7 a. m. hailed the Pasley and desired her to send her boat on board. The reply to this was a broadside within pistol-shot distance; and the Pasley continued to engage her superior opponent until 8 h. 15 m.; when the

xebec ceased her fire, and, taking advantage of the calm which had followed the heavy firing, pulled away with her sweeps. The Pasley used her sweeps, but the xebec having more sweeps and more men, outpulled the British brig, and before night reached the island of Ivica. In this very creditable affair to the Pasley, the latter had one seaman killed and two wounded.

In a few months afterwards an opportunity occurred in which Lieutenant Wooldridge was more successful. On the 28th of October, Cape de Gata bearing west-north-west distant 20 leagues, the Pasley fell in with and was chased by the Spanish privateer polacre-ship *Virgen-del-Rosario*, of 10 guns (pierced for 20), eight of them long 12, and two long 24, pounders, with a crew of 94 men. Being to windward, the Rosario soon neared the Pasley, and an animated engagement commenced. After the action had continued about an hour, the Pasley, having had her gaff and most of the stays and main rigging shot away, found her opponent's guns, upon the whole, much too heavy. As the readiest mode to reduce this inequality, the Pasley ran athwart the hawse of the Rosario, and lashed the latter's bowsprit to her own capstan. The British crew, in an instant, were on the Spanish ship's decks; and, after a sanguinary hand-to-hand struggle of about 15 minutes' duration, carried the Rosario.

The Pasley's loss amounted to her gunner, Mr. James Pooke, and two seamen killed, her commander (shot through the left shoulder), master (Ambrose Lions, mortally), first mate (George Davie), and five seamen wounded. The loss on board the privateer was very severe: it consisted of her first and second captains, second lieutenant, two prize-masters, the gunner, and 15 seamen killed, and 13 officers and seamen wounded. Considering the great disparity of force between the two vessels, this must be pronounced a very gallant affair on the part of the Pasley; and the judgment, promptitude, and valour, displayed by Lieutenant Wooldridge on the occasion, gained him not only the just applause of his superiors, but that to which he had an equal claim, the rank of commander.

#### COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS.—WEST INDIES.

The rupture between England and Denmark and Sweden was soon followed by the seizure of the colonies of the latter by the former. On the 20th of March the Swedish island of St.-Bartholomew surrendered by capitulation to a British naval and military force, under Rear-admiral John Thomas Duckworth and Lieutenant-general Trigge. On the 24th the Swedish island of St.-Martin; on the 29th the Danish islands of St.-Thomas, St.-John, and their dependencies; and, on the 31st the Danish island of Santa-Cruz, all accepted the same terms as St.-Bartholomew. On the 16th of April the French garrison

evacuated the Dutch island of St.-Eustatia; which, with the island of Saba, was taken possession of by the 20-gun ship *Arab*, Captain John Perkins, and a small detachment of troops under Colonel Blunt, of the third regiment of Buffs.

#### COAST OF AFRICA.

As soon as the British government became apprized of that article in the treaty of Badajos, by which Portugal agreed to exclude British shipping from her ports, a force was sent to occupy the island of Madeira. On the 23d of July a squadron anchored in the bay of Funchal, and a detachment of troops under Colonel Clinton landed and took possession, without resistance, of the two forts which command the anchorage.

These prompt measures, on the part of England, induced the prince-regent to use his most strenuous endeavours to prevent the First Consul of France, who would not acknowledge himself a party to the treaty with Spain, from overrunning Portugal with the powerful army which, under General Leclerc, Buonaparte's brother-in-law, was already upon the frontiers. Before, however, matters became ripe enough for action, England and France had commenced the negotiations which ended in the treaty of Amiens; and, on the 29th of September, a treaty of peace was signed at Madrid between France and Portugal; by the fourth article of which the latter ceded to France all that part of Portuguese Guiana (nearly equal in extent to the whole of French Guiana), which extends to the Carapanatuba, a river that flows into the Amazon at some distance above Fort Macussa.

#### EAST INDIES.

On the 21st of June the Dutch island of Ternate, after an obstinate resistance of 52 days, surrendered by capitulation to the military and naval forces of the honourable East India company, under the respective commands of Colonel Burr and Captain Hayes.

Upon the same principle, we believe, that induced them to occupy the island of Madeira, the British government placed garrisons in all the colonies or factories of Portugal, in the East Indies, except Macao.

#### PEACE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

On the 1st of October was signed in London, by Lord Hawkesbury, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, on the part of Great Britain, and by citizen Louis-Guillaume Otto, commissary for the exchange of French prisoners in England, on

the part of France, preliminary articles of peace between the two nations. On the 10th, the ratifications were duly exchanged; and, on the 12th, his Britannic Majesty issued a proclamation, ordering a cessation of arms by sea and land. According to the preliminary articles, five months from the date of the exchange of ratifications was the longest period during which hostilities could legally exist in the most distant part of the globe.

In consequence of the proclamation, the British blockading squadrons retired from the opposite coast; at which time, however, the French ports were all alive. In them ships were getting ready, and troops embarking, for an expedition to St.-Domingo; where the blacks were in open rebellion against the whites. The Dutch and Spanish ports began also to exhibit an unusual activity. England, therefore, with a becoming forecast, delayed awhile disarming her ships.

As any treaty of peace to which England is a party, is necessarily made up, in a great degree, of colonial cessions, this appears the proper head of the work under which to offer the few remarks we have to make on the subject. And, although the definitive treaty between all the belligerents was not finally concluded until the 25th of March, 1802, at Amiens, we shall at once state what change it effected, more particularly in the colonial property of the different powers.

Let us first briefly advert to the stipulations which affected the European territory of the several belligerents. France got back the small islands of Saint-Marcouf. Portugal was to remain as before the war, except as to the province which, by the treaty of Badajoz, she had ceded to Spain.\* The republic of the Seven Islands was acknowledged. Egypt and the other territories of the Sublime Porte were to be retained in their integrity as before the war. For this article there would have been no occasion, had the British government known, as well as Buonaparte did, the issue of the Egyptian campaign. The islands of Malta, Goza, and Comino were to be restored to the order of St.-John of Jerusalem as before the war; and the British troops were to evacuate those islands within three months after the exchange of the ratification. The French troops were to evacuate Naples and the Roman territory; and the British troops, in like manner, were to evacuate Porto-Ferrajo, as well as all the islands and forts which they might occupy in the Mediterranean or Adriatic. The colonies now demand our attention.

#### NORTH AMERICA.

England had taken from France the valuable fishery islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon: but France, by the treaty of Amiens, got them restored to her.

\* See p. 111.

## \* WEST INDIES.

England had taken from Holland all her possessions except Dutch Guiana, and gave them all back to her. From Spain she had taken Trinidad; and Buonaparte, as a declared punishment to Spain for having made peace with Portugal without his privity, allowed England to retain that fine island. Portugal so far benefited by the treaty of Amiens, that the boundary line between the two Guianas was brought much nearer to its ancient limit, than it was by the treaty which her fears had just before induced her to sign with France at Madrid. Denmark had lost, but now regained her three islands. Sweden, also, got back St-Bartholomew. France had lost all her sugar islands but Guadeloupe and its dependencies, and got them all restored to her.

## COAST OF AFRICA.

Holland had lost the Cape of Good Hope, but got that important settlement restored to her. To Portugal, Madeira was of course restored; and France got back Gorée.

## EAST INDIES.

Holland had lost Malacca and the islands of Amboyna, Banda, and Ternate; also Trincomalé and the remaining Dutch settlements in the island of Ceylon. The latter were retained by Great Britain; but all the former were restored to Holland. Spain's East-Indian territories had remained unmolested; and such of Portugal's, as had been recently garrisoned, were restored. Denmark still held Tranquebar. France had lost Pondicherry, Chandernagore, and other settlements up the Ganges; also Foul-Point on the island of Madagascar. The whole of these were restored to her by the treaty of Amiens.

Whatever grounds politicians might have for auguring, from the terms of this solemn compact, a short-lived peace, certain it is, that the activity which reigned on the ocean, an activity much greater than any which had been witnessed during the last two or three years of the war, gave, to the treaty the air of a truce, or suspension of arms, in which each of the belligerents, some of whom signed it for no other purpose, was striving to gain an advantageous position, in order, when the tocsin should again sound, to be ready for the recommencement of hostilities. French, Dutch, and Spanish fleets were preparing to put to sea; and English fleets, to follow them and watch their motions: who, then could doubt that, although the wax upon the seals of the treaty concluding the last had scarcely cooled, a new war was on the eve of bursting forth?

## STATE OF THE BRITISH NAVY.

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THE difference in the totals, between the abstract for this year\* and that for the last, is too slight to need any observation. The casualty-list of the French navy contains few important losses.† That of the Spanish navy, with the exception of the Gamo, is filled with the issue of one unfortunate rencontre.‡ The Dutch navy, having lain quietly in port, ran no risk of suffering any diminution in its numbers. The loss sustained by the Danish navy was of trifling amount; and, considered in a national point of view, was far overbalanced by the renown which the Danes acquired on the occasion.§ The British casualty-list is distinguishable from any that have preceded it, except that connected with Abstract No. 3, for the number of its captures; among which, as a very rare occurrence, appear two line-of-battle ships.||

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year 1802, was,

Admirals	.	.	.	.	45
Vice-admirals.	.	.	.	.	38
Rear-admirals	.	.	.	.	55
Post-captains	.	.	.	.	544
Commanders, or sloop-captains	.	.	.	.	406
Lieutenants	.	.	.	.	2322
Masters	.	.	.	.	640
				superannuated	30
				ed as comms.	50

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 10.

† See Appendix, No. 13.

‡ See Appendix, No. 14.

§ See Appendix, No. 15.

|| See Appendix, No. 16.

and the number of seamen and marines voted for the service of the year, was, 130,000 for the first five lunar months, 88,000 for one lunar month, and 70,000 for the remaining seven lunar months.\*

Although, in reference to the abstract immediately preceding it, the abstract for 1802 offers nothing worthy of remark, yet, as coming the next in succession after the close of a war, it contains a variety of matter for consideration. The first circumstance that strikes a reader conversant with the subject is, the important variation between the numerical grand-totals, both line and general, of Abstract No. 10, and of the "Statement and Distribution of the Naval British Force," as given in Steel's list for February, 1802. The Abstract's line-total, with the addition of the two ships remarked upon in the asterisk note belonging to it, is 191, Steel's 198; the Abstract's general total, with the addition just noticed, 783, Steel's 803. Of Steel's line-of-battle number, nine will be found in class q, and one in class u; thus reducing it to 188. But Steel has anticipated the breaking up of the Warspite 74, Captivity and Eagle 64's, and Panther 60; which again augments his number to 192. If from the latter be deducted the Prince-Edward, a ship he classes as a 60 instead of a 50, we have 191; which, with the correction in the note already referred to, is the precise number in the Abstract. Having thus explained the difference that exists between the line-total in the Abstract, and that in Steel's February list, we shall have very little difficulty in approximating the two under-line totals; one of which is 592, the other 603. If we deduct from the latter, four fire-vessels, four river-barges, and four or five transport-tenders and other small-craft, which, for reasons already given, are excluded from the former,† the numbers will be equal.

A test yet remains, more authoritative than Steel, the official list or register of the British navy for the 1st of January, 1802. There the line-total is 180, the under-line total 665, and the grand-total 845. It seldom happens that the official register takes any notice of the *armées en flûte*, or reduced ships: consequently, they remain, list after list, among their full-armed class-mates. If, then, we deduct, as was done in the comparison with Steel, the nine ships at q, and the one at u, we bring the official line-total to 170. Four line-of-battle ships appear among the official "ship-rigged sloops;"‡ two among the "prison-ships;"§ one among the "hospital-ships;"|| seven among the "receiving-ships;"¶ and there were seven others which, al-

\* See Appendix, No. 17.

† See note c\* to Abstract No. 3, at vol. i., p. 402.

‡ Sandwich, San-Yidro, Royal-Oak, and Prudent; all of which had been prison-ships.

§ Sultan and Captivity.

|| Union, afterwards Sussex.

¶ Royal-William, Cambridge, Grafton, Chichester, Yarmouth, Medway, and Rippon.

though in service, some of them since 1800, were not registered at the date of the abstract.\* Here, at once, is the number required. With respect to the under-line totals, we have merely to deduct from the 665, the 67 "hoys, lighters, and transports," and the 10 "hulks," and we have 588, a number which is four below the abstract number. This trifling difference is to be found, if we could stay to trace it, among the small-craft, several of which are included in the abstract, and not registered in the official list; while others, as fire-vessels, river-barges, "barge-magazine," "latteen-settee," &c., that assist to swell the latter, are not to be found in the former.

Having thus established the general correctness of the numerical totals of Abstract No. 10, and through it, we hope, of its nine tabular predecessors, we will, after premising that, should any doubt arise respecting the proper classification of a ship, a reference to the notes (which, in fact, are the key to the abstracts) may clear up the point, proceed to draw a slight comparison between the first and last abstracts, the two between which an eight years' war had intervened. In doing this we shall confine ourselves to the line-totals, and even then, to the cruising totals only. According to the latter, the numerical increase is 13 ships; but the most decided improvement is discoverable in the relative tonnages. For instance, the 113 ships in No. 1 measured upon an average 1645 tons; while in the 126 ships in No. 10 measure 1740 tons. The accession of the five ships at B, C, and G, and of 26 out of the 30 at K, L., and M, have chiefly contributed to this important augmentation.

The number of line-of-battle ships, added to the British navy from the navies of foreign powers, were, French 27, Dutch 17, Spanish 5, and Danish 1; total 50:† a number that, besides being considerably short of what Steel and other writers have recorded, contains a larger proportion of ineffective ships than they allow, as the following statement will show:

## FOREIGN BUILT.

	Stationary Cruisers, Harbour- Ships, &c.	
	No.	No.
In Abstract No. 10.....	28	18
"      No. 1.....	3	2
Remaining, of ships captured in the war of 1793 .....	20	16
Reduced by the "Converted" column.....	5	
Captured, &c. ....	5	
Sold or taken to pieces .....		4
Whole of the ships of the line captured in the war of 1793...	30	20

\* Attenien, Nassau (late Holstein), De-Ruyter, Guelderland, Leyden, Texel (late Cerberus), and Utrecht.

† See Appendix, No. 17.



The line-of-battle loss, which the British navy sustained in the same war, amounts to 20 ships; of which no fewer than three-fourths were wrecked and accidentally burnt.\*

It is usual, at the termination of a war, to exhibit, by a few figures, the relative gains and losses of the parties that had been engaged in it. Accordingly, in December, 1801, a cabinet minister laid before the British parliament a statement expressing that, when the war commenced, the British navy consisted of 135, and, when it ended, of 202 ships of the line. But for the concurrent testimony of several reporters, one might suppose the former number to contain a typographical error, in the transposition of the 3 and 5. We have shown, in its proper place, the accuracy of the number 153, which appears in the line column of the first annual abstract;† and have just done the same, in the fullest manner, respecting the number 191, in Abstract No. 10.‡ The number, which comes nearest to the minister's number, is to be found in Steel's list for November, 1801: it wants but two of the amount. Admitting the minister to have collected 200 of his 202 line-of-battle ships from Steel's list (it is evident he did not get them from the official list), whence did he obtain the number 35, for the whole of the line-of-battle ships possessed by France at the close of the year 1801? At the commencement of the year 1803, we shall show, in the clearest manner, that this number scarcely covers half of the line-of-battle ships which must have belonged to France at the peace of Amiens; and it already has appeared, that, instead of 202 ships of the line, 126, or, including those building, 148,§ was the proper number to be confronted with the French number.

#### AMERICA AND THE BARBARY STATES.

Although this was a year of peace between England and the other great powers, there were still some naval operations of a warlike character going on, a summary of which may serve, if to do no more, to keep alive the interest in such matters until, by the general clash of arms throughout Europe, the annalist is again called upon to record events of magnitude and importance.

It is too well known to be creditable to them, that the formidable christian powers of Europe have long paid a tribute, either in specie or kind, to the regencies of Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis, to induce these merciless freebooters to abstain from molesting the commerce of the former; from making prizes of their

\* See Appendix, No. 18.

† See note \* to that abstract, and the same note to Abstract No. 2, vol. i, pp. 400, 401.

‡ See note \* to that abstract, in the Appendix of this volume.

§ Ibid.

vessels, and slaves of their people. The United States of America, having a considerable Mediterranean commerce at stake, found it wise to follow the example of the older and richer states of Europe. It is difficult to say how much this sop to the three-headed monster annually cost the American republic; but, in articles of merchandise, timber, cannon, cordage, money, and now and then a frigate or corvette armed and equipped for war, we should consider that the United States did not pay less to the three regencies than from 100,000 to 150,000 dollars per annum.

In the month of October, 1800, the United States' 32-gun frigate *George-Washington*, Captain William Bainbridge, was lying at an anchor in the road of Algiers. The dey considered this as a fine opportunity to get the presents, which he, as well as the heads of the other regencies, annually made to the grand seignior, conveyed to Constantinople. The demand for the American frigate to be sent upon this mission was formally made, and reluctantly complied with. Laden with presents to the amount of a million and a half of dollars, encumbered with 100 Turks as passengers, and degraded by carrying the flag of Algiers at her main topgallantmast-head, the *George-Washington* sailed for and arrived at Constantinople. Having there disembarked her live and dead lumber, the American frigate sailed upon her return, and on the 21st of January 1801, re-anchored at Algiers.

The disgraceful use to which an American frigate had thus been put "deeply affected," to use the words of Mr. President Jefferson, "the sensibility, not only of the president, but of the people of the United States." The "indignity" was certainly calculated to do all this; but we cannot any where discover that the *Washington* was sent "by force" upon her extraordinary and humiliating mission. We think that both Captain Bainbridge and the American consul, Mr. Richard O'Brien, made out but a poor case to substantiate that fact.

Whatever feelings the submission of these gentlemen may have excited in their own country, its effect was a very natural one in Algiers and the two neighbouring regencies: they became more loud and exorbitant than ever in their demands for money and presents. Algiers, however, was partially appeased by the seasonable arrival of a ship from America with the arrears of the subsidy due to her. But, jealous of the favours shown to the Dey of Algiers, the Bashaw of Tripoli became very outrageous. In some of his conferences with the American consul, the bashaw says, "There is no nation I wish to be at peace with more than yours; but all nations pay me, and so must the Americans."—"Compliments, although acceptable, are of very little value; and the heads of the Barbary States know their friends by the value of the presents that they receive from them." To give a practical proof of his estimation of compli-

ments, the Bashaw of Tripoli, on the 14th of May, 1801, caused the flagstaff of the United States in front of the consul's house to be cut down; the customary mode, with these summary gentlemen, of promulgating a declaration of war.

Not to be behindhand with his two brother spoliators to the westward, the Bey of Tunis made use of a somewhat ludicrous pretext for levying a contribution upon his "friends." On the night of the 18th of June a fire broke out in the palace, and in its progress consumed 50,000 stands of arms. On the 20th the American consul, Mr. William Eaton, having been summoned to the Bey's presence, was told that his government must supply 10,000 stands of arms. "I have," says the Bey, "proportioned my loss among my friends, and this falls to you to furnish. Tell your government to send them without delay." The consul made a very proper reply; and, upon the whole conducted himself with becoming, and, as the result proved, successful firmness.

Expecting from the tenour of the consular communications from Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis, that a rupture with one or more of them would shortly take place, the government of the United States, since the latter end of May, had despatched to the Mediterranean a squadron of three frigates and a sloop or two, just half the force then in commission, under the orders of Commodore Dale; which squadron also carried out presents to a tolerably large amount, for such of the regencies as yet remained at peace.

On the 2d of July Commodore Dale, with the 44-gun frigates *President* and *Philadelphia*, 32-gun frigate *Essex*, and the brig-sloop *Enterprise*, anchored in the bay of Gibraltar; where were also lying, having come in to get a supply of water, a Tripolitan ship of war, with the high admiral's flag on board, carrying 26 guns, 9 and 6 pounders, and 260 men, and a brig of 16 guns, 6-pounders, and 160 men. The commanders of these vessels, who were now performing quarantine, pretended not to know that their government had declared war against the United States; but Commodore Dale became assured of the fact from a communication with the shore. He soon afterwards made sail for the coast of Barbary, and in the course of the month showed his squadron off Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli in succession. The two first of these regencies appear to have lowered their tone a little on this rather unexpected visit. With Tripoli, however, no arrangement was effected, and the war went on. After remaining off Tripoli about 18 days, Commodore Dale stood along the coast to the westward as far as the island of Pidussa, then steered for Malta to get a supply of water; and on the 16th came to an anchor in the harbour of Valetta.

On the 1st of August the United States' schooner *Enterprise*, of 14 long 6-pounders and 90 men, commanded by Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett, being on her way to join Commodore Dale at Malta, and not far from that island, fell in with a Tripolitan

polacre-ship, of 14 guns (probably 4-pounders, and it is doubtful if some were not swivels) and 80 men, commanded by Rais-Mahomet Sous. An action immediately commenced within pistol-shot, and continued for nearly two hours, when the Tripolitan colours were either shot away or struck. Elated with their victory, the American crew gave three cheers, and quitted their guns. In an instant the corsair rehoisted her flag, and renewed the action with redoubled vigour, the Tripolitans brandishing their sabres, and seeming desirous to board the *Enterprise*. The crew of the latter, however, having flown back to their guns, poured into their opponent so destructive a fire, that the barbarians unequivocally hauled down their colours. Lieutenant Sterrett now ordered the corsair under his lee quarter, and kept his men at their guns. But the Tripolitan vessel, the instant she got to the station to which she had been ordered, poured another broadside into the *Enterprise*, and, hoisting the red or bloody flag, made an attempt to board. The Americans were now most justly incensed against the Mahomedans; and the *Enterprise*, obtaining a raking position, brought down the corsair's mizenmast, and well riddled her hull. Seeing what was now likely to be his fate, the Tripolitan captain implored for quarter; and bending in a supplicating manner over the waist-barriade of his vessel, threw his colours into the sea, as the surest indication of his sincerity. The *Enterprise* immediately ceased her fire; and thus ended an action which had lasted just three hours.

As a proof no less of the utter incompetency of the Tripolitans as men-of-war's men, as of the skill to which the Americans had already arrived in the use of their guns, the *Enterprise* did not have a man hurt, and received very little damage in hull or rigging; while the corsair was greatly shattered in her hull and two remaining masts, and sustained, out of her 80 men in crew, a loss of 20 killed and 30 wounded, including among the latter her captain and first lieutenant.

Agreeably to the instructions he had received, Lieutenant Sterrett ordered the guns, swords, pistols, and ammunition of his prize, to be thrown overboard, and both her masts to be cut away by the board. A spar was then raised to serve for a mast, and an old tattered sail hung to it as a flag. In this condition the corsair was sent to Tripoli; and it is related that, on her arrival there, the bashaw marked his indignation by ordering the wounded captain to be paraded through the streets mounted upon an ass, and then to receive 500 bastinadoes. This was a fine reward, certainly, for having held out, against a very superior antagonist, until nearly two-thirds of his crew were killed or disabled.

On the 21st of August Commodore Dale put to sea from Malta with his squadron, and on the 30th captured a Greek ship from Smyrna bound to Tripoli, having on board one officer and 20 soldiers, 14 merchants, and some women and children, all

Tripoli. Considering this a good opportunity to negotiate an exchange with the bey for some Americans whom his cruisers had taken, the commodore proceeded straight to Tripoli; and, arriving off the port on the 3d of September, sent on shore a message to that effect. The bey said he would not give one American for all the soldiers; that only eight of the merchants were his subjects; and that he cared very little about any of them. He at length, however, agreed to give three Americans for the 21 soldiers, and three more for the eight merchants. With this the American commodore was obliged to be satisfied. Soon afterwards, finding his crew getting very sickly and his provisions very short, Commodore Dale raised the blockade of Tripoli, and steered for Gibraltar. During the winter months the American squadron visited Tripoli only occasionally. In March, 1802, having had all their arrears of presents paid up, the regencies of Algiers and Tunis became satisfied with the United States. Nothing, however, during the whole of this year, appears to have been done against Tripoli, although the cruisers of that regency were capturing American vessels wherever they could find them.

#### FRENCH EXPEDITION TO ST.-DOMINGO.

We have already noticed the bustle of preparation going on in the continental ports, just when a treaty of peace had apparently set fleets and armies to at least a temporary rest. An expedition to the island of Saint-Domingo was the plan in agitation. Previously to any account of occurrences on the shores of that ill-fated island, we will bestow a glance upon the changes which the preceding two or three years had effected in a colony that, when France owned it, was the most profitable of any in the West Indies.

Buonaparte, as soon as he had got himself placed at the head of the French government, sent out to Saint-Domingo an arrêté, containing the programme of a constitution for the government of the island; and, by way of gilding the pill, he appointed the celebrated black General Toussaint-Louverture, commander-in-chief of the colonial army; of which, owing to the unhealthy state of the island and the impossibility of sending out reinforcements, a very small portion were natives of France. Before the close of the year 1799 Toussaint possessed himself of the Spanish part of the island, including the city of Santo-Domingo. Shortly afterwards this gifted negro drew up, and finally got adopted, the plan of a colonial constitution, in which he named himself governor of the island and president for life, with the right of appointing his successor. Toussaint probably would not have ventured to take so bold a step, had he been aware that the war was so near its close: he knew that, while it continued, he

should have the protection of the English; and that the ships of the latter would prevent those of France from transporting any troops to recapture the island, or from otherwise molesting him in his possession.

As soon as the negotiation between France and England had assumed a favourable appearance, the ex-proprietors of estates in Saint-Domingo, strengthened by the whole body of French merchants, who keenly felt the loss of so fair a portion of their trade, applied to the first-consul to send out an army and retake the island. The nation at large seemed to have but one feeling on the subject; and Buonaparte, in despite, as he had himself declared, of his better judgment,\* gave orders to equip an expedition suitable to the magnitude of the undertaking. The army was to be composed of 21,200 men, under General Leclerc; and the fleet to convey them to the Antilles was to consist of 33 sail of the line, and nearly an equal number of frigates, ship and brig corvettes, and flûte-transports, under the command of Vice-admiral Villaret-Joyeuse.

On the 14th of December, 1801, after a long delay by contrary winds, a fleet composed of 10 French sail of the line, under the commander-in-chief, and of five Spanish, under Vice-admiral Gravina, accompanied by six frigates, four corvettes and smaller vessels, and two transports, containing altogether 7000 men, set sail from the road of Brest. On the morning of the 17th, off Belle-Isle, one French sail of the line, one frigate, one corvette, and one flûte, with 900 men on board, joined from Lorient; and a squadron from Rochefort, under Rear-admiral La Touche-Tréville, consisting of six sail of the line, six frigates, two corvettes, and two despatch-vessels, and having on board 3000 men, was expected to join, but did not until the combined fleet, on the 29th of January, 1802, reached Cape Samana on the island of its destination. One 74, the Duquesne, and one frigate, the Cornélie, having on board 700 men between them, had parted company; which left 10,500 as the number of men to be disembarked from the first division of the fleet.

The following were the dispositions for landing the troops; 1000, under General Kerverseau, at Santo-Domingo; 3000, under General Boudet, at Port-au-Prince; 2500, under General Rochambeau, in Mancenille bay, to attack Fort-Dauphin, and, on carrying it, to proceed to the mole Saint-Nicolas, there to be joined by 4000 men under General Hardy. While the ships were proceeding to their assigned points of debarkation, two other French squadrons arrived at the rendezvous: one from Toulon, of four sail of the line and one frigate, under Rear-admiral Ganteaume, with 2300 men; the other from Cadiz, of three sail of the line and three frigates, under Rear-admiral Linois, with 1500 men on board. In the mean time, the 10,500

\* See O'Meara's *Napoléon in Exile*, vol. ii., p. 199.

troops, that had arrived in the first division, partly by intrigue and partly by force, had effected their landing.

It is foreign to these pages to enter upon the details of the military operations which, after a brave and protracted resistance on the part of the indigenes, led to their dispersion or surrender; but even this did not take place until the remaining 6900 of the 21,200 French troops ordered upon the expedition arrived at the island. The black chief, who had exhibited so many traits of moderation and generalship, after capitulating and being allowed to return to his home, was suddenly arrested and conveyed on board the *Héros* 74, lying off Gonaïves. On being brought on board the French ship, this extraordinary man is said to have uttered these words: "En me renversant, on n'a abattu que le tronc de l'arbre de la liberté des noirs, il repoussera par les racines parcequ'elles sont profondes et nombreuses."

Having been thus illegally dragged on board the *Héros*, Toussaint was most inhumanly, and contrary to all the assurances held out to him by General Leclerc, transported to France, to end his days in a prison. He was shut up in Fort de Joux, and died six months afterwards in rather a mysterious way. On this subject the following appears in a work of considerable notoriety: "I mentioned Toussaint-Louverture, and observed that, amongst other calumnies, some of his (Buonaparte's) enemies had asserted that he had caused him to be put to death privately in prison. 'It does not deserve an answer,' replied Napoléon; 'what possible interest could I have in putting a negro to death after he had arrived in France? Had he died in St.-Domingo, then indeed something might have been suspected, but, after he had safely landed in France, what object could have been in view?'"\*

Whatever, in reality, was the mode by which Toussaint ended his days, the act of forcibly withdrawing him from Saint-Domingo, after he had honourably capitulated, proved in the end as impolitic as it was cruel. Several enterprising black chiefs still remained on the island: Clerveaux, Christophe, Paul-Louverture (nephew to Toussaint), and Dessalines; and who, with the whole of their countrymen, were exasperated at the treachery which had deprived them of their gallant leader. Part of the French troops were sent away to aid in subduing the revolted negroes at Guadeloupe; and, among the remainder, as the summer advanced, the yellow fever made dreadful ravages.

About the middle of August accounts reached Saint-Domingo, of the success of the French at Guadeloupe, and that slavery, in all its horrors, had been re-established in the colony. This news spread like wildfire among the negroes at the first-named island, and operating upon minds already smarting under their own wrongs, determined them to revolt. The first eruption broke out

\* O'Meara's *Napoléon in Exile*, vol. ii., p. 198.

about the middle of September. The death of General Leclerc of the fever, on the 2d of November,\* conferred on General Rochambeau the command of the French forces on the island; but all the efforts of these, ably directed as they were, and although strengthened by the arrival, on the 5th of April, 1803, of a reinforcement of 2000 troops of the line, could not, it is believed, have preserved the colony to France, even if the war between the latter power and England had not, as it just then had, broken out afresh. That war and its mass of interesting details now claim our attention.

• His body, after being embalmed, was conveyed to France on board the (late British) *Swiftsure* 74.



## WAR OF 1803.

SCARCELY had the embers of the bonfires, lit up in celebration of the peace of Amiens, grown cold on the ground, ere the two principal parties to the treaty became again involved in war. Although the formal declaration, the act of England herself in this instance, did not issue until toward the middle of the year, each nation, with well-grounded forebodings of what was to happen, began her preparations at its commencement. So much of those preparations, as relate to naval concerns, fall properly within the scope of this work; and, as usual, we shall begin with the abstract, or tabular statement, of the British navy for the current year.\*

Between that abstract and the preceding one a difference occurs, as well in one or more of the principal heads, as in the arrangement of the lower part of the table. A desire to improve the remaining abstracts of the series has suggested the alteration, and the necessary explanations on the subject will be found in the notes which accompany the present year's abstract.

A state of peace having filled the period between this abstract and the last, no captured column appears; and the built, purchased, and wrecked columns exhibit an unusual paucity of numbers.† The decrease observable in many of the totals arises, partly from the alterations above alluded to, but, in a much greater degree, from the multiplicity of vessels sold or taken to pieces since the termination of the war. One fact is remarkable: the total of line-of-battle ships employable for sea-service falls short by two, of the corresponding total in the abstract for 1793. So that, during a period of 10 years, eight of them in war, the British navy had slightly decreased in ships of the line. If statesmen and historians have asserted otherwise, it has been because they drew their comparisons between the wrong totals. An increase of 11 certainly appears among the permanent-harbour-service ships, but it is the sea-service cruisers which constitute the effective strength of a navy.

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract, No. 11.

† See Appendix, No. 19.

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year, was,

Admirals	.	.	.	.	.	45
Vice-admirals	.	.	.	.	.	36
Rear-admirals	.	.	.	.	.	51
"					superannuated 26	
Post-captains	.	.	.	.	.	668
"					13	
Commanders, or sloop-captains	.	.	.	.	.	413
"					superannuated 49	
Lieutenants	.	.	.	.	.	2480
Masters	.	.	.	.	.	529

And the number of seamen and marines voted for the service of 1803, was, 50,000 for the first two, 60,000 for the next four, and 100,000 for the remaining seven lunar months of it.\*

The King of England's message to parliament on the 8th of March, in the impression it made upon the public mind, was nearly tantamount to a declaration of war; and preparations for carrying it on with vigour were immediately commenced in all the dock-yards of the empire. The state of the British navy, as it stood on the 1st of January, has already appeared in its proper place. To the 32 line-of-battle cruisers, then in commission, were added, before the 1st of May, 20 additional ones; and, by the 1st of the following month, the number of ships of the line in commission was augmented to 60, besides a proportionate number of 50-gun ships, frigates, sloops, and smaller vessels, all either at sea or fitting for sea. A great many vessels of every class, including a large proportion of line-of-battle ships, were repairing; and several frigates, sloops, and schooners, were ordered to be constructed with all possible despatch.

The first-consul of France was not, on his part, inactive. In the month of March he gave orders that the port of Flushing should be got ready to receive and equip a squadron, to be called the "Squadron of the North," and which was to consist of ten 74-gun ships from Dutch models. This was probably, because they draw less water, in proportion to their rate, than the ships of other nations. The ships thus ordered were immediately to be laid down, part in Flushing and Ostende, and the remainder in ports of France. Gun-vessels and flat-bottomed boats were also to be constructed at every convenient spot along the shores of the Scheldt, the Weser, and the Elbe; and a quantity of ship-timber, hamp, and other naval stores, to the value of 20,000,000 of francs, was ordered to be immediately purchased in Holland. In testimony, also, of his love for the naval service, Buonaparte, since the 25th of January, 1802, had made his brother Jérôme an enseigne de vaisseau.

\* See Appendix, No. 20.

In the road of Brest were lying four ships of the line, nine others were in the docks, repairing and nearly ready; and these were ordered to be expedited by all possible means. There were on the stocks, nearly finished; and five lay in the inner harbour, waiting their turns to be docked; making a total of 21 serviceable line-of-battle ships in the port of Brest. There were also, laying up in the harbour, six or eight old and worn-out ships, including the *Invincible* and *Terrible* three-deckers.

In the port of Lorient were three ships on the stocks, expected to be launched in November; and two additional ones were ordered to be laid down. At Saint-Malo a 74 was ordered to be built; and at Nantes four frigates, exclusive of two Dutch-built 74s, intended for the Scheldt squadron. At Bordeaux another of the latter was ordered to be built. At Rochefort three line-of-battle ships were building, and nearly ready: three others were now ordered. At Toulon there were eight ships of the line afloat, two on the stocks nearly finished, and two others about to be commenced. At Marseilles the last of the 10 Dutch-built 74s for the Scheldt squadron was ordered to be laid down. At Genoa a 74-gun ship and frigate were immediately to be put in hand, from draughts prepared at Brest.\* There were also nine French line-of-battle ships at, or coming from, the island of St. Domingo, and one, the *Marengo*, on her road to the East Indies; making a total of 66 ships, including 47 afloat, or soon expected to be so.†

If it were not quite clear, from the very nature of these formidable preparations, thus carried on in the midst of peace, that a renewal of the war with England was contemplated, no doubt could exist, on a perusal of the instructions which, since early in February, Buonaparte had drawn up for the guidance of General Decaen. On the 6th of March this officer sailed from Brest, in the *Marengo* 74, for the French settlements in India, of which he had been appointed governor-general; and whither the *Marengo*, and the frigates *Atalante*, *Belle-Poule*, and *Sémillante*, and transports *Côte-d'Or* and *Marie-Françoise*, were carrying, for the alleged purpose of taking possession of Pondicherry agreeably to the third article of the treaty of Amiens, about 1350 troops.

It appears by one or two paragraphs in the document alluded to,‡ that the first-consul did not anticipate an actual rupture before the month of September. War was, however, declared by England, virtually on the 16th of May, when letters of marque and general reprisals were ordered, and formally in two days

\* *Précis des Evénemens Militaires, &c.* par M. Le Comte Mathieu Dumas, Lieutenant Général des armées du Roi. A Paris, 1822; tome xi., p. 180.

† See p. 166; also Appendix, No. 21.

‡ For the original of which see Appendix, No. 22.

afterwards; and, had the declaration bore date in the preceding February, no one, acquainted with the avowed intentions of Buonaparte, could say it had issued a day too early. Simultaneously with the order for reprisals against French ships, issued one for detaining ships belonging to the Batavian republic, Holland being to all intents and purposes a province of France.

Convinced that the peace of the world is generally held by a thread, which the caprice of a minister may almost at any time break, we shall not puzzle ourselves, or the reader, with endeavouring to investigate the causes of the war which commenced in the year 1803, but shall plunge at once into the details of its operations; such operations at least as lie within our province, those in which the navies of the several belligerents take a part.

On the 17th of May, at 7 p. m., Admiral the Honourable William Cornwallis, in whose able hands the command of the Channel fleet still remained, having his flag on board the Dreadnought 98, sailed from Cawsand bay, with a fleet of 10 sail of the line and frigates, to cruise off Ushant and watch the motions of the French ships in Brest harbour, five or six only of which were in a state to put to sea. Of the remaining 21 ships of the line which the port contained, some were fitting, others repairing, and three were still upon the stocks, but on the eve of being launched. Could, therefore, a greater force than 10 sail of the line have been sent to cruise off Brest, it would, in the divided state of the French navy, have been wholly unnecessary.\*

Owing to the very reduced state of the Batavian navy, which, including three or four ships in the ports of Spain, now consisted of not more than seven sail of the line and a few frigates in a serviceable state, three British ships were all that were required in the North Sea. Four or five others were in the Irish Channel; about an equal number cruised to the southward of Brest; and, of those remaining in Plymouth and Portsmouth, upwards of 20 were fitting for sea, as fast as the dearth of seamen, and unfortunate want of stores, would admit.

Although the watchfulness of Admiral Cornwallis, who, on the 9th of July, shifted his flag from the Dreadnought to the 112 gun-ship *Ville-de-Paris*, precluded any addition to the Brest fleet from without the port, two fine ships joined it from within. Both were launched on the same day, the 15th of August; one the *Cassard* '74, the other, the celebrated three-decker on hand since the year 1794, and which, under such highly-wrought feelings, was then ordered to be named the *Vengeur*, to commemorate the supposed martyrdom of the '74 of that name, captured and sunk in Lord Howe's action.\*

\* See vol. i., p. 174.

The summer passed, and the year nearly closed, without any material change in the relative positions of the Brest and Channel fleets. On Christmas-day, however, the strong south-west gales, which, with short intermissions had blown for some weeks, increased to so alarming a height, that the blockading ships, one and all, were compelled to retire from the French coast, and seek safety in Plymouth and other British ports. At this time lay in the outer road of Brest, ready for sea, the *Vengeur* three-decker, bearing the flag of Vice-admiral Laurent-Jean-François Truguet, an 80, with Rear-admiral Ganteaume's flag, and six 74s, attended by about an equal number of frigates and corvettes, but they made no attempt to sail.

Before the end of the year there were several other of the continental ports opening into the ocean, which, besides Brest, contained French ships of the line, and in sufficient number when united to excite some attention. At Rochefort had recently arrived, along with some frigates, two of the nine sail of the line, already mentioned as at, or coming from, the island of St.-Domingo when the war broke out. In Ferrol and Corunna were lying five other of those line-of-battle ships, and a sixth ship (making the eighth in the whole), the *Aigle* 74, had put into Cadiz. To guard all these ports, except the last, was a part of the duty of the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet; and, as soon as practicable, they were watched by British squadrons corresponding in force with the French squadrons within them.

Although a single gun-boat is not of a force to excite alarm, several scores of such vessels, united in a fleet, are sufficiently formidable to call for the fullest attention of an enemy. With this view the British government, very soon after war was declared, stationed cruisers, commanded by active and experienced officers, in front of all those ports along the Channel frontier of France, from Ostende to Cape La Hougue, and thence to Granville, at which divisions of gun-vessels were known to be constructing or fitting out. Buonaparte's plan, for the employment of this apparently insignificant description of force in the invasion of England, was not matured until the ensuing year; but, in the mean time, considerable activity prevailed among the different entrepôts along the above line of coast. On most occasions, when any of the flotilla ventured from under the protection of their batteries, they were met, and either captured or driven back, by the blockading force; and were sometimes attacked with success, even when moored, as they considered, beyond the reach of British enterprise. We mean now to embody the most interesting of the skirmishes that ensued, during the present year, between British cruisers and the French invasion-flotilla.

On the 14th of June, in the morning, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Immortalité*, Captain Edward William Campbell

Rich Owen, and 18-gun brig-sloops Cruiser and Jalouse, Captain John Hancock and Christopher Strachey, chased the two French gun-vessels, Inabordable schooner and Commode brig, each carrying one 18, and three 24 pounder long guns, on shore upon the east part of Cape Blanc-Nez. As soon as the flood-tide made, the Cruiser and Jalouse stood in, and, anchoring with springs, commenced engaging the batteries under which the gun-vessels had grounded. At the end of an hour's mutual cannonade the batteries were silenced; and, in the face of a heavy fire of musketry from the cliffs, by which Mr. Charles Adams, master's mate of the Jalouse, the only person hurt, was badly wounded, the boats of the three British vessels boarded and brought off the French brig and schooner.

On the 1st of August a French armed lugger, which the British 38-gun frigate Hydra, Captain George Mundy, had prevented from entering the port of Havre, having hauled close to the beach about two miles to the westward of the river Touque, Captain Mundy despatched the Hydra's boats, under the orders of Lieutenant Francis M'Mahon Tracy, assisted by Messieurs John Barclay and George French, midshipmen, to endeavour to bring off or destroy her. On the near approach of the boats the crew of the lugger, which was the Favori, of four carriage-guns, commanded by a lieutenant de vaisseau, abandoned her and retreated to the shore; where, in concert with a party of military, they posted themselves behind some sand-banks that lay abreast and within musket-shot of their vessel. From this position the French soldiers and sailors kept up a constant fire upon the people in the boats and on board the Favori; and received a return from the British marines, until the lugger, by the exertions of the prize-master and his men, had gained a safe distance from the shore. One seaman killed was the extent of the loss on the British side.

On the 14th of September, at 8 A. M., the Immortalité frigate, in company with the bomb-vessels, Perseus, Captain John Methuist, and Explosion, Captain Robert Paul, commenced an attack upon the batteries that protect the town of Dieppe, also on 17 gun-vessels building in the port. The firing was continued on both sides until 11 h. 30 m. A. M.; when, the lee-tide making strong, and the town having taken fire badly in one place, and slightly in two others, the frigate and bomb-vessels weighed, and proceeded off St.-Valery en Caux, where six gun-boats were constructing. At 3 P. M. the British opened a fire upon that place, and continued it for an hour, apparently with some effect: Captain Owen then retired, with the loss of one man missing and five men wounded.

On the 13th of September, in the evening, the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate Cerberus, Captain William Selby, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, anchored as close to the town of Dieppe as the tide would admit, having

only 16 feet under her keel at low water. In company with the *Cerberus* were the sloops of war, *Charwell* and *Kite*, Captains Philip Dumaresq and Philip Pison, Ealing schooner, Lieutenant William Archbold, and "*Carteret*" cutter, with whose commander's name we are unacquainted. As soon as the bomb-vessels *Sulphur* and *Terror*, Captains Daniel M'Leod and George Nicholas Hardinge, which were hourly expected, should arrive, it was intended to bombard the port of Granville, in the hope to destroy some of the numerous gun-boats lying within the pier.

At 11 P. M. the *Terror* came up; but, having as well as the *Cerberus* grounded at low water, it was not until 2 A. M. on the 14th, that Captain Hardinge could get to the station assigned him. Being then judiciously placed by her commander, the *Terror* commenced throwing shells from her two mortars, and received an immediate return from the gun and mortar batteries on the heights near the town, also from some guns mounted upon the pier, and several gun-vessels stationed at the entrance of the harbour. The fire was kept up until after 5 A. M.; when the *Terror* was recalled, and, weighing, reanchored at a greater distance from the town, with a loss of only two men wounded by splinters.

Shortly afterwards the *Sulphur* bomb, whose bad sailing had prevented her from beating up, arrived and anchored in company with the *Cerberus* and squadron. In the evening both bomb-vessels threw a few shells; but the tide prevented them from getting near enough to produce much effect.

On the 15th, in the morning, all the ships were enabled to take capital positions; and soon after 5 A. M. the bombardment recommenced with great spirit and continued until 10h. 30m. A. M.; when the falling tide rendered it necessary for the British ships to withdraw from the attack. Although 22 gun-vessels, which had hauled out of the pier and formed themselves in a regular line, had united with the batteries around the port in replying to the fire of the British, no loss and very little damage was sustained by the latter.

Shortly after getting under sail to remove into deeper water, the *Cerberus* grounded upon one of the sand-banks. Nine of the French gun-boats, perceiving the situation of the British frigate, attempted to annoy her, and began a heavy cannonade, but were eventually compelled, by the fire of the *Charwell*, *Kite*, bomb-vessels, and cutters, to retire for shelter into the harbour. After remaining aground about three hours, the *Cerberus* floated with the rising tide. The attack upon the French town and gun-vessels then ceased; nor was it known that any material effect had been produced by it.

On the 27th of September, in the evening, a division of sloops, bombs, and smaller vessels, under the orders of Captain Samuel Jackson of the 16-gun ship-sloop *Assam*, anchored off Calais,

the bomb-vessels to the north-east of the town, and the remainder of the squadron abreast of the town and pier-head battery. The French immediately opened a fire from all directions, and the first shell fell within a ship's length of the Autumn and burst under water. The vessels being at this time so close to each other as to be in danger from the enemy's shells, Captain Jackson directed them to weigh and reanchor in more open order, while he remained with the Autumn in her original station. In this way the bombardment continued for several hours, with some apparent damage to the east end of the town, but with none whatever to the British squadron. At length a gale from the north-east obliged the ships to weigh and stand off; and thus the action ended.

On the next day, the 28th, a division of gun-boats, taking advantage of the absence of the British squadron, quitted Calais for Boulogne; and, although chased and fired at by the 36-gun frigate Leda, Captain Robert Honyman, they arrived in safety at their destination. On the 29th, a second division, 25 in number, attempted to do the same; and, after a three hours' cannonade by the Leda, the whole, except the two which ran on shore and were bilged upon the rocks, succeeded in reaching the anchorage off the pier of Boulogne; forming, with those already there, a force of 55 sail.

On the 31st of October, at 9 A.M., while the Leda frigate, in company with the Lark and Harpy sloops of war, were off Etaples, working towards the shore against a strong east-south-east wind, a large gun-brig, said to be of 12 long 24-pounders, with six schooners and sloops under her convoy, was observed coming out of the port. Captain Honyman immediately signalled the Harpy and Lark to make sail in chase. About this time, however, the British hired cutter, Admiral-Mitchell, of 12 carronades, 12-pounders, and 35 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant Alexander Shippard, being close off Boulogne, the port to which the vessels were steering, gallantly stood after them; and, at 10 A.M., brought the gun-brig to action, close under the batteries of Portet. At the end of a two hours and a half's engagement, the cutter drove the gun-brig and one of the sloops on shore.

The Admiral-Mitchell's mast and cross-jack yard were wounded in several places, by a shell which fell on board, and her sails and rigging were a good deal cut by grape: the cutter had also one carronade dismounted, and was hulled in several places. Fortunately, however, her loss did not amount to more than two men badly, and two slightly wounded. The strong land-wind having entirely prevented the small British squadron in the offing from acting, this affair was highly creditable to Lieutenant Shippard, and the officers and crew of the Admiral-Mitchell. Our attention is now called to the Mediterranean.

The British naval force upon that station, at the breaking out



of the war, consisted of 10 sail of the line, under the command of Rear-admiral Sir Richard Bickerton, in the *Kent* 74. The probability that this extensive and important station would soon become the scene of very active operations, led to the appointment of Vice-admiral Lord Nelson to the chief command. His lordship, accordingly, on the 18th of May, hoisted his flag on board his old ship the *Victory*, in Portsmouth harbour. On the 20th, at 5 P. M., accompanied by the 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Amphion*, Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy, the *Victory* sailed from Spithead, bound, in the first instance, to the fleet off Brest, to ascertain if her assistance would be required by Admiral Cornwallis; in which event she was to remain with the latter, and the vice-admiral was to proceed to his station in the frigate.

On the 22d, at 4 P. M., the two ships arrived off the island of Ushant, the appointed rendezvous; but a severe gale of wind had blown the British fleet from its station. After a vain search for the admiral, both at the rendezvous and nearer to Brest, Lord Nelson, at 7 h. 30 m. P. M. on the 23d, shifted his flag to the *Amphion*, and at 8 P. M., made sail, with a fair wind, leaving the *Victory* to follow, in case her services should be dispensed with by the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet.

On the 25th, in the morning, the wind shifted from north-west to south-west, and blew fresh. The foul wind, with a heavy sea, continued until the night of the 30th, when a light air sprang up from the northward. With the aid of this, the *Amphion*, on the morning of the 3d of June, entered the Straits, and at 9 h. 30 m. P. M. anchored in the bay of Gibraltar. On the 4th, at 4 A. M., the *Amphion* weighed and made sail. On the 15th, the frigate reached Malta; quitted it on the 17th, at 3 A. M., and on the 25th, arrived off Naples, where his lordship expected to find the squadron. Sir Richard had, however, since the 4th, sailed for Toulon; and thither the *Amphion* immediately bent her course. A succession of calms and light winds made it the 8th of July ere Lord Nelson could reach his old cruising ground, where he found Sir Richard, with the

#### Gun-ship

80.	Gibraltar . . . .	Captain George Frederick Ryves.
	<i>Kent</i> . . . . .	Rear-admiral (w.) Sir Richard Bickerton, Bart.
		Captain Edward O'Brien.
24	<i>Donegal</i> . . . . .	" Sir Richard John Strachan, Bart.
	<i>Superb</i> . . . . .	" Richard Goodwin Keats.
	<i>Belleisle</i> . . . . .	" John Whitby.
	<i>Renown</i> . . . . .	" John Chambers White.
64	<i>Monmouth</i> . . . .	" George Hart.
	<i>Agincourt</i> . . . .	" Charles Marsh Schomberg.
	Frigates, <i>Active</i> , <i>Phoebe</i> , and (now) <i>Amphion</i> .	

The French line-of-battle force in Toulon consisted of seven ships nearly ready for sea, under Vice-admiral René-Madeleine La Touche-Tréville, two repairing in the arsenal, and five on the stocks. The ships afloat were the 80s *Formidable* and *Indomptable*.

table, and 74s Atlas, Berwick (late British), Intrépide, Mont-Blanc, and Scipion; the two in dock were the late British ships Hannibal, now Annibal, and Swiftsure; and those on the stocks, were the 80s Bucentaure and Neptune, and 74s Borée, Phaëton, and Pluton, the two 80s, and the last-named 74 nearly ready for launching.

At this time nearly the whole of the Mediterranean coast was subject, more or less, to the sway of France. In Barcelona and other Spanish ports, French cruisers were allowed to carry in and sell their prizes, while to a British vessel admittance was prohibited by an order of the government. Genoa was as much France as Toulon, and in her dock-yard was constructing a French 74, to be named after her, the *Génois*. Tuscany was gradually becoming French; and so was Sardinia, although under the mask of a rigid neutrality. Except Naples, every state in the two Sicilies was obedient to the nod of Buonaparte; who had set his emissaries at work in the Morea, to excite the Greeks to an insurrection against the Turks, in the hope, by taking part with the latter, to obtain Egypt as the price of, what could not fail to be, a successful interference.

Expecting, probably, that the *Victory* would not be detained by Admiral Cornwallis, Lord Nelson continued on board the *Amphion*, in preference to removing to a larger ship. Within forty hours after the *Amphion* had, as already stated, separated from the *Victory*, the latter fell in with the Channel fleet, and, after a stay of scarcely two hours, was permitted to proceed on her passage to the Mediterranean. On the 28th of May, in latitude 45° 40' north, longitude 6° 10' west, Captain Sutton was fortunate enough to fall in with and capture the French 32-gun frigate *Embuscade* (late British *Ambuscade*\*), Captain Jean-Baptiste-Alexis Fradin, 30 days from Cape-François, bound to Rochefort, with not the whole of her guns mounted, and with a crew of only 187 men.

On the 12th of June, in the evening, the *Victory* anchored in Gibraltar, and departed thence on the afternoon of the 15th. On the 9th of July, she anchored in the harbour of Valetta, island of Malta, and quitted it on the 11th; and on the 30th, at about 4 p.m., a few leagues to the westward of Cape Sicie, the *Victory* joined the Mediterranean squadron, then consisting of the *Gibraltar*, *Bellevue*, *Donegal*, *Renown*, and *Monmouth*, with the three frigates, *Active*, *Phœbe*, and *Amphion*. On the same evening, Lord Nelson shifted his flag to the *Victory*, taking Captain George Murray as his first captain, and Captain Hardy, as his second; the latter being succeeded in the command of the *Amphion* by Captain Sutton, late of the *Victory*. The station off Cape Sicie had been chosen by the vice-admiral on two accounts;

\* See vol. ii., p. 243. The *Ambuscade* was restored to her rank in the British navy.

one, should Spain, as was not thought unlikely, suddenly ally herself to France, to prevent the junction of a Spanish fleet from the westward; the other, to be sufficiently to windward to be able, if the usual north-easterly gale should shift to north-north-west, or north-north-east, to take shelter under the Hyères islands, or under Cape San-Sebastian.

Early in the month of August the 80-gun ship *Canopus*, Rear-admiral George Campbell, Captain John Conn, joined the British squadron; and on the 15th of the month the fine 80-gun ship *Neptune* was launched at Toulon. This, in a little while, augmented the French force in the road to eight sail of the line; while Lord Nelson, having detached the *Canopus* and *Monmouth*, was still left with only six, the *Victory*, *Belleisle*, *Kent*, *Renown*, *Superb*, and *Triumph*; the latter recently arrived, and commanded by Captain Sir Robert Barlow. A French writer, alluding to the British naval force in the Mediterranean at this time, says: "L'amiral Nelson croisait avec dix-huit vaisseaux et un nombre correspondant de frégates."\* This must have explained to the satisfaction of the French people, why their admiral, with only eight sail of the line, made no effort to capture or drive away the blockading force.

His ships being short of water, Lord Nelson, on the 24th of October, steered for a newly discovered anchorage among the Magdalena islands, on the north coast of Sardinia; leaving, to watch the French force in Toulon, the frigates *Seahorse* and *Narcissus*. On the 31st, at 6 P. M., after a seven days' anxious struggle with adverse gales and currents, dark nights and a rocky and most intricate passage, the whole squadron, anchored, without an accident, in Agincourt sound, under the Sardinian shore; a noble harbour formed by an indented bay in the latter, and defended to the northward by the small islands of St.-Estevan, Spargiotou, Magdalena, and Cibrera.

This being an anchorage, which according to the declaration of Lord Nelson, was one of the finest harbours he had ever seen, we feel bound to state how Captain Ryves happened to make the important discovery. Some time in the year 1802 the 64-gun ship *Agincourt*, then commanded by Captain Ryves, was detached by Sir Richard Bickerton, to proceed to the Magdalena islands, and, if possible, prevent the French taking possession of them, as, according to intelligence recently received, they were about to do, notwithstanding the treaty of Amiens. At this period there did not exist a chart of those islands; nor was it known that any ship of war had ever anchored among them: the *Agincourt* herself, indeed, was nearly lost in doing so. No Frenchmen appearing, Captain Ryves spent the week he was directed to remain there in making a survey of the islands; which he performed alone, there not being a single

\* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome x., p. 55.

person on board able to assist him. In May, 1803, Captain Ryves was promoted to the Gibraltar, and Lord Nelson, we believe, named the anchorage Agincourt sound.

On the 9th of November, having obtained a supply of water and fresh beef for the squadron, Lord Nelson got under way and sailed from the Magdalena islands; but, owing to a continuance of foul weather, he did not arrive off Toulon until the 23d. Here the British admiral found the French squadron in the outer road, to all appearance, just as he had left it a month previous. On the 24th the Excellent 74, Captain Frank Sotheron, joined the squadron from England.

The continuance of gales of wind, with a heavy sea from the north-west to north-east, and a belief that Spain had at length settled her neutrality, induced Lord Nelson to take his winter station off Cape San-Sebastian, keeping frigates off Toulon, to apprise him of the least movement on the part of the French ships. Of the weak and ill-provided state of several of his ships, Lord Nelson, in his letters to the admiralty, complained very bitterly, and, as it appears, not without reason. "The Superb," says his lordship, "is in a very weak state, but Keats is so superior to any difficulties, that I hear but little from her. The Kent is gone to Malta, fit only for a summer passage. Every bit of twice-laid stuff belonging to the Canopus is condemned, and all the running rigging in the fleet, except the Victory's. We have fitted the Excellent with new main and mizen rigging: it was shameful for the dock-yard (Portsmouth) to send a ship to sea with such rigging."

The severity of the weather, coupled with the inefficient state of his squadron, compelled the British admiral, about the 12th of December, to enter the bay of Palma; where the ships remained until the want of water sent them, on the 21st, a second time to Agincourt sound. In this commodious harbour, Lord Nelson and his squadron lay at anchor at the close of the year; the port of Toulon, and the force within it, being carefully watched by Captain Ross Donnelly, of the Narcissus, with another frigate or two in company.

#### ✓ LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

On the 18th of May the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Doris, Captain Richard Henry Pearson, cruising off Usant, fell in with and chased the French national lugger *Affronteur*, of 14 long eight's and 92 men, commanded by Lieutenant Morce-André Dutoya. Gaining fast upon the lugger the Doris fired a shot wide of her, to induce her to shorten sail, but without effect. To a second shot, discharged this time at her, the lugger fired a shot in return, and actually maintained a running fight with the frigate, until the latter ran close alongside. Nor

did the *Affronteur*, even then, give up the contest, until her captain and eight of her men were killed, and 14 wounded, one of them mortally. The *Doris* received some slight damage in the hull and rigging, and had one man wounded, by the fire of her puny but resolute antagonist.

It is hard to draw the line between a resistance that is prudential, and one which is, as this has been pronounced, "fraught with temerity." Had the lugger shot away the frigate's fore topmast, and thereby effected her escape, all would have united in praising the skill and bravery of M. Dutoya and his people. Had the *Affronteur* surrendered at the first fire, few would have admitted that her officers and men deserved to belong to a national cruiser, even of her small class. At all events, in a service where so much is to be effected by undauntedness, it is safer to praise the extreme of that quality, than not to censure an over-cautious discretion.

The capture of the *Affronteur*, it will be observed, took place on the very day on which the declaration of war issued from St.-James's. This, with the capture of two merchant vessels on the same or the following day, was made a subject of serious complaint against England. "*Contre le droit des gens, mais suivant un usage trop commun de la part de l'Angleterre, les hostilités précéderent la déclaration de guerre. On croyait encore à Paris les négociations en activité lorsqu'on y apprit, par une dépêche télégraphique du préfet maritime de Brest, que les Anglais s'étaient emparés de deux bâtimens marchands dans la baie d'Audierne; le même jour, ou le lendemain, ils attaquèrent les bâtimens de guerre français.*"\* The fact is, so far from the negotiation being "in activity," Lord Whitworth had obtained his passports since the 12th of the month, and General Andreossi had applied for his a week earlier. Moreover, it was only on the 25th of May that General Mortier, from his headquarters at Coërvéden, summoned the Hanoverian electorate to surrender to his army.

On the 28th of May the French 36-gun frigate *Franchise*, still commanded by Captain Jurien, but with 10 of her guns in the hold, and a reduced complement of 137 men, was captured by the 74-gun ship *Minotaur*,\* Captain John Charles Moore Mansfield, and two other 74s, which had chased from the Channel fleet. The prize was 35 days from Port-au-Prince, bound to Brest. Being a tolerably fine frigate of 898 tons, the *Franchise* was added to the British navy, by the same name, as a 12-pounder 36.

On the 15th of June, in latitude 47° 10' north, longitude 20° west, the British 24-pounder 40-gun frigate *Endymion*, Captain the Honourable Charles Paget, fell in with, and after a chase of eight hours, captured, the French ship-corvette *Bucchante*, of

18 long 12-pounders and 300 men, commanded by Lieutenant François-Louis Kerimel; and who persisted so long in his endeavours to escape, that the *Endymion's* chase-guns killed his first lieutenant and seven seamen, and wounded nine others.

When fallen in with, the *Bacchante* was on her way to Brest from St. Domingo, whither she had sailed with despatches about three months previous. The prize was a remarkably fine corvette of 642 tons, and became added to the British navy, under her French name, as a post-ship.

On the 27th of June, at night, three boats belonging to the British 38-gun frigate *Loire*, Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland, cruising off the Isle of Bas, was despatched, under the orders of Lieutenants Francis Temple and James Bowen, assisted among others by Midshipman Philip Henry Bridges, to attack the French 10-gun brig *Venteux*, Lieutenant Gilles-François Montfort, lying close under the batteries of the island. Owing to the heavy rowing of one of the boats, two only could get up. These, in the most gallant manner, boarded, and after a severe conflict of 10 minutes carried, the French brig; whose 10 guns consisted of four long 18-pounders, and six 36-pounder brass carronades. The *Venteux* was perfectly prepared for the attack, and had her deck covered with men. Of these she lost her second officer and two seamen killed, her commander, with her four remaining officers, and eight seamen, wounded. The British loss amounted to the boatswain (Mr. M'Gwier), four seamen, and one marine wounded, two of the seamen dangerously.

Even without reckoning the force of the batteries, the capture, by two boats' crews, of a brig armed and manned like the *Venteux*, was a truly gallant exploit; and Lieutenant Temple, the leader of the party, well merited the promotion which he in consequence obtained. Mr. Bridges, also, of whose conduct on the occasion Lieutenant Temple spoke in the highest terms, was made a lieutenant.

On the 28th of June, as a British squadron, composed of the 74-gun ships *Cumberland*, Captain Henry William Bayntun, *Goliath*, Captain Charles Brisbane, and *Hercule*, acting captain Lieutenant John B. Hills, was cruising off Cape Nicholas-Mole, two strange sail were discovered in-shore. These were the French 36-pounder 44-gun frigate *Poursuivante*, Commodore Jean-Baptiste-Phillibert Willaumez, and 16-gun ship-corvette *Mignonne*, Captain Jean-Pierre Bargeau, neither of them fully armed or manned, two days from Cayes, bound to the Cape on their way to France.

The *Goliath* by signal went in chase of the *Mignonne*; and, carrying up the breeze while the latter lay becalmed close under the land, overtook and captured the corvette after the exchange of a few harmless shot. The *Mignonne* had landed six of her 16 long 12-pounders (described as 18-pounders in the official

letter), and had on board a crew of only 80 men and boys. The prize, a remarkably fast-sailing ship,\* was afterwards added to the British navy under her French name; but, getting aground soon after she was commissioned, the *Mignonne* was obliged to be laid in the mud in Port-Royal Harbour, Jamaica.

When the *Goliath's* signal was made to chase the *Mignonne*, the *Cumberland* made the *Hercule's* to endeavour to cut off the *Poursuivante*. The *Hercule* made sail in very light and baffling winds, and appears to have brought to to fire her broadside long before there was any occasion. Owing to this the *Poursuivante*, touched by a shot, gained considerably in the chase, although the *Hercule* was evidently the faster sailer. Subsequently the *Hercule* filled and got within gun-shot, and a smart action ensued; but the British 74, owing perhaps to a dread of shoal water, managed so badly, that the French frigate effected her escape into Cape Nicholas-Mole.

The *Hercule* was a good deal damaged in her rigging and sails, and had a few men wounded, but none killed. A French account erroneously states, that the *Hercule* had 40 men killed and wounded, including among the former her captain. Captain Ferris, in fact, was at Jamaica, and the first lieutenant, as we have stated, was the acting commander. The *Poursuivante* had her masts, rigging, sails, and hull very much cut up, and lost six men killed and 15 wounded. Great credit was due to Captain Willaumez, his officers and crew, for the skill and spirit which they evinced upon the occasion. The *Poursuivante*, we believe, eventually reached Rochefort; but, as far as our researches go, this powerful frigate never afterwards went to sea. Having been built in a Dutch port, and that as long ago as the year 1794 or 1795, the *Poursuivante*, in all probability, was found to be rotten and unserviceable.

On the 30th of June, soon after daylight, as the *Cumberland* and *Vanguard* 74s, Captains Henry William Bayntun and James Walker, were cruising between Jean-Rabel and Cape Nicholas-Mole, a large ship was discovered steering down towards the last-named port. The two 74s immediately went in chase, and soon arrived up, the *Vanguard* on the starboard beam, and the *Cumberland* on the larboard bow, of the French 40-gun frigate *Créole*, Captain Jean-Marie-Pierre Lebastard.

After receiving a few shot from the *Vanguard*, and firing one in return, the *Créole* hauled down her colours. The frigate had quitted Cape-François the preceding day, and had on board General Morgan, the second in command at the island, and his staff, together with 530 troops, but only 150 seamen. Being a fine large frigate, the *Créole* was added in her own name to the 38-gun class of the British navy; but, owing in a great degree to the insufficient manner in which she was repaired at Port-

\* The Jamaica measurement of the *Mignonne* was 642 tons, but 500 was probably nearer the mark. See vol. iii., p. 49.

Royal dock-yard, the *Créole*, commanded by Captain Austin Bissell, foundered on her passage to England, and had it not been for the presence of other ships, would have consigned her officers and crew to a watery grave.

On the 2d of July the British 38-gun frigate *Minerve*, Captain Jahleel Brenton, grounded and was captured at the entrance of the harbour of Cherbourg. The circumstances under which this happened have been so fully detailed by Captain Brenton's brother, that we cannot do better than transcribe our contemporary's account.

"In the evening the *Minerve*, running close in with Cherbourg in a thick fog, mistook Fort de la Liberté for Pélée; and a number of vessels being seen to the eastward, the pilot assured the captain he might run amongst them without hesitation. The helm was accordingly put up for the purpose, when just as the ship was about to open her fire, she grounded, and the fog at the same time dispersing, discovered her to be in a very perilous situation. She was on the western Cone Head, about six furlongs from Fort de la Liberté, of 70 guns and 15 mortars; and one mile from the isle Pélée, of 100 guns, and 25 mortars, from both of which a fire almost immediately opened. This happened about nine o'clock in the evening. Captain Brenton, aware that strong and decided measures were necessary, and that the launch of a frigate was not calculated to carry out a bower anchor, immediately despatched his boats armed, to cut out a vessel from under the batteries, of sufficient capacity for the purpose; whilst the launch, with her carronade, should be employed in diverting the fire of two gun-brigs, lying in such a position ahead of the *Minerve*, as to annoy her greatly by a raking fire. The yawl, being the first boat in the water, was sent under the orders of the Honourable Lieutenant William Walpole, and the other boats were directed to follow as soon as ready; but the gallant officer, to whom the enterprise was intrusted, found his own boat sufficient. He proceeded under a heavy fire of round, grape, and musketry, and from her position close to the batteries, cut out a lugger of 50 tons, laden with stone for the works, and towed her off to the ship. Before the bower anchor could be placed in this vessel, it was necessary to clear her of her cargo, and that this might be done, without adding to the shoal on which the ship lay, she was veered astern by the ebb tide to the length of a hawser. Unfortunately, the moon shone with great brightness. The enemy's fire became very galling: the more so, as no return could be made but from the two fore-castle guns, those of the main deck having been all run close forward, for the purpose of lightening the ship abaft, where she hung. At 11 p.m. the lugger, being cleared, was brought under the larboard cathead, to receive the small bower anchor, and during this operation, was so frequently struck by the gun-brigs, as to keep a carpenter constantly employed in stop-



ping the shot-holes. By midnight all was ready; a anchor had been previously laid out for the purpose of war the lugger, but the moment the hawser became taut, it was shot away. Every thing now depended upon the boats, which were sent to take the lugger in tow, and succeeded, under a severe fire, in gaining their object, and the anchor was let go in a proper position. At three o'clock in the morning, the wind had entirely subsided, and the captain, almost hopeless of being able to save the ship, contemplated the probable necessity of being obliged to abandon her. With this view he caused the wounded men to be brought up and put into the lugger, destroyed his private signals, and prepared fires in the store-rooms, to be lighted at the last extremity. A fine breeze, however, springing up from the land, as the tide rose, revived the hope of saving the ship, and the wounded men were returned to the cockpit. The lugger's masts were soon after shot away by the guns of the batteries, over the gangway of the *Minerve*. At four, the captain was manned, and many of the crew were killed and wounded as they hove at the bars. At five, the ship floated, under the most heartfelt cheers of the crew. It was considered as a certainty, that in the course of two or three minutes they would be out of gun-shot of the batteries, and consequently out of danger; but this pleasing prospect soon vanished. The wind again declined into a perfect calm, and the last drain of the flood tide carried the now helpless ship into the harbour, and laid her upon a broken cone. In this situation she remained until the top of high water, when she surrendered, after sustaining the fire of the enemy for ten hours, and having eleven men killed and sixteen wounded.

"Such was the state of her masts that, had there been a moderate breeze, they must have gone by the board. She was lightened in the course of the day by the French, and got off. The capture of so fine a frigate at the commencement of the war, occasioned great triumph, and was announced in the theatre at Brussels, by Buonaparte in person; who, addressing the audience, stated the circumstance in the following terms: '*La guerre vient de commencer sous les plus heureuses auspices, une superbe frégate de l'ennemi vient de se rendre à deux de nos chaloupes canonnières.*' The ship was called the '*Canonnière*,' in order to support this despicable falsehood.

"Captain Brenton was detained a prisoner in France for two years and a half; many of his officers and men died in captivity. The greater part, suffering a barbarous imprisonment of eleven years, were not released till the tyrant was defeated on the plains of *Leipsic*, in 1814. A British sailor, who had both his legs while the *Minerve* lay under the fire of the batteries, was carried to the cockpit. Waiting for his turn to be dressed, he heard the cheers of the crew on deck, and eagerly demanded what they meant. Being told the ship was off the shoal, and

would soon be clear of the forts; 'Then down the legs!' exclaimed the poor fellow, and taking his knife from his pocket, he cut the remaining muscles which attached them to him, and joined in the cheers with the rest of his comrades. When the ship was taken, he was placed in the boat to be conveyed to the hospital; but determined not to outlive the loss of liberty, he slacked his tourniquets, and bled to death."\*

To this account we have only to add, that, among the gun-vessels which attacked the *Minerve* in her defenceless situation, were the two brigs *Chiffon* and *Terrible*, each armed with eight or ten heavy long guns. They, in fact, were the "*chaloupes canonnières*" alluded to in the French accounts. In capturing the *Minerve*, the French got back one of their own frigates; and they represent her, truly, we believe, to have mounted, including fourteen 32-pounder carronades and six nines on the quarterdeck and forecastle, 48 guns.

In the month of January, 1806, and not before, Captain Brenton was released from his captivity in exchange for Captain *Infernet*, of the *Intrépide*, taken at the battle of *Trafalgar*. At a court-martial subsequently held at *Portsmouth*, Captain Brenton, his officers, and surviving ship's company, were not only most honourably acquitted for the loss of the *Minerve*, but highly praised for their gallant defence of her.

On the 4th of July, in the evening, the British 38-gun frigate *Naiad*, Captain James Wallis, sent her boats, under the orders of Lieutenant William Dean, assisted by Lieutenant John Louis, Lieutenant of marines Robert Irwin, and Messieurs Gordon, Glenney, and Stewart, midshipmen, to cut out from among the rocks and shoals of the *Saintes* near *Brest* the French national schooner *Providence*, of two guns and 22 men and boys, Lieutenant Martres *Préville*, on her way from the foundry near *Nantes* to *Brest*, laden with heavy cannon, 36, 24, and 18 pounders, and some choice ship-timber. Notwithstanding all the difficulties they had to encounter in the rapidity of the tide, and the number of rocks and shoals with which the French schooner was surrounded and protected, the British boats brought her safely off, without the occurrence of the slightest accident.

On the afternoon of the 24th of July a heavy squall from the land induced the two French 74s in *Cape François*, the *Duquesne*, *Commodore Pierre-Maurice-Julien Querangal*, and *Duguay-Tronin*, Captain *Claude Touffet*, accompanied by the 40-gun frigate *Guerrière*, Captain *Louis-Alexis Beaudouin*, to put to sea, in the hope to be able to effect their escape to Europe. On clearing the harbour, the two 74s hauled to the westward, but not unseen by a part of the British blockading squadron; which then consisted of the four 74-gun ships *Bellerophon*, *Commodore John Loring*, and *Elephant*, *Theseus*, and *Vanguard*, Captains *George Dundas*, *John Bligh*, and *James Walker*.

At about 9 P. M., when darkness favoured the manoeuvre, the French ships separated, the Duguay-Trouin tacking to the eastward, while the Duquesne continued her course alongshore to the westward. The Elephant being the weathermost of the chasing ships, was ordered to tack after the Duguay-Trouin; while the commodore, in the Bellerophon, accompanied by the 18-pounder 32-gun frigates *Æolus* and *Tartar*, Captains Andrew Fitzherbert Evans and John Perkins, pursued the Duquesne. At about midnight the *Theseus* and *Vanguard* joined in the chase. On the 25th, at 7 A. M., the *Theseus* was detached, in consequence of a heavy firing being heard to the eastward. At 8 A. M. a brigand battery opened a fire upon the Duquesne, which she returned. The *Vanguard* and *Tartar*, towards noon, were fast coming up with the French ship; and at about 3 h. 30 m. P. M., after an exchange of several shot from bow and stern chasers, the Duquesne struck her colours. It appears that the French ship sustained no loss; nor did the British loss amount to more than one man killed and one wounded on board the *Vanguard*. The prize, a fine 74 of 1901 tons, was afterwards added to the British navy under her French name; but being, in the following year, carelessly run aground on Morant Keys, went to England only to be broken up.

The Elephant was not so fortunate as to make a prize of her chase. At daylight, when off Cape Picolet, Captain Dundas saw the Duguay-Trouin about a mile from him, and immediately wore in pursuit. At 6 A. M. the French 74 opened a fire from her stern-chasers, and hulled the British ship two or three times. Soon afterwards the Elephant gained a position upon the star-board quarter of the Duguay-Trouin, and there fired into her several distant broadsides. About this time the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Snake*, Captain William Roberts, made herself known in the north-west quarter; but the appearance of the *Guerrière* frigate to windward, or some other unexplained cause, prevented the Elephant from maintaining her position. The consequence was, that both the Duguay-Trouin and the *Guerrière* effected their escape. The Elephant had a few shot in her hull, and one in her bowsprit, and sustained some slight damage in her rigging and sails; but it does not appear that a single man on board of her was hurt.

The French 74 and frigate steered straight for Europe, and reached latitude  $46^{\circ} 40'$  north, longitude  $11^{\circ} 16'$  west, without any occurrence worth notice. On the 29th of August, in the afternoon when appear as that to the port to which they were bound, Ferrol, they fell in with the British 38-gun frigate *Beaulieu*, Captain John Maitland. The latter immediately made sail in chase, and before dark ascertained that the strangers were

On the 31st, at daybreak, the weather being foggy, the strange ships were not discernible. At 1 h. 30 m. P. M., however, the fog having dispersed, and the wind shifted from

west to east-north-east, the Duguay-Trouin and Guerrière again made their appearance, and were now so near as fully to discover that the largest and weathermost ship was a French 74.

This would have justified Captain Maitland in discontinuing the pursuit, except perhaps to watch the enemy's motions and endeavour to ascertain his route. Being aware, however, that French ships, singly and in small divisions, were coming from the island of St.-Domingo; and that they were mostly armed en flûte, and manned with a very sickly, as well as numerically inferior crew, Captain Maitland resolved to have some stronger proof that the two ships to leeward were not of that description. Accordingly the Boadicea stood on; and at 2 p. m., when passing at the distance of about a quarter of a mile, exchanged broadsides with the Duguay-Trouin. The fire from the latter, although ineffectual, indicated that the ship was fully armed; and the Boadicea found it necessary to make all sail to escape from her opponents so decidedly superior to her. The Duguay-Trouin and Guerrière, who was considerably to leeward of her consort, immediately wore round in pursuit of the British frigate; but finding, at 2 h. 50 m. p. m., that the Boadicea was gaining ground, the French 74 and frigate gave over the chase and hauled to the south-east.

It is stated, in a contemporary work, that the Boadicea brought down the Duguay-Trouin's foretopsail yard, and sent several shot between wind and water; and that, according to the testimony of a prisoner on board the 74, the latter was compelled to keep her pumps incessantly going for three days.\* With respect to the fall of the topsail yard, no notice is taken of it in the Boadicea's log; and the alleged damage to the hull of the Duguay-Trouin rests upon very questionable authority.

On the 2d of September the latter ship and her consort arrived off Cape Prior. Here they fell in with a British squadron, under Commodore Sir Edward Pellew. The only ship of this squadron, in a situation to chase with any effect, was the Culloden 74, Captain Barrington Dacres; and at about 11 h. 50 m. a. m. the latter commenced action with the Duguay-Trouin and Guerrière, both of whom were well to windward. The French 74, being the weathermost ship, got first into Corunna, the forts of which fired at the Culloden as she approached. With the frigate the latter kept up a running fight until 2 h. 30 m. p. m.; when, being almost in the jaws of the port, the British 74 was obliged to haul off. The Culloden had four men wounded; and the Guerrière, according to the French accounts, six men killed and 15 wounded, including among the latter her captain and first lieutenant. The frigate's masts and rigging were also much cut.

On the 11th of July, in the forenoon, as the British 18-gun brig-sloop Raccoon (16 carronades, 18-pounders, and two long

\* Marshall, vol. i., p. 845.

sizes\*), Captain Austen Bissell, was working between the islands of Guanda and St.-Domingo, she observed, and immediately bore up for, a French brig-corvette, lying at anchor in Leogane roads. The latter, which was our old acquaintance the *Lodi*, now reduced in force to 10 guns, 6-pounders, and 61 men, and commanded by Lieutenant Pierre-Isaac Taupier, placed springs on her cables, and prepared to repel the attack of the British vessel. At 3 h. 15 m. p. m., having anchored, with a spring on her cable, within 30 yards of the *Lodi*, the *Racoon* commenced the action. After a mutual cannonade of 30 minutes' duration, the French brig cut her cables, and began to make off; whereupon the *Racoon* cut also, and, following closely, compelled her opponent, at the end of 10 minutes more, to strike her colours. The *Lodi* was nearly unrigged by the *Racoon*'s well-directed fire, and sustained a loss of one man killed and 14 wounded. The *Racoon* had only one person wounded, master's mate Thomas Gill, whose left arm was carried away by a round shot.

On the 17th of August, at 1 p. m., the *Racoon*, cruising off San-Jago in the island of Cuba, in company with a prize-schooner, observed an armed brig coming alongshore; and who, soon afterwards, hauled her wind to speak a schooner which had been avoiding the *Racoon* since morning. At 3 p. m. the strange brig and schooner bore up together, under all sail, with a strong breeze. Captain Bissell stood off until certain of fetching them, and then made sail in shore. At 4 h. 15 m. p. m. the brig hoisted French colours, and fired a gun, still keeping within half a mile of the shore, under a press of sail. At 4 h. 20 m. p. m. she fired her broadside at the *Racoon*, and attempted to cross the latter's hawse; but the *Racoon*, although going eight knots through the water, put her helm hard a-port, and fired her broadside, which, as the two vessels were nearly on board of each other, brought down the French brig's studding-sails, topsails, &c. The latter then luffed up, ran on shore in a small rocky bay, and struck her colours. To avoid a similar fate, the *Racoon* hove in stays, and, on wearing round, discovered the breakers nearly under her stern. In about half an hour the French brig rehoisted her colours, and was repeatedly fired upon, in passing, by the *Racoon*. Towards sunset the former's mainmast went overboard, and the vessel fell on her beam-ends. As the French brig had landed boats full of armed men, and lined the shore, and the *Racoon* was 44 men short of complement, including her two lieutenants, Captain Bissell felt himself obliged to refuse the application of the master, Mr. James Thompson, to go, with a few picked men, and endeavour to burn the vessel. By morning

\* The *Racoon*'s carronades had originally been 32-pounders (see vol. ii., p. 369); but on March 2, 1800, these were ordered to be exchanged for 24s; and, on September 14, 1802, the latter were again exchanged for 18s. On this subject see vol. i., p. 409, note Y\*.

the latter had lost her remaining mast, and lay a perfect wreck, full of water.

On this occasion the *Raccoon* sustained neither loss nor damage. As to the name and force of his opponent, Captain Bissell says, "I have since learned her name is la *Mutine*, national brig, carrying 18 long 18-pounders, and was full of men from Port-au-Paix, bound to St.-Jago." Such a force for a brig has not been met with. The guns, if 18-pounders, must have been carronades, or, as is more probable, were long eights or sixes.

On the 13th of October, in the afternoon, the *Raccoon*, still commanded by the same enterprising officer, while cruising off Cumberland harbour in the island of Cuba, observed several vessels to windward coming close alongshore, all of which, before sunset, hauled in towards the harbour. Having heard of the evacuation of Port-au-Prince, Captain Bissell anchored in a small bay, in the expectation of seeing those vessels pass him in the night. Daylight on the 14th discovered eight or nine sail, a few miles to windward, nearly becalmed. The *Raccoon* instantly weighed, with a fine land wind, and proceeded in chase. At 6 h. 30 m. A. M. a brig, a schooner, and a cutter, all apparently full of men, hoisted French colours, and fired guns to windward. The brig attempted to get in-shore of the *Raccoon*, and her two consorts, with the assistance of their sweeps and boats, endeavoured to join her. The land breeze, however, carried the *Raccoon* within gun-shot of the brig; which, after receiving one or two broadsides, struck, and proved to be the *Petite-Fille*, French national gun-brig, having on board 180 troops, including about 50 officers of all ranks.

Scarcely had the *Raccoon* sent an officer and a small party of men to secure her prize, than the schooner and cutter, having got nearly within gun-shot, commenced firing. Calms and baffling winds prevented the *Raccoon* from getting nearer until 10 A. M., when the sea-breeze set in. At 11 A. M. the two vessels bore up together, evidently with a determination to board the *Raccoon*, the cutter steering for her bows, and the schooner hauling out to pass astern. The British brig shortened sail to receive her two opponents, but kept herself under sufficient command to counteract their design. When the assailants had arrived within pistol-shot, the *Raccoon* fired a broadside at the cutter, who speedily returned it with long guns and musketry. The *Raccoon* then wore round and fired her opposite broadside into the schooner; and so, alternately, maintaining a running fight, and preventing either from boarding. This mode of engaging lasted more than an hour, both schooner and cutter keeping up an incessant fire of musketry; nor was it until she had been literally beaten to a wreck, and had lost many men in killed, that the cutter struck her colours. She proved to be the *Amélie*, a national vessel, carrying four carriage-guns, with many swivels, and upwards of 70 troops.

Having taken possession of the cutter, the *Racoon* crowded sail after the schooner, the *Jeune-Adèle*, carrying six small guns, and 80 troops; and which vessel, on being approached within gun-shot and fired at, surrendered without further resistance. Standing in-shore to rejoin her first prize, the *Racoon* soon discovered that the Frenchmen on board, while the latter was engaging the cutter and schooner, had overpowered the prize-crew, and run the brig on shore among the rocks. Captain Bissell, however, got back his officer and men. The loss on board the cutter and schooner was about 40 in killed and wounded: that of the *Racoon* was only one person wounded, Mr. Thompson, the master, who in the early part of the action had received a violent contusion, which completely disabled him.

On the 14th of August, when in latitude 48° north, longitude 16° west, on her homeward voyage, the British East-India Company's ship *Lord Nelson*, Captain Robert Spottiswood, of 26 guns (20 long 18 and six long 12 pounders), and 102 men in crew, exclusive of passengers, was fallen in with by the French ship-privateer *Bellone*, of 34 guns, including 24 long eights on her main deck, and 260 men. An action ensued, and lasted an hour and a half, when the privateer succeeded in carrying her opponent by boarding, but not until the *Bellone* had been once repulsed, and the Indiaman sustained a loss of five men killed and 31 wounded. Placing an officer and 41 men in charge of the *Lord-Nelson*, the *Bellone* proceeded with her towards Corunna. On the 20th a British frigate chased the two ships, and would have retaken the Indiaman, had not the *Bellone*, trusting to her great sailing powers, led away the former. The *Lord-Nelson*, now alone, was attacked on the 23d by an English cutter-privateer, of fourteen 6-pounders; and the latter, highly to the credit of her officers and crew, maintained a two hours' action before she was beaten off.

On the 25th, at 1 P. M., in latitude 46° north, longitude 12° west, the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Seagull* (sixteen 24-pounder carronades and two sixes), Captain Henry Burke, discovered to leeward and chased the *Lord-Nelson*. At 5 P. M. the latter hoisted French colours, and fired a gun. At 7 P. M., the *Seagull* having got within gun-shot, an action commenced; which continued, with very slight intermission, until 6 A. M. on the 26th; when the brig, having received two shot between wind and water, had her masts and rigging much wounded and cut up, and her fore yard shot away in the slings, hauled off to refit. At 8 h. 30 m., just as the *Seagull*, having replaced her damaged rigging, was about to renew the action, a British squadron, of four sail of the line, under Captain Sir Edward Pellew, in the 80-gun ship *Tonnant*, hove in sight. By noon, or a little after, the *Colossus*, the advanced ship of Sir Edward's squadron, overtook and recaptured the *Lord-Nelson*. In her two actions, par-

ticularly in that with the *Seagull*, the *Indiaman* had received considerable damage in hull, masts, and rigging: her loss by the brig's fire has not been recorded. The loss, sustained by the *Seagull* amounted to two seamen killed, and seven seamen and one marine wounded.

On the 9th of September, at daylight, the British hired cutter *Sheerness*, of eight 4-pounders and 30 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant Henry Rowed, having the look-out on the French fleet in Brest harbour, observed, close in-shore, two *chasse-marées* stealing towards the port. Sending a boat, with seven men and the mate, to cut off one, the *Sheerness* herself proceeded in chase of the other, then nearly five miles distant, and close under a battery about nine miles to the eastward of *Bec du Raz*. At 10 A.M. it fell calm, and the only mode of pursuing the enemy was by a small boat suspended at the stern of the *Sheerness*, and which with difficulty would contain five men. Lieutenant Rowed acquainted the crew with his determination to proceed in this boat, and called for four volunteers to accompany him. Immediately John Marks the boatswain, and three others, came forward; and the boat with her five hands put off from the cutter, in chase of the *chasse-marée*, then about four miles off, and, by the aid of her sweeps, nearing the shore very fast.

After the boat had pulled for two hours, the *chasse-marée* was seen to run on shore under the above-mentioned battery, which stood within a stone's throw of the beach. Notwithstanding this, and that there were 30 French soldiers drawn up on the beach to protect the vessel, Lieutenant Rowed continued his pursuit; and, as he and his four followers laid the French *chasse-marée* on board on one side, her crew deserted her from the other. It was then that the soldiers opened a heavy fire of musketry upon the British, who had just commenced cutting the cable, and were using other means to get the vessel afloat. In order that the French soldiers might not see how to point their pieces, the British seamen, although there was not a breath of wind, hoisted the foresail; but of which the halliards, almost at the same moment, were shot away. Fortunately for the enterprising crew now on board the *chasse-marée*, the tide was flowing and aided their exertions: the vessel got off, and the boat commenced towing her from the shore. Fortunately, also, not a man of the five was hurt, although, as afterwards counted, 49 musket-balls, intended for them, had lodged in the side and the two masts of the *chasse-marée*.

Scarcely had the prize been towed a third of a mile, when a French boat, containing an officer and nine men, armed with muskets, and who had pulled up in the wake of the vessel unobserved by the boat ahead of her, suddenly made her appearance alongside. In an instant, and without waiting for any orders, John Marks, the boatswain, dropping his oar, and



neglecting to take any kind of weapon in his hand, leaped from the boat on board the *chasse-marée*; and, running to the side close off which the French boat lay, stood, in a menacing attitude, unarmed as he was, for at least half a minute, until his four companions, with a supply of muskets and ammunition, and who could only quit their ticklish boat one at a time, got to his assistance. If not astonishment at the sight, it must have been a generous impulse, that prevented the Frenchmen from shooting or sabring the brave boatswain; for they were, it seems, near enough to the vessel's side, to have done even the latter. Seeing that Lieutenant Rowed and his four men were determined to defend their prize, the French boat, after a feeble attempt to get possession, sheered off, the soldiers in her keeping up, for a short time, as they receded from the vessel, an ineffectual fire of musketry. The battery also opened a fire upon the *chasse-marée* as she was towing off; but it proved equally harmless with that from the soldiers, both on the beach and in the boat.

The capture of two unarmed *chasse-marées* (for the mate had taken his prize without any difficulty) would, indeed, be a trifling occurrence, were it not for the circumstances under which one of them had been boarded and brought off; circumstances that ennoble the act, and rank it above many which are blazoned in the Gazette, and yield to the parties both praise and promotion. The navy-list shows, that Lieutenant Rowed gained no step in his profession: indeed it was not, as the same document proves, until nearly ten years afterwards, that he was made a commander. As to the boatswain, he, it appears, on account of the very station he filled, and, by every account, so well filled, was, according to the etiquette of the service, excluded from the reward of promotion. It was only, therefore, from the Patriotic Fund at Lloyd's, that he could receive some testimony of the high opinion entertained of his services. Lieutenant Rowed himself made the application, founding it on the inability of the admiralty, without violating precedent, to provide for the "poor fellow; and who," adds his commander, and where was there a better judge? "exclusive of his bravery, is a very good character." The committee, it is believed, presented Mr. Marks with a handsome sum of money. Acts like this of Lieutenant Rowed and his four men (the names of all of whom we would record, did we know them) deserve to be made public, if only for the example they hold out, not of adequate reward certainly, but of the impunity which often accompanies the most hazardous attacks. Let him, therefore, who is disposed to calculate the chances of personal risk that may attend the enterprise in which he is called upon to embark, reflect upon the 49 musket-balls which were aimed at, and yet missed, Lieutenant Rowed and the four gallant fellows who were on board of this captured French *chasse-marée*.

On the 20th of September, at 5 P. M., the British hired cutter *Princess-Augusta*, of eight 4-pounders and 26 men, commanded by Lieutenant Isaac William Scott, being off the Texel, saw two schooners in the south-west, bearing down under British colours. The cutter, however, suspected them to be enemies, and cleared for action. At 6 h. 30 m. P. M. the schooner hauled down the English and hoisted Dutch colours. The largest, which was the *Union*, Lieutenant St.-Faust, mounting 12 guns, and stated to have had on board 70 men, hailed from to-windward, and then opened her broadside, which killed the cutter's gunner and boatswain, and mortally wounded Lieutenant Scott. The cutter was not slow in returning the fire, and successfully repulsed several attempts to board. Meanwhile the other schooner, the *Wraak*, Lieutenant Doudet, mounting eight guns, and manned with about 50 men, had ranged up under the cutter's lee, and now poured in her broadside. This schooner also made a vain attempt to board. After an hour's engagement, during which the large schooner's bowsprit was several times over the cutter's stern, the latter beat off both her opponents, with the additional loss of two seamen wounded, making a total loss of three, including her commander, killed, and two wounded.

In his dying moments, Lieutenant Scott recommended the master to fight the cutter bravely, and desired him to tell the admiral (Lord Keith) that he had done his duty. The lieutenant certainly had done so, in a manner that became a British officer; and Mr. Joseph Thomas, the master, fully acted up to his commander's injunctions: he, and the few hands about him, fought their vessel heroically, and by so doing brought her off in safety. The same Dutch newspaper, from which we have extracted the names of the two schooners, states, that the carpenter of the *Wraak* was killed, and her first lieutenant and several of her men badly wounded.

On the 9th of October, in the evening, the British 16-gun brig-sloop *Atalante*, Captain Joseph Ore Masefield, chased and drove on shore off the mouth of the river Pennerf, near St.-Guildas, two French ketches and one brig. The wind blowing directly off shore, Captain Masefield conceived it practicable to cut the vessels out; and accordingly, soon after dark, the six-oared cutter under Lieutenant John Hawkins, and the five-oared cutter under Mr. Richard Burstal, the master, were despatched upon that service, the *Atalante* standing in, as close as the shoals would permit, to protect them.

At 9 h. 30 m. P. M. the two boats reached the French vessels, when Lieutenant Hawkins, with his boat, boarded and took possession of the in-shore vessel, then fast aground within 120 yards of the beach; but the British could not succeed in getting her afloat, owing to a heavy fire of musketry from a number of troops drawn up on the beach, assisted by two field-pieces and a party of troops, which had previously embarked

from the shore on board of the other two vessels. Thus frustrated in his plan, the lieutenant cut the cable of the vessel, and then abandoned her to go to the assistance of his coadjutor in the other boat.

In the mean time Mr. Burstal, with a sergeant of marines and five other men, in defiance of a party of 10 soldiers armed with muskets and bayonets, had boarded and carried the French brig; but not until the former had killed six of the soldiers, hove two overboard, and drove the remainder, with the brig's crew, down her hatchway. Finding that this vessel, besides being light and of no value, was also fast aground upon a ridge of rocks, Lieutenant Hawkins, who had now joined his companion, contented himself with cutting the brig's cable; not thinking proper, from motives of humanity, to set the vessel on fire, as several people were heard below, supposed to be wounded. In this very dashing little exploit, Mr. Burstal's boat, in boarding the French brig, had one man killed and two wounded, the only loss sustained by the British.

On the 26th of October the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Osprey*, Captain George Younghusband, being off Trinidad, saw and chased a suspicious sail under the land. On arriving within four miles of the stranger the *Osprey* found herself becalmed, and at the same time discovered, from the number of sweeps rowed by her, that the vessel was a privateer. The *Osprey's* further progress being checked by the calm, Captain Younghusband despatched three boats, under the command of Lieutenant Robert Henderson, in the cutter, to attempt the capture of the schooner. The unequal speed of the boats being greatly in favour of the cutter, Lieutenant Henderson, apprehensive that if he waited for his companions the privateer would escape, continued to pull ahead, and at length, with his 17 seamen, in the bravest manner, under a heavy fire from the guns and musketry of the vessel, boarded and captured the French privateer-schooner *Ressource*, mounting four 4-pounders, with a crew of 43 men, of whom two were killed and 12 wounded. On board the cutter, Lieutenant Henderson and four seamen were wounded, one of the latter dangerously.

On the 27th of October the British 16-gun ship-sloop *Merlin*, Captain Edward Pelham Brenton, and 14-gun schooner *Milbrook*, Lieutenant Mauritius Adolphus Newton De Starck, discovered the French lugger-privateer *Sept-Frères*, of two carriage-guns and 30 men, commanded by Captain Pollet, endeavouring to get into Calais. Captain Brenton immediately despatched in pursuit of her the boats of the *Merlin*, under the orders of Lieutenant Henry Clement Thompson, who had already lost an arm in the service. Finding her retreat effectually cut off by the British boats, the lugger ran herself on shore about half a mile to the westward of Gravelines. In the evening the *Milbrook* stood in, and anchored within musket-shot of the *Sept-Frères*;

and, in the face of a heavy fire opened upon the schooner and the boats by some field-pieces brought down to the beach, the British totally destroyed the French lugger, without incurring any loss, although the Milbrook was several times struck by shot.

On the 3d of November, while the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Blanche*, Captain Zachary Mudge, was lying at an anchor off the entrance of Mancenille bay, island of St.-Domingo, the French cutter *Albion*, armed with two 4-pounders, six swivels, and 20 muskets, and manned with 43 officers and men, was discovered lying close to the guns of Monte-Christi, waiting to carry her cargo, consisting of 52 bullocks, to the relief of the garrison of Cape-François. As the cutter, notwithstanding her proximity to the fort, which mounted four long 24-pounders and three field-pieces, appeared to be assailable, Captain Mudge, on the same day, despatched the launch, barge, and two cutters, with 63 officers and men, under the command of Lieutenant William Braithwaite, to attempt cutting her out. The boats returned unsuccessful, not owing to any lack of zeal in officers or men, but to their having proceeded to the attack in open day, with the sea-breeze blowing right into the bay. The battery, in consequence, had begun early to fire at the boats, and soon convinced Lieutenant Braithwaite that, should he even succeed in capturing the cutter, it would, in the state of the wind, be impossible to get her from the shore without a great sacrifice of lives.

With more judgment, a night attack was determined upon, and Lieutenant Edward Nicolls, of the marines, volunteered, with one boat, to attempt cutting out the vessel. His offer was accepted; and on the evening of the 4th the red cutter, with 13 men, including himself, pushed off from the frigate. A doubt respecting the sufficiency of the force, or some other cause, induced Captain Mudge to order the barge, with 22 men, under the orders of Lieutenant the Honourable Warwick Lake, first of the *Blanche*, to follow the red cutter and supersede Lieutenant Nicolls in the command. The second boat joined the first, and, as soon as the two arrived abreast of the French cutter, Lieutenant Nicolls hailed Lieutenant Lake, and pointed her out to him; but the latter professed to disbelieve that the vessel in sight was the *Albion*: he considered that she lay on the opposite or north-east side of the bay, and with the barge proceeded in that direction; leaving the red cutter to watch the motions of the vessel, which Lieutenant Nicolls still maintained was the *Albion*, the object of their joint search.

It was now 2 h. 30 m. A. M. on the 5th, and the land wind was blowing fresh out of the bay. An hour or two more, and the day would begin to dawn, and the breeze to slacken, perhaps wholly to subside. The men in the boat were few, but their hearts were stout. In short the red cutter commenced pulling,

cautiously and silently, towards the French vessel ; the crew of which, expecting a second attack, had made preparations to meet it. As soon as the boat arrived within pistol-shot, the cutter hailed. Replying to the hail with three hearty cheers, the boat rapidly advanced, receiving in quick succession two volleys of musketry. The first passed over the heads of the British ; but the second severely wounded the coxswain, the man at the bow-oar, and a marine. Before the French cutter could fire a third time, Lieutenant Nicolls, at the head of his little party, sprang on board of her. The French captain was at his post, and discharged his pistol at Lieutenant Nicolls just as the latter was within a yard of him. The ball passed round the rim of the lieutenant's belly, and, escaping through his side, lodged in the fleshy part of his right arm. Almost at the same moment a ball, either from the pistol of Lieutenant Nicolls, or from the musket of a marine standing near him, killed the French captain. After this the resistance was trifling ; and the surviving officers and men of the French cutter were presently driven below and subdued, with the loss, besides their captain killed, of five men wounded, one of them mortally.

As yet, not a shot had been fired from the battery, although it was distant scarcely 100 yards from the cutter. Judging that the best way to keep the battery quiet would be to maintain the appearance of the Albion's being still in French possession, and able to repulse her assailants, Lieutenant Nicolls ordered the marines of his party to continue firing their muskets : the seamen, meanwhile, busied themselves in getting the vessel under sail. A spring having been run out from the cutter's quarter to her cable, and the jib cleared, the cable was cut, and the jib hoisted to cast her. At this moment the barge came alongside, and Lieutenant Lake took command of the prize. Scarcely had he done so, and the musketry by his orders been discontinued, when the battery opened a fire of round and grape, which killed two of the Blanche's people. However, the breeze being fair, and blowing moderately strong, the captured cutter, with two boats towing her, soon ran out of gun-shot, and without incurring any further loss, joined the frigate in the offing.

Cutting out an armed vessel is usually a desperate service, and the prize seldom repays the loss which is sustained in capturing her. The spirit engendered by such acts is, however, of the noblest, and, in a national point of view, of the most useful kind : its emulative influence spreads from man to man, and from ship to ship, until the ardour for engaging in services of danger, services, the repeated success of which has stamped a lasting character upon the British navy, requires more frequently to be checked than to be incited. An attack by boats upon an armed sailing vessel, as respects the first foot-hold upon her deck especially, may be likened to the "forlorn hope" of a besieging army ; great is the peril, and great ought to be the reward. So

the reward usually is, if the affair be represented in its true colours to the proper authority. The same officer, who, when about to transmit to his government the account of an engagement between his ship and another, fears saying too much, lest he should be chargeable with egotism, when, in the routine of his duty, he has to write about an act performed exclusively by his subordinates, enters minutely into the merits of the case, points out those who distinguished themselves, and separates, as well as he is able, the actual combatants from such as, by accident or otherwise, did not partake of the danger; well knowing that, without this act of justice on his part, promotion, honours, and other rewards, may light upon the undeserving, while he who fought and bled, he who, both planned and achieved the enterprise, may find himself passed over and neglected.

The captain of the *Blanche* had a fine opportunity, without detracting from the bravery of one party, to state the good fortune (call it nothing else) of the other. Here follows his letter to the admiralty: "Having gained intelligence that there was a large coppered cutter full of bullocks for the Cape, laying close under the guns of Monte-Christi (four 24-pounders and three field-pieces), notwithstanding her situation, I was convinced we could bring her off; and at two this morning she was masterly and gallantly attacked by Lieutenant Lake, in the cutter, and Lieutenant Nichols of the marines, in the barge, who cut her out. She is ninety-two tons burthen, coppered close-up and ~~fastened~~, with two 4-pounders, six swivels, and twenty muskets. This affair cost me two men killed, and two wounded."

The mistatements in this letter, now that the correct details are confronted with them, discover their importance; and it cannot be doubted, that Captain Mudge had a favourite whom he was determined to serve, no matter at whose expense. How came he not to name Lieutenant Nicolls among the wounded? It was not a scratch of his finger nor a graze of his shin, but a hole on each side of his body and a ball in his arm, that sent him bleeding to the *Blanche's* cockpit. Who would expect that, of the "two" men wounded, one was a commissioned officer? In every case, except this, the rank, if not the name, of the officer is stated in the official letter; and, in some letters, the smallest boy in the ship, if he has been wounded ever so slightly, may find his name in the returns. The name of Lieutenant "Nichols," however, as the commanding officer of one of the boats (not of "the barge"), entitled him, in the estimation of the committee at Lloyd's, to a second best claim upon their bounty; so that, when the Patriotic Fund presented Lieutenant Lake, "for his gallantry," with a sword valued at 50*l.*, they gave Lieutenant Nicolls one valued at 30*l.* Another quarter, equally deceived, promoted one officer, but, until a subsequent explanation at least, paid no attention to the claims of the other.

Between the two attacks upon the Albion, another boat-party from the *Blanche* captured, in a very gallant manner, a vessel of superior force. On the 4th, in the morning, the launch, armed with a 12-pounder carronade, and manned with 28 men, under the command of Mr. John Smith, master's mate, attacked, and after an obstinate conflict of 10 minutes boarded and carried, as she was coming out of the Caracol passage, a French schooner, mounting one long 8-pounder on a pivot, and manned with 30 men, of whom one was killed and five were wounded. The launch had one man killed and two wounded. The prize was a beautiful ballahou-schooner, and had on board a considerable quantity of dollars.

In his official letter, announcing the capture of this schooner, Captain Mudge says, "She is one of the finest vessels of her class I ever saw, and is fit for his majesty's service;" and, to show how ready he was, in some cases, to atone for his apparent neglect of a young officer, Captain Mudge in a postscript adds, "I have omitted mentioning the Honourable Frederick Berkley; but the only apology I can make is saying he behaved nobly, and was much to be envied."

A day or two after the affair of Mr. Smith, midshipman Edward Henry a'Court, with a marine and seven seamen, was despatched from the *Blanche* in the red cutter, to collect sand for the use of the ship. Although it had been ordered that youngsters, sent upon services of this kind, lest their pugnacious spirit should lead them into danger, were not to be allowed arms, the men in the boat, before they pushed off from the frigate, contrived to smuggle five or six muskets through the ports. It so happened that, in the dusk of evening, the boat fell in with a schooner, nearly becalmed. The midshipman and his little party of sanders unhesitatingly pulled towards her; and, as she had the appearance of a privateer, and might open a cannonade upon them, Mr. a'Court judiciously kept in her wake. Just as the boat had approached the stern of the schooner, a fire of musketry from the latter mortally wounded one man, and badly wounded another, of the boat-party. Mr. a'Court, nevertheless, pulled straight up alongside, and, with the assistance of his five remaining hands, boarded and carried a French schooner, bound to Cape-François, having among her passengers, a detachment of between 30 and 40 soldiers, commanded by a colonel, who had fought, bled, and distinguished himself, at the battle of Arcole. His wound was a fractured scull, and, upon the piece of plate that covered the denuded part, and which extended over a great portion of one side of his head, was engraven, in large characters, the word "Arcole."

When asked how he could surrender to so insignificant a force, the French colonel, with a shrug replied, that it was all owing to "le mal de mer;" and that, had he been on shore, the case would have been otherwise. Let that have been as it may,

the conduct of young a'Court evinced unparalleled gallantry, a considerable degree of judgment, and certainly both the officer and men in the boat deserved to have their names recorded for the bravery they had displayed.

No public mention was made by Captain Mudge of this affair, which is, we think, entitled to the publicity and the praise which we have endeavoured to render to a young, enterprising, and gallant officer.

On the 14th of November, while the British 74-gun ship *Blenheim*, Captain Thomas Graves, lay at anchor off the Diamond Rock, island of Martinique, intelligence reached her that the French privateer-schooner *Harmonie*, a vessel the most destructive to commerce of any in the Caribbean sea, had just put into the harbour of Marin in the bay of Sainte-Anne. The *Blenheim* immediately weighed, but, having a strong sea-breeze and lee-current to contend with, did not, until the morning of the 16th, arrive abreast of Marin. Having reconnoitred the harbour, the battery on each side of it, and that situated above the town, Captain Graves resolved to detach 60 seamen under Lieutenants Thomas Cole and Thomas Furber, and 60 marines under Lieutenants George Beatty and Walter S. Boyd, to attempt cutting out the privateer. The seamen in their boats were to attack the latter; while the marines were to endeavour to surprise, or in any event to storm, Fort-Dunkirk, a battery of nine guns, situated on the starboard side of the harbour, and the possession of which was necessary, to prevent the island militia from rendezvousing on Marin point, whence they could have much annoyed the British boats on their return.

Just as the party was about to proceed, the British 14-gun brig-sloop *Drake*, Captain William Ferris, accompanied by the hired armed cutter *Swift*, joined the *Blenheim*. Captain Ferris, having volunteered, was permitted to take the command of the expedition, and to add 14 of the *Drake's* seamen to the 60 from the *Blenheim*, making a total of 134 seamen and marines, officers included. All things being prepared, the boats with the seamen, towed by the *Drake*, and those with the marines, by the *Swift*, at 11 P.M., proceeded off the mouth of Marin harbour, about three miles from the entrance to which the privateer lay. By judiciously timing their departure from the ship, both parties arrived at the same instant at their respective destinations. The marines surprised the fort, took 15 prisoners, dismounted and spiked the guns, among which were six 24-pounders, destroyed the carriages, and blew up the magazine; but Lieutenant Beatty humanely spread the barracks, as, had they been set on fire, a large and ripe field of canes adjoining would inevitably have been destroyed.

The boats with the seamen passed the battery on the larboard side of the harbour undiscovered, but the privateer was upon her guard, and commenced a heavy fire on the British; who,



nevertheless, in the most prompt and gallant manner, boarded, and in a few minutes carried her. The seamen had one of their number killed and five wounded; the marines, although fired upon by two sentinels, had no one hurt. The *Harmonie*, mounting eight carriage-guns, with a complement of 66 men, had two of the latter killed and 14 wounded. The boats, accompanied by their prize, repassed the larboard fort, within musket-shot, but were so fortunate as to escape without further loss. In the conduct of this enterprise, much judgment as well as gallantry was evinced; without which, from the many obstacles opposed to success, the result might not have been so favourable.

On the night of the 10th of December the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Shannon*, Captain Edward Leveson Gower, in company with the 16-gun ship-sloop *Merlin*, Captain Edward Pelham Brenton, while standing across from Cape La Hève to Cape La Hougue, in a gale of wind from the south-south-west, was taken under the lee bow by the flood-tide, and carried up towards the river Isigny; "and, when the captain supposed himself to the northward of Cape Barfleur, he had that lighthouse bearing about north."\* The night was extremely dark and tempestuous, and the *Shannon*, about 8 p.m., struck the ground. The *Merlin* just then got a glimpse of the land in a flash of lightning, and instantly wore from it under her foresail and close-reefed main topsail. The *Shannon*, a fine new frigate of 881 tons (sister vessel to the *Tribune*), just launched, was totally wrecked: her officers and crew, fortunately, were all saved, but made prisoners by the French.

On the 16th, at 11 h. 30 m. A. M., Barfleur lighthouse bearing north half-west distant four leagues, the *Merlin* discovered her late consort the *Shannon* on shore under the batteries of Tatihou island. At 5 p. m., having approached quite near to the wreck, Captain Brenton despatched two boats manned and armed, under the orders of Lieutenants John Sheridan and Henry Clement Thompson, to endeavour to set fire to and destroy the frigate: a service which these officers effectually executed, without the loss of a man, although exposed to a heavy fire from the French batteries. About three years and three months after the loss of the *Shannon*, her late captain and officers, having returned to their country, were honourably acquitted of all blame by the sentence of a court-martial.

#### COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS.—WEST INDIES.

A renewal of the war brings us again to the round of successful operations against the colonies of the weaker maritime powers. On the 21st of June, at 11 A. M., Commodore Samuel Hood, with the 74-gun ships *Centaur* and *Courageux*, Captains

\* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 302.

Bendall Robert Littlehales and Benjamin Hallowell, and some smaller vessels, having on board a detachment of the British army under Lieutenant-general Grinfield, anchored in Chac-bay, Sainte-Lucie, for the purpose of reducing the island. Before 5 p. m., by the able disposition of Captain Hallowell, the whole of the troops were disembarked in good order. At 5 h. 30 m. p. m. the French outworks were driven in, and the town of Castries taken. The commandant of Morne-Fortunée, the principal fortress of the island, was then summoned to surrender. Brigadier-general Noguès refusing to do so, the works were stormed at 4 a. m. on the 22d, and at 4 h. 30 m. were carried, with a loss to the British army of 20 officers and men killed, and 110 wounded. What was the exact strength of the garrison, or the loss which the French sustained in resisting the assault, does not appear by the official despatches; but it is stated, to the credit of the British, considering the custom on such occasions, that not a Frenchman was hurt after possession of the place had been obtained.

On the third day after effecting this capture, the *Centaur*, accompanied by some smaller vessels containing a division of the troops, sailed from Sainte-Lucie to attack Tobago. On the 31st the expedition arrived off the island, and on the same day the troops, covered by a heavy fire from the ships of war, landed without loss. So rapid and so decisive were the movements of the British, that in the evening General Berthier commanding at Fort-Scarborough proposed a capitulation; which, by half past four the following morning, was acceded to, and the island of Tobago again became a colony of Great-Britain.

Previously to the end of September the Dutch colonies of Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, had also changed masters, with equal facility, and happily without bloodshed. In the river Demerara was captured the Batavian 14-gun corvette *Hippomenes*.

About the middle of June, which was almost immediately after the intelligence of the recommencement of hostilities reached the island of Jamaica, a squadron of ships sailed from Port-Royal, to cruise in the neighbourhood of St.-Domingo, and co-operate with the Black insurgents in freeing the island of the small remnant of French whom the scurvy and the yellow fever had yet spared, and who still retained possession of the line of posts on the sea-coast. Hitherto their ships had enabled the French to hold and provision these; but the British ships soon drove away or captured the former, and effectually shut up the ports against all succours and supplies from Europe or elsewhere.

By the end of October the only ports remaining in the hands of the French, in what was formerly the French part of the island of Saint-Domingo, were Cape-François and the mole of St.-Nicholas. At the latter port General Noailles commanded,

at the former General Rochambeau. Cape-François, besides being blockaded at sea by the British, was invested on land by the insurgents; and the French garrison had the additional misfortune of being reduced to a state bordering on famine.

Thus situated, General Rochambeau, on the 17th of November, proposed to Commodore John Loring, the commanding officer of the British blockading force, to evacuate the Cape, provided he and his garrison were suffered to go to France on board one or more of the ships of war in port. Such terms were of course rejected. The General then concluded a treaty with Dessalines, by which, in 10 days from the 20th of November, he was to evacuate the Cape and its dependencies, and to be allowed, himself, and his troops, and their baggage, to retire on board the French ships lying in the harbour. By the fifth day General Rochambeau had embarked his garrison, and hoped to escape the English squadron; but the latter was too vigilant to afford the former even an opportunity of making the attempt. On the 30th, the day on which the truce expired, the Negroes hoisted their colours upon all the forts, and began to prepare for sinking the French ships with red-hot shot, should they any longer delay their departure. To know the reason of this delay, Captain Loring had sent in Captain Bligh with a flag of truce; when, at a meeting between him and Captain Barré, the French naval commanding officer, a rough sketch of a capitulation, was drawn up and signed, and General Dessalines was induced to allow the French ships, with colours hoisted, to sail out of the harbour. They were then, after firing each a broadside in return to a shot discharged athwart their bows by one of the British ships, to haul down the French colours and surrender.

The 40-gun frigate *Surveillante*, accompanied by some smaller vessels, came out in this manner, and was taken possession of by the British; but the *Clorinde*, another 40-gun frigate, in her way out grounded upon the rocks under Fort St.-Joseph at the entrance of the harbour, and beat off her rudder. The frigate, in short, was in so desperate a situation, that the British boats, which had been detached to assist the French ships in getting out of the mole, were returning to the squadron, upon a supposition that no efforts of theirs could save the *Clorinde*. The ship, which was thus abandoned to her fate, had on board, besides a small crew of from 150 to 200 men, General Lapoype and 700 French troops, together with several of the officers' wives, their women-servants, and children; in all full 900 souls.

Among the boats of the squadron, employed upon the service just mentioned, was the launch of the *Hercule*, manned with from 30 to 40 hands, under the command of Acting-lieutenant Nisbet Josiah Willoughby. From slow-pulling, or from some other unexplained cause, retarded in her progress, the launch was among the rearmost of those boats. Anxious to rescue so many persons as were evidently on board the *Clorinde*, from the cer-

tain death that awaited them, either by perishing in the ship, or by being massacred, as was the execrable practice, on the shore; feeling it to be almost a stigma upon the character of the British navy not to make an effort to save human beings, political enemies especially, so critically circumstanced, Lieutenant Willoughby took upon himself the whole responsibility, and put back with his launch towards the grounded ship.

Finding, as he approached the *Clorinde*, that her side was crowded with men ready to spring into the first boat which came alongside, and knowing that his people, as well as those who entered the launch from the ship, would fall an immediate sacrifice, the lieutenant searched for, and with difficulty procured, a small punt. In this he embarked, directing the launch to lay off, and was soon on board the frigate; which he found heeling much and beating heavily. Despairing now of saving the ship, Lieutenant Willoughby yet resolved to put in practice every resource to save her numerous crew. As the most feasible plan which suggested itself, the lieutenant represented to General Lapoye that, as by the terms of the capitulation the French vessels of war were to haul down their colours when outside the harbour, it would not be a greater sacrifice of national honour, considering the situation of the *Clorinde*, if he did so immediately, and gave the frigate up to him. Lieutenant Willoughby would then, he said, hoist English colours, wait upon General Dessalines, and demand, not only that the British flag should be respected, but that, if assistance could not be procured from the shore, and the *Clorinde* should be lost in the night then fast approaching, the crew and passengers should be considered as prisoners to the British, and be protected until the commanding officer of the squadron had it in his power to send for them.

General Lapoye readily assenting to the terms proposed, the French flag was hauled down, and replaced by the British flag; and Lieutenant Willoughby immediately hailed the Haytian officer in command of Fort St.-Joseph, and expressed a wish to wait upon General Dessalines. Permission was granted, and Lieutenant Willoughby, after experiencing some difficulty in landing, obtained an interview with the Haytian general; who not only received the British lieutenant with great urbanity, but promised all that he requested. With the assistance thus obtained, and that of two or three more boats which had just joined from the squadron, and favoured by a sudden fall in the wind, Lieutenant Willoughby succeeded in heaving the *Clorinde* off the rocks! Thus, "to the uncommon exertions and professional abilities," as Rear-admiral Duckworth happily expresses it, of Acting-lieutenant Willoughby, was owing the preservation of more than 900 people's lives, and the acquisition to the British navy of a frigate which, with her late consort, the *Surveillante*, continued, for many years afterwards, to be one of the finest ships of the 38-gun class.

Having now no French force to blockade at Cape-François, Commodore Loring bore up for the mole of Saint-Nicolas, to treat with M. Noailles, the French general in command there. On the 2d of December a proposition to that effect was made; but the general declined acceding to the terms, alleging that he had provisions for five months, and would not surrender until the last extremity. The Bellerophon and squadron then proceeded with the prizes and prisoners to Jamaica. On the very night on which the blockade of the Mole was raised, General Noailles, having previously made his arrangements, sailed out of the port, with his garrison contained in seven small vessels, and arrived in safety at the island of Cuba. Among the French "*Victoires et Conquêtes*," recorded in a work bearing that title, is an extraordinary one performed by M. Noailles on his short voyage to Cuba. It seems that "*une corvette anglaise*," crossed the path of his brig (on what day or night is not stated), and hailed her, to know if General Noailles was on board. The French brig concealed her numerous crew, and, hoisting English colours, declared that she also had been sent to intercept the general and his garrison. The two vessels then steered in company; and, in the night, General Noailles, at the head of 30 grenadiers, leaped on board of, and after a short resistance carried, the "*corvette anglaise*." The conqueror proceeded with his prize to Havana, and died shortly afterwards of the wounds he had received in the action. Notwithstanding the grave manner in which this story is told, the British navy lost no "*corvette*," or even 4-gun schooner, by capture in these seas, in the year 1803.

Thus, by the departure of the last European garrison from the French part of the island of Saint-Domingo, were the negroes, after a long and sanguinary struggle, freed from their invaders. A part of the latter had previously escaped to the Spanish part of the island; and Generals Kerverseau and Ferrand, with a few troops, still occupied the cities of Santo-Domingo and San-Jago. According to a French writer, France, by her expedition to this island, lost 20 general officers and upwards of 40,000 men.\* This amount must include colonial troops, and some reinforcements which we have not been able to enumerate.

#### EAST INDIES.

It has already been stated that, on the 6th of March, a small French squadron, consisting of one 74, three frigates, and two transports, with a French governor-general and about 1350 troops on board, sailed from the road of Brest, bound to the East Indies, for the alleged purpose of taking possession of Pondicherry, ceded to France by the treaty of Amiens.† On the 28th

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xiv., p. 390.

† See p. 176.

of April, in a violent gale of wind, the *Belle-Poule* parted company from the squadron: and, although she called at Madagascar, this fast-sailing frigate anchored in Pondicherry road on the 16th of June, being the 102d day from her quitting Brest.

The *Belle-Poule* brought out a French colonel, appointed lieutenant-governor under M. Decaen; and who now, in pursuance of his instructions, called upon the commanding officers of the different factories to restore the settlement agreeably to the article in the treaty. Owing to the want of orders, or to the informality of the application, the latter declined giving up their charge; and thus matters remained, when, on the 5th of July, Vice-admiral Peter Rainier, with the 50-gun ship *Centurion*, Captain John Sprat Rainier, 74-gun ship *Tremendous*, Captain John Osborn, 64-gun ships *Trident* and *Lancaster*, Captains Thomas Surridge and William Fothergill, 44 en-flûte *Sheerness*, frigates *Concorde*, *Dédaigneuse*, and *Fox*, and ship-sloop *Victor*, from Bombay, partly in consequence of information from England representing that the peace was not very secure, anchored in the road of Cuddalore, situated about 20 miles to the south-west of Pondicherry. Consequently, when, on the morning of the 11th of July, Rear-admiral Linois, with the *Marengo* 74, and *Atalante* and *Sémillante* frigates, joined the *Belle-Poule*, Pondicherry and its dependencies still remained in the hands of the British.

Aware that his own and General Decaen's mission to the East had an object in view covertly inimical to British interests, the French admiral could well have dispensed with the presence of a British squadron; and yet no sooner had he anchored than he found himself overlooked by one, consisting of three sail of the line, a 50, and four or five smaller vessels. Two of the squadron, the *Trident* and *Victor*, at this time lay at anchor in Pondicherry road; and the remainder, including the flag-ship, in the road of Cuddalore. As soon as he observed the French squadron come to anchor, the British admiral got under way, and advanced nearer; and, on being joined by the *Trident* and *Victor*, who had weighed since noon, reanchored at 7 p. m. about midway between Cuddalore and Pondicherry roads. On the 12th, at 10 a. m., the French transport brig *Marie-Françoise* joined Admiral Linois, and at 6 p. m. the brig-corvette *Bélier*, with despatches from France. This vessel had quitted Brest ten days later than the *Marengo*, and, it was understood, brought out the substance of the king of England's message to his parliament of March 8; with directions to M. Linois to repair instantly to the Isle of France, there to get his ships, already armed and manned on a war establishment, refitted and provisioned, and expect every day to receive an order to commence hostilities against the English. This appears to have been the substance of these despatches, but their full contents have not transpired. The instructions put into the hands of M. Decaen when he sailed from France, and which appear to have been

drawn up by Napoléon himself, afford indubitable proofs of his bad faith towards England, particularly as regarded her Indian possessions.\*

It was not many hours before the arrival of the *Bélier*, that Captain Joseph-Marie Vignaud, of the *Marengo*, accompanied by the French admiral's nephew, had paid a visit to Vice-admiral Rainier, for the purpose of inviting the latter to breakfast on the following morning with M. Linois. The invitation was accepted, and the 16-gun ship-sloop *Rattlesnake*, which had just joined the squadron, was ordered to be ready to convey Vice-admiral Rainier to the anchorage of the *Marengo* and her consorts. But, whether it was owing to the peremptory nature of his orders, or that he feared their warlike tenour might escape, and he and his ships be detained by the British admiral, the French admiral, at midnight, unseen and unheard, slipped his cables, and, with the transport-brig *Marie-Françoise*, put to sea under all sail.

At daydawn on the 13th, to the surprise of the British, nothing was to be seen of M. Linois and his ships, either in the road, where he had left his anchors, and even the longboats of his ships fast at their grapnels, or as far as the eye could stretch in the offing. In the course of the morning the principal part of the British squadron got under way and set sail for Madras; but the admiral, with the *Centurion* and one or two of the smaller ships, remained at the anchorage. On the same evening the French transport ship *Côte-d'Or*, with 326 troops on board, anchored in Pondicherry road; and, at noon, the *Centurion* and *Concorde* got under way and anchored close to her.

On the 15th, at daybreak, the *Belle-Poule*, who had separated from her squadron and since been to Madras, appeared off the road, in company with the *Terpsichore* frigate. The latter cast anchor; but the *Belle-Poule*, after making some signals to the transport, stood away to sea. At 11 p.m. the *Côte-d'Or* weighed and dropped out of the road, and in half an hour the *Terpsichore* was under all sail in chase of her. On the 16th, at daylight, the *Terpsichore* hailed the transport, and ordered her to return, but the French ship refused. On this the frigate fired a few shot, when the *Côte-d'Or* hauled down her colours, and quietly accompanied the *Terpsichore* back to the anchorage. On the 24th, in the forenoon, the French transport was allowed to sail, attended by the British frigate *Dédaigneuse*, to see that she went nowhere else but to her alleged destination, the Isle of France. On the same day, at 8 p.m., Vice-admiral Rainier weighed and steered for Madras, where he arrived on the following morning. Shortly afterwards the *Dédaigneuse* also arrived, having seen the French transport as far on her way to the Isle of France as the latitude of 1° 50' north.

\* See p. 176, and Appendix, No. 22.

The message of the 8th of March, considered every where as the signal of the approach of war between England and France, reached Madras on or about the 5th of July. It is probable that the intelligence was communicated to Admiral Rainier by the *Terpsichore*. At all events, in a week or two after the admiral's arrival at Madras, the British ships began taking on board their war-stores. It was not, however, until the 3d of September, that the king's message of the 16th of May, which was tantamount to a declaration of war, reached that settlement; nor until the 13th of September, that the news of the actual commencement of war arrived at Fort-William. The intelligence had been received at Bombay on the 21st of August; where, two days afterwards, arrived the board of admiralty's directions for the conduct to be pursued by Vice-admiral Rainier, and which could not well have reached him at Madras earlier than the first week in September.

Rear-admiral Linois, with his squadron, arrived at the Isle of France on the 16th of August; and, about the latter end of the succeeding month, the French 20-gun corvette *Berceau*, it is believed, brought out the news of the war. On the 8th of October (why he deferred sailing till then does not appear) the French admiral, having detached the *Atalante* on a special mission to Mascat, a Portuguese settlement in Arabia-Felix, put to sea with the *Marengo*, *Belle-Poule*, *Sémillante*, and *Berceau*. The ships retained on board a portion of the troops they had brought from France, and with which they were now proceeding to reinforce the garrisons of the Isle of Réunion, or Bourbon, and of the city of Batavia, the capital of Java.

In the early part of his voyage M. Linois had the good fortune to fall in with and capture several richly-laden English ships; and, on making Sumatra, he resolved to pay a visit to the road of Bencoolen, a British settlement upon that island. A pilot belonging to the port, mistaking the *Marengo* for, what by her colours she appeared, an English man of war, went off to her, and anchored the French squadron just out of range of a battery which commanded the road. Meanwhile the merchant vessels, having discovered the true character of the strange ships, had cut or slipped and proceeded to Sellabar, a small port about two leagues to the southward of Bencoolen. They were soon followed by the *Sémillante* and *Berceau*, but not in time to prevent six of the vessels from being burnt, and two others run on shore, by their crews. The French burnt the two vessels that were aground, also three warehouses filled with spice, rice, and opium, and carried off a ship and two brigs, richly laden; but not with entire impunity, as the *Sémillante* had two men killed by a shot from the shore. Having performed this exploit, the French squadron set sail, and on or about the 10th of December anchored in the road of Batavia.



## BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

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BETWEEN the second abstract of the present and the same of the preceding war,\* there appears, in the sea-service commission-column, a diminution of no fewer than 10 line-of-battle ships. This arose chiefly out of the extensive plan of reform, projected by the first lord of the admiralty, and since put in practice with all the vigour and perseverance which characterised the proceedings of the gallant earl. Many old and useful officers, and a vast number of artificers, had been discharged from the king's dock-yards; the customary supplies of timber, and other important articles of naval stores, had been omitted to be kept up; and some articles, including a large portion of hemp, had actually been sold out of the service. A deficiency of workmen and of materials produced, of course, a suspension in the routine of dock-yard business. New ships could not be built; nor, and a very serious misfortune it was, could old ones be repaired. Many of the ships in commission, too, having been merely patched up, were scarcely in a state to keep the sea.†

On the other hand, much fraud and peculation was put a stop to; many thousands of pounds were saved to the country; and, if some suffered who had done no wrong, others gained, who had long had their rights withheld. In short, Earl St.-Vincent, by his measures for reforming the civil branches of the British navy, did much temporary evil; but he also did much permanent good.

A reference to the proper lists will give the names of the purchased enemy's line-of-battle ships and frigates,‡ also of the British ships captured or otherwise lost during the year 1803.§ Any thing further deserving notice in No. 12 Abstract will be found in the notes belonging to it.

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstracts Nos. 12 and 2.

† See p. 185.

‡ See Appendix, No. 23.

§ See Appendix, No. 24.

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year, was,

Admirals . . . . .	41
Vice-admirals . . . . .	32
Rear-admirals . . . . .	50
"            superannuated	23
Post-captains . . . . .	673
"            "            "	11
Commanders, or Sloop-captains . . . . .	409
"            superannuated	48
Lieutenants . . . . .	2457
Masters . . . . .	541

And the number of seamen and marines, voted for the year 1804, was 100,000.\*

As soon as the commerce of France began to suffer from the vigilance and activity of British cruisers, the war acquired among the French, those especially who were engaged in trade and resident along the coasts of the Channel, a truly national character. The conduct of some of the king's ships, in firing upon small towns and defenceless places upon the French coast, excited in the inhabitants a strong feeling of indignation; and some of the London journals betrayed a very ill taste when they extolled such exploits. It was this hostile spirit against the English that induced the first-consul, amidst his many plans for a vigorous prosecution of the war, to prefer that plan which had for its basis a descent upon the island that held him at defiance; as if resolved, by a single campaign, to verify the assertion which he had publicly made, that England, unsupported, could not withstand the power of France.

To assemble an army of med sufficient for the purpose, even though it should amount to 160,000 men, was not very difficult in a country that could boast of a population of thirty millions; nor, with so much manual strength at command, and such high-wrought zeal in the cause, was the construction of 2000 prames, gun-vessels, and flat-bottomed boats, to contain that army, an inexecutable task. But some doubt existed, even in France, about the practicability of getting this formidable armament across the 20 or 30 miles of sea, which so provokingly flowed betwixt it and its destined shore. However, as it was with the reflecting, and not with the labouring, class of society, that any such doubt existed, the work of preparation still went on, and that with all the enthusiasm for which the French are so celebrated. Almost every department in the state voted a ship of the line, each of the larger villages a frigate, and every commune gave its prame, gun-vessel, flat-bottomed boat, or péniche. Vessels for the flotilla were constructing, not only in the great naval

ports and in the small harbours along the coast, but upon the banks of every river that contained more than three feet of water; no matter whether that river emptied itself directly into the ocean, or first united its waters with those of the Seine, the Loire, the Garonne, or the Rhine. Even Paris became, for a time, a maritime arsenal: two slips were erected there, and many vessels of the small kind were launched from them. A due share of attention was also bestowed upon vessels of a more warlike class. At Anvers, or Antwerp, on the river Scheldt, for the first time during a great many years, the keels of ships of the line were laid down. The dock-yards of Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, and Toulon, also displayed the new-laid keels of several ships of force and magnitude.

Our attention must now be directed to what is going on at the first of the four last-named ports. At the close of the preceding year, the port of Brest was left, owing to the extreme severity of the weather, without a blockading force. Before, however, the new year was many days old, a favourable change enabled Admiral Cornwallis to regain his station off Ushant, and to assemble, by the 12th of January, 13 of his ships. Three or four more subsequently joined. Such had been the exertions in Brest harbour during the winter months, that, by the latter end of April, 17 sail of the line, including two three-deckers, lay at anchor in the road, ready for sea.

The first day of the following month gave birth to a set of directions, framed by Napoléon himself, for the improvement of his fleet in Brest water. He begins by complaining, that the enemy should be permitted, with a small number of vessels, to blockade so considerable a fleet as the one at anchor in that port. He orders that the ships shall get under way every day, as well to exercise the crews, as to harass the British, and favour the passage of the flotilla coming from Audierne; that 200 soldiers shall be placed on board each ship of the line; and who, besides being exercised at the guns and about the rigging and sails, are to row in the ship's launch. Premiums are to be given to those who excel in these matters; and nothing that can excite the emulation of either soldiers or sailors appears to have been overlooked. Every ship of the line is to be provided with a quantity of 36-pound shells for her lower battery, and the men are to be taught how to fire them off with effect. The captains are ordered not to quit their vessels to go on shore, and even the commander in chief is not allowed to lodge elsewhere than on board his ship.\*

About ten days after the date of Napoléon's directions to the minister of marine, Vice-admiral Decrès, two sail of the line from the other harbour joined themselves to the 17 already at anchor in the road. It does not appear, however, that any movement of consequence took place among the ships; either because

\* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 195.

the first-consul's attention was too much engrossed by the new dignity he was about to assume, of that he required the presence of the fleet to assist in giving *éclat* to the imposing ceremony, which, on the 14th of that same month of May, made him Emperor of France.

Even after the bustle of this business was over, the Brest ships remained at their moorings until the 25th of July, when, encouraged by a fine wind at east-north-east and a thick fog, the advanced squadron, of five sail of the line and two or three frigates, got under way, and stood for the passage du Raz. A sudden return of clear weather, however, enabled the British look-out cutter to discover and make a signal of the circumstance. Immediately Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Graves, commanding the in-shore squadron, proceeded in chase; but the French ships, in the mean time, had hauled to the wind, and were working back to Brest road. No second attempt to escape, of which the British outside were aware, was made during the remainder of the year; although, as will presently appear, an expedition of the utmost consequence had been designed to quit Brest before the end of November.

The number of ships of the line, at this time ready for sea in Brest road, was 22; exclusive of the *Océan* three-decker, repairing in the docks, but expected soon to be afloat, the shipwrights having been ordered to work at her by torchlight. This fleet was now under the command of Vice-admiral Ganteaume. A curious circumstance had led to the expulsion of this officer's predecessor. When, in the month of May, the officers of the Brest fleet were called upon to put their signatures to a note for conferring the imperial dignity upon Napoléon, Vice-admiral Truguet, true to his republican principles, refused to sign the paper. He wrote to Buonaparte, assigning his reason; and, to show his readiness to perform his duty against the enemies of the nation, made use of the following laconic expression: "*Un mot, et l'armée est à la voile.*" Napoléon, feeling himself personally offended, removed the admiral from his command, dismissed him from being a member of the council of state, and ordered his name to be struck out of the list of the legion of honour.

The directions given by Napoléon to his minister of marine were, that the Brest fleet of 23 (the *Océan* included) sail of the line, under Vice-admiral Ganteaume, with from 30,000 to 40,000 troops on board, under General Augereau, should quit port at the first opportunity that might occur in the month of November, proceed to Lough-Swilly bay in the north of Ireland, and there disembark the men. Should any difficulty arise, the coast of Scotland was to receive the troops. Vice-admiral Ganteaume was then to call off the Texel, and, bringing away with him the seven Dutch sail of the line and transports with 2500 troops on board in that harbour, make his appearance before Boulogne. The 30 sail of the line, by this means assembled, added to the

20 sail under M. Villeneuve approaching from off Rochefort, would, it was considered, be sufficient to cover the grand flotilla, and enable it to fulfil the ultimate object of all the expeditions on foot, a disembarkation of its host of troops on the shores of England; and which, it was at last discovered, could not be accomplished without the powerful aid of the larger vessels. The year 1804, however, was not destined to witness the attempt, much less the execution, of this gigantic, and, in the opinion of most persons, impracticable undertaking.

Before we proceed, as is now our intention, to narrate the different engagements which, during the present year, ensued between the British cruisers and the French flotilla, prepared or preparing for the invasion of England, some account of the vessels of that flotilla, and of the ports in which they were assembling, will free the subject from much of the obscurity that must otherwise attend it. The armed vessels of the flotilla were divided into five or six classes. It will suffice to describe the prame, and the gun-vessel, or canonnière. The prame was a remarkably strong-built vessel, measuring in her extreme length about 110 French feet, and 25 in breadth, and drawing from seven to eight feet water. She was rigged as a ship, and carried 12 long 24-pounders, with a crew of 38 sailors, and upwards of 100 soldiers, the majority of them, from daily practice, as useful on shipboard as the sailors themselves. Of these prames, or corvettes, 20, each with stalls for 50 horses, were ordered to be constructed; but the number was afterwards greatly augmented.

The first-class gun-vessels, rigged as brigs, were usually armed with three long 24-pounders and an 8-inch mortar, and the second class, with one 24-pounder forward, and a field-piece abaft; some rigged as schooners, and some as luggers. Of these two classes between 600 and 700 were constructed; and, of a smaller and lighter class called "*péniches*" (rigged chiefly as *schuyts*), about 400. The gun-vessels, as well as the prames, were afterwards increased in number; so that the armed vessels of the flotilla amounted to 1339, and the transports to 954; total 2293 vessels. The naval commander-in-chief of this numerous flotilla was Vice-admiral Eustache Bruix, having as an assistant, on account of ill health, Rear-admiral Jean-Raimond Lacrosse, a brave and intelligent officer, and the same, it will be recollected, who commanded the *Droits-de-l'Homme* at the time of her loss.

The ports of reunion for the flotilla were seven; Ostende, Dunkerque, Calais, Ambleteuse, Vinnereux, Boulogne, and Etaples. Boulogne, as being situated directly in front of, and only about 12 leagues distant from, the low land between Dover and Hastings point, was made the main dépôt, or capital. The grand project of invasion was thought of, Boulogne had a worthless harbour, formed by the estuary of the river Laine, and nearly dry at low water, with only one quay. In a short time both banks of the river were lined with quays;

moles were constructed, a capacious basin dug, and a bridge thrown across the river. By means of a dam the waters were confined, and the vessels kept afloat; and, to prevent any annoyance on the part of the British, immense batteries were erected at all the commanding points. As a still further protection against a bombardment, a strong line of heavy gun-vessels was moored across the road; which, by nature, was difficult of approach, on account of the numerous shoals and sand-banks in its vicinity. Vimereux, situated about a league to the north-east of Boulogne, was actually formed into a port expressly to receive the flotilla; and the harbour of Ambleteuse was deepened and enlarged, to answer the same purpose. A glance at the chart of this coast will show how difficult the whole of these ports are of access on account of the sands. No vessel, indeed, beyond a gun-brig in size, can approach near enough to do any execution. The tides, too, which cross each other in an extraordinary manner, are very serious obstacles in the way of a bombarding force.

Corresponding exertions were making on the opposite side of the Channel. An immense number of small vessels, armed each with one or two heavy long guns, were stationed at the Nore and at all the most assailable parts of the English coast; as were also several large armed ships, mounted with heavy carronades, and which ships, although not in a state to go to sea, answered perfectly well for floating-batteries. Mortella towers were also erected along the coast; and an immense army, composed of regulars, militia, and volunteers, were ready, on the first summons, to rush to the point of danger. In mid-channel and along the French coast, British cruisers were constantly on the watch, ready to blaze away upon the vessels of the flotilla, the instant they showed themselves outside the sands and batteries by which they were protected. The commander-in-chief on the Downs station, Admiral Lord Keith, had this important service under his immediate direction; and several enterprising officers had the command of flying squadrons, that cruised close along the French coast.

On the 20th of February, in the morning, the British hired cutter *Active*, of six small guns and about 30 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant John Williams, being off Gravelines, discovered, within three quarters of a mile of the shore, 16 sail of French gun-boats and transports running from Ostende towards Boulogne. In spite of the great disparity of force, Lieutenant Williams gallantly gave chase; at 10 h. 30 m. A. M. commenced a running fight with the flotilla; and at 11 A. M. compelled the outermost vessel, a horse-transport, to haul down her colours. The delay in taking possession of the *Jeune-Isabelle* enabled the other vessels to get under the protection of the batteries, before the *Active* could again make sail in pursuit.

On the 8th of May, at daybreak, the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Vincejo*, Captain John Wesley Wright, (18-pounder carronades, with a crew on board of 51 effective men and the extraordinary number of 24 boys), having been becalmed close to the mouth of the river Morbihan, coast of France, was carried by the ebb-tide, in less than an hour, so near to the Teigneuse rock, that she was forced to anchor to avoid running upon it. Having sounded, the brig weighed and warped herself into the fair channel, still baffled in her manœuvres by a calm and a strong tide directly against her. While in this situation, sweeping with all her strength to get clear of the coast, a flotilla of 17 armed vessels was rowing towards her from the Morbihan; consisting of six brigs, first-class gun-vessels, with three guns, one 24 and two 18 pounders, and from sixty to 80 men each; six luggers, second class gun-vessels, two guns, 18-pounders, with from 40 to 50 men each; five luggers, third class gun-vessels, one brass 36-pounder carronade throwing shells, and from 20 to 30 men each; total, 35 guns (of which 30 were long 18 and 24 pounders), and from 700 to 800 men, commanded by Lieutenant Laurent Tourneur.

By 8 h. 30 m. A. M., having advanced within extreme range, the gun-vessels began to open their fire. They continued gaining rapidly upon the brig until 9 h. 30 m.; when they had approached so near, that the *Vincejo* was obliged to sweep her broadside to and engage, under the additional disadvantage that her few men were fatigued by hard labour at the oar, and divided during the action between the larboard guns and the starboard sweeps. The *Vincejo* maintained this unequal contest for nearly two hours, and that within grape and hailing distance. The brig's hull, masts, yards, and rigging had at length received great damage: three guns were disabled; and, owing to the booms having fallen upon the main deck (the brig having a quarterdeck like the *Port-Mahon*), and the loss, out of her small effective crew, of two men killed and 12 wounded, including Captain Wright himself, in the groin (but who would not quit the deck), the fire was reduced to one gun in about five minutes. Thus situated, the *Vincejo* had no alternative but to strike her colours.

The loss sustained by the flotilla could never be ascertained; but, from the marks of blood on board the brig to which the prisoners were first carried, and the evident damage done to several of the vessels, not a doubt was entertained as to its severity. A highly exaggerated account of this action appears in a French work, in which the little *Vincejo*, described as "une forte corvette," is associated with "un longre anglaise," and the French force is reduced to "quatre canonnières."

The subsequent mysterious death of Captain Wright in the Temple at Paris struck all Europe with horror. Although the

\* *Victaires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 33.

affair is still involved in doubt, it is but justice to state, that Napoléon has strenuously denied having offered any violence to the person of this gallant British officer.\* Among the papers discovered at Captain Wright's death, and restored by the present French government to Sir Sidney Smith, under whose auspices, it will be recollected, Captain Wright, when a lieutenant of the *Tigre*, had greatly distinguished himself, was a narrative of the circumstances of the *Vincejo's* capture, drawn up for the needless purpose of justifying her officers and crew from the charge of pusillanimity advanced by the hireling press of France. To show how differently the actual antagonists of the British brig thought of her behaviour in the action, we have only to subjoin the speech of Lieutenant Tourneur upon receiving Lieutenant Wright's sword: "Monsieur, vous avez noblement défendu l'honneur de votre nation, et la réputation de votre marine. Nous aimons et estimons les braves, et l'on vous traitera, vous et votre équipage, avec tous les égards possibles."

Having, like a ship-sloop, a detached quarterdeck and fore-castle with barricades and portholes, and being on account of the smallness of her ports and the spaces between them, pierced for 10 guns of a side on the main deck, the *Vincejo* appeared to be a much more formidable vessel than she really was. In point of size, being only 277 tons, she was not much larger than a French gun-brig, and, in point of armament, not nearly so effective. All this was made known to the commanding officer of the French gun-boats, by two deserters from the brig a few days before her capture. The surprise is, that a vessel, so poorly armed and manned as the *Vincejo*, should have been sent alone to cruise in waters where she was so likely to be assailed by a tenfold superior force. Captain Wright, it appears, made frequent complaints of this nature to Admiral Lord Keith; but the latter took an effectual way of silencing them: he menaced the enterprising young officer with his displeasure.\*

The following portion of Captain Wright's narrative will show, as well the effect produced upon his mind by the statements circulated in France to his disadvantage, as the species of daring service in which he had employed the *Vincejo* for some weeks previous to her capture; a capture of the importance of which the French government were so fully sensible, that they promoted Lieutenant Tourneur on the spot to a capitaine de frégate.

"Had it ever occurred to me," says Captain Wright, "that blame could in any manner attach to my conduct, under the closest scrutiny of a court composed of my brother officers, famed for the severity of their criticism on all that concerns the honour of the country and the reputation of the navy, and who are at least as good judges as the enemy, of the risks that a

\* See O'Meara's *Napoléon in Exile*, vol. i., pp. 340, 449; and vol. ii. pp. 24, 182, 215.

† *Naval Chronicle*, vol. xxxv., p. 450.



brave and enterprising officer ought reasonably to run in performing the king's service; I confess that I should more readily have anticipated a charge of temerity than a censure of pusillanimity. If, with, I may fairly assert, as ill manned a ship as ever sailed from England, a station was maintained singly, with very little interval, for three months, without a pilot, within the enemy's islands, in the mouth of their rivers, in the presence of an extremely superior force continually in motion; if his convoys, attended by this force, were as often chased, forced out of their course, and obliged to take shelter in ports they were not destined for; if that very weak and inefficient ship's company was, in that time, by unremitting attention and exertion, brought to such a state of discipline as gave me sufficient confidence to wait for, and chase into her own ports, an enemy's ship, in all respects greatly superior to the brig I commanded; if lying to a whole day in the enemy's road at the mouth of a river, bidding defiance to two brigs, each of nearly equal force with the *Vincejo*, a schooner, and 50 sail of armed gun-boats, brigs and luggers, all under way, and occasionally laying their heads off the land, but keeping close to their batteries; if, after having got ashore in the mouth of a river, within grape-range of the batteries, I had, I may well be permitted to say, the audacity to unrig the *Vincejo*, get her guns out, and haul her high and dry into an enemy's port in a small island, between Belle-Isle and the Main, within four miles of the continent, to examine her keel and repair her damage, making preparations in the mean time to fight a land battle, in case of a very probable attack, protected only by the presence of a frigate for a day or two; if taking and running on shore several of the enemy's vessels under the batteries, in sight of the above force; if unreeving and reeving double all my running rigging that was susceptible of it, and almost entirely rigging my ship anew, as much to increase my mechanical purchases, to supply the deficiency of hands in working her, as promptly to make sailors of my landmen and boys, with whatever circumstances may be added to this catalogue, from my public account of the action, and the testimony of my immediate captors, be proofs of want of energy, bravery, intelligence, and seamanship, it must be acknowledged that I ought to take my place among arrant cowards and incorrigible lubbers.\*

Owing to the great preparations making in Flushing, Helvoet, and Ostende, these ports were narrowly watched by a British force placed under the orders of Commodore Sir William Sidney Smith, in the 50-gun ship *Antelope*; whose accustomed anchorage was near the north-east extremity of the Schonevelde channel, about six leagues west-north-west, or thereabouts, of Flushing, and rather more than the same distance, in nearly a south-south-west direction, from Ostende. The following was the plan adopted for a quick

\* *Naval Chronicle*, vol. xxxv. p. 445.

communication of intelligence. One vessel took her station within view of distant signals (flags as large as ensigns, expressing their import, not by colour, but by number and position) from the commodore's ship; and the vessel or vessels close off the enemy's port, on having any thing important to communicate, stretched out to the offing until their signals were seen and answered by the intermediate cruiser, and then resumed their station, or otherwise, as circumstances might require.

On the 15th of May the British force stationed close off the port of Ostende consisted of the 18-gun brig-sloop Cruiser, Captain John Hancock, and 16-gun ship-sloop Rattler, Captain Francis Mason; who kept up a communication with the squadron cruising off Calais, by means of three or four gun-brigs, under the orders of Lieutenant Patrick Manderston, of the Minx. On the evening of this day 22 one-masted gun-vessels and one schooner were seen to haul out of the harbour of Ostende, and to take up an anchorage to the westward of the lighthouse, within the sand. Captain Hancock immediately made the signal of recal to the four gun-brigs, then standing to the westward, and despatched the hired armed cutter Stag, Lieutenant William Patfull, with the intelligence to the commodore. Having done this, Captain Hancock, as soon as it grew dark, got under way with his two sloops; and, the better to prevent the escape of the division of gun-boats outside, which were commanded by Capitaine de frégate Bernard-Isidore Lambour, reanchored within long range of the batteries at the pier-head.

On the 16th, at daybreak, the four British gun-brigs, being still in sight, were again recalled; but, as on the preceding evening, they did not see or understand the signal. At 9 h. 30 m. A. M. the Rattler, who lay a little to the eastward of the Cruiser, made the signal, first for five sail, and then for a fleet, in the east-south-east. This was a strong division of the Gallo-Batavian or Flushing flotilla, which had sailed from its anchorage in the Inner Wieling at daybreak on that morning, under the command of Rear-admiral Ver-Huell, bound to Ostende, and consisted of the two ship-rigged prames (12 long 24-pounders each) Ville-d'Anvers, bearing the admiral's flag, Lieutenant André Dutailis, and Ville-d'Aix, Captain François-Jacques Meynue, 19 schooners, and 47 schuyts, in all 68 sail; mounting between them upwards of 100 long 36, 24, and 18 pounders, besides lighter pieces on the side, brass carronades, and mortars, and carrying a body of between 4000 and 5000 troops.

At 10 A. M., which was as early as the tide served, the two sloops got under way and began working towards the enemy, At about 11 A. M. the wind shifted to the south-west; which, while it favoured the two sloops, headed the flotilla, then nearly abreast of Blanckenberghe, and induced the Dutch admiral to bear up and put back towards Flushing. At about noon Sir

Sidney Smith's squadron consisting, besides the *Antelope*, of the 36-gun frigate *Penelope*, Captain William Robert Broughton, and 32-gun frigate *Aimable*, Captain William Bolton, hove in sight of the two sloops; and which squadron had weighed from the Schonevelde since between 10 and 11 A. M., in consequence of an announcement by one of the in-shore ships, that the Gallo-Batavian flotilla was making sail from the Inner Wieling.

At about 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the Cruiser came up with, fired at, and compelled to strike, one of the rearmost vessels, a schuyt mounting one long 36-pounder, and carrying five Dutch seamen and 25 French troops. Making the signal for the *Rattler* to take possession, the British brig continued to stand on, in the hope to close with one of the prames. Feeling himself, as the French accounts state, somewhat nettled at having one of his vessels captured by a force so comparatively insignificant, Admiral Ver-Huell, took advantage of a slight change of wind in his favour, and stood back towards Ostende with all his remaining flotilla except eight schuyts, which continued their route towards the Inner Wieling. At about 1 h. 45 m. P. M. the *Ville-d'Anvers* fired a shot at the Cruiser, which passed over her, and fell close under the bows of the *Rattler*. Shortly afterwards, the wind shifting six points, both sloops fell off in their course, and found themselves nearly abreast of the leading prame, and upon the lee beam of the flotilla, then crowding sail to get in-shore. At a few minutes before 2 P. M. the *Ville-d'Anvers* commenced a heavy fire upon the Cruiser and *Rattler*, and several of the schooners and schuyts also opened their fire. In a short time the two sloops were in the midst of the flotilla, engaging on both sides, and frequently assailed by shot and shells from the batteries of Blanckenberghe. Notwithstanding all this the Cruiser and *Rattler* gallantly drove on shore the *Ville-d'Anvers* prame, and four of the schooners.

At 3 h. 45 m. P. M. the *Aimable* arrived up with, and opened her fire upon, a portion of the flotilla close under the batteries of Blanckenberghe. At about 4 h. 30 m. P. M. the *Penelope* and *Antelope* also got into action, and, by their heavy fire, drove several other schooners and schuyts on shore. At 7 P. M. the *Aimable* found herself near to the grounded prame, and received from her a very destructive fire; several artillerymen from the shore having got on board the *Ville-d'Anvers*, and replaced her crew, most of whom had fled upon her first grounding: at which time, too, her colours were either hauled down or shot away. At about 7 h. 45 m. P. M., the tide having fallen and left the British ships in little more water than they drew, the *Antelope* made the signal to discontinue the engagement; and the squadron drew off into deeper water. The Gallo-Batavian flotilla, or what remained of it, took this opportunity of getting into the basin of Ostende; whither they were accompanied by

the division of French gun-vessels which, by the orders of Rear-admiral Charles Magon, the commanding officer of the Ostende flotilla, had on the preceding evening, as already stated, anchored to the westward of the lighthouse, and which had subsequently gone to the assistance of Rear-admiral Ver-Huëll.

The loss on the part of the British, compared with the vigour and duration of the firing, was of no great amount. The Cruiser had one seaman killed, and her captain's clerk (George Ellis) and three seamen wounded; the Rattler, two seamen killed and three wounded; the Aimable, one master's mate (Mr. Christie), one midshipman (Mr. Johnson), four seamen, and one boy killed, and one lieutenant (William Mather), her purser (William Shadwell), one midshipman (Mr. Conner), and 11 seamen wounded; total, 13 killed and 32 wounded. Besides having her rigging and sails a good deal cut, the Cruiser received two large shot between wind and water. The Rattler suffered also in her rigging and sails; and the Aimable, in addition to her damages aloft, was struck in several parts of her hull. The acknowledged loss, on the Gallo-Batavian flotilla, amounted to 18 killed and 60 wounded, 29 of the latter and four of the former on board the two prames.

From the sketch here given it now appears, that the Cruiser and Rattler, unsupported by any other ships, most gallantly attacked, and after a two hours' action very nearly discomfited, this formidable Gallo-Batavian flotilla. Unfortunately the public letter of Commodore Sir Sidney Smith, although it admits that "Captains Hancock and Mason, bore the brunt of the attack, and continued it for six hours against a great superiority of fire," was calculated to convey an impression, the letter in fact expressly states, that the Antelope, Penelope, and Aimable participated in the action from its commencement. Sir Sidney says, "The signal was made to the Cruiser and Rattler for an enemy in the E.S.E. to call their attention from Ostend; the squadron weighed," &c. But, in reality, neither of the sloops was in sight of the Antelope for a full hour after she and her companions had weighed; nor does the log of the Antelope mention their names until the following entry occurs: "At 2 observed the Rattler and Cruiser commence firing on the enemy's flotilla." The log of the Aimable refers to the first appearance of the two sloops in nearly the same manner: "At 2 Cruiser and Rattler brought the enemy to action," &c. And how could the commodore well have descried the two sloops earlier than the commencement of the afternoon, when the Antelope had been at anchor full six leagues (some accounts say nine) from their anchorage; at such a distance, in fact, that it took the Stag, from 9 P.M. on the 15th to 5 h. 30 m. A.M. on the 16th, before her commander could deliver his despatches to Sir Sidney? Moreover, the first signal of any kind, noticed in the log of the Antelope, is one made at 4 P.M., "to engage the enemy." Whereas, in proof that much

had been effected two hours before he was in a situation to make that signal, Sir Sidney in his letter says: "Since two o'clock (a little earlier than was the case) the sternmost prame struck her colours and ran on shore."

But there is a more disinterested testimony, in favour of the claims of the Cruiser and Rattler, than is to be found in the logs of any of the British ships. The French minister of marine, Vice-admiral Decrès, under date of May 20, 1804, gives as the substance of the report of Rear-admiral Ver-Huell, that an English frigate and corvette, or, in other words, that an English frigate-built and brig-rigged corvette, who were very near, manœuvred to cut off two of the gun-boats and a transport, &c. "The action during two hours," proceeds the account, "was extremely warm: the two enemy's vessels were disabled and retreated." The rear-admiral goes on to state, that the port of Ostende being left open, he steered towards it; but that Commodore Sir Sidney Smith, "having assembled his squadron, attacked the flotilla within three leagues of Ostende," &c. As this translation is at complete variance, in some material points, with that which appears in the work of a contemporary, we will here add the original passages, or so much of them as is necessary: "*Une frégate et une corvette anglaise,\* qui étaient fort près, manœvrèrent,*" &c. "*Le combat, pendant deux heures, fut extrêmement chaud, les deux bâtimens ennemis furent désarmés et firent chasses.*"† "*Le Commodore Sidney Smith, ayant pu réunir sa croisière, joignit la flotille gallo-batave à trois lieues d'Ostende.*"

From the above extracts, it is evident that Rear-admiral Ver-Huell considered that he was attacked, and engaged for two hours, by the Cruiser and Rattler, before the Antelope, or any other ship of Sir Sidney's squadron, fired a shot at him; and thus, like an honest man, did he report the fact to the official organ of his government. But the appearance of Sir Sidney Smith's official letter, in the columns of the *Moniteur*, made M. Decrès condemn the haste he had used in publishing the report of the Dutch admiral. Instead of the attack having been made by two sloops, or, taking the literal translation, by one frigate and one sloop, it was here confessedly made by one 50-gun ship, three frigates, two sloops, and two cutters. Accordingly M. Dumas, and all the other French historians, reject their own official account as too tame and inglorious, and prefer incorporating in their pages the official account of their enemy. This is particularly the case in one work, which, on most other occasions, would scorn to glean its materials from any source that was not decidedly French.‡ We regret that we were so far misled by Sir Sidney's letter, as, in the former edition of this

\* An English frigate and a cutter.—Brenton, vol. iii., p. 244.

† The two vessels of the enemy were dismantled and sheered off.—*Ib.*, p. 245.

‡ *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 19.

work, to have contributed to mislead the public respecting the real merits of the engagement off Boulogne in May, 1804.

On the 17th, at daybreak, the four gun-brigs, commanded by Lieutenant Manderston, having joined, were sent in, under the direction of Captain Hancock, to see what could be done with the French prame *Ville-d'Anvers*, aground to the eastward of Ostende. The gun-brigs opened their fire, but received from the numerous train of horse and other artillery assembled along the beach, as well as from the heavy mortars and pieces of cannon mounted upon the heights, so heavy a fire in return, that they were obliged to desist and haul off. No loss appears to have been sustained by the gun-brigs; but the *Minx* was struck by a large shot in the hounds of her mainmast. On the morning of the 19th the 16-gun ship-sloops *Galgo*, Captain Michael Dodd, and Inspector, Captain Edward James Mitchell, co-operated with the gun-brigs in a second attack upon the grounded prame; but, protected by the powerful batteries on shore, the *Ville-d'Anvers* floated with the rising tide and got safe into Ostende. Five of the eight grounded schooners and schuyts were also floated into the basin.

Hâvre, owing to its central position on the French Channel-coast, was made a temporary dépôt for the vessels of the flotilla constructed to the westward, or in the Seine and the rivers flowing into it. As soon as a sufficient number was assembled, they were to be convoyed, by prames and gun-brigs, to the grand entrepôt at Boulogne. In the month of July a British squadron, composed chiefly of sloops, bombs, and small-craft, under the orders of Captain Robert Dudley Oliver, in the 38-gun frigate *Melpomène*, was stationed off Hâvre, to reconnoitre and harass the port, and prevent, as well the vessels of the flotilla inside from escaping, as those on the outside from joining. On the 23d the bomb-vessels bombarded the town, set it on fire, and compelled several of the vessels to retire behind the pier and up the river. The mortar-batteries on shore opened a fire in return, which, although continued for some time, inflicted very little damage and no loss on the British vessels. On the 1st of August a second attack was made, attended with nearly a similar result.

On the 19th of July, in the afternoon, the wind, setting in strong from the north-north-east, made so much sea, that the French flotilla in the road of Boulogne became very uneasy. At about 8 P. M. the leewardmost brigs began to get under way, and work to windward, while some of the luggers ran down apparently for Etaples, leaving in the road at anchor 45 brigs and 46 luggers. The British frigate *Immortalité*, Captain Owen, with the 38-gun frigate *Leda*, Captain Robert Honyman, and several small vessels, was then at anchor about eight leagues to the westward of the town of Boulogne. The commodore immediately directed the 18-gun brig-sloop *Harpy*, Captain

Edmund Heywood, and the gun-brigs Bloodhound and Archer, Lieutenants Henry Richardson and John Price, to run in and open their fire upon such of the enemy's vessels as attempted to stand off from the land. The 16-gun ship-sloop Autumn, Captain Samuel Jackson, was at this time getting under way, and lost no time in giving her support to the Harpy and her two consorts; all four vessels maintaining an occasional fire during the whole weather-tide.

At daylight on the 20th there were 19 brigs and eight luggers only remaining in the bay; and at about 6 A. M. these began to slip singly, and run to the southward for the port of Etaples, or Saint-Valéry-sur-Somme, the Autumn and three brigs being then too far to leeward to give them any interruption. As soon as the tide permitted, the *Immortalité* and *Leda* weighed and stood in close to Boulogne, when it was perceived that a brig, a lugger, and several large boats, were stranded on the beach west of the harbour. The crews of the vessels were endeavouring to save from them what they could, but the tide most probably completed their destruction. Three other French brigs and a lugger were on the rocks near the village of Portet, totally destroyed. A brig and two luggers remained at anchor close to the rocks, with signals flying; the brig had lost her topmasts, topsails, and lower yards, and one of the luggers the head of her mainmast: besides which the sea was making a perfect breach over them.

In the French version of the affair no mention is made of the presence of the British. All is ascribed to the fury of the gale, which did, indeed, occasion sufficient havoc among the numerous craft. The exact number of gun-vessels that foundered, or were stranded, is not stated; but the account acknowledges, that upwards of 400 soldiers and sailors were engulfed with the former, and that a great many perished with the latter. The emperor was a spectator of the scene, and, if we are to credit the French writers, evinced much sensibility on the occasion. "*L'empereur, arrivé de la veille à Boulogne, fut témoin de ces désastres; il se montra encore plus affligé que furieux; la sensibilité chez lui parut bien supérieure au dépit, et l'orgueil de son caractère ceda à la bonté de son cœur.*"\* Napoléon, no doubt, was taught a lesson by the disaster: he saw that the shots and shells of British ships were not all he had to fear, in getting his immense armada across the English Channel.

Boulogne, being as already mentioned the head-quarters of the grand armament preparing for the invasion of England, occupied a due share of the latter's attention. The British squadron, which cruised off Boulogne in August, consisted of from 15 to 20 vessels, under the command of Rear-admiral Louis in the 50-gun ship *Leopard*. The main body usually lay at anchor, in 15 fathoms' water, about 10 miles north-west of the

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 136.

port; and a detached or flying division, of five or six vessels, under the command of Captain Owen, in the frigate *Immortalité*, generally cruised just out of shell-range of the enemy's batteries, anchoring occasionally, as the state of the tide rendered necessary. It should here be observed, that, in addition to the batteries, masked as well as open, all along the edge of the cliff, there were seven or eight forts erected on the sands at low water; where also lay ready several mortar-beds, over which the tide flowed, and to which the mortars were brought as soon as it left them dry.

On the 25th of August there were lying in the road of Boulogne, moored in line, 146 French gun-vessels, 62 of them brigs, or first-class gun-vessels, the remainder chiefly luggers. Of these gun-vessels, 45 composed the *Hâvre*-division, which, under *Capitaine de vaisseau François-Henri-Eugène Daugier*, had since the 16th entered the road. On the same 25th an unusual degree of bustle and activity prevailed in the port, on account of the presence of the French emperor, who had just done presiding at the grand ceremony of distributing to the troops the cross of the legion of honour. This imposing spectacle took place on the 16th of August, the anniversary of the day on which "*Saint Napoléon*" had usurped in the French calendar the place of "*Saint Roch*." Upwards of 80,000 men, taken chiefly from the camps of Boulogne and Montreuil, were present on the occasion.

To amuse the French emperor, probably, Admiral Bruix, at about 1 h. 45 m. p. m., ordered a division of gun-vessels, under *Capitaine de vaisseau Julien Le Ray*, to weigh, and, with the north-easterly wind then blowing, work up towards *Pointe-Bombe*; near to which lay the British gun-brig *Bruiser*, Lieutenant *Thomas Smithies*, or, as the French writers have it, "*une grande corvette anglaise à trois mâts*,"\* watching their manœuvres. In a short time a firing commenced between the parties, and soon brought to the spot the *Immortalité*; who, at 2 h. 30 m. p. m. opened her broadside upon the gun-vessels, and received in return a heavy fire from the batteries, one shot from which struck her under the main chains, but did no material injury. It now became necessary to haul further from the shore; and the *Immortalité*, having done so, lay to about three miles off the port.

Early on the morning of the 26th the *Archer* and *Blood-hound*, commanded as before,† fired at some luggers coming

\* One would hardly suppose this possible, but it is no less true; and, as a proof what strange optics the writer was blessed with, he could not discover a single brig in the British squadron: "*Leurs forces se composaient*," he says, "*de deux vaisseaux de ligne*," (meaning a 50 and a frigate,) "*deux frégates de quarante-quatre, de sept corvettes de guerre à trois mâts, de deux lougres, et d'un cutter*."—*Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 45.

† See p. 227.



round Cape Grinez, but who kept too close to the shore to be molested. Towards the afternoon a second division of gun-vessels, under Capitaine de vaisseau Etienne Pevrieux, and two sections of Prussian mortar-vessels, got under way, and, when joined to Captain Le Ray's division, which was still manœuvring between Vimereux and Ambleteuse, formed a total of 60 brigs, and upwards of 30 luggers. The French emperor himself, it appears, was at this time in the road in his barge, attended by Marshals Soult and Mortier, and Admiral Bruix. At 4 p. m. the *Immortalité*, followed by the *Harpy*, still commanded by Captain Heywood, gun-brig *Adder*, Lieutenant George Wood, and hired armed cutter *Constitution*, commanded by Lieutenant J. S. A. Dennis, made sail towards the flotilla, and in a quarter of an hour afterwards opened her fire; as did the vessels astern of her. The gun-vessels, however, kept near the shore, purposely to draw the British within reach of the batteries. There was no withstanding the temptation, and the *Immortalité* and her three companions tacked and stood in, within three quarters of a mile of the batteries, which kept up an incessant fire.

As if that were not enough to preserve the gun-vessels from capture, the greater part of those in the road weighed and proceeded to their assistance. "*Presque tous les bâtimens qui se trouvaient en rade prirent part à ce combat, selon leur position, et furent soutenus par le feu des batteries de la côte, quand l'ennemi tenta de s'en approcher. Les mortiers à grande portée lui firent beaucoup de mal, &c.*"\*

At about 5 p. m., while the *Constitution* with her 12-pounder carronades was engaging, in the most gallant manner, a heavy gun-brig and two lugger-rigged yachts, painted with white bottoms and green sides, and richly gilt, a 13-inch shell fell on board between the companion and skylight, passed through the deck, stove a skuttle-butt, and went through the cutter's bottom. The hole being too large to be stopped, and the vessel filling fast, a signal of distress was hoisted. In a few minutes the boats of the squadron were alongside, and the whole of the crew were saved. A shell also fell on board the *Harpy*, and, after killing one of her seamen, lodged in a beam on the main deck, without doing further harm. The reason given for its not exploding is a very extraordinary one. According to several English accounts, the fusee was actually extinguished by the blood of the poor man, through whose body the shell had just passed. The *Immortalité* was twice struck by shot in the hull, and had four men slightly wounded. This frigate and her division, to which the *Bruiser* gun-brig, commanded as before, had since joined herself, now hauled off out of gun-shot. Some of the French vessels were compelled to run on shore on account of the shot-holes in their hulls; and such of the remainder, as

\* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 47,

the batteries had not permitted to be materially damaged, bore up for the road of Boulogne. On the two succeeding days some slight skirmishes also took place, but nothing decisive could be effected on account of the French batteries; nor was any injury done to the British vessels, beyond a wound in the Bruiser's bowsprit.

It is singular that the same French writer, who tells us of the immense advantage which a host of these gun-vessels derived from the gun and mortar batteries along the coast, should cite the engagement or skirmish of the 26th of August, as "*une des plus fortes épreuves de l'effet réciproque du feu des petits bâtimens de flotille opposés à une ligne de vaisseaux et frégates d'un rang très-supérieur.*"\* The writer should have stopped until a case occurred where a score or so of these gun-vessels, having got beyond the reach of their protectors, suddenly found themselves, in a fine commanding breeze, close to leeward of a single British frigate, of the *Immortalité* for instance. How many of them, does he think, would escape capture or destruction? None, provided the frigate stayed not to pick up the drowning crews of those she crushed by her stem, or sank by her broadsides; and provided those vessels, that hauled down their flags to save themselves from the fate of their companions, did not treacherously rehoist them, because the frigate was too much occupied to send a boat to take possession. None knew this better than Napoléon. The affair of the 26th of August, of which he had unintentionally been an eye-witness, convinced him. He did not say so, it is true: it was not his policy. Within the short space of little more than five weeks, the French emperor had witnessed, both what the Channel gales and the Channel cruisers would do with his flotilla, if it fell in the way of either.

Towards the latter end of the summer a plan was submitted to, and received the sanction of the British government, for destroying such vessels of the invasion-flotilla, as should moor in any of the open roads along the French Channel-coast. This desirable object was to be attained chiefly by means of a novel, or rather, of a revived species of fire-vessel of a very peculiar description. It consisted of a coffer of about 21 feet long, and three and a quarter broad, resembling in appearance a log of mahogany, except that its extremities were formed like a wedge. Its covering was of thick plank, lined with lead, calked and tarred. Outside this was a coat of canvass, paid over with hot pitch. The vessel weighed, when filled (done of course before the covering is wholly put on), about two tons. The contents consisted, besides the apparatus, of as much ballast as would just keep the upper surface of the deck of the coffer even with the water's edge. Amidst a quantity of powder (about 40

barrels) and other inflammable matter, was a piece of clockwork, the main spring of which, on the withdrawing of a peg placed on the outside, would, in a given time (from six to ten minutes), draw the trigger of a lock, and explode the vessel. This "catamaran" as it was called, had no mast, and was to be towed to the spot of its operation. On the opposite end to that to which the tow-rope was fixed was a line, with a sort of grappling-iron at its extremity, kept afloat by pieces of cork, and intended to hook itself to the cable of the object of destruction, and swing the coffer alongside.

The appearance of about 150 vessels, moored in a double line outside the pier of Boulogne, offered a fit opportunity for trying the effect of these much-vaunted machines. Accordingly on the 1st of October, in the morning, Admiral Lord Keith, in the *Monarch* 74, with three 64s, two 50s, and several frigates, sloops, bombs, gun-brigs, cutters, and fire-vessels, anchored about five miles from the French line off Boulogne. In the course of the day, the *Monarch*, accompanied by three frigates and some smaller vessels, weighed, and reanchored just out of gun-shot of the French batteries and flotilla. This movement, coupled with the information previously furnished by spies, left no doubt in the minds of the French as to the nature of the attack that was about to ensue. Every defensive preparation had already been made by Rear-admiral Lacrosse, whose flag was flying on board the *Ville-de-Mayence* prame, stationed in the centre of the line. Towards evening the French admiral despatched several gun-boats and armed launches to a distance outside, that they might be ready, as well to give notice by signal of the enemy's approach, as, if possible, to grapple and tow away the fire-vessels. On shore the batteries were all ready, and bodies of troops, with numerous field-pieces, were stationed along the coast.

On the 2d of October, at about 9 h. 15 m. P. M., the four fire-vessels, *Amity*, *Devonshire*, *Peggy*, and *Providence*, towed by armed launches, proceeded upon the service assigned them. In less than a quarter of an hour their approach was signalled by the French videttes; who, as soon as they found that the fire they opened was not returned, suspected the nature of the vessels which, with a strong tide and fair wind, were fast diving towards them. A scuffle now ensued between the French gun-boats and the English launches; and the latter, having towed their charges to a proper distance, and ignited the fuses, left the tide to perform the rest, and rowed back to their ships. As the fire-vessels approached the left of the French line, a heavy cannonade commenced, with a view of sinking them, but it failed in its effect. The *Providence*, entering among the gun-boats, exploded at 10 h. 15 m., between No. 149 and No. 142, stationed in the second line, wounding two men on board the latter vessel. The explosion was awfully loud, and created considerable alarm, as well along the French line, as among the

spectators on shore; but no more mischief appears to have been done than has just been stated.

In another 20 minutes the Peggy, passing through a vacant space left purposely for her, exploded in the rear of the line, with an effect as slight as the first, merely wounding an officer and two men. A third fire-vessel, the Devonshire, exploded at about 1 A. M. on the 3d, wounding two men only. The fourth, which was the Amity, pointed to the admiral's prame; but the Ville-de-Mayence, slackening her cables, let the enemy drift harmlessly by. This vessel, at her explosion, appears to have effected even less than her three companions.

Four or five of the catamarans also exploded, the last at about 3 h. 30 m. A. M.; but only one, and that by an unexpected occurrence, appears to have caused any destruction to the French. A British boat, having just done towing a catamaran, was, the French say, abandoned by her crew, but left with a sail up. If so, it must have been as a *ruse*, and the English must have transported themselves to another boat, as the enemy's gun-vessel was approaching. Lord Keith's letter containing not a word of details, the French accounts are all to which we have to trust. A heavily-armed launch, or *péniche*, (No. 267,) approached this vacant boat, into which 27 French soldiers and sailors instantly leaped. Scarcely had the latter made off with their prize, before the *péniche* ran foul of the catamaran, and was instantly blown into the air, with the loss of all her remaining crew, consisting of her commander and 13 soldiers and sailors. Those left in the captured boat gained the port of Vimereux. This made the French loss amount, altogether, to 14 killed and seven wounded. The British had not a man hurt.

Many were the anathemas hurled against England for the barbarity of this attack by catamaran, but surely without reason. Had she not a right to crush, in the ports of its formation if she could, the flotilla which, it was publicly declared, had for its sole object the conveyance of troops for a descent upon her shores? What is there, compared with explosion-vessels and fire-ships, peculiarly gentle in the employment of red-hot balls, and grape and langridge shot; or, indeed, in any of the missiles or weapons with which war is usually waged? That the catamaran affair was a silly project was asserted with more reason, than that it was a cruel or an illegal one. It was a complete failure, and, like every failure of the kind, conferred additional strength upon that which it was intended to destroy. Under an idea, for instance, that the British would improve their plans, and make a second attempt at burning the flotilla, "une chaîne de barrage" was constructed, which completely sheltered the line of gun-boats at Boulogne from explosion-vessels of every description.

On the 8th of October, a division of French lugger-rigged gun-vessels being perceived from the road of Jersey, creeping

along the coast of Normandy from the southward, the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Albacore*, Captain Major Jacob Henniker, slipped and made sail, followed by a gun-brig and cutter; but who, missing the sloop in the haze, returned to the anchorage. Towards evening the *Albacore*, being near the *Grosnez de Flamanville*, compelled five of the luggers to anchor close to the surf, under the corner of a battery to the southward of *Grosnez*. The wind being dead on shore and a lee tide making, the *Albacore* lay off until the 9th, at 10 A. M.; when, with the assistance of the weather tide, Captain Henniker stood in, under a heavy fire from the battery and gun-vessels. At 11 A. M. the *Albacore* anchored, with springs, close to the gun-vessels, and within about 200 yards of the surf: the sloop then opened her fire, and continued it until all five vessels were driven on shore, and lay broadside to in a heavy surf, which broke with great violence over them. Their men, in great numbers, landed upon the beach; and some were seen bearing the wounded in their arms. Having, owing to the strength of the wind, dragged her anchor, the *Albacore*, at the falling of the tide, slipped and hauled off, without any loss, but with her hull struck in several places, her main and maintop masts shot through, and her rigging of every kind much cut.

On the 23d of October, at 4 P. M., a division of the French *flotilla*, consisting of two prames, one with a commodore's broad pendant, and 18 armed schuyts, put to sea from Ostende, and steered to the westward, just as the Cruiser, Captain Hancock, accompanied by the gun-brigs *Blazer*, Lieutenant John Hinton, *Conflict*, Lieutenant Charles C. Ormsby, *Tigress*, Lieutenant Edward Greensword, and *Escort*, Lieutenant Joseph Gulston Garland, and hired armed cutters *Admiral-Mitchell* and *Griffin*, Lieutenants Richard Williams and James Dillon, was standing in to reconnoitre the port. Chase was given, and the headmost prame, at 5 h. 18 m. P. M., was brought to action by the Cruiser and her consorts. The mutual cannonade continued until 6 h. 35 m. P. M.; when the prame's fire, which had been confined to musketry for the last half hour, entirely ceased. As, however, the tide was rapidly falling, darkness coming on, and no person on board was acquainted with the shoals to the westward of Ostende, the Cruiser, then in less than three fathoms' water, hauled off and anchored.

Meantime, in her eagerness to close with the prame, the *Conflict* gun-brig had grounded; and, although the brig was in two fathoms' water, the prame steered safe in-shore of her. As soon as the prame had passed out of gun-shot, Lieutenant Ormsby commenced lightening his vessel, in the hope to get her off. His endeavours proving fruitless, the lieutenant and his men quitted the *Conflict*, and pulled for the Cruiser, whose lights were then in view. An attempt to bring away the gun-brig was afterwards made by the *Griffin* and *Admiral-Mitchell* cutters, manned in

addition to their own crews, by the whole of the Conflict's crew, and by 10 seamen and half the marines belonging to the Cruiser. But the Conflict was found to be high and dry on the beach, and in complete possession of the enemy; the fire from whose howitzers and field-pieces, besides greatly damaging the Griffin in her advance, killed one and wounded seven of the party, including Acting-lieutenant Abraham Garland of the Cruiser most severely, having lost his right leg very high up. Two seamen had also been wounded in the previous cannonade.

On the 8th of December, in the evening, an attempt was made, under the direction of Captain Sir Home Popham, of the 50-gun ship Antelope, by means of the Susannah explosion-vessel and two carcasses, or catamarans, to destroy Fort Rouge, the advanced pile-battery at the entrance of the harbour of Calais; but, if the French accounts are to be credited, little or no damage was effected by the single explosion, that of the Susannah, which took place. One carcass could not be fixed; and the other, when fixed, would not go off. On the British side not a man was hurt; and it appears that the same good fortune attended the persons on shore. We must now quit, for a while, gun-boats and catamarans to attend to the operations of fleets of line-of-battle ships.

Among the advantages which the British government had contemplated by retaining possession of the island of Malta, its proximity to Toulon was not the least important; and yet Lord Nelson often emphatically declared, that he would as soon the news of the sailing of the Toulon fleet reached him at St.-Helen's as at Malta. In proof of the force of that impression upon Lord Nelson's mind, the Mediterranean fleet had not once entered Valetta harbour since he had taken the command, the vice-admiral invariably, when he was compelled to seek a port, steering for Agincourt sound; where, on the last day of the preceding year, we left him and his fleet at anchor.\* Lord Nelson readily admitted, however, that the island of Malta was an important outwork to Egypt, and, through the latter to India; and that England, by possessing it, acquired a decided influence in the Levant and over the whole of southern Italy.

On the 4th of January, leaving the 38-gun frigate Amazon, Captain William Parker, and some smaller vessels, to aid the Sardinians, in the event of an expected invasion from the neighbouring island of Corsica, the vice-admiral, with the remainder of his fleet, weighed and put to sea. On the 9th Captain Keats in the Superb was detached, to settle some dispute with the Dey of Algiers; and, to give weight to the negotiation, Lord Nelson himself, on the 17th, made his appearance off the Barbary coast. The Superb having rejoined on the following day, the fleet stood back to Sardinia, and on the 27th, at 5 P.M., again dropped anchor in Agincourt sound.

Between February 1st and 8th the fleet cruised in the neighbourhood of the French coast, and then anchored near the island of Cabrera. On the 19th Lord Nelson again put to sea, and remained out until the 25th of March; having, on the 15th been joined by the 100-gun ship *Royal-Sovereign*, Captain Pulteney Malcolm, from England. Weighing again on the 3d of April, the fleet passed between the island of Elba and Cape Corse, and on the 9th, in the morning, took a station about midway between the capes Sicie and Sepet. On the same afternoon the French batteries at the latter place fired several shot at the *Amazon*, while taking possession of a prize-brig in-shore; and three French frigates came out of Toulon, and stood towards her. On this the 74-gun ship *Donegal*, Captain Sir Richard John Strachan, and 38-gun frigate *Active*, Captain Richard Hussey Moubay, closed the *Amazon*; whereupon, at 6 h. 30 m. P. M., the French ships, including four others that had just rounded Cape Sepet, tacked and put back.

On the 10th of May the *Leviathan* 74, Captain Henry William Bayntun, accompanied by three bomb-vessels, joined the fleet, which, on the day following, anchored among the Magdalena islands. On the 14th the Gibraltar rejoined from Naples, and on the 19th the British fleet weighed and steered for Toulon. By this time the French fleet had also received an accession of force: the 80-gun ship *Bucentaure* had been launched, and, with seven other line-of-battle ships, lay in the outer road ready for sea. A few other ships were in nearly the same state of readiness in the inner road; and the whole were still under the command of Vice-admiral La Touche-Tréville, who had now the new 80 for his flag-ship.

On the 24th of May, in the forenoon, as the *Canopus*, *Donegal*, and *Amazon*, having been detached from the fleet, then out of sight in the offing, were standing upon the larboard tack, with a light air from the south-west, close to the eastward of Cape Sepet, for the purpose of reconnoitring the fleet in Toulon, a French line-of-battle ship and frigate were observed under sail between the capes Sepet and Brun, which form the entrance to the harbour. At half-past noon, when about three miles from the shore, the *Amazon*, *Donegal*, and *Canopus* tacked in succession. No sooner had the *Canopus* put about, than several French gun-boats swept from under Cape Sepet, and, profiting by the calm state of the weather, opened a distant fire upon her and the *Amazon*. The *Canopus*, in return, discharged a few of her lowerdeck guns, and stood on to the south-east by east, with the wind, now a moderate breeze, from west-north-west.

On hearing the firing, two French ships of the line and two frigates had slipped their cables and made sail, to assist the line-of-battle ship and frigate already outside. At 2 h. 30 m. P. M., the more sail of the line slipped, and followed the others; making now five sail of the line and three frigates that were in chase of

the reconnoitring ships. Shortly afterwards the French van-frigate, being on the weather quarter of the Canopus, opened a fire upon her and the Donegal, which these ships immediately returned.\* With so superior a force it was in vain to contend, and Rear-admiral Campbell directed his little division to make sail. At 3 h. 30 m. P. M., finding pursuit useless, the French ships tacked and stood back to their port; and at 9 h. 30 m. P. M., and not before, the Canopus and her two companions joined the Victory and the fleet.\*

On the 13th of June, in the afternoon, two strange ships having been signalled as under sail off the east end of the island of Porquerolles, Lord Nelson, who, with the in-shore or lee division, consisting of the Victory, Canopus, Belleisle, Donegal, and Excellent, lay off the Hyères, while Sir Richard Bickerton, with the weather division, also of five sail of the line, cruised about 20 leagues from the land, ordered the frigates Amazon and Phœbe, the latter commanded by Captain the Honourable Thomas Bladen Capel, to proceed in chase. Light winds made it noon on the following day, the 14th, before the two frigates reached the entrance of the Grande-Passe; and soon afterwards, it being signalled that the strangers were frigates, and known that batteries were near them, Lord Nelson directed the Excellent to lend her aid to the Amazon and Phœbe. At 5 P. M. the two French frigates, Incoïruptible and Sirène, and 18-gun brig-corvette Furet, were seen at anchor under the castle of Porquerolles. At 5 h. 30 m. P. M. one of the forts fired at the Phœbe, but the shot did not reach her. In another quarter of an hour both British frigates having cleared for action, anchored with springs on their cables, just out of gun-shot of the northmost fort. Scarcely had the frigates done this, than the whole French fleet in Toulon road was discovered getting under way. The Amazon and Phœbe immediately reweighed, and stood out to sea. The Excellent, having also been recalled by signal, put about and rejoined her division; which, since 4 h. 30 m., had bore up, with the wind at west-south-west, under all sail, for the Grande-Passe.

At 5 P. M., or soon after, the Victory and the ships with her, observing the French admiral coming out of Toulon with eight sail of the line and four frigates, shortened sail and hauled to the wind, in line of battle, on the starboard tack. At 8 P. M. Cape Sicie bore from the Victory north-west by west distant seven leagues; and at 1 h. 30 m. A. M. on the 15th, having wore and tacked several times, the lee division hove to. At 3 h. 45 m. A. M. Lord Nelson again made sail, and at noon was only 11 miles to the westward of the north-west end of Porquerolles:

\* The authors of the quarto "Life of Nelson," by confounding this sortie with another that occurred three weeks afterwards, have entangled themselves and their readers in a labyrinth of mistakes. See Clarke and M'Arthur's Book, vol. ii., pp. 366-7.



At 5 P. M. the Amazon and Phoebe joined the vice-admiral; at which time the French fleet, counted at 14 sail of ships, was standing off and on between Cape Sepet and the last-named island. At 6 A. M. the lee division again hove to for a short time. At 7 P. M. the Incorruptible, Sirène, and Furet joined their fleet; which, having effected the apparent object of the sally, now stood back into port, and was followed, until well inside of Sepet, by Lord Nelson and his division.

This would have passed off as an occurrence of no moment, had not M. La Touche-Tréville thought proper to make it the subject of an official communication to his government. He admits having sent the two frigates and a brig-corvette to cruise in the bay of Hyères; as well as that he sailed out, with the whole of his fleet, to prevent their retreat from being cut off by a line-of-battle ship and two frigates detached by Lord Nelson. He states truly, that the latter, upon this, recalled his detached ships, but most untruly, that the British admiral "ran away."

What Lord Nelson thought of the French admiral's exploit may be gathered from a letter which, on the 18th of June, he wrote to Sir John Acton: "Mons. La Touche came out on the 14th. I was off the Hières with five ships; he had eight of the line and six frigates. In the evening he stood under Sepet again, and, I believe I may call it, we chased him into Toulon the morning of the 15th. I am satisfied he meant nothing beyond a gasconade; but am confident, when he is ordered for any service, that he will risk falling in with us, and the event of a battle, to try and accomplish his orders."\* It was not until some weeks after the date of this letter that Lord Nelson saw a copy of the official one of M. La Touche.† The statement of the French admiral gave his lordship much more concern than it ought to have done; so much indeed, that he transmitted a copy of the Victory's log to the admiralty. It was sufficient for M. La Touche that his assertion, taken in a larger sense than he had probably anticipated, that of having chased the British admiral with all the latter's 10 sail of the line present, gained credence in a quarter which immediately promoted him from "un grand officier de la légion d'honneur," to "un grand officier de l'empire," and conferred upon him, also, the lucrative appointment of "inspecteur des côtes de la Méditerranée."

Napoléon's letter, apprizing M. La Touche-Tréville of the manner in which he had rewarded his gallantry, is dated at Malmesbury, the 2d of July, and contains some important directions relative to the proceedings of the Toulon fleet. The vice-admiral is informed, that two battalions of picked troops of the line, consisting of 800 men each, have received orders to embark

\* Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii., p. 372.

† For a transcript of the original letter, see Appendix No. 26.

on board his ships, presumed to be 10 of the line, ready for sea in the road. If seamen are wanted, the corvettes are to be disarmed, and pressgangs sent to the port of Marseilles. The orders about the employment of shells for the 36-pounders in the Brest fleet are here repeated, with an assurance that, if fired at a distance of not more than 200 or 300 toises, they will produce a much greater effect upon the hull of a ship than cannon-balls.\*

M. La Touche-Tréville is then directed, after having, if possible, deceived Lord Nelson as to his destination, to put to sea, pass the Straits, sail wide of Ferrol to avoid being seen by the blockading squadron, and arrive off Rochefort; where he is to be joined by the six sail of the line, including the new ship *Achille* then expected to be ready, in that port. With his 16 sail of the line and 11 frigates, the vice-admiral is then to proceed off Boulogne, either doubling Ireland, or otherwise, as circumstances may warrant. The Brest fleet, composed of 23 sail of the line, with a strong body of troops on board, is in the mean time to draw off the attention of Admiral Cornwallis, and to oblige him to keep close to the coast of Bretagne, to be ready to intercept it on its supposed route to the westward. The further destination of M. La Touche-Tréville is left to be communicated to him, when he arrives in the neighbourhood of Boulogne; which, Napoléon conjectures, will be in the course of September, admitting the fleet to have sailed from Toulon, as he trusts it will, about the 28th of July.

For 16 or 17 days previous to the date last mentioned, a succession of heavy gales of wind had rendered it very difficult for Lord Nelson to keep his station; especially as scarcely more than half his ships were in a seaworthy state.† On the 19th of July the *Ambuscade* frigate, with eight sail of transports, joining from England, Lord Nelson wore and stood for the gulf of Palma, with the double object of unloading the transports and of sheltering the fleet. The station off Toulon, in the mean time, was left in charge of Captain William Hargood, of the *Belleisle*, having in company the *Fisgard* and *Niger* frigates, the *Acheron* bomb-vessel, and two transports.

On the 20th of August, when the violence of the wind had driven these ships out of sight of the shore, five French sail of the line and six frigates, under the orders of Rear-admiral Dumanoir-le-Pellé, in the *Formidable* 80, sailed out of Toulon, for the sole purpose, as alleged, of practising manœuvres. The division cruised within six or seven leagues of the port until the 5th, when the *Belleisle* and her consorts, making their appearance, were telegraphed by the signal-posts on Cape Sepet as six sail of the line, "six vaisseaux ennemis;" and the *Neptune*, of 80 guns, "pour rendre la partie égale," went out and joined M. Dumanoir.

\*Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., p. 193.

†See p. 214.

So states the letter which M. La Touche-Tréville thought it worth while to send to his government on so important an occasion.

On the 7th, the French squadron returned to Toulon, and the Belleisle and her five highly-honoured companions approached near enough to count seven of the ships standing in the harbour. On the 8th, in the evening, the Belleisle reconnoitred the port, and observed 10 sail of the line, six frigates, and one brig, at anchor in the road. On the same day, Lord Nelson, with his fleet, anchored in a bay in the island of Pulla; where, he had been informed, excellent fresh water could easily be procured. "A very fine watering-place," says his lordship in his diary, "found by Captain Hillyar, about five miles to the westward of Porto-Torres, with the springs about 200 yards from the beach, where 40 casks may be filled at the same time."

On the 10th, the Vice-admiral\* weighed and put to sea; but, having by a severe gale of wind been blown under Cape San-Sebastian, was not able, until the 26th, to reconnoitre Toulon. In the outer harbour, the Victory counted 20 ship-rigged vessels, including 10 sail of the line; and in the inner harbour, 11 sail of the line and one frigate.

On the 18th of August, in the night, Vice-admiral La Touche-Tréville died on board the Bucentaure;† and the command of the fleet, until a successor should be appointed by Buonaparte, devolved upon Admiral Dumanoir-le-Pelley, whose flag, as already stated, was flying on board the 80-gun ship Formidable. The British fleet outside of Toulon, although the Conqueror, Spencer, and Tigre, had joined, still consisted of only 10 sail of the line, the Gibraltar, Kent, and Triumph, having parted company. Even had Lord Nelson's force been less, or the blockade of the port actually raised, the French rear-admiral, as will presently appear, had received no orders to quit port.

In a letter from Napoléon to his minister of marine at Brest, of date September 29, are contained directions, that Vice-admiral Villeneuve, then appointed to the command of, and supposed to have already joined, the Toulon fleet, should quit the road, if possible, before the 21st of October, having previously received on board about 6500 troops under General Lauriston. The fleet, stated to consist of 11 ships of the line and seven or eight frigates, was to sail out of the Mediterranean, call for the Aigle, detach two of its fastest sailers, along with four frigates and two brigs, having on board 1800 troops, to relieve Spanish detachments at Gorée, ravage the British settlements on the coast of Africa, and capture the island of Saint-Helen, wanted

On the first of the month, Lord Nelson had changed his flag from blue to red, as Sir Richard Bickerton had from white to red.

The French papers say he died in consequence of walking so often up to the signal-post upon Sepet, to watch us."—*Letter of Lord Nelson, in Clarke and Gordon's Voy. li. p. 367.*

as a dépôt for the French cruisers and their prizes in that quarter of the globe; while, with 10 sail of the line and frigates, and the remainder of the troops, M. Villeneuve was to sail for Cayenne. Having there taken on board the celebrated General Victor Hugues, the French admiral was to proceed off Surinam, and effect a junction with a squadron of five sail of the line and four frigates, under Rear-admiral Missiessy, M. Villeneuve's successor at Rochefort; and who, it was supposed, would already have fulfilled the first part of his mission. This was, with 3500 men under General Legrange, to proceed to Martinique and Guadeloupe; and, after leaving 1000 men at each of those islands, to attempt, with the remaining 1500, the capture of the island of Dominique, and, if possible, of Sainte-Lucie. Having garrisoned the captured islands, Rear-admiral Missiessy was to proceed off Surinam, and await the arrival of Admiral Villeneuve; who, with his force now augmented to 15 sail of the line, seven or eight frigates, and full 5000 men, was to possess himself of Surinam, and the other Dutch colonies in this quarter. That done, the French admiral was to place under contribution all the British West-India islands, enter the different roadsteads, and capture or burn the vessels lying there; leaving in the Antilles, purposely to harass British commerce, the greater part of his corvettes, of which as many as possible were to quit Toulon with the expedition. He was, next, to leave 1200 men with General Ferrand at the city of Santo-Domingo, raise the blockade of Ferrol, and, taking out the five ships in that port, appear off Rochefort with 20 sail of the line. Here Vice-admiral Villeneuve would receive directions at what point he was to join Vice-admiral Ganteaume at his 30 sail of the line,\* in order to fulfil the ultimate object in view, the descent upon England.

Napoléon, it appears, had wavered in his choice of an admiral for the Toulon command between MM. Bruix, Villeneuve, and Rosily. Owing to this or to some other delay, Vice-admiral Villeneuve did not hoist his flag on board the Bucentaure until the 6th of November, a few days anterior to which Lord Nelson had retired to his station from Agincourt sound; whither, since the 18th of the preceding month, the want of wood, water, and provisions, had driven the British fleet. On the night of the 14th of November Lord Nelson received intelligence of the seizure of the Spanish frigates, and had, in consequence, a part of his attention directed to a squadron of five or six sail of the line at anchor in Cartagena. On the 25th of December the Swiftsure joined Lord Nelson; and on the 31st, in the evening, the British fleet, owing to the absence of the superb, reduced again to 10 sail of the line, besides two frigates and a bomb-vessel, cruised about six leagues to the southward and eastward

\* See p. 217.

of Cape San-Sebastian. The French fleet in the outer road of Toulon, now increased to 11 sail of the line and seven or eight frigates, had since the 12th of the month been embarking the troops allotted for the intended expedition, and was ready for a start, the moment a fair wind and a clear offing should afford the opportunity.

By the *Swiftsure*, or some small vessel that joined on the same day, Lord Nelson received despatches from the admiralty, respecting the conduct he was to pursue towards the Spaniards. The despatches were dated September 19, and directed him to take such measures of precaution only, as might be necessary for opposing or counteracting any hostile attempts of the Spaniards against the British dominions or trade. He was, however, not to suffer any act of hostility or aggression, with the exception of detaining Spanish ships with treasure on board, to be committed by his fleet until he received further orders, or had obtained positive information from unquestionable authority of hostilities having been committed by the Spaniards against the English. Additional directions, dated September 25, ordered the captains and commanders of the Mediterranean fleet to keep a vigilant look-out, and to detain Spanish ships or vessels laden with military stores. On November 25, lest any misapprehension might arise, further instructions were sent out not to detain, in the first instance, any ship belonging to his catholic majesty, sailing from a port of Spain, but to require the commander to return directly to the port whence he came; and, only in the event of his refusing to comply with such requisition, was the admiral to detain and send the vessel to Gibraltar or England: he was further directed not to detain any homeward-bound Spanish ship of war, unless she should have treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever.

#### LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

At the distance of rather less than a mile from the south-west end of the island of Martinique, or *Pointe du Diamant*, and about six miles south-east from the entrance to the harbour or bay of *Fort-Royal*, stands the *roche du Diamant*, or *Diamond rock*, in latitude  $14^{\circ} 24'$  north, longitude  $61^{\circ} 6'$  west. In height, as measured by a quadrant, it is 600 feet; in circumference rather less than a mile; and "in form very much resembling a round haystack." The south side of the rock is inaccessible, it being so flat steep, like a wall, but sloping a little towards the top. The east and the south-west sides are also inaccessible: the first has an overhanging cave about 300 yards high, and the other several caves of great magnitude. The west side, where breakers run into the sea, affords the only landing. But even this landing is not at all times practicable, on account of the surf; and a

person, when he has landed, has to creep through crannies, and over dangerous steepes, until he reaches the north-west side, where the eye is suddenly relieved by a sloping grove of wild fig-trees.

In the latter end of the year 1803 the British 74-gun ship *Centaur*, Captain Murray Maxwell, bearing the broad pendant of Commodore Samuel Hood, was cruising off Fort-Royal bay, to watch the port and intercept the vessels bound in or out of it. Finding that, as the *Diamond* had deep water all round, many vessels escaped capture by running inside of it, Captain Hood determined to take possession of and fortify the rock; and make it a sort of *dépôt*, or stationary ship of war, whence boats could be detached to harass the enemy's trade. A landing was effected; and in the course of the month of January, 1804, with incredible difficulty, five of the *Centaur's* guns, three long 24 and two 18 pounders, were mounted in different parts of this stupendous rock. The mode of getting them from the ship to an eminence so much higher than her mast-heads was characteristic and ingenious: a cable was made fast by one end to the ship and by the other to the rock, along which passed a traveller, or running loop; to this was suspended the cannon, or whatever else it was desirous to remove, and which, by means of suitable tackles, was dragged up the acclivity of the cable to the summit of the rock. "Were you to see," says a writer, who was on the spot, "how, along a dire, and, I had almost said, a perpendicular acclivity, the sailors are hanging in clusters, hauling up a four-and-twenty pounder by hawsers, you would wonder; they appear like mice hauling a little sausage: scarcely can we hear the governor on the top of the rock directing them with his trumpet, the *Centaur* lying close under it, like a cocoa-shell, to which the hawsers are affixed."

One of the 24-pounders, fitted upon a circular carriage, commanded the landing place, and would reach in an eastern direction nearly across the bay of Marin. Another was mounted upon the north-east side, and the third 24 about midway up the rock. Upon the summit, which commands an immense distance, were mounted the two 18-pounders. As soon as these guns were all mounted, and a sufficient quantity of powder and shot for their use was brought from the *Centaur*, Lieutenant James W. *Kes* Maurice, of that ship, with the rank of commander, and a crew of 120 men and boys, for whom a four months' supply of provisions and water had also been landed, hoisted his pendant on board the British "sloop of war"† *Diamond-rock*.

On the evening of the 3d of February four boats, containing 60 seamen and 12 marines, under the orders of Lieutenant Robert Carthew Reynolds, of the *Centaur*, then at her old

\* Naval Chronicle, vol. xii., p. 206.

† So registered in the navy-lists.

station off the *Diamond*, were detached to attempt the capture of the French brig-corvette *Curieux*, Capitaine de frégate Joseph-Marie-Emmanuel Cordier, of 16 long 6-pounders and (supposed to have been about 100, but with only, as admitted) 70 men, lying at anchor close under Fort-Edouard at the entrance of the Carénage, Fort-Royal harbour, Martinique, victualled for three months, and all ready for a start to sea. Although the suspicion that an attack might be made by a part of the blockading force had led to every commendable precaution to prevent surprise; such as, loading the carriage-guns with grape, and the swivels (of which there were eight) and wall-pieces with musket-balls, spreading on the quarterdeck and in the arm-chest the muskets, sabres, pistols, tomahawks, and pikes, filling the cartouch-boxes, placing, as sentries, one marine at each gangway-ladder, one at each bow, and two at the stern, tracing up the boarding-nettings, and directing a sharp look-out to be kept by every officer and man of the watch (28 in number), yet was the *Curieux*, owing to the vigour of the onset and the hour chosen for making the attack, unapprized of her enemy's approach until too late to offer a successful resistance.

At about three quarters of an hour past midnight, after a hard pull of 20 miles, and just as the moon was peeping from behind a cloud, the *Centaur's* boats were hailed by the *Curieux*, and then fired into by the sentries, by two of the starboard 6-pounders, a swivel, and a wall-piece. The 12 marines returned the fire with their muskets, and the boats pulled rapidly on. In the midst of a scuffle alongside, the barge pushed for the brig's stern. Here hung a rope-ladder, to which two boats were fast. Lieutenant Reynolds, and a seaman named Richard Templeton, ascended by it to the taffrail, and, in defiance of the swivels and wall-pieces mounted at this end of the vessel, were quickly followed by the rest of the barge's crew. In his way up the ladder, Lieutenant Reynolds, with admirable coolness, cut away one of the tracing-lines with his sword, whereby the corner of the netting fell, and thus enabled the three remaining boats to board on the brig's quarter.

Since the first alarm had been given, all the *Curieux's* officers and men, headed by their brave commander, had been at their quarters; and a sanguinary combat now ensued, in which the French officers took a much more active part than a portion of their men. The French, however, were soon overpowered: some were killed or badly wounded; others thrown down the hatchway; and the remainder, finding themselves abandoned, retreated to the forecastle. Here a line of pikes stood opposed to the British; but all was unavailable. Handspikes and the butt-ends of muskets became formidable weapons in the hands of the latter, and soon laid the captain and most of the officers near him prostrate on the deck. The majority of the surviving crew having by this time fled below, all further resistance pre-

sently ceased. The British were not long in cutting the cables of their prize, nor in unfurling her sails ; and, in a very few minutes, the *Curieux*, in the hands of her new masters, stood out of Fort-Royal harbour. A smart fire was successively opened from Fort Edouard, a battery on Pointe Negro, and another at Pointe Soloman, but the brig passed clear, and, long before break of day, was at anchor by the side of the *Centaur*.

It was an additional cause of congratulation to the British, that their loss of men, considering the magnitude of the enterprise, was small, consisting of only nine wounded. Three of the number, it is true, were officers ; Lieutenant Reynolds, the gallant leader of the party, his able second, Lieutenant George Edmund Byron Bettesworth, and Mr. John Tracy, a midshipman. The two latter were not badly wounded ; but the first-named officer had received no fewer than five severe, and, as they eventually proved, mortal wounds : one of the seamen, also, died of his wounds. The loss on the part of the French was very serious. The *Curieux* had one midshipman and nine petty officers, seamen, and marines killed, and 30, including all her commissioned officers but one midshipman, wounded, many of them severely, and some mortally. The French captain had a singular escape : after having been knocked down and stunned, he was thrown overboard, but fell on the fluke of the anchor, whence he dropped into one of the *Curieux's* boats which was alongside, full of water-casks. The only man in the boat immediately cut her adrift, and pulled for the shore ; and Captain Cordelier, on recovering his senses, was as much chagrined as surprised at the novelty of his situation.

The *Curieux* had long been at sea, and was considered to be one of the best-manned and best-disciplined brigs in the French navy. Some of her crew were undoubtedly panic-struck ; but the time, and the suddenness of the attack, coupled with its resistless impetuosity, may serve in part for their excuse. The determined behaviour of the French officers excited the admiration of their opponents ; and Lieutenant Louis-Ange Cheminant, and Enseigne de vaisseau Jean-Joseph-Maurice Joly (both wounded), as likewise was their brave commander, particularly distinguished themselves. The conduct of the British upon the occasion speaks for itself.

Commodore Hood, very considerably, despatched the *Curieux* to Fort-Royal as a flag of truce with the wounded Frenchmen ; and Vice-admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, the governor-general of the island, with a proper sense of the act, sent back his acknowledgments. Upon her return, the *Curieux*, under her French name, became a British sloop of war, and was given to the officer who had headed the party that captured her ; but Captain Reynolds's wounds were of too severe a nature to admit of his taking the immediate charge of his new command. This



gallant young officer, indeed, breathed his last in the early part of the ensuing September.

The following passage occurs in a translated copy (all, we believe, that has been published) of Lieutenant Cheminant's letter to Governor Villaret: "I render justice to the English; they not only afforded the last military honours to the midshipman Bourgonnière, but they afforded the most particular assistance to the wounded, and not the value of a handkerchief was taken from the crew."

On the 5th of February, at 3 P.M., the British 12-gun schooner *Eclair* (18-pounder carronades), Lieutenant William Carr, while cruising about 68 leagues to the northward of the island of Tortola, saw and immediately chased a strange sail to the southward. In about half an hour the stranger was discovered to be a ship standing towards the *Eclair*. At 4 P.M., having by the usual mode of signalling ascertained that the vessel approaching her was an enemy, the schooner shortened sail and cleared for action. At 4 h. 30 m. the ship, which from subsequent information was the celebrated French privateer *Grand-Décidé*, Captain Mathieu Gov, of 22 long 8-pounders, and a complement including 80 soldiers, of about 220 men, being within musket-shot on the larboard and weather bow of the *Eclair*, hauled up her courses, hove to, and hoisted French colours. When within pistol-shot, the *Grand-Décidé* commenced the action, by discharging her larboard broadside and a heavy fire of musketry, and received in return the larboard broadside of the schooner. The *Eclair* then wore round and fired her starboard broadside. In this manner the action continued, without intermission on either side, until 5 h. 15 m. P.M.; when the French ship slackened her fire, filled, and bore up, as if intending to rake the schooner; but, instead of doing so, the privateer ceased firing, and made all sail to the northward. The *Eclair* instantly filled, and made sail in chase. At 7 P.M. the *Grand-Décidé* was getting away fast, and by 8 h. 30 m. had run entirely out of sight.

In this truly gallant exploit, the *Eclair*, out of her 60 men and boys, lost one marine killed and four seamen wounded, and had her standing and running rigging cut to pieces, and her barricade, masts, and yards much damaged. That a ship so powerful in guns and men as the *Grand-Décidé*, should, in a 45 minutes' engagement, have done no more execution in personnel, is as extraordinary, as that she should have ultimately fled from a vessel so much her inferior in guns, complement, and size. It was, however, established, to the entire satisfaction of Commodore Hood, that the privateer was the *Grand-Décidé* from Guadaloupe and that she was so armed and manned. The gallantry of Lieutenant Carr in attacking such a vessel, and the ability and determination displayed by him, his officers, and crew,

throughout a contest which, in spite of the inequality of force, terminated so creditably to the *Eclair*, merited all the praise called forth upon the occasion.

On the 5th of March, at 2 p.m., the *Eclair*, still commanded by Lieutenant Carr, while passing Englishman's Head, Guadeloupe, discovered a schooner, which shortly afterwards hoisted a red pendant, stood into the Hayes, and anchored close under some batteries on the shore. Upon a nearer approach, Lieutenant Carr ascertained that the vessel was a French privateer, filled with men: and he would then have sent in the cutter to attack her, had not the wind from the westward blown fresh on the shore. At 7 p.m. it fell calm; and the cutter commanded by Mr. John Salmon, the master, having under him Mr. John B. Douglas, the surgeon (also a volunteer), and 10 seamen, quitted the *Eclair*, and proceeded towards the harbour in which the privateer lay.

Notwithstanding a smart fire from the battery at the entrance of the harbour, and from the vessel herself, the master persevered, and after a stout resistance of 10 minutes, boarded and carried the French privateer-schooner *Rose*, of one long brass-8-pounder on a pivot, and 49 men, well armed and fully prepared. Of these the privateer had five men killed, and 10, including the captain and four that jumped overboard, wounded. Of the 12 officers and men, who had in so gallant a manner effected this capture not one was hurt. The master's next difficulty was, in a dead calm, to carry off his prize. This he and his men at length did, by dint of towing and sweeping; and, although exposed to a fire of great guns and musketry from the shore, reached their vessel without the slightest accident. The *Rose* was well found, and victualled complete for a three months' cruise, upon which she was just going to sail, when the *Eclair's* boat so gallantly intercepted her.

On the 31st of January, Commodore Nathaniel Dance, of the honourable East-India company's service, sailed from Canton for Europe with the following 16 regular Indiamen, all of which are denominated "1200-ton ships," the registered tonnage of most however, exceeds 1300, and in some cases amounts to 1500 tons:

Earl-Camden.....	Nathaniel Dance,
Warley .....	Henry Wilson,
Alfred .....	James Farquharson,
Royal-George .....	John Fam Timmins,
Coutts .....	Robert Torin,
Wexford .....	Wm. Stanley Clarke,
Ganges .....	William Moffat,
Exeter .....	Henry Meriton,
Earl-of-Abergavenny .....	John Wordsworth,
Henry-Addington.....	John Kirkpatrick,
Bombay-Castle .....	Arch. Hamilton,
Cumberland .....	Wm. Ward Farrer,

Hope .....	Jas. Pendergrass,
Dorsetshire .....	Rob. Hunter Brown,
Warren-Hastings .....	Thomas Larkins,
Ocean .....	Jno. Christ. Lochner,

also 11 country-ships, one Botany-bay and one Portuguese ship, and a fast-sailing armed brig, the Ganges, in the company's service ; total, 59 ships and one brig.

On the 14th of February, at 8 A. M., Pulo-Auro in sight and bearing west-south-west, the Royal-George made the signal for seeing four strange sail in the south-west. Commodore Dance immediately signalled the Alfred, Royal-George, Bombay-Castle, and Hope, to go down and examine the strangers : and Lieutenant Robert Fowler, late commander of the British armed store-ship Porpoise (wrecked in the preceding August), and at this time a passenger on board the Earl-Camden, volunteered to go in the Ganges brig, on the same service. The signals of the look-out ships soon apprized the commodore that the strange vessels were a French squadron, consisting of a line-of-battle ship, three frigates, and a brig. They were, in fact, the 74-gun ship Marengo, Captain Joseph-Marie Vignaud, 40-gun frigate Belle-Poule, Captain Alain-Adélaïde-Marie Bruilhac, 36-gun frigate Sémillante, Captain Léonard-Bernard Motard, 22-gun corvette Berceau, Captain Emmanuel Halgan, and the Batavian 16-gun brig-corvette Aventurier, which Rear-admiral Linois, whose flag was on board the Marengo, had borrowed from the colonial government at Batavia and commissioned by one of his lieutenants. On the 10th of the preceding December, it will be remembered the Marengo and her three consorts anchored in the road of Batavia.\* Thence they sailed on the 28th, accompanied by the Aventurier, and stored with six months' provisions, on purpose to look after the China fleet, of whose strength and time of departure Rear-admiral Linois had, as he declares, been duly informed.

At 1 P. M. the British commodore recalled the look-out ships, and formed the line of battle in close order. Admiral Linois, as soon as he could fetch in the wake of the British fleet, which he knew to be that expected from China, put about. The ships of the latter continued their course under easy sail ; and, as the French were now close astern, Commodore Dance expected his rear to be attacked, and prepared to support it ; but, at night-fall, the French ships, preferring a daylight action, hauled close to the wind. The Ganges brig was sent to station the country-ships on the lee bow of the armed Indiamen, and, having done so, returned with some volunteers for the latter.

The British ships lay to all night, the men at their quarters. At daybreak on the 15th the French, having made a proper use of the intermediate time, were about three miles to windward,

also lying to. M. Linois in his letters says, "If the bold front put on by the enemy in the daytime had been intended as a ruse to conceal his weakness, he would have profited by the darkness of the night to endeavour to conceal his escape; and in that case I should have taken advantage of his manœuvres. But I soon became convinced that this security was not feigned; three of his ships constantly kept their lights up, and the fleet continued to lie to, in order of battle, throughout the night. This position facilitated my gaining the wind, and enabled me to observe the enemy closely."\*

Both parties now hoisted their colours. Three of Commodore Dance's principal ships and the armed brig hoisted blue ensigns; the remainder of the fleet, red; and the whole of the China ships, having been recently painted, cut rather an imposing figure. This circumstance, coupled with the information that only 23 ships and a brig had quitted Canton, led, as he states, M. Linois to believe, that the three supernumerary ships formed the escort to the fleet. Admitting this to have been the fact, the French admiral was justified in making his advance with caution. At 9 A. M., observing that the enemy's men of war did not come down, the Indiamen formed in order of sailing, and continued their course under an easy sail upon the starboard tack; whereupon the three French ships and Batavian brig filled on the opposite tack, and edged away towards the merchant fleet.

At 1 P. M., finding that M. Linois intended to cut off his rear, Commodore Dance made the signal to tack in succession, bear down in line ahead, and engage on arriving abreast of the enemy. The manœuvre was correctly executed, the Royal-George leading, followed successively, in close order, by the Ganges, Earl-Camden, Warley, Alfred, and others. Thus formed, and carrying topgallantsails, the British ships stood towards the French ships; and these, carrying royals, and some of them topgallant studding-sails, were keeping more away to facilitate the junction.

At about 1 h. 15 m. P. M. the French admiral opened his fire upon the Royal-George and the ships next astern of her. The Royal-George returned the fire in a very spirited manner, and was ably seconded, as they came up, by the Ganges and Earl-Camden. The Warley and Alfred were the next ships that got into action. The Royal-George was engaged about 40 minutes, and fired about eight or nine broadsides; the Ganges, about 35 minutes, and fired seven or eight; the Earl-Camden, about 25 minutes, and may have fired five broadsides; and the Warley and Alfred, who came into action nearly together, were engaged about 15 minutes. After the mutual cannonade had lasted in this way just 43 minutes, the Marengo and her consorts ceased

\*See Appendix, No. 27.

firing, hauled their wind, and stood away under all sail to the eastward.

At 2 P. M. the Earl-Camden made the signal for a general chase, and the Indiamen pursued the French admiral until 4 P. M.; when, considering the immense property at stake, and fearing that his charge might be carried too far from the mouth of the Straits of Malacca, Commodore Dance made the signal to tack, which was immediately obeyed. At 8 A. M. the British ships anchored in a situation to enter the Straits in the morning, and soon lost sight of the squadron of M. Linois. The following is the French admiral's account of the defeat which he acknowledges to have experienced. "The headmost enemy's ship, having sustained some damage, bore away; but, supported by those astern, again brought her broadside to bear, and, as well as the others, kept up a very spirited fire. The ships which had tacked rejoined those which were engaging us, and three of the first engaged ships manœuvred to double our rear, while the remainder of the fleet, crowding sail and bearing up, evinced an intention to surround us.\* By this manœuvre the enemy would have rendered my situation very dangerous. The superiority of his force was ascertained, and I had no longer to deliberate upon the part I should take to avoid the consequences of an unequal engagement: profiting by the smoke, I hauled up to port, and steering east-north-east, I increased my distance from the enemy, who continued the pursuit of the squadron for three hours, discharging at it several ineffective broadsides."†

The Royal-George had one man killed and one wounded, and received several shot in the hull, and more in her sails; comparatively trifling casualties, considering that she bore the brunt of the action, and was so long engaged. Few shot touched either the Ganges or the Earl-Camden; and no other loss or damage appears to have been sustained by the British during this three-quarters of an hour's partial cannonade. The fire of the Royal-George, and the three or four ships in her wake, being chiefly directed at the rigging of the French ships, did not, according to M. Linois, injure a person on board of them.

With respect to the armament of the 16 Indiamen thus drawn up in line-of-battle, they carried from 30 to 36 guns each; but the strongest of them was not a match for the *Sémillante*, and some of them would have found it difficult to avoid yielding to the *Berceau*. Some of the ships carried upon the main-deck 26 medium 18-pounders, or "cannonades," weighing about 28 cwt. and of very little use: guns of this description,

\* We do not understand what is meant by this, and yet the account clearly so states, thus: "*Trois de ceux qui avaient des premiers pris part à l'action, manœuvraient pour nous doubler à l'arrière, tandis que le reste de la flotte, se couvrant de voile, et laissant arriver, annonçait le projet de nous envelopper.*"

† See Appendix, No. 28.

indeed, have long since been exploded. Ten 18-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck made up the 36 guns. Others of the ships, and those among the largest, mounted long 12 and 6 pounders. No one of the crews, we believe, exceeded 140 men, and that number included Chinese, Jascars, &c. Moreover, in fitting the ships, so much more attention had been paid to stowage than to the means of attack and defence, that one and sometimes two butts of water were lashed between the guns, and the decks in general greatly lumbered. Of the force of the French ships it will be sufficient to say that the *Marengo*, *Belle-Poule*, and *Sémillante* were armed as Nos. 4, 5, and 7 in the small table at p. 54 of the first volume. The force of the *Berceanu* has already appeared,\* and that of the brig is too insignificant to notice.

The promptitude and firmness of Commodore Dance and his brave associates undoubtedly saved from capture a rich and valuable fleet. The slightest indecision in him or them would have encouraged the French admiral to persevere in his attack; and, had he done so, no efforts, however gallant and judicious, could have prevented a part of the fleet at least from falling into his hands. It would be uncharitable to call in question the courage of Rear-admiral Linois: one must therefore suppose that it was, as he has stated, the warlike appearance of those 16 ships, the regularity of their manœuvres, and the boldness of their advance, that led the French admiral to doubt whether a part of them were not national cruisers; more especially, as it was an uncommon occurrence, during a war, for an East-India fleet to be without the protection of one or more powerful king's ships.

The commanders, officers, and crews of the respective ships, that had thus distinguished themselves, were liberally rewarded by the East-India Company, as well as by the committee for managing the Patriotic Fund.† Commodore Dance, also, as he well merited, received from his late majesty the honour of knighthood. Among the sums of money voted to Sir Nathaniel were 5000*l.* by the Bombay Insurance Society; and the answer of thanks returned by the commodore contains the following passage: "Placed, by the adventitious circumstances of se-

\* See p. 54.

† This truly named "Patriotic Fund," originated at a meeting of the subscribers to Lloyd's Coffee-house, held on the 20th of July, 1803, Brook Watson, esq. in the chair. The object is explained in the third resolution: "That to animate the efforts of our defenders by sea and land, it is expedient to raise, by the patriotism of the community at large, a suitable fund for their comfort and relief—for the purpose of assuaging the anguish of their wounds, or palliating, in some degree the more weighty misfortune of the loss of limbs—of alleviating the distresses of the widow and orphan—of smoothing the brow of sorrow for the fall of dearest relatives, the props of unhappy indigence or helpless age—and of granting pecuniary rewards, or honourable badges of distinction, for successful exertions of valour or merit."

niority of service and absence of convoy, in the chief command of the fleet intrusted to my care, it has been my good fortune to have been enabled, by the firmness of those by whom I was supported, to perform my trust not only with fidelity, but without loss to my employers. Public opinion and public rewards have already far outrun my deserts; and I cannot but be sensible that the liberal spirit of my generous countrymen has measured what they are pleased to term their grateful sense of my conduct, rather by the particular utility of the exploit, than by any individual merit I can claim." Here is an instance of modesty and candour, as exemplary as it is rare; and which sheds an additional lustre upon the character of Sir Nathaniel Dance.

On the 19th of February the British 14-gun brig-sloop *Drake*, under the temporary command of Lieutenant William King of the *Centaur*, while cruising off the port of Trinité on the north side of the island of Martinique, discovered in the harbour, taking in cargoes in defiance of the blockade, two American brigs and a schooner, moored within pistol-shot of a fort mounting three French 24-pounders. Being determined to make an attempt to cut out these vessels, Lieutenant King despatched the boats of the *Drake*, under the orders of Lieutenant William Cumpston, assisted by Mr. William Robson, the master, upon that service. The three American vessels were gallantly boarded and taken possession of, in the face of a heavy fire from the fort, and from two field-pieces; but, having no wind, Lieutenant Cumpston and his party could only succeed in bringing out the schooner, which was accomplished without loss.

On the night of the 24th Lieutenant King himself, with 21 seamen and nine marines, landed and spiked the guns at the fort and the two field-pieces, with the loss of one seaman killed, and Lieutenant Cumpston and one seaman slightly wounded.

On the night of the 4th of March the barge and pinnace of the 74-gun ship *Blenheim*, Captain William Ferris, having on board 50 officers and men under the orders of Lieutenant Thomas Furber, made a most gallant but unsuccessful attempt to cut out the French national schooner *Curieuse*, lying chain-moored close under a fort at the town of St. Pierre. The schooner had made very formidable preparations, having rigged out her sweeps on each side, traced her boarding-nettings to her lower masts-heads, and there fastened them in the securest manner. Notwithstanding all this, and a heavy fire of great guns and musketry, as well from the schooner herself, as from a party of soldiers drawn up on the beach, from the neighbouring forts, and from an armed sloop and several smaller vessels, Lieutenant Furber and those under him gallantly boarded and carried the *Curieuse*; but, no sooner were her cables cut, than the schooner, held fast by the chain, swang round and grounded upon the beach. The severe loss now sustained obliged Lieutenant Furber to desist from any further attempts; and the two boats

got back to the *Blenheim*, with one seaman, and two marines killed, five officers (names not reported), 11 seamen, and three marines wounded, and three seamen missing.

On the morning of the 13th of March the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Emerald*, Captain James O'Brien, observed a French privateer-schooner, on account of inability to work up to St.-Pierre's, run in and anchor close under a battery at Seron, just within the Pearl rock at the western extremity of Martinique. As the frigate herself, being considerably to leeward, was unable to reach the spot in time, Captain O'Brien despatched the armed sloop *Fort-Diamond*, with Lieutenant Thomas Forrest and 30 volunteers, to attempt the service; and, in order to take off the attention of the battery from the movements of the sloop, he sent in a different direction the frigate's boats, joined by two from the 44-gun ship *Pandour*, which had just hove in sight.

Having reached the anchorage, Lieutenant Forrest dashed in, and laid the French schooner on board, the crew of which, amounting to about 60 whites and blacks, after discharging her broadside and a volley of musketry, fled over the side to the shore. By the force with which the *Fort-Diamond* struck the schooner, the chain, by which the latter had fastened herself to the shore, was broke, and about 20 feet of it remained hanging at her bows. The prize proved to be the privateer *Mosambique*, armed with ten 18-pounder carronades, commanded by Captain Vallentes, and fitted for a three months' cruise. This very gallant exploit was performed with so trifling a loss, as one master's mate (Mr. Hall) and one seaman wounded.

On the 14th of March, in the morning, the British brig-sloop *Drake*, still commanded by Lieutenant William King, cruising off Englishman's Head, island of Guadeloupe, fell in with a French privateer-schooner, and a large ship in company, apparently her prize, but was unable to overtake either until the ship ran herself on shore near the batteries of the Hayes. The *Drake* now endeavoured to cut off the schooner; but, having had her main topmast shot away and her rigging much damaged, was unable to effect her object. About this time another ship hove in sight in the offing, and appeared to be steering as if also with the intention to run on shore. Despatching two boats, under the orders of Mr. Robson the master, to watch the first ship, now observed to be again afloat, with directions to attack her, should she endeavour to escape, Lieutenant King made sail after and recaptured the ship in the offing, an English merchantman, valuably laden.

The *Drake's* two boats, meanwhile, pulled in towards the ship in-shore, the crew of which, except one man who had not time to effect his escape, abandoned her as the former approached. Possession of the ship, which had 18 guns mounted and was very large, was thus easily obtained; but in half an hour she



blew up, killing one master's mate, three seamen, and one marine, and mortally wounding Mr. Robson, who expired a few hours afterwards, and badly wounding several of the small party belonging to the two boats. In all cases, where a vessel is abandoned in this way, treachery should be suspected, and the magazine be quickly examined. There can be little doubt that the fellow who was behind his comrades, had laid the train which produced the fatal explosion.

On the 17th of March the British 16-gun brig-sloop *Penguin*, Captain George Morris, cruising off *Sénégal* bar, chased and drove upon it the French privateer-schooner *Renommée* of 12 long 6-pounders and 87 men, belonging to *Sénégal*. Owing to the continuance of the surf, no opportunity occurred of making an attempt to destroy her until the morning of the 24th. At this time the *Renommée* had shifted her position, from the efforts apparently of two armed schooners, which, since the preceding evening, had dropped down to the mouth of the river, and now lay within 200 yards of her.

Standing as close in as the shoalness of the water would admit, the *Penguin* opened a fire upon the three vessels; but, although shot were exchanged for an hour and a half, the brig could not get near enough to force the two schooners to retire up the river. At 10 P.M., therefore, Captain Morris despatched the jollyboat, under the command of Lieutenant Charles Williams, with directions to endeavour to destroy the grounded schooner; a service which was executed in the ablest manner before 1 A.M. on the 25th, and that without any loss on the part of the British.

On the 23d of March, the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Osprey*, Captain George Younghusband, cruising on the Windward-island station, discovered in the south-west quarter, and immediately chased, the French frigate-built privateer *Egyptienne*, of 36 guns, Captain Placiard, with three merchant ships under her convoy. As soon as the *Osprey* had arrived within hail, the *Egyptienne* hoisted her colours and fired her broadside. This was instantly returned, and the two ships continued in close action for one hour and 20 minutes; at the end of which time the *Egyptienne* ceased firing, and began to make off, and her convoy to separate on different courses. To the regret of the British officers and crew, it was soon found that the French ship, even with her topsails on the cap, outsailed their vessel. The *Osprey*, however, continued the chase, until the *Egyptienne* disappeared in the dark.

The force of the *Osprey* consisted of 16 carronades, 32-pounders and two sixes, with a complement of 120 men and boys: that of the *Egyptienne* was 36 guns, French 12 and 6 pounders, with a crew on board of 248 men. The one ship measured 386,\* and the other, which was formerly the national

\* See vol. ii., p. 396, note Y\*.

frigate *Raillouse*,\* since given or sold to some merchants at Bordeaux, 857 tons. The *Osprey* sustained a loss of one man killed and 16 wounded, and was a good deal damaged in her sails and rigging. The loss on board the *Egyptienne*, as afterwards ascertained, amounted out of a crew of 248 men and boys, to eight men killed and 19 wounded; and the ship herself was very much cut by shot in hull, masts, sails, and rigging: a proof that the *Osprey*'s carronades had been discharged with quickness and precision.

It is exploits like these that afford examples of gallantry in the true import of the word. Had Captain Younghusband, on discovering the size and strength of the *Egyptienne*, forborne to attack her, no imputation would have rested on his professional character. But he had a higher sense of the duties of a British naval commander: he chose to wrestle with his powerful antagonist; and so vigorous and effective was his attack, that nothing but lightness of heel saved the *Egyptienne* from becoming his prize. In such a creditable encounter we must not omit to state, that Lieutenant Francis Augustus Collier was second in command of the *Osprey*.

On the 25th, in the forenoon, this same *Egyptienne* fell in with the British 14-gun ship-sloop *Hippomenes* (ten long 12, and 2 long 8 pounders, and two 24-pounder carronades, all Dutch caliber), Captain Conway Shipley, and mistaking her probably, for the ship she had been so beaten by two days before, crowded sail to get off. The *Hippomenes* pursued, and, after an arduous chase of 54 hours, and a running fight of three hours and 20 minutes more, came up with and captured, the French ship. The *Egyptienne* struck the moment the sloop got fairly alongside; and, owing to her feeble resistance, inflicted no greater loss on the *Hippomenes* than slightly wounding one person, Mr. John Lloyd, a master's mate.

The bold front and rational confidence of the *Egyptienne* in the beginning of the one action, and her panic-struck behaviour and hasty flight in that of the other, occasion the principal difference in the merits of the two. The conduct of Captain Shipley was much enhanced by his readiness to do justice to the performance of his brother-commander of the *Osprey*, "whose gallantry," he says, "astonished them." It is probable that M. Placard found a difficulty in persuading the merchants of Bordeaux again to place him in the command of one of their privateers.

Being 30 years old and much broken in her sheer, the *Egyptienne* was purchased into the British service merely as a prison-ship. Her name was changed to *Antigua*; and she was stationed at English harbour in the island of that name.

On the 24th of March the British ship-sloop *Wolverine*, of 13

\* See vol. i., p. 381.

guns,\* Captain Henry Gordon, being in latitude  $48^{\circ} 15'$  north, and longitude  $23^{\circ} 15'$  west, on her way to Newfoundland with eight merchant vessels under her protection, discovered to the eastward, which was directly to windward, two large sail bearing down for the convoy. At 2 h. 30 m. P. M. the strangers were made out to be vessels of force, and soon afterwards to be enemies. Finding it to be their intention to cut off the rear of the convoy, the *Wolverine* tacked; and, as she stood on between the latter and them, signalled the merchantmen to make the best of their way into port.

At 4 P. M., having arrived within half gun-shot of the large vessel, which was the French frigate-privateer *Blonde*, Captain Aregnaudeau, of 30 guns, including 24 long 8-pounders on the main deck, the *Wolverine* hove to on the starboard tack; whereupon the *Blonde* hauled her wind, and, after firing her broadside, wore, with the intention of raking the *Wolverine*. To frustrate this manœuvre, and to maintain her leeward position, which, on account of the extreme lowness of her ports, and the consequent necessity of using her weather battery, was more advantageous to her, the *Wolverine*, before she discharged a gun, wore also. The *Blonde* then hove to on the *Wolverine*'s larboard beam, within pistol-shot distance, and commenced a heavy and well-directed fire with great guns and small arms; which was returned by the British vessel with considerable spirit, although one of her two long 18-pounders, in being shifted from the starboard to the larboard side, got jammed in the groove, and remained utterly useless. In this way the action continued for 50 minutes; when, having had her rigging and sails cut to pieces, her wheel shot away, and her hull low down, so pierced with shot as to fill the hold with water, the *Wolverine* hauled down her colours.

Out of her complement of 76 men and boys, the *Wolverine* had one midshipman, one boatswain's mate, one quartermaster, and two seamen killed, and 10 seamen wounded, one of them mortally. The *Blonde*, formerly, it is believed, a French national "24-gun corvette" of 580 or 600 tons, out of a complement of 240 men and boys, did not, according to the admission of her officers, sustain any great loss than her first lieutenant mortally, and five of her men slightly wounded. The damage done to the *Blonde* was confined to her rigging and sails, and that comparatively trifling.

In less than a quarter of an hour after the last boat with the prisoners had quitted her, the *Wolverine* gave a heel and went down; thereby affording an irrefragable proof that the ship had been defended to the last extremity, and that her officers and crew were barely saved, by their surrender, from perishing in the

\* For the extraordinary manner in which this sloop was fitted, see vol. ii., p. 314.

deep. The long duration of the action was not without its effect. The second privateer, either from bad sailing or bad management, could not overtake one of the eight merchant vessels; nor could the *Blonde* withdraw herself in time to do more than capture two of the number: the remainder effected their escape.

A 50 minutes' close engagement between two ships so decidedly unequal in force entitled the weaker, although the vanquished party, to at least as much praise, as is usually bestowed upon the victor in a well-matched contest. Had the *Blonde* been a national ship, and even worse armed, worse manned, and worse fought than she was, Captain Gordon and his first lieutenant would have been promoted for their gallantry, and the conduct of all on board the *Wolverine* been held up as an example of the devotedness of British seamen in upholding the honour of their flag, and in protecting the commercial interests of their country. But, as it was a privateer, a "paltry privateer," in the words of the *Annual Register*, which had captured the king's ship, the action of the *Wolverine* and *Blonde* was considered to be discreditable to the former, and therefore not worthy to be recorded in the annals of the British navy. To make success the sole criterion of merit is as unjust, as it is discouraging: where, then, is the stimulus to persevere in an almost hopeless, or even in a barely doubtful cause; and what more can a seaman do, than stand to his gun until his vessel sinks under him?

This is as the account stands in our first edition; and, although not a line of the details here given is to be found in any other publication, we may usefully add the following from the work of a contemporary, published since; and to whom, we believe, that information on the subject was granted which was refused to us. "Captain Gordon, though many years a prisoner, was promoted to the rank of post-captain, and, on his return to England, most honourably acquitted by the sentence of a court-martial."\* The admiralty list informs us, that Captain Gordon was made post on the 8th of April, 1805: it was this lapse of nearly 13 months, and our unacquaintance, for the reason already stated, with the requested particulars of his case, which occasioned us to suppose that Captain Gordon had not been rewarded in the manner he deserved.

On the 26th of March the British 36-gun frigate *Apollo*, Captain John William Taylor Dixon, and 28-gun frigate *Carysfort*, Captain Robert Fanshawe, sailed from the Cove of Cork with 69 merchant vessels under convoy, bound to the West-Indies. On the 2d of April, at 3 A. M., while steering south-

\* *Brenton*, vol. iiii., p. 391. The complement of the *Blonde* is here reduced to "180 men;" but, in confirmation of the accuracy of our account, we may state, that the ship was captured by the British a few months afterwards with 240 men on board.

south-east with a strong south-west gale, to the astonishment of every person on board, the Apollo struck the ground. The ship continued striking very heavily, and making much water: in about 10 minutes, however, the Apollo beat over the shoal, and having lost her rudder, could not be steered. The ship then put before the wind, but, from the quantity of water she had made, and was still making, with every probability of soon foundering. In about five minutes, the Apollo struck the ground again, and continued striking with such tremendous shocks, that it was feared the ship would instantly go to pieces. The three masts were then cut away, and the ship fell on the starboard side with her gunwale under water. The violence with which the ship struck the ground, and the weight of the guns, those on the quarterdeck tearing away the bulwarks, soon made the frigate a perfect wreck abaft: only four or five guns, therefore, could be fired to alarm the convoy and give notice of danger.

Most of the officers and men were entirely naked, the captain among the rest; and who stood upon the cabin skylight grating, holding fast by the stump of the mizenmast, and making use of every soothing expression which could have been suggested to encourage men in so perilous a situation. Daylight, which appeared at about 4 h. 30 m., discovered the land, at the distance of about 200 yards, a long sandy beach reaching to Cape Mondégo, three leagues to the southward. At the same time the melancholy sight presented itself of between 20 and 30 sail of the convoy on shore both to the northward and southward, and several of them perfect wrecks. An appearance of the ship's, parting occasioned the crew, or the 220 that remained (about 20 having perished between decks and otherwise), by the captain's orders to remove to the forepart of the ship; and, soon afterwards, the Apollo parted at the gangways. Several officers and men, who attempted to swim on shore, were drowned. About 30, however, succeeded in reaching the shore upon planks and spars: among them were Lieutenant Edward Harvey, and Mr. Callam, master's mate. The succeeding night was a dreadful one, many old men and boys, including two young midshipmen, dying through hunger and fatigue. During the whole of it Captain Dixon remained upon the bowsprit.

We shall give the remainder of the melancholy details in the words of one of the officers of the ship: "Tuesday morning presented us no better prospect of being relieved from the jaws of death, the wind blowing stronger, and the sea much more turbulent. About noon, this day, our drooping spirits were somewhat raised by seeing Lieutenant Harvey and Mr. Callam hoisting out a boat from one of the merchant ships to come to the assistance of their distressed shipmates. They several times attempted to launch her through the surf, but being a very heavy boat, and the sea on the beach acting so powerfully against them, they could not possibly effect it, though assisted

by nearly 100 of the merchant sailors and Portuguese peasants. Several men went upon rafts this day, made from pieces of the wreck, but not one soul reached the shore; the wind having shifted, and the current setting out, they were all driven to sea; among whom was our captain, who, about three in the afternoon, went on the jib-boom with three seamen; anxious to save the remainder of the ship's company, and too sanguine of getting safe on shore, he ventured upon the spar, saying, on jumping into the sea, 'My lads, I'll save you all.' In a few seconds he lost his hold of the spar, which he could not regain: he drifted to sea, and perished. Such was also the fate of the three brave volunteers who followed his fortune. The loss of our captain, who, until now, had animated the almost lifeless crews; as well as the noble exertions of Lieutenant Harvey and Mr. Callam, to launch the boat, not succeeding, every gleam of hope vanished, and we looked forward for certain death the ensuing night, not only from cold, hunger, and fatigue, but the expectation of the remaining part of the wreck going to pieces every moment. Had not the Apollo been a new and well-built ship, that small portion of her could never have resisted the waves and stuck so well together, particularly as all the after part from the chess-trees was gone, the starboard bow under water, the fore-castle deck nearly perpendicular, the weight of the guns hanging to the larboard bulwark on the inside, and the bower and spare anchors on the outside, which it was not prudent to cut away, as they afforded resting places to a considerable number of men, there being only the fore channels and cathead, where it was possible to live in, and about which were stowed upwards of 150 men: it being impracticable to continue any longer in the head, or upon the bowsprit, by reason of the breakers washing completely over those places. The night drawing on, the wind increasing, frequent showers of rain, the sea washing over us, and looking every instant for the fore-castle giving way, when we must all have perished together, afforded a spectacle truly deplorable, the bare recollection of which even now makes me shudder. The piercing cries of the people this dismal night, at every sea coming over them, which happened every two minutes, were pitiful in the extreme; the water running from the head down all over the body, keeping us continually wet. This shocking night, the remaining strength of every person was exerted for his individual safety. From the crowding so close together in so narrow a compass, and the want of something to moisten their mouths, several poor wretches were suffocated, which frequently reminded me of the black hole, with this only difference, that these poor sufferers were confined by strong walls, we by water; the least movement without clinging fast would have launched us into eternity. Some unfortunate wretches drank salt water, several their own urine, some chewed leather, myself and many more chewed lead, from which we

conceived we found considerable relief, by reason of its drawing the saliva, which we swallowed. In less than an hour after the ship first struck the ground, all the provisions were under water, and the ship a wreck, so that it was impossible to procure any part. After the most painful night that it is possible to conceive, on daylight appearing, we observed Lieutenant Harvey and Mr. Callam again endeavouring to launch the boat. Several attempts were made without success, a number of men belonging to the merchant ships being much bruised and hurt in assisting; alternate hopes and fears now pervaded our wretched minds; fifteen men got safe on shore this morning, on pieces of the wreck.—About three in the afternoon of Wednesday the 4th, we had the inexpressible happiness of seeing the boat launched through the surf, by the indefatigable exertion of the above officers, assisted by the masters of the merchant ships, with a number of Portuguese peasants, who were encouraged by Mr. Whitney, the British consul from Figuiera. All the crew then remaining on the wreck were brought safe on shore, praising God for a happy deliverance from a shipwreck which has never had its parallel. As soon as I stepped out of the boat, I found several persons whose humanity prompted them to offer me sustenance, though improperly, in spirits, which I avoided as much as possible. Our weak state may be conceived, when it is considered that we received no nourishment from Sunday to Wednesday afternoon, and continually exposed to the fury of the watery elements. After eating and drinking a little, I found myself weaker than before, occasioned, I apprehend, from having been so long without either. Some men died soon after getting on shore, from imprudently drinking too large a quantity of spirits. All the crew were in a very weak and exhausted state, the greater part being badly bruised and wounded. About 40 sail of merchant ships were wrecked at the same time on this dreadful beach. Some ships sunk with all their crew, and almost every ship lost from two to twelve men each; yet the situation of the remainder was not equal to that of the frigate's ship's company, as the merchant ships drawing a less draught of water, were mostly driven close on the shore, and no person remained on board them after the first morning. The masters of the merchant ships had tents upon the beach, and some provisions they had saved from the wrecks, which they very generously distributed, and gave every assistance to the Apollo's ship's company."

Fortunately for the remainder of the convoy, Captain Fanshawe, without signal, wore just as it grew dark; and, with all the ships who were near enough to see and adopt her change of course, the Carysfort arrived in safety at Barbadoes. Of the Apollo's crew, 61 officers and men were lost; but the number that perished from the merchant vessels was comparatively insignificant, for the reason already given.

On the 28th of March the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Scorpion*, Captain George Nicholas Hardinge, having been detached by Rear-admiral Thornborough to reconnoitre the Vlie passage into the Texel, discovered two Dutch brig-corvettes at anchor in the road. At the outermost, which was the *Atalante*, of 16 long 12-pounders, Captain Hardinge resolved to make a dash with his boats; an attack by the *Scorpion* herself being impracticable, owing to the numerous shoals that surround the entrance. On the 31st, just as a favourable opportunity occurred, and the men were about to embark, the British 14-gun ship-sloop *Beaver*, Captain Charles Pelly, joined company. The latter, at his urgent request, was permitted to serve under Captain Hardinge; and at 9 h. 30 m. P. M., three boats from the *Scorpion*, and two from the *Beaver*, containing between them about 60 officers and men, pushed off from the first-named sloop.

Having the flood-tide in their favour, the boats, in two hours, arrived alongside of the *Atalante*, who had her boarding-nettings traced up, and was fully prepared to resist the attack. Captain Hardinge was the first man that leaped on board. His boat was promptly supported by the others; and such was the impetuosity of the assault, that many of the Dutchmen quitted their quarters and ran below, "leaving to us," says Captain Hardinge, in a private letter, "the painful duty of combating those whom we respected the most." These, the remainder of a crew on board of 76, after a short but severe conflict, in which they had their commander and three seamen killed, their first lieutenant, two other officers, and eight seamen badly wounded, were overpowered. The British then set about securing the hatches, which the party below, headed by a lieutenant, repeatedly attempted to force. The Dutch officer, however, receiving a desperate wound, his men relaxed their efforts, and at length surrendered. Of the five boats employed, those of the *Scorpion* only sustained any loss; and that was comparatively trifling, amounting to only one lieutenant (Buckland Stirling Bluett), the sloop's master (Woodward Williams), one midshipman (Edmund Jones), and two seamen wounded.

The above private letter from Captain Hardinge contains some interesting particulars, not less illustrative of the writer's gallantry than of his goodness of heart. "The decks," he says, "were slippery in consequence of rain; so that, grappling with my first opponent, a mate of the watch, I fell, but recovering my position, fought him upon equal terms, and killed him. I then engaged the captain, as brave a man as any service ever boasted: he had almost killed one of my seamen. To my shame be it spoken, he disarmed me, and was on the point of killing me, when a seaman of mine," as Captain H. thought at the time, but it was Mr. Williams, the master of the *Scorpion*, "came up, rescued me at the peril of his own life, and enabled me to recover my sword. At this time all the men were come



from the boats, and were in possession of the deck. Two were going to fall upon the captain at once. I ran up, held them back, and then adjured him to accept quarter. With inflexible heroism he disdained the gift, kept us at bay, and compelled us to kill him. He fell, covered with honourable wounds."

Having, in the manner related, possessed themselves of the *Atalante*, the British had another enemy to combat: a sudden gale from an adverse quarter frustrated all their attempts to put to sea from the road. Captain Hardinge now secured his prisoners, stationed his men at the *Atalante's* guns, got the powder on deck, and made every arrangement to attack the other Dutch brig. The dawn of day, however, showed the latter at too great a distance to be approached, especially as the gale had not in the least abated. In this perilous state the British remained for 48 hours; during which, two of their boats had broken adrift, and two others had swamped alongside of the *Atalante*. At length, the wind again shifting, the *Atalante* made a push to get out; but the two captains found the navigation so difficult, that it was three days ere they could accomplish their object.

This, in all its bearings, was an exploit worthy of British seamen; and every admirer of meritorious conduct will be pleased to learn, that the officer who had so judiciously planned, and so gallantly led on to, the attack, together with his brave and able second, was immediately promoted. Lieutenant Bluett, also, as he well merited, was made a commander. A step to post-rank is frequently not without its alloy: Captain Hardinge, no longer qualified to command a sloop, was obliged to quit the *Scorpion*, a fine brig of 384 tons, just launched, to be the captain of a dull, convoy-keeping "post-ship," the *Proselyte*, of 404 tons, late a Newcastle collier; a cruiser, which any privateer could have run from, and any well-manned 18-gun brig, the *Scorpion* herself, for instance, have captured.

The following postscript to the private letter referred to at a previous page affords a fine specimen of a British officer's magnanimity: "In two days after the captain's death," says Captain Hardinge, "he was buried with all the naval honours in my power to bestow upon him. During the ceremony of his interment the English colours disappeared, and the Dutch were hoisted in their place. All the Dutch prisoners were liberated; one of them delivered an *éloge* upon the hero they had lost, and we fired three volleys over him as he descended into the deep." To give to this affair, so honourable to those engaged in it, the proper finish, Rear-admiral Thornborough sent a flag of truce to the Batavian Admiral Killkert inside, with the late Captain Carp's servant, and the effects of the deceased, in order that they might be delivered to his relations.

On the 3d of April the British hired cutter *Swift*, of 77 tons, eight 4-pounders, and 23 men and boys, commanded by

Lieutenant William Martin Leake, was fallen in with, engaged, boarded, and after a stout struggle, and the loss of her commander and many others of her small crew carried, by the French xebc-privateer *Espérance*, of 150 tons, 10 guns (represented, by the ship that afterwards captured her, as "24 and 12 pounders," probably carronades), and a crew of 54 men, commanded by Captain Escoffier. The *Swift*, it appears, was carrying despatches to Vice-admiral Lord Nelson off Toulon; but which, we rather think (for very few, if any particulars have been published), were thrown overboard previously to the cutter's capture. It does certainly seem strange, that, in a navy such as that of England, despatches to a commander-in-chief, upon an important foreign station, should be forwarded by a vessel not equal in force to a frigate's launch, when armed with her carronade and proper complement of men.

On the 9th of April, at daylight, in latitude  $7^{\circ} 44'$  north, and longitude  $84^{\circ} 30'$  east, the British armed en flûte late 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Wilhelmina*, Captain Henry Lambert, steering west-north-west, with the wind at north by east, and accompanied by the country-ship *William-Petrie*, laden with government stores for Trincomalé, and which ship the frigate, being bound to Madras, had been ordered to protect as far as the courses of the two remained the same, discovered a sail in the east-south-east steering to the eastward. Shortly afterwards the stranger wore and stood after the British vessels. Towards noon it fell calm, and the afternoon and night passed with very little wind, the stranger, until dark, still in sight. At daylight on the 10th, the wind then a light breeze from the north-east, and the course of the frigate and her charge about west half-north, the stranger was seen in the east by north, steering to the south-west. In a little time the latter hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, and steered directly after the former. Observing that the vessel was a ship of force, and suspecting her to be an enemy's cruiser, Captain Lambert directed the master of the *William-Petrie*, who had already arrived at the point for parting company, to alter his course after dark, and make the best of his way to the port of his destination.

The jury-rig alone of an armed en flûte ship of war is a great deception, and it is generally in the power of the captain to give a mercantile appearance to the hull of his vessel. This was particularly the case in regard to the *Wilhelmina*, she being a ship of Dutch construction. It was the disguised appearance of the *Wilhelmina*, that induced the stranger, who we may now introduce as the French frigate-privateer *Psyché*, of 36 guns, Captain Trogoff, after reconnoitring as she had done, boldly to approach, with the determination of attacking the supposed Indiaman. At 6 p. m. came on a squall with rain; through which, in her eagerness to close with the latter, the *Psyché* carried all sail. At 6 h. 45 m., it being dark and cloudy, the *Wilhelmina*, who to

allow her opponent to come up had previously shortened sail, hove to. At 9 p. m. the *Wilhelmina* filled, and, lowering her topgallantsails and driver, continued under easy sail, discovering the *Psyché* at intervals through the flashes of lightning, which were extremely vivid.

On the 11th, at 3 h. 30 m. A. M., a heavy squall from the north-north-west obliged the *Wilhelmina* to hand her topgallantsails and lower her topsails, and for the present shut out the *Psyché* from her view. At daylight, however, the latter reappeared, still in the north-east; and the British frigate immediately tacked, and, with colours flying, stood toward her. The gallantry of this step will be better appreciated when it is known, that the *Wilhelmina* mounted only 14 long 9-pounders, and one 12-pounder carronade fitted upon trucks and used as a shifting gun, on her main deck, and four long 9-pounders (which had been left by the *Victorious* at Madras) and two sixes on her quarterdeck and forecastle, with a complement of 134 men and boys, 10 of the men received out of the 50-gun ship *Grampus*, to work the four extra nines;\* whereas the *Psyché*, formerly a French national frigate, of the class and size of the *Railleuse*, or *Egyptienne* as subsequently named, mounted 24 long French 12-pounders on the main deck, and 10 (English, we believe) 18-pounder carronades and two French sixes on the quarterdeck and forecastle, with a crew of 250 men and boys.

\* At 5 h. 30 m. A. M., being on the larboard tack, with the wind still from the north-north-west, but moderate, the *Wilhelmina* passed about 50 yards to windward of the *Psyché*, then, with French colours flying, close hauled on the opposite tack. After a mutual broadside, accompanied on the part of the French ship by a hail to surrender, the *Psyché* tacked, and the *Wilhelmina* wore; each ship continuing to fire as her guns could be brought to bear. The plan adopted by the *Psyché*, of pointing every alternate gun upon the broadside at her opponent's rigging, occasioned the *Wilhelmina*, from the loss of bowlines and braces, to come to the wind on the starboard tack with every sail aback. While the British ship lay in this unmanageable state, the French ship passed under her stern; and, raking the *Wilhelmina*, knocked away the main topmast, badly wounded the main yard, and did considerable damage to her rigging and sails.

"Having at length paid off and got before the wind, the Wil-

\* A letter from Captain Lambert to Vice-admiral Rainier, giving a short account of this action, and copied into all the London papers, contains, in the manner of a postscript, the following paragraph: "N.B. His majesty's ship *Wilhelmina* carries 18 6-pounders and 100 men." It is probable that this "N. B." was added by the copyist or first publisher, and not by the writer, of the letter; for the account in the text is not only taken from one of the officers who was present in the action, but, with the exception of the four supernumerary guns, agrees with the navy-office establishment upon all frigate-flûtes of the *Wilhelmina*'s class.

helmina brought her larboard broadside to bear; and presently the Psyché evinced an intention to board the British frigate upon the quarter; but, on seeing that the latter was prepared to repel the attempt, the Psyché put her helm a-starboard and sheered off. A furious connonade was now maintained on both sides, the yard-arms nearly locking, until the Psyché, ranging ahead, crossed her opponent's bows. In practising this manœuvre, the Psyché brought herself in the wind; but by throwing her headsails aback, and keeping her after yards square or shivering, the French ship paid off: not, however, until the Wilhelmina, with her starboard guns, had poured in a raking fire astern. After this the two ships again got parallel to each other, and again engaged so closely, that the yards were overhanging; when, at 7 A. M., profiting by her more perfect state aloft, and her very superior powers of sailing, the Psyché ceased firing, crowded all the canvass she could spread, and stood away to the south-east.

This being an action during the progress of which the combatants frequently changed positions, the details of it will be better understood by a reference to the following diagram:



Ill calculated, indeed, was the Wilhelmina for a chase, either from or towards an enemy. Her main topmast was down; her bowsprit wounded in two, and her foremast in 10 places; her fore and main yards, and her main and mizen masts were also wounded, and her lower rigging and all her boats more or less damaged. Her aftermost fore-castle bits were shot away, and her hull was pierced with shot in several places. A Captain Wright, of the India-service, was on board the Psyché during the engagement, and subsequently mentioned, that the Wilhelmina's shot, comparatively small as they were, had reduced the privateer to nearly a sinking state; the latter, at the close of the action, having seven feet water in her hold, a circumstance that sufficiently explains the manner of its termination.

Of her 134 men and boys, the *Wilhelmina* had her boatswain and three seamen mortally, and six seamen slightly wounded. It may here be remarked, that the additional height given to the trucks of the *Wilhelmina*'s maindeck carriages, to suit them to ports constructed for 12-pounders, was found to increase the facility of working the muzzles; a circumstance which occasioned her inferiority in number of men to be less sensibly felt. With respect to the loss on board the *Psyché*, that ship, according to the statement of Captain Wright, had her second captain and 10 men killed, and her commander (dangerously) and 32 men wounded, 13 of them mortally.

With such a disparity of force as evidently existed against the *Wilhelmina*, this was an action highly honourable to the British ship. It is true that the *Wilhelmina*'s opponent was a privateer; but the *Psyché*, by all accounts, was a better appointed, better manned, and better disciplined ship, than many frigates of the same force in the French navy. Commanded by no less a man than Captain Jacques Bergeret, already known to us as the *Virginie*'s gallant captain, the *Psyché* had sailed from Madras in the beginning of February, bound to Pondicherry on commercial pursuits. Thence she proceeded to the Isle of France, and arrived there in May. In June or July news of the war reached the island. The *Psyché* was immediately armed and equipped as a ship of war; but Captain Bergeret, preferring employment in the national navy, sent out his ship to cruise, under the command of a Captain Trogoff, either the son or nephew of the French admiral who commanded the ships at Toulon when Lord Hood entered that port in August, 1793; Captain Trogoff was considered, in the eastern hemisphere, the chief scene of his exploits, to be a brave, skilful, and enterprising officer.

On the other hand, it was Captain Lambert's good fortune to have been preceded in the command of the *Wilhelmina* by an officer who knew how to appreciate (and how few do) the art of naval gunnery. Captain James Lind had been indefatigable in teaching his men to fire with precision; and the effect of the skill attained by the latter was visible in the execution they did to an antagonist, that otherwise, notwithstanding they continued to display, as no doubt they would, the characteristic bravery of British seamen, might, by her decided superiority of force, have ultimately compelled the *Wilhelmina* to surrender."

After quitting the latter, the *Psyché* proceeded, with all haste, pumping day and night, to the Isle of France. There she arrived in almost a sinking state; and, judging from the storm of shot with which their late opponent had assailed them, her officers publicly declared that the *Psyché* had "beaten off" (a very commodious, and therefore a very frequent expression in all similar cases) an English "44-gun frigate." As soon as she had repaired the most important of her damages, the *Wilhelmina*

pursued her route to the road of Madras, where she safely arrived; and, as an additional proof of the discomfited state of the *Psyché*, the *William-Petrie*, whose cargo was valued at 40,000*l.* sterling, although not wholly out of sight at the commencement of the action, also arrived in safety at Trincomalé.

Captain Lambert's gallantry was rewarded, as it well merited, by immediate promotion to post-rank; and he was appointed to the command of the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Terpsichore*, one of the British cruisers upon the eastern station. In so creditable an action we are pleased in being able to state, that the two lieutenants of the *Wilhelmina* were George Tippet and George Phillimore, and her master Thomas Curtis.

From the details already given, it is evident that the character of this action mainly depends upon the actual, in contradistinction to the nominal, force of the combatants. For instance, call the *Wilhelmina* a British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate, or a frigate "of 32 guns," and you arm her, according to the admiralty-order fixing her establishment, with 38 guns, including six 24-pounder carronades, and with a crew of 215 men and boys. Call the *Psyché* even "a large," or a "frigate-built" privateer, and you will scarcely raise her, in the reader's estimation, above the *Bellone*, beaten off by the *Milbrook*, or the *Blonde* that captured the *Wolverine*. Even suppose the reader to rank the "large French frigate-built privateer" with the *Egyptienne*; beaten off by the *Osprey*, and afterwards captured by the *Hippomenes*, you have already made the implied full-armed *Wilhelmina* more than a match for her, and have therefore reduced the exploit of a British frigate far beneath that confessedly performed by a British sloop. Omit the name of the privateer, lengthen the duration of the action, and mistate the mode of its termination; and you convert that which, if not a conquest, was decidedly a victory, into a censurable defeat. It is with us an invariable rule, not to state, without showing, that an action is gallant, or an officer a "hero." Above all things, we avoid making such an assertion when our own details, few as they may be, prove directly the reverse. These remarks premised, we subjoin the account of the *Wilhelmina's* action, as it stands in the work of a contemporary.

"Captain Henry Lambert commanded the *Wilhelmina*, of thirty-two guns, an old Dutch-built frigate, without one quality to recommend her as a ship of war, unless it were that of looking so unlike one in every respect that the enemy fearlessly approached her, and by that means were sometimes captured when a chase would have ended in disappointment. This ship, in the month of April, 1804, fell in, off the east side of Ceylon, with a large French frigate-built privateer, which she engaged with great obstinacy and fury for three hours, when the Frenchman being much disabled, and the British frigate still more so, they separated, nor was it in the power of our young hero to renew

the action, the enemy having so much the advantage of him in point of sailing.”\*

On the 21st of June, at noon, the British ship-sloop *Hippomenes*,† now commanded by Captain Kenneth Mackenzie, cruising to windward of Antigua, in latitude 18° north, and longitude 58° west, with the wind at east, and her head to the northward, observed in the north-east a brig, which afterwards proved to be the French privateer *Buonaparte*, Captain Paimpén, of 18 long 8-pounders and 146 men. The peculiar construction of the *Hippomenes*, a Dutch-built corvette, had been taken advantage of in so disguising her appearance, that the privateer, believing the ship to be an African trader, bore down, under English colours, to take possession of her. At 1 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Buonaparte* shortened sail, and the *Hippomenes* hauled close to the wind to expedite the meeting. At 1 h. 50 m. P.M. the *Hippomenes* opened her fire at the privateer, who had now changed her colours to French. The latter instantly returned the fire, and a spirited action ensued. In the course of 10 or 12 minutes the *Buonaparte* ranged up on the weather quarter of the *Hippomenes*, and in a little time, becoming unmanageable, fell on board her opponent, dropping stem-on a little abaft the latter's fore chains. The guns of the *Hippomenes*, particularly two carronades on the upper deck, a Dutch 24-pounder and an English 12, in a very few minutes did serious injury to the *Buonaparte*; while the latter, from her tops, threw stink-pots upon the decks of the former, thereby setting her on fire abaft.

It was at this crisis that, having to prevent the privateer's escape caused her bowsprit to be lashed to his ship's mainmast, Captain Mackenzie called to his crew to follow him in boarding, and secure the victory. He then, followed by his officers, and, as he thought by at least 50 or 60 of his men, rushed upon the *Buonaparte*'s fore-castle. The onset was encouraging: for the brig's crew, with scarcely a show of resistance, retreated abaft the mainmast. Here the privateer's men rallied; and well they might rally, for they now saw what a mere handful of enemies stood upon their deck. The fact is, no more men had followed Captain Mackenzie and his officers, than made a total of 18 British; opposed to whom, allowing an ample deduction for previous loss, were 100 French. The catastrophe may be summed up in a few words. Captain Mackenzie, his officers, and the few gallant fellows in company, defended themselves until five of the party were killed and eight wounded, including a master's mate severely, and the captain in as many as 14 places; and who, in endeavouring to regain his ship, fell senseless into her main chains, just a minute or two before the lashing gave way and the vessels parted. Nine, including the captain

\* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 344.

† See p. 255.

and master, got back to the *Hippomenes*. The first lieutenant, Mr. William Pierce, and the purser, Mr. William Collman, along with two seamen, were taken prisoners; and the remaining five lay dead upon the privateer's deck.

The *Hippomenes* had been but recently commissioned at the Dutch port in which she had surrendered to the British;\* and her complement had been made up, partly of draughts from other ships of war, that is, by freeing each of them of a certain number of skulkers, raw hands, and incorrigible rogues, and partly of foreign renegades, who, tired of the restraints of a prison-ship life, gladly "volunteered" their services to an enemy, from whom they meant to escape (and who can blame them?) the first opportunity. Perhaps a portion of the crew consisted of pressed men; but pressed men were to be found on board of every ship in the British navy. Moreover pressed men have proved themselves, on several occasions, among the best men in the ship. That they should be so will not appear strange, when it is considered that an officer, where he can, presses seamen; and, if he has liberty to take three men out of ten on board a merchant vessel, he does not choose the worst. A pressed man or a volunteer, if he has the heart of an Englishman, will not suffer himself to be bearded by an enemy; and it is far from improbable, that the majority of the eight or ten seamen, who accompanied Captain Mackenzie in boarding the privateer, and who suffered so heavily owing to the pusillanimity of their shipmates, were pressed men. Had the dastards but shown themselves on the brig's fore-castle, the colours, in all probability, would have been hauled down; for it is known that, before the boarding commenced, the privateer had lost five men killed and 15 wounded, besides being very considerably damaged in masts, rigging, and hull. It was on this account that the *Buonaparte* felt no inclination to renew the combat, and, in the disabled state of the sloop of war's rigging, this truly fortunate privateer soon effected her escape.

It is very common for the captain of a ship, when writing the account of any capture unexpectedly made without a contest, to anticipate the prowess that would have been displayed by his men, had the enemy possessed strength or courage enough to put it to the test. Not quite three months before the affair of the *Buonaparte*, the *Hippomenes*, it will be recollected, had the singular good fortune to capture, almost without a blow, a French privateer of 36 guns. Captain Shipley, who then commanded the *Hippomenes*, wrote thus in his official letter: "I feel much pleasure in saying, the officers and men behaved with that coolness and intrepidity inherent in Englishmen; and, had the enemy allowed them a trial alongside, I am convinced her superior force would not have availed them much." The officers

\* See p. 207.



of the *Hippomenes* afterwards proved how well they had merited their captain's eulogium; but as to the men—of them, however, enough has been said. Captain Paimpéni himself must have despised the wretches, to whose faint-heartedness he owed the preservation of his ship; while the mangled bodies of their late comrades, still reeking upon his deck, must have taught him to discriminate between the counterfeit and the genuine British seaman.

On the 11th of July, at 10 P.M., three boats of the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Narcissus*, Captain Ross Donnelly, three of the 38-gun frigate *Seahorse*, Captain the Honourable Courtenay Boyle, and four of the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Maidstone*, Captain the Honourable George Elliott, under the orders of Lieutenant John Thompson, first of the *Narcissus*, assisted by Lieutenants John Richard Lumley, of the *Seahorse*, Ogle Moore, of the *Maidstone*, and Hyde Parker, of the *Narcissus*, put off from the last-named frigate, to make an attack upon 12 settees, chiefly with cargoes on board, lying at La Vandour, in the bay of Hyères, distant between four and five miles from the ships. The vessels were moored head and stern, close to the beach, to which also they were completely secured, and were covered by a battery of three guns.

In the face of a tremendous fire of grape-shot and musketry, as well from the settees as from the battery and the houses of the town, Lieutenant Thompson and his party, about midnight, succeeded in boarding and setting fire to most of the vessels. One only was brought off, and a most costly prize she was; the loss on the part of the British amounting to one midshipman (Thomas Owen Roche), one marine, and two seamen killed, and one lieutenant (John Richard Lumley), one master's mate (Robert Mansell), three midshipmen (Thomas William Beddingfield, Thomas Alexander Watt, and John George Victor), 15 seamen, and three marines wounded, many of them severely. The gallantry of attacks like these no one can dispute; but who will say that, had all the 12 settees, instead of one of them, been brought off, they would have compensated for the valuable blood which had been spilt? Lieutenant Lumley's was a dreadful wound, and one from which it was next to a miracle that he ever recovered. His right arm was amputated at the shoulder-joint, and a portion of the scapula removed with it.

On the 12th of July the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Aigle*, Captain George Wolfe, standing in for the Cordouan lighthouse with a moderate breeze from the north-east, discovered a French ship and brig steering to the southward. These were the *Charente*, of 20 long 6-pounders, four swivels, and 104 men, commanded by Lieutenant Joseph Sampson, and the *Jolie*, of eight "12-pounders" (if not carronades, more likely 8-pounders), two swivels, and 75 men, commanded by Lieutenant Benjamin Gadobert; both vessels from Rochefort, but

last from the *Gironde*, bound to Bayonne, the brig laden with cannon and ~~of~~ <sup>munitions</sup> stores.

At 5 P. M. the *Aigle* closed with the French ship and brig; and, from their not having altered their course, and their now exchanging signals and shortening sail, Captain Wolfe expected that they meant to engage. To the surprise, however, of the British, the *Charente* and *Joie*, after firing their starboard broadsides without effect, ran upon the strand about 10 leagues to the southward of Cordouan, and within a stone's throw of each other. The French crews then took to the boats; but, these becoming swamped in the surf, many of the men were drowned. The *Aigle* immediately anchored about a mile from the beach, for the purpose of endeavouring to get the two vessels afloat; but the immense surf thrown up in consequence of a recent westerly gale rendered fruitless every effort, although persevered in for a whole night and part of the next day. Captain Wolfe was therefore obliged to destroy the French ship and brig; a service which was effectually executed, under the personal directions of Mr. Furlonger the master, and Mr. Steel the gunner.

On the 15th of July, at 2 h. 30 m. A. M., Cape Roman in the United States of America in sight, the French ship-rigged privateer *Dame-Ambert*, Captain Charles Lamarque (represented as a reduced officer of the French navy), saw and chased a ship to leeward. The latter, which was the British 14-gun ship-sloop *Lilly*, Captain William Compton, being equally desirous of a meeting, the two ships by 9 h. 30 m. A. M. were near enough for the *Dame-Ambert* to open her fire. The British ship, however, was compelled to wait until her paltry 12-pounder carronades (not equal in effectiveness to 4-pounder long guns) could reach her antagonist. Having disabled the *Lilly* in sails and rigging, and considerably weakened her in crew, the *Dame-Ambert* closed, in order to finish the contest by boarding. To do this effectually, the *Dame-Ambert*, who from the entire state of her rigging possessed the facility of manœuvring as she pleased, stationed herself in a raking position; and, having swept the *Lilly*'s deck by her guns, lashed the sloop's bowsprit to her taffrail. In this state the French privateer made eight successive attempts to board, and was gallantly repulsed in all. On the ninth time, having killed the *Lilly*'s captain, first lieutenant, and others of her principal officers, and killed or wounded the greater part of her remaining crew, the *Dame-Ambert*, just two hours and 10 minutes from the commencement of the action, carried the British vessel.

The *Lilly* had been a Bermudian trader, and in the year 1795 was purchased for the British navy. She measured 200 tons, was armed with 14 carronades, 12-pounders, and two long fours, and had a complement of 80 men and boys. Her exact loss in the action cannot now be ascertained. Her captain and first

lieutenant were among the killed, which, according to the French accounts, amounted to a great proportion of the crew; and her badly wounded, on the same authority, were 15 or 16, including all her remaining officers. The Dame-Ambert had been the British packet Marlborough, one of the largest in the service, recently captured. She was afterwards refitted at Guadaloupe, and armed with 16 long French 6-pounders, and a complement of 140 men. The French say, that their crew, when they fell in with the Lilly (but this wants confirmation), was reduced to 75 men, and that the Dame-Ambert lost in the action five men killed and 11 wounded.

Nothing but the accidental circumstance of the Lilly's having three masts instead of two occasioned her not to be classed as a gun-brig; and truly, if she had been a gun-brig, she would have been one of the least effective in the service. They all carry carronades of an 18-pounder caliber: hers were 12-pounders, and those of the old construction, short and badly formed, the derision of the merest tyro in naval gunnery. Unfortunately, owing to the mortality among the British officers, and the stigma that attaches to the capture of a king's ship by a privateer, no account of this action has been published, except in the French papers. It is only to call things by their right names, and that which seems a disgrace becomes, in reality, an honour. A defeat like the Lilly's is more creditable than many a puffed-up victory, for which chaplets have been worn and rewards bestowed. The fact of her having been a sloop of war was not lost upon the captors; and "*une corvette de l'état*" occurs in more than one place in the French account of the action. The prize was afterwards fitted out as a privateer, and named, after the Governor of Guadaloupe, Général-Ernouf.

On the 31st of July, at daybreak, the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate Tartar, Captain Keith Maxwell, standing in to leeward of the island of Saona, West Indies, discovered from her mast-head a small sail, to which she immediately gave chase; keeping as close as possible to leeward of the island, in order to prevent the latter's escape that way, and compel her to make the attempt through the passage between Saona and St.-Domingo, a very narrow and intricate channel even for small vessels. At about 7 A. M. the chase was made out to be a schooner, full of men, using her sweeps to escape through the before-mentioned channel. By carrying all possible sail, the Tartar, at 8 A. M., got within range of shot; but, owing to the short tacks she was obliged to make, could use her guns to very little purpose without losing ground in the chase. The schooner, therefore, which was the French privateer *Hirondelle*, Captain La Place, of 10 long 4-pounders and 50 men, notwithstanding that several of the frigate's shot passed over her and through her sails, persisted in beating to windward until 10 A. M.; when,

having advanced nearly half-way up the channel, she came to an anchor under a reef of rocks.

Finding the Tartar to be in six fathoms' water, without the possibility of anchoring in safety, or of effectually cannonading the schooner, Captain Maxwell despatched three boats, under the command of Lieutenant Henry Mullah, assisted by Lieutenant Nicholas Lockyer and several midshipmen, all volunteers, to endeavour to bring out the privateer. The instant the boats put off, the *Hirondelle* hoisted her colours, fired a gun, and warped her broadside towards them. As the British advanced, the privateer opened a fire from her great guns, and, as the boats drew nearer, from her small arms also. In spite of this, and of a strong sea-breeze directly on the bows of the boats, Lieutenant Mullah intrepidly pulled up to the privateer; and, after a short but obstinate resistance, boarded and carried her, with the loss only of one seaman and one marine wounded. The *Hirondelle* had nine killed and six wounded, besides three missing, supposed to have been drowned in attempting to swim on shore. The number of British in the boats does not appear in the official letter; but, admitting they amounted to 50, or even to 60 officers and men, and that they had an 18-pounder carronade in the launch, still, against a vessel so well armed and prepared, and under circumstances of weather which, by retarding the progress of the boats, exposed them the longer to the privateer's fire, the capture of the *Hirondelle* was highly honourable to the parties engaged.

On the 12th of August, at 4 h. 30 m. p. m., the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Galatea*, Captain Henry Heathcote, cruising in the neighbourhood of Guadaloupe, ran down the channel between that island and the Saintes islands, with the intention of attempting to cut out the late British sloop of war *Lilly*, which, it was understood, had gone into the Saintes, to repair and refit as a French privateer. At 6 h. 30 m. p. m., observing the *Lilly* at anchor in the road near the Anse à Mire, the *Galatea* hove to, hoisted out her boats, and sent them, in the evening, manned and armed, to execute the service. The boats returned soon after daylight on the 13th, without having been able to discover the *Lilly*; but the *Lilly*, and all who were interested in defending her, had discovered them, and were making suitable preparations to resist an attack, should one again be attempted. An officer and 30 soldiers were added to the *Lilly*'s crew, and a privateer schooner, which happened to be in port, was moored athwart the hawse of the ship, in such a manner as completely to enfilade the assailants in their approach. So confident were the French in the means they had taken to repulse the British, that the commanding officer on shore gave orders to the different outposts, and to those in command at the batteries, not to fire or do any thing to excite a suspicion that they were aware of the enemy's approach.

Having hoisted in her boats, the *Galatea*, who had dropped to leeward during the night, made sail and beat up to reconnoitre more fully the position of the *Lilly*. On nearing the road, the *Galatea* discovered the French privateer schooner lying close to the ship; and, as a proof that there were batteries to protect both ship and schooner, the frigate was repeatedly fired at with shot and shells, some of the latter bursting at no great distance. The *Galatea* continued turning to windward until about 10 P.M., by which time she had nearly weathered the *Saintes*. Having hove to, the frigate hoisted out four boats, embarked in them about 90 officers and men, armed the launch with an 18-pounder carronade, and then towed the boats within three miles north-west of the citadel. Casting themselves off, the four boats, under the command of Lieutenant Charles Hayman, first of the *Galatea*, assisted by several other officers, including Lieutenant Robert Hall, of the marines, and Mr. Michael Birbeck, the master, pulled towards the harbour, hoping, under cover of the night, to surprise the object of their attack.

To prevent the possibility of such an occurrence, the *Lilly*, or rather, the *Général-Ernouf*, for that was the ship's new name, had, just as it grew dark, sent one of her boats to row guard at the entrance of the road. By this, the ship, the schooner, the forts, and the town, became fully apprized of the approach of the British; who, finding no shot fired at them from the batteries, no signals of alarm made along the coast, naturally concluded that they were unseen. Eager to be the first at the post of danger, Lieutenant Hayman in the barge pushed ahead of his comrades, and, at a few minutes past 1 A.M. on the 14th, got nearly alongside of the *Lilly*. Then it was that the fire began. Heedless of it all, the barge, followed by the other boats, was soon in contact with the ship. A dreadful struggle ensued. Lieutenant Hayman fell, mortally wounded both by musketry and the bayonet; and, out of 26 or 27 officers and men in the barge, three only, it appears, were left free from dangerous wounds. The three remaining boats tried in vain to overcome the numerous and still increasing force opposed to them. After sustaining nearly an hour's fire from great guns and musketry, they were compelled to turn their bows to the offing, leaving the barge to her fate. But the British were only quitting one set of foes to get within the clutches of another. The batteries now opened their fire, and a dreadful fire it was. The cannonade continued, gradually slackening as the boats receded from the shore, until 3 h. 30 m. A.M., when it entirely ceased.

Just as the day dawned, the miserable remnant of the expedition reached the frigate. Out of about 90 officers and men, who had quitted the *Galatea* on the preceding night, not more than 20 returned in an unwounded state. Among the

killed, besides Lieutenant Hayman, was the master, and Mr. Wall, a midshipman; and among the wounded were several officers, including Lieutenant Hall of the marines, who lost an arm and was made prisoner. The number of killed and wounded together, as reported on the return of the boats, was 44, including Lieutenants Hayman and Hall, but not, as it would appear, the seven killed and 14 wounded out of the 24 seamen and marines belonging to the barge. The addition of these makes the loss of the Galatea, in attempting to cut out the Lilly, 65 in killed and wounded: whereas the French acknowledge a loss of only four men killed; and, although they do not enumerate the wounded, name, as among them, Captain Lapointe, commanding the *Général-Erneuf*, and Lieutenant Mourct, commanding the detachment of troops put on board by the commandant of the garrison.

The object of the service, upon which the Galatea's boats had been despatched on the evening of the 12th, was laudable; inasmuch as it was not only to recapture a ship that belonged to the British navy, but to cut short the cruise of a privateer likely to do a serious injury to British commerce. Nor was the number of men sent, admitting it to have been each time the same, inadequate apparently to the purpose in view, that of surprising (for their lay the gist of the enterprise) and capturing the Lilly at her anchors in the road. The boats returned without finding the vessel. Having hoisted them in, the Galatea should have made sail from, not towards, the spot where the privateer lay. Instead of this, the frigate hovered off the port all the day, observed a second privateer moored along with the first, witnessed, and, the French say, felt, the strength of the batteries that protected both privateers; and yet, in the evening, Captain Heathcote, a second time, sends his boats to pass, and, having accomplished or failed in their main object, to repass, those batteries; batteries, the fire from which the Galatea herself, much less her boats, would have been unable to withstand.

For an enterprise so doubtful in its expediency and so fatal in its result, a brief English account would suffice; and none, indeed, appears to have been published. The French, on the other hand, made public every particular; every particular, at least, which they thought would contribute to aggrandize the exploit performed by Lapointe and Lieutenant Mourct. But they tell us nothing of any aid afforded by the schooner privateer, or by the batteries; whose united fire, nevertheless, powerfully co-operated in repulsing the assailants. That there were forts, the account admits, openly, when alluding to the supposed effect of some shells thrown at the frigate, and tacitly, when dwelling upon the accident which, the French declare, befel three of the British boats, in their endeavours to retire. These, they state, and positively state, were sunk, with their crews. With equal truth the French add, that there was a fifth boat

present, but which kept rather aloof during the boarding-attempt, and suffered the loss of half its crew ere it got clear. "Trois furent coulées, une quatrième prise, et le cinquième canot, qui avait un peu tenu le large, échappa avec la moitié de son monde hors de combat."\*

Whatever were the faults of this enterprise, they existed in the plan, not in the execution. The heavy loss sustained by the boats prove, that the British had effected as much as flesh and blood could effect: they had lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, more than two thirds of their number; and yet the remainder would not yield, but bravely fought their way back to their ship. Much do we regret our inability to give a fuller account of the various difficulties which Lieutenant Hayman and his party had to contend with, in order that we may do justice to the memories of the dead, and cheer the feelings of the living, among those who, although unsuccessful in their object, so nobly maintained the character of British seamen.

On the 17th of August, in latitude  $49^{\circ} 30'$  north, longitude  $12^{\circ} 20'$  west, the British 38-gun frigate Loire, Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland, fell in with the French ship privateer Blonde, of Bordeaux, mounting 30 guns, 8-pounders on the main deck, with a crew of 240 men; the same ship that, about five months previous, captured the Wolverine. After a 20 hours' chase, including a running fight of a quarter of an hour, during which the Loire had one midshipman (Ross Connor) and five men wounded, and the Blonde two men killed and five wounded, the latter hauled down her colours.

On the 15th of September, at 6 A. M., the British 50-gun ship Centurion, commanded by Lieutenant James Robert Phillips, in the absence of Captain James Lind upon service on shore (and who was also acting in the absence of the ship's proper commanding officer, Captain John Sprat Rainier, dangerously ill), while at anchor in Vizagapatam road, waiting until two Indiamen were loaded and ready to return with her to Madras, perceived under the land in the south-west, at a distance of about 12 miles, three ships coming down before the wind, with all sail set. At 9 h. 30 m. A. M. the strangers were made out to be a line-of-battle ship and two frigates, the former with a flag at her mizen topgallantmast-head. At 9 h. 45 m. the French ships steered directly in for the road, two without any colours, and the third, the outermost frigate, with a St.-George's ensign. The Centurion immediately opened a fire at the headmost frigate, to induce her to show her colours. Soon afterwards the 74 made signals, which were answered by the frigates. This at once pointed out that the ships were enemies, and a signal to that effect was made by the Centurion to the two Indiamen in company, followed by another, directing them to put into a port in view. The Barnaby

promptly answered the signal, cut her cable, and ran on shore ;\* but the Princess-Charlotte, Captain John Logan, who lay inshore of the Centurion, kept at her anchors.

The flag-ship was suspected to be what she really was, the Marengo, Rear-admiral Linois ; and her two consorts were the 40-gun frigate *Atalante*, Captain Camille-Charles-Alexis Gaudin-Beauchène, and 36-gun frigate *Sémillante*, commanded as before by Captain Motard. It is seven months to a day since we left Rear-admiral Linois, with a force a trifle greater than that which he now possessed, running from a fleet of unescorted Indiamen ; a fleet which he had weighed from Pulo-Auro purposely to capture, but which, under the able directions of Commodore Nathaniel Dance, put him and his squadron to flight.† The French admiral afterwards proceeded to Batavia ; where, or on the passage to it, he was joined by the *Atalante*. Taking in a supply of provisions, he steered for the Isle of France, and arrived there on the 2d of April, followed a day or two afterwards by two of his frigates, with a valuable prize. Here his discomfiture by the India fleet gained him the ill-will of General Decaen, who wrote to his government on the subject, and we believe, sent his despatches to France by the *Berceau*. After waiting two months and a half at the Isle of France, M. Linois put to sea with the Marengo, *Atalante*, and *Sémillante*. He cruised, first, to the southward of Madagascar, anchoring a part of the time, on account of bad weather, in the bay of Saint-Augustin : he then moved to a station near the island of Ceylon, where he took several rich prizes. M. Linois subsequently entered the bay of Bengal, passed Madras at about 20 leagues' distance, and visited the roads of Masulipatam and Cosanguay : thence he swept the coast of Golconda, and arrived on the 15th of September off Vizagapatam ; not without an object, for he had, the day previous, when off Masulipatam, received information from some country-boats, that the British frigate *Wilhelmina* had recently sailed from that road, with an Indiaman in company, bound to Vizagapatam. It so happened that Vice-admiral Rainier had substituted the Centurion for the *Wilhelmina* ; a difference which the French admiral, to his cost, very soon discovered.

At a few minutes past 10 A.M. the *Atalante*, which was the headmost ship of the three, was distant from the Centurion about half a mile, and all three ships now hoisted French colours. The Centurion immediately cut her cable, and sheeted home her topsails, which had been previously unfurled. This brought her broadside to bear ; and the whole of it was immediately poured into the *Atalante*, then within the distance of 200 yards : at this time the Marengo and *Sémillante* were ranging up on the larboard quarter of the Centurion. At 10 h.

\* This ship afterwards got into the surf, and was totally lost.

† See p. 252.



10 m. A. M. the *Marengo* and *Sémillante* opened their fire, which the *Centurion* returned. After the action had continued about a quarter of an hour, the *Centurion's* colours were shot away, as also were those of the *Marengo*; but both ensigns were promptly replaced. At 10 h. 45 m. A. M. the 74, whose rigging appeared much damaged, hauled her wind and stood out, followed by the frigates. A battery of three guns at the town, under the command of Colonel Campbell of the 74th regiment, had co-operated with the *Centurion* in resisting the unequal attack.

Abandoned for the present, the *Centurion* continued to stand in-shore, and, in passing, hailed the *Princess-Charlotte*, and desired her to cut her cable, but without effect. About this time Captain Lind joined his ship; and, finding her rigging and sails too much cut to admit of her being worked to advantage, anchored at the back of the surf, about a mile and a half to the north-east of the town, in six fathoms' water. Here the *Centurion*, now too distant to be supported by the battery at the town, prepared herself for renewing an engagement, which she had no means of avoiding, without resorting to an alternative not yet in contemplation.

At 11 h. 15 m. A. M. the *Marengo* and frigates put about and again stood in; and in another quarter of an hour the 74, after having repeatedly tried the range of her guns, dropped anchor abreast of, and about a mile distant from, the *Centurion*. Having clewed up her topsails and furled her courses, the *Marengo* recommenced the cannonade, supported occasionally by the *Atalante*, who kept under sail on the *Centurion's* larboard quarter, and lay nearer than the *Marengo*, and in a much more annoying position. The *Sémillante*, meanwhile, was taking possession of the *Princess-Charlotte*. Unambitious of sharing glory with the *Centurion*, the latter had struck her colours without firing a shot, although she mounted 24 long 12-pounders, with a crew of 71 men, and was a very formidable looking ship of 610 tons burden. Colonel Campbell had sent to her assistance about 50 seapoys; but the boats saw the shameful occurrence in time to save themselves by pulling back to the shore.

The distance at which the *Marengo*, doubtless from ignorance of the bay and dread of grounding, had anchored, was far more favourable to her than to the *Centurion*, the latter having, except a 6-pounder or two, no other long guns than the 24s on her first or lower deck. In consequence, the *Centurion's* hull, masts, yards, and rigging, were severely cut by the fire of her two assailants: several shot struck her between wind and water, and one went through the gunner's store-room. At length, at about 1 h. 15 m. P. M., a shot from the *Marengo* cut the cable of the *Centurion*; and, about the same time, the 74 cut or slipped her cable, hoisted her jib, and, accompanied by the two frigates and prize, stood away to sea. The *Centurion* also made some sail; but, on getting a little further off-shore, brought up again with

the sheet-anchor, and continued her fire on the *Marengo* until the latter was out of gun-shot. By 4 p.m. the *Centurion* was again ready for action; but the French squadron still pursued its course off-shore, and at sunset was standing before the wind to the north-east.

The principal damages of the *Centurion* have already been enumerated. Her loss was by no means commensurate: it amounted to only one man mortally, and nine slightly wounded. The *Marengo* suffered a good deal in her masts, yards, and rigging; and one shot carried away her fore-cap. Her loss amounted to two seamen killed, and one enseigne de vaisseau badly wounded. The *Atalante* had also two men killed, besides six wounded, one of them mortally. The *Sémillante*, thanks to the forbearance of the Princess-Charlotte, had no casualty to complain of.

It is difficult to understand what it was that induced M. Linois to abandon an enterprise of such apparent ease, as the capture or destruction of a 50-gun ship by a 74 and two frigates. The rear-admiral's official letter, as published in the *Moniteur*, is a very lame performance. Such excuses as, the shoalness of the water, the great force of the battery on shore, the "extraordinary" armament of the *Centurion*, the distance from a port in which he could refit, and the rumour that two English line-of-battle ships had been seen or heard of in the neighbourhood, could only have suggested themselves to one who felt a little ashamed at the want of energy he had displayed. The *Centurion* for instance, could not have drawn less water than a French frigate of the class of those with the *Marengo*; and the two frigates, mounting between them upwards of 80 guns, and manned by at least 600 men, might have laid the *Centurion* on board, or compelled her to run on shore. "La première batterie du fort," gravely says the French account, "n'est que de 8 canons de 32 ou 24. On ignore le nombre de la seconde, 4 pièces de campagne avaient été transportées par les troupes sur le rivage." The latter were so, and were 12-pounders; but, as already related, could not reach the *Marengo*. Among other mistakes, M. Linois states the *Centurion* to have carried "26 canons de 32 à la seconde batterie;" which, as she mounted "24 (or rather 22) canons de 24 à la première batterie," would, indeed, have been arming her "d'une manière extraordinaire." Her second-deck guns were 32-pounder carronades; and, from the distance at which the action was fought, Captain Lind would have greatly preferred the long 12-pounders for which they had been substituted.

A half-laden merchant prize, although an Indiaman, or rather, as was the case, a country ship, was a sorry recompence for the defeat, and a defeat it was, which the French admiral had sustained. On the other hand, the officers and crew of the British ship gave an honourable proof of what may be done by a

judicious perseverance in resisting the attack of a superior force. By conduct so laudable and exemplary, they preserved their vessel, and exalted the character of their country; and the two navies must continue to view, with very different feelings, the defence of the *Centurion* in Vizagapatam road.

An action between the single ships of two nations at peace is rare. Still more rare is an action, under similar circumstances, between two squadrons. Should the occurrence happen, it is usually at night, when the ships find a difficulty in understanding each other's signals; but, the instant the mistake is discovered, the firing ceases, and no breach is made in the amicable relations of the two powers. Unfortunately the next action in order of date was fought between an English and a Spanish squadron, not amidst darkness, but in the open day; not through any accident, but under express orders from the government of one of the combatants; and, so far from the matter being afterwards made up, it led to an almost immediate declaration of war by the party who had to complain of the aggression.

Without entering into a consideration of the political connexion which at this time subsisted between France and Spain, it may suffice to state that, towards the latter end of the summer of 1804, the British government received intelligence, through the officer, Rear-admiral the Honourable Alexander Cochrane, in command of the squadron stationed off Ferrol, that an armament was fitting out in that port; that a considerable Spanish force was already collected there; and that French troops were then on their march thither, and near at hand. It is true that all this was afterwards disproved by the Spanish government; but such proof could have no retroactive effect. Immediately on the receipt of Rear-admiral Cochrane's information, the British admiralty despatched a squadron off Cadiz, to intercept and detain, by force or otherwise, the four Spanish frigates, known to be bound to that port with an immense quantity of specie, which they were bringing from Monte-Video, in South America.

On the 3d of October the British squadron sent upon this important service, and which consisted of the 44-gun frigate *Indefatigable*, Captain Graham Moore, 18-pounder 32-gun frigates *Medusa*, Captain John Gore, and *Amphion*, Captain Samuel Sutton, and 38-gun frigate *Lively*, Captain Graham Eden Hamond, assembled off Cape Santa-Maria. On the 5th, at 6 A. M., that cape bearing north-east distant nine leagues, the *Medusa* made a signal for four large sail bearing west by south, the wind at this time being about east-north-east. The squadron immediately wore, and made sail in chase. At 8 A. M. the strangers, which were the Spanish 40-gun frigate *Medea*, Rear-admiral Don Joseph Bustamente, and 34-gun frigates *Fama* (with a broad pendant), *Clara*, and *Mercedes*, formed the line

of battle ahead, in the following order: Fama, Medea, Mercedes, Clara. At 9 h. 5 m. A. M. the Medusa placed herself within half pistol-shot, on the weather beam of the Fama. Presently the Indefatigable took a similar station by the side of the Medea; and the Amphion and Lively, as they came up, ranged alongside the Mercedes and Clara, the Amphion judiciously running to leeward of her opponent.

After ineffectually hailing the Medea to shorten sail, the Indefatigable fired a shot across her forefoot: on which the Spanish frigate did as she had been requested. Captain Moore then sent Lieutenant Thomas Arscott to inform the Spanish commanding officer, that his orders were to detain the squadron, and that it was his wish to execute those orders without bloodshed, but that the Spanish admiral's determination must be instantly made. The boat not returning so soon as expected, the Indefatigable made a signal for her, and, to enforce it, fired a shot ahead of the Medea. The officer having at length returned with an unsatisfactory answer, the Indefatigable, at about 9 h. 30 m. A. M., fired a second shot ahead of the Medea, and bore down close upon her weather bow. Immediately the Mercedes fired into the Amphion, and in a few seconds afterwards the Medea opened her fire upon the Indefatigable. The latter then made the signal for close battle; and it instantly commenced with all the animation, on one side at least, which the prospect of such trophies could inspire.

At the end of about nine minutes the Mercedes blew up alongside of the Amphion with a tremendous explosion. In a minute or two afterwards the Fama struck her colours; but, on the Medusa's ceasing her fire, rehoisted them, and attempted to make off. The Medusa immediately bore up under the Spanish frigate's stern, and poured in a heavy fire, but the Fama continued her course to leeward. Having sustained, during 17 minutes, the Indefatigable's heavy broadsides, and finding a new opponent in the Amphion, who had advanced on her starboard quarter, the Medea surrendered. In another five minutes the Clara did the same, and the Lively was left at liberty to aid the Medusa in the pursuit of the Fama. At about 45 m. past noon the Lively, being an admirable sailer, got near enough to fire her bow-guns at the Fama; and at 1 h. 15 m. P. M. this, the only remaining Spanish frigate, struck to the two British frigates in chase of her.

The force of the Indefatigable has already more than once appeared; that of the Lively was the full establishment of a 38, numbering 46 guns, and the Amphion and Medusa each mounted 40 guns. The Lively had two men killed and four wounded; the Amphion, three men wounded, one or two of them by the splinters which fell upon her decks when her unfortunate antagonist blew up. No other loss, and but a very trifling damage, was sustained by the British ships.

The *Medea* was a fine frigate of 1046 tons, and mounted 42 guns, 18-pounders on the main deck, and eights on the quarter-deck and forecastle, with a complement of 300 men; of whom two were killed and 10 wounded. The three remaining frigates were each armed similar to the *Mahonesa*, except perhaps in having an additional pair of 6-pounders.\* The *Fama*, out of her 280 men and boys, had 11 killed and 50 wounded; the *Clara*, out of her 300, seven killed and 20 wounded; and the *Mercedes* lost, by the fatal explosion, the whole of her 280 in crew and passengers, except the second captain and about 40 men, who were taken off the ship's forecastle after it had separated from the remainder of the hull, and except two passengers, who happened to be on board the *Medea*.

It is therefore quite clear, that the *Indefatigable* and any two of her three consorts would have been a match, even in a time of notorious war, for these four Spanish frigates. As it was, the latter defended themselves with the characteristic bravery of Spaniards, notwithstanding that they could have been in no state of preparation, and that the melancholy loss of one of their number so early in the action increased the odds against them.

Two more circumstances conspired to invest this transaction with more odium than perhaps would otherwise have attached to it. One of those circumstances was the miserable fate of so many poor souls at the explosion of the frigate, and the heart-rending misfortune it entailed upon one, in particular, who had been a passenger on board. This gentleman, a Captain Alvear, of the Spanish navy, with his wife, four amiable daughters, and five sons grown up to manhood, had embarked in the *Mercedes*, carrying with him a fortune, estimated at about 30,000*l.* sterling, the gradual savings of 30 years' industry as a merchant in South America. Not many minutes before the engagement began, the captain and his eldest son had gone on board the *Medea*; and there, in a very little while, did he witness the catastrophe that hurled his wife, his daughters, and his remaining sons to destruction, and sent that treasure, which was mere dross in the comparison, to the bottomless deep.

The second circumstance alluded to was the tempting nature of the lading on board these vessels. The cargoes of the three captured frigates, consisted of Vidona wool, cascarilla, ratinia, seal-skins, seal-oil, bars of tin, pigs of copper, dollars, and ingots of gold, and netted very little short of a million sterling. Therefore, as the *Mercedes* was similarly freighted, the total value of what had been shipped on board the squadron probably amounted to nearly a third of a million more. We must not omit to state, that the British government restored to Captain Alvear, out of the proceeds of the three cargoes, the 30,000*l.* sterling, which he had lost in the *Mercedes*.

\* See vol. i., p. 358.

Many persons, who concurred in the expediency, doubted the right, of detaining these ships ; and many, again, to whom the legality of the act appeared clear, were of opinion, that a more formidable force should have been sent to execute the service, in order to have justified the Spanish admiral in surrendering without an appeal to arms.

The affair naturally created a great stir at Madrid, and on the 27th of November an order issued to make reprisals on English property ; but it was not until the 12th of the following month that the King of Spain issued his formal declaration of war, nor until the 11th of January, 1805, that Great Britain directed letters of marque to be granted against Spanish vessels and property.

#### COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS.—WEST INDIES.

Viewing the success of Captain Watkins at Curaçoa in September, 1800,\* without apparently taking into consideration, or attaching the proper weight to, the circumstances out of which it arose, namely the occupation of the whole west part of the island by a French republican force of six or seven times the strength of the Dutch garrison, Rear-admiral Sir John Thomas Duckworth, the commander-in-chief at Jamaica, flattered himself that he had only to send up a line-of-battle ship or two, and the inhabitants would again surrender the island to the arms of his Britannic majesty.

Nor was the rear-admiral the only British officer who had taken such an idea into his head, grounded upon the same partial view of the previous surrender. When, in the middle of the year 1803, intelligence of the declaration of war against Holland reached Port-Royal, Jamaica, the 10-gun schooner *Gipsy*, Acting-lieutenant Michael Fitton, was despatched to Curaçoa, to warn any British cruisers that might be lying there, of what had taken place, in order that they might provide for their safety. Arriving in the harbour of St.-Ann, the *Gipsy* found at anchor there the 18-gun ship-sloop *Surinam*, Captain Robert Tucker. To this officer, in as secret a manner as he could, Lieutenant Fitton communicated the intelligence, and advised him immediately to get under way. "No," says Captain Tucker, "I'll summon the fiscal to surrender the island to me." In vain did the lieutenant represent the folly of such a proceeding ; in vain did he point to the numerous batteries around the harbour : Captain Tucker went on shore, and made his proposal in form. The Dutch authorities had received no official account of the war ; but they took the captain's word, and not only his word, but his sword, and his ship, and all that were on board of her. Knowing well what would happen, Lieutenant Fitton, in the mean time, had weighed and stood out ; and the *Gipsy* was soon chased off the port by two armed

\* See p. 60.

vessels of superior force, which, in consequence of Captain Tucker's imprudence, had been despatched in pursuit of her.

In the early part of December, 1803, the 74-gun ship *Theseus*, Captain John Bligh, arrived at Port-Royal Jamaica, from the mole of Saint-Nicholas. On the 17th Captain Bligh received an order directing him to proceed on the ensuing day off the city of Santo-Domingo, and, in company with the 74-gun ship *Vanguard*, Captain James Walker, previously stationed there, to blockade the port. Should the French in possession of the town\* propose capitulation, Captain Bligh was authorized to treat with them, and was at the same time verbally informed by Sir John Duckworth, in strict confidence, that he would receive an order by the 74-gun ship *Hercule*, Captain Richard Dalling Dunn, to attack the island of Curaçoa; but that it was not his, Sir John's, intention, that the safety of the line-of-battle ships should be risked by attempting to force the harbour of St.-Ann.

On the 19th the *Theseus* sailed from Port-Royal, and before the end of the month arrived off the city of Santo-Domingo; but the *Vanguard* was not there, nor, in fact, did that ship join at all. On the 15th of January, 1804, Captain Bligh received his orders by the *Hercule*, and by them was directed, taking with him the three 74s, already named, also the 18-pounder 36-gun frigates *Blanche*, Captain Zachary Mudge, and *Pique*, Captain William Bayne Hodgson Ross, and the 10-gun schooner *Gipsy*, Acting-lieutenant Michael Fitton, to proceed without a moment's loss of time off the island of Curaçoa; "having," says Sir John, "received certain information that the garrison of Curaçoa has not been strengthened since the commencement of the war, and consists of only 160 troops, with a frigate in the port whose officers and crew are said nearly all to have fallen victims to the climate." Captain Bligh is then directed to summon the island to surrender to his majesty's arms upon liberal conditions. In case of a refusal, and that he should have no reason to believe there had been any augmentation of the garrison, Captain Bligh is to land a part of the crews of the ships. Then follows this nugatory salvo: "But it is my duty to caution you by no means to hazard more than the object is worth." Nugatory, indeed; for, by what standard was the relative value of the object and the means to be measured?

With his two 74s, two frigates, and one schooner, and with no other knowledge of the state of Curaçoa than was contained in the paragraph already quoted from his orders, and with no person on board the squadron who had ever seen the island, except Captain Ross and Mr. Fitton, Captain Bligh made sail for his destination. Owing to calms and variable winds, the squadron did not, until the 30th of January, arrive in sight of the island of Bonaire, which lies off the east end of Curaçoa. In the evening the ships bore up, and early on the next morning, the 31st, hove to about six miles to the eastward of the town and

harbour of St.-Ann. Captain Ross having embarked on board the *Gipsy*, was despatched with a flag of truce and a summons to the Dutch governor or fiscal, to surrender the island to the British. At 9 h. 30 m. A. M. the *Gipsy* stood out of the harbour, with the preconcerted signal flying, announcing that the terms had been refused.

The passage into the harbour is so narrow, that, even with a fair wind (and it now blew off the land), a line-of-battle ship can with difficulty enter; and the batteries that command the harbour and town, including Fort République, against which from its situation, an attack by storm is impracticable, mounted nearly 100 pieces of cannon. In the harbour were lying the Dutch 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Hatslaar* and two French privateers. Under these circumstances, no alternative remained but to try the effect of a landing. Leaving, therefore, the two frigates, as well to blockade the harbour, as to cause a diversion of the enemy's force, Captain Bligh, with the two 74s and schooner, bore up for a small cove, which had been pointed out by Mr. Fitton as the most eligible spot for effecting a disembarkation.

According to a previous arrangement the boats of the squadron, containing all the marines of the four ships, 199 in number, and a detachment of 406 seamen, had assembled on board the *Hercule*, and were commanded as follows: the seamen of the *Theseus*, by Lieutenants Edward Henry a'Court and Richard Henry Muddle, assisted by six midshipmen; and her marines by Lieutenants Earle Harwood and Bertrand Cahuac. The seamen of the *Hercule*, by Lieutenants John B. Hills and Nisbet Josiah Willoughby; and the marines by Lieutenant Samuel Perrot. The seamen of the *Blanche*, by Lieutenant William Woolsey, of the *Hercule*, in lieu of their proper commanding officer, Lieutenant William Braithwaite, who, to his disgrace as an officer and a gentleman, was incapacitated from filling his proper station by habitual drunkenness. The marines of the *Blanche* were commanded by Lieutenant Edward Nicolls, the senior marine-officer in the squadron. The seamen of the *Pique*, on account of the sickness of two of her three lieutenants, were commanded by Captain Ross, and her marines by Lieutenant William Henry Craig; and the whole detachment of seamen and marines, numbering 605 officers and men, was placed under the orders of Captain Dunn, of the *Hercule*.

In passing Fort Amsterdam, situated on the south-east side of the entrance to St.-Ann, the two 74s were fired at, but without effect, the shot falling short. At 11 h. 30 m. Fort Piscadero, mounting 10 Dutch 12-pounders, and protecting the intended point of disembarkation, opened a fire. This was immediately returned by the *Theseus*, within half musket-shot, although the ship was unable to remain alongside owing to a strong head wind and lee current. By making short tacks, however, the *Theseus* brought her guns to bear with such effect that the fort



fired only an occasional gun when the ship was in stays. At 1 P. M. the first division of seamen and marines in the boats stormed and carried the fort without loss, and struck the Dutch colours, which the enemy, on retreating, had left flying. By a rapid movement the British gained the heights, and, with the loss of only four or five killed and wounded, drove the Dutch soldiers from the position. This done, the remainder of the seamen and marines were landed, and the Gipsy schooner anchored in the cove. Captain Bligh also went on shore; and, as there was no anchorage for them, the *Theseus* and *Hercule* continued to stand off and on, but, owing to the wind and current, found a great difficulty in keeping their stations. During the night several shot were fired at the ships from Fort Amsterdam; but, although two or three went over the *Theseus*, not one shot struck either ship.

On the morning of the 1st of February two 18-pounder carronades and a light field-piece were landed from the *Theseus*; and, with great difficulty and some danger, were dragged four miles to the advanced post at the height. This post was situated about 800 yards to the westward of the town of St.-Ann, which it in part overlooked, and was placed under the command of Lieutenant Willoughby, while the post between that and the point of disembarkation was commanded by Lieutenant Hills. On the 2d two long 18-pounders were landed, and one or both were got to "Willoughby's battery;" as was also one of the Dutch 12-pounders from Fort Piscadero. But this was not accomplished without some loss from the heavy fire kept up by Fort République. Four more 18-pounder carronades and another field-piece or two were landed and mounted at one or the other of the posts; and a constant interchange of firing was kept up between the British and Dutch batteries. In this firing a French battery, mounted by some of the guns, and manned by the crews, of the privateers, also took a part.

On the evening of the 4th there was a smart skirmish between the British at the advanced post and the enemy's sharpshooters, in which the latter were repulsed; and on the morning of the 5th a more serious affair took place between the marines under Lieutenant Nicolls and a force of Dutch and French estimated at 500 men. Notwithstanding his numerical inferiority, Lieutenant Nicolls, in the most gallant manner, repulsed the allied forces; but, pursuing the enemy too far, not without the loss of nearly 20 in killed and wounded, chiefly from the cannon of Fort République. On the next day, the 6th, the cannonade between the forts was resumed; but Lieutenant Willoughby, finding it in vain to present any of his pieces at Fort République, directed them at the town and at the shipping in the harbour. By this means the town was partially set on fire; and the *Hatslaar* would probably have been destroyed, had not the Dutch placed

alongside of her, as a sort of *fend-off*, two large merchant vessels, whose hulls received the greater part of the shot.

In this way passed a number of successive days, the force of the British gradually decreasing, not merely by loss from the cannon of the forts and in the different skirmishes, but from fatigue and sickness. At length not an officer was left at the advanced battery but Lieutenant Willoughby and Midshipman Eaton Travers; and 63 of the men had been obliged to be re-embarked owing to an attack of dysentery: a circumstance not to be wondered at considering that both officers and men lay upon the ground, without any of those conveniences deemed indispensable in the encampment of an army. The force of the Dutch too, instead of amounting to only 160 regulars, consisted of 250 effective men, besides a body of local militia, and the crews of the vessels in the harbour. In addition to all this, the Dutch learnt by deserters, nine of whom quitted in one night, the weak state of the British force, and that the squadron must soon raise the blockade for the want of provisions.

In this state of things Captain Bligh, on the morning of the 23d, despatched the *Gipsy* to apprise Sir John Duckworth of his intention, unless any thing favourable should happen, to re-embark his people on the 4th of March. In the course of that same 23d, the Dutch received a reinforcement; and in the evening the *Pique* was obliged to bear up for Jamaica, on account of having damaged her rudder.

Nearly one half, or 30 out of 67, of the *Hercule's* marines were Poles, part of the prisoners taken at St.-Domingo; and who, most inconsiderately, had been allowed to enter. On the 24th these "volunteers," very naturally, evinced so clear an intention of going over to the enemy, that they were obliged to be sent on board their ship with all haste. The re-embarkation of the whole remaining force could now no longer be delayed; and on the 25th, by 9 P. M., every person was on board an American schooner and one or two other vessels of a light draught, except Lieutenant Hills and a small party left to destroy Fort Piscadero. At 11 P. M. this was effectually done, and the lieutenant and his men soon joined their companions afloat.

The loss of the British, in the different skirmishes that had taken place, amounted to one midshipman (Joseph Palmer), eight seamen, two sergeants and seven privates of marines killed, and three lieutenants of marines (Messieurs Harwood, Cahuac, and Perrot, the latter with the loss of an arm), 16 seamen, two sergeants and 21 privates of marines wounded; total, 18 killed and 42 wounded. The whole of the guns, that had been landed from the ships, were also left behind, except, we believe, two 3-pounder field-pieces; but the abandoned guns were all rendered unserviceable, and the carriages, platforms, &c. destroyed.

The circumstances, under which Lieutenant Perrot received

his severe wound, are so extraordinary as to be worthy a recital. During almost every day of the three weeks and upwards that the advanced battery was held, Lieutenant Willoughby, with a recklessness of his person that, as it appears to us, the occasion did not warrant, used to sit in a chair upon the ramparts or breastwork of his little battery, exposed to a daily, nay almost to an hourly, discharge of shot from one or two guns mounted upon the Dutch fort above. The earth was ploughed up all around, and one man, we believe, was killed close to the spot; but still the table and chair, and the daring young officer who sat there, remained untouched. On one afternoon Lieutenant Perrot was induced to seat himself in the chair. Scarcely had he done so, when a shot came, took off his left arm, badly wounded the knee upon which it had been resting, and knocked the table to atoms.

Notwithstanding the ill success which had attended this, as Sir John himself not inaptly termed it, "child of his own brain," the addition of the Vanguard's seamen and marines, and of a heavy mortar or two, would have enabled Captain Bligh to cut off the water from the Dutch garrison, and probably have compelled the French faction that ruled the island to accede to the proposed capitulation. The British officers and men behaved most admirably: and the masterly manner, in which, for so long a time and under so many privations, Lieutenant Hills and Willoughby, the latter in particular, maintained their respective posts, elicited the strong praise of Captain Bligh: who also, in reference to another officer, says to Sir John Duckworth, "Mr. Fitton has throughout shown so much zeal and judgment, that I should feel most happy if you can consistently give him a commission appointing him lieutenant of the Gipsy." This recommendation was attended to; and, in a few days after the Gipsy anchored at Port-Royal, her commander, although the bearer of despatches announcing a defeat, received, what years of active employment and of hard and responsible service, what more than one successful case of acknowledged skill and gallantry as a commanding officer,\* had failed to procure him, his commission as a lieutenant.

On the 25th of April the British 74-gun ship Centaur, Captain Murray Maxwell, bearing the broad pendant of Commodore Samuel Hood, accompanied by the three armées en flûte or reduced 44-gun ships Pandour, Captain John Nash, and Serapis, Captain Henry Waring, and reduced 28-gun frigate Alligator, Captain Charles Richardson, also the ship-sloop Hippomenes, Captain Conway Shipley, brig-sloop Drake, Captain William Ferris, and armed schooner Unique, Lieutenant George R. Brand, with a fleet of transports having on board nearly 2000 troops, under Major-general Sir Charles Green, after a passage

\* See p. 60.

of 22 days from Barbadoes, arrived off the island of Surinam; when immediate measures were taken to send a division of the army, of about 700 men, under the command of Brigadier-general Maitland, to land at Warapee creek. The direction of the disembarkation being left to Captain Conway Shipley of the *Hippomenes*, the latter, with that sloop, a transport, and three armed vessels, landed the troops on the night of the 30th, assisted by Captain Kenneth M'Kenzie of the brig-sloop *Gua-chapin*; and who, with great zeal, had quitted his sloop 50 leagues to leeward, with all her boats, on finding, from baffling winds and currents, that she could not get up.

That no time might be lost, Brigadier-general Hughes, who had arrived in the *Pandour*, was ordered to endeavour to gain possession, on the following night, of Braam's point; and instructions were sent to Captain James O'Brien, of the 36-gun frigate *Emerald*, then lying off the bar of Surinam river, to carry this service, in concert with the brigadier, into execution. The *Emerald* lost not a moment, but as the tide flowed, pushed over the bar, followed by the *Pandour* and *Drake*, and anchored close to a battery of seven 18-pounders. The fort commenced a brisk fire upon the *Emerald*; but, after the ships had anchored, it was silenced by a few broadsides, without any loss on their side. In the fort were captured 43 officers and men, three of whom were wounded. Not being able to approach nearer to the island in the *Centaur*, on account of the water she drew, the general and commodore removed the next morning to the *Emerald*, lying at the entrance of the river. Having there summoned the colony, an answer was received containing a refusal of the terms. The moment therefore, that the tide served, every effort was made to get up the river; which, from the shallowness of the water, was very difficult, the *Emerald* having passed through the mud in three feet less than she drew. Owing to the lowness of the tide, it was not until the night of the 5th of May that the frigate reached a station near to the fort.

The officers of engineers having explored the roads through the woods, close to the 12-gun battery of Frederici, which communicated with Leyden redoubt of the same force, an attack was made, on the morning of the 30th, by a detachment of troops under Brigadier-general Hughes, conducted in the boats by Captain Maxwell, of the *Centaur*, and Captains Ferris and Richardson, of the *Drake* and *Alligator*. The party landed at Plantation Resolution; and, after a tedious march through woods and swamps, the brigadier and his detachment, accompanied by Captains Maxwell and Ferris, some other officers, and about 30 seamen, carried the battery of Frederici; and, although the enemy blew up the magazine, by which many of the British suffered on entering the work, the troops and seamen, passing without delay a causeway of 700 yards, in the face

of five pieces of cannon that bore upon it, carried in a few minutes more the redoubt of Leyden.

Brigadier-general Maitland had come down the river Comowina, and the ships had all got up near Frederici. By this time, too, the troops were advancing, and the enemy's communications nearly intercepted by the activity of the armed boats of the British; whose provisions, stores, and cannon were already prepared for attacking fort New-Amsterdam, mounting upwards of 80 guns. Aware of all this, the Batavian commandant, Lieutenant-colonel Batenburg, on the 5th of May, sent a flag of truce; and shortly after the receipt of it a capitulation was signed.

Commodore Bloys-Van-Treslong, on the British claiming the surrender of the ships, entered into the terms proposed. He had stationed the *Proserpine* of 32 guns, 18-pounders, near to fort New-Amsterdam, and had extended a line of defence across the river, with the *Pylades* corvette, of 18 guns, at the other extremity, about a mile above the redoubt Purmunt: he had also placed three merchantmen, of from eight to 12 guns, in the centre, and had employed a schooner of 10 guns to reconnoitre and cover the shore at Voorburg, should the British troops have attempted to advance by that side. Besides this force, the Dutch commodore had seven gun-boats ready to act as occasion required.

This important colony was gained, fortunately, with a very inconsiderable loss on either side. That of the British navy amounted to one lieutenant (James Edward Smith, first of the *Centaur*), one midshipman (William Shuldham), one boatswain, and two seamen killed, and three lieutenants (William King and Robert Henderson, both of the *Centaur*, and George R. Brand, of the *Unique*), and five seamen wounded; and that of the army, three privates killed, and 13 officers and privates wounded; total of the British loss, eight killed and 21 wounded, and the greater part owing to the explosion at Frederici. The Dutch appear to have sustained no other loss than the three men already mentioned as wounded in the battery at Braam's point. The number of prisoners taken at Surinam, exclusively of staff and detachments, amounted to 2001; and the total number of pieces of iron and brass ordnance, about half of which were dismounted, was 282.

On the 17th of January, late in the evening, a French squadron commanded by Lieutenant Jean-Michel Mahé, consisting of the armed ship *Oncle-Thomas*, of 20 guns, and the schooners *Renommée* of 14, *Oiseau* of 10 guns, and *Rosalie*, *Vigie*, and another, of two each, fitted out at Cayenne, and having on board 565 officers, soldiers, and sailors, anchored off the British settlement of Gorée. The officer commanding there, Colonel Fraser, had at his disposal only 54 white men including officers, and made the best dispositions in his power for resisting an attack.

On the 18th, at 3 A. M., eight boats from the squadron disembarked 240 troops upon the rocks to the eastward of the town, where the surf happened to be unusually low. An engagement immediately ensued; when, after a loss of 19 men killed and wounded on the part of the British (most of whom were in a sickly state), and 75 on the part of the French, Colonel Fraser surrendered on a capitulation, and the port was taken possession of by the troops and seamen of Lieutenant Mahé.

The French remained in quiet possession of their conquest until the 7th of March, in the morning, when the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Inconstant*, Captain Edward Stirling Dickson, accompanied by a store-ship and three transports, arrived off the settlement. The appearance of English colours on the citadel occasioned Captain Dickson to send Lieutenant Charles Pickford on shore in the cutter, to ascertain in whose possession the place was. Not having, by 10 P. M., received any information, Captain Dickson despatched three boats, manned and armed, under Mr. Runciman, midshipman, to cut out a ship in the harbour. The service was executed, under a heavy fire from the batteries, which sank one of the boats and wounded one of the men. The strength of the garrison having by this means been obtained, the *Inconstant* weighed and stood to the westward, to prevent any succours being thrown in from Sénégal. Having, on the following day, been joined by a fourth merchant ship or transport, the three boats of the latter made the number sufficient to carry the allotted portion of troops; and Captain Dickson commenced preparations to disembark the men on the following day; when, at daybreak on the 8th, English colours were seen flying over French at the fort, the French garrison having the night previous capitulated with Lieutenant Pickford. Thus was the settlement of Gorée restored, without the loss of a man, to its former masters.

#### AMERICA AND THE BARBARY STATES.

From some cause respecting which it would be profitless to inquire these belligerents\* remained comparatively inactive until the latter months of the year 1803, when an adjustment of some differences, which had arisen between the Emperor of Morocco and the United States, left Commodore Preble, who now commanded the American squadron, at liberty to direct his whole attention to Tripoli. Scarcely, however, had the American commodore put his squadron into motion, ere it met with a very serious loss.

On the 31st of October, at 9 A. M., the 44-gun frigate *Philadelphia*, Captain William Bainbridge, being about five leagues to the westward of Tripoli, discovered and immediately chased a

sail in shore, under Tripolitan colours, standing before the wind to the eastward. The Philadelphia soon opened her fire, and continued it until 11 h. 30 m. A. M.: when, being in seven fathoms' water, and finding that he could not prevent the vessel entering Tripoli, Captain Bainbridge discontinued the pursuit. In working off from the shore under her topsails, and when about four miles and a half from the town of Tripoli, the Philadelphia struck upon a rock not laid down in the charts. A boat was immediately lowered to sound: and, the greatest depth of water appearing to be astern, the topgallantsails were set, and all the sails thrown flat aback. Three anchors also were cut from the bows, the water in the hold started, and the guns thrown overboard excepting a few abaft, to defend the ship against the attacks of the Tripolitan gun-boats then firing at her. All this, however, proved ineffectual; as did the attempt to lighten the ship forward, by cutting away the foremast. About sunset, observing a reinforcement of gun-boats approaching from Tripoli, and having no means of defence left, the Philadelphia hauled down her colours. The Tripolitans immediately took possession of the American frigate, and made prisoners of the officers and men; whose number, fortunately, did not at this time exceed 300. About 48 hours afterwards, by great exertions and a strong breeze in their favour, the Tripolitans got the Philadelphia afloat, and towed her into the harbour.

Before we proceed to give an account of the performances of American seamen, the introduction of a few lines, published eight years ago, and not since, to our knowledge, impugned, will render it probable, that we may yet be recording, in part, the exploits of British seamen: "It is fresh in the recollection of many officers of the British navy, how difficult it was, at this period, to keep the seamen from deserting to the Americans. The short peace of 1803 occasioned many of our ships to be paid off; and the nature of the service upon which the Americans were engaged, held forth a strong inducement to the manly feelings of the British tar. It was not to raise his arm against his own countrymen, but against barbarians, whose foul deeds excited indignation in every generous breast. The Americans cannot deny, that the complements of their ships in the Tripolitan war consisted chiefly of British seamen, supplied by a Scotch renegade at New-York, and by numerous other crimps in the different seaport towns of the United States; and that those complements were afterwards filled up, by similar means, at Cadiz and other ports of the Mediterranean. Was not Commodore Preble, on account of being detected in some transaction of this sort, obliged to shorten his stay at Gibraltar, and to fix Syracuse, instead of Malta, for his next rendezvous? To such as know the facility with which, either in the ships or on the shores, of the United States, a deserter, or an emigrant, can obtain his naturalization, the term "American" requires an epithet to render it intelligible.

In recording the exploits of "Americans," it is but to lop off the qualifying adjunct "adopted," and every native reader feels a hero's blood flowing in his veins. On the other hand, should disgrace be attached to the deed, Mr. Clark (the American naval historian) and his brother-writers, anticipating the reader's wishes, seldom fail to state, that the parties were not American, but British sailors.\*

We must premise, also, that the only accounts we have to refer to are those written by the Americans. The Tripolitans have no annalist to compile, no state-historiographer to magnify and blazon, the feats performed by themselves; nor have they any acute and patriotic writer, to expose the exaggerations, and disprove the mistatements, published by their enemies. With such a one-sided case before us we almost fear to proceed; and yet we should be sorry to omit recording, or, by doubting, to throw a slight upon, an act of genuine gallantry, achieved by Frenchman or American, Christian or Mahomedan.

Feeling a laudable desire to prevent the Tripolitans from making any use of the fine frigate which, by an accident so untoward, had fallen into their hands, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, of the United States' 44-gun frigate *Constitution*, submitted to Commodore Preble a plan for setting fire to and destroying the *Philadelphia* in the harbour of Tripoli. The Commodore at first thought the enterprise too hazardous, but at length gave his consent. On the 3d of February, having embarked with 70 volunteers, including Lieutenant James Lawrence and Midshipman Charles Morris, on board a Turkish prize ketch, newly named the *Intrepid*, Lieutenant Decatur sailed from Syracuse, accompanied by the 18-gun brig *Syren*, Lieutenant Charles Stewart; whose boats, covered by the brig's fire, were to co-operate in the attack.

On the 18th, in the evening, the *Intrepid* and *Syren* arrived off the harbour of Tripoli; but it appears that the two vessels "by a change of wind" separated, and that at 8 p. m. the *Intrepid* entered the harbour alone. The *Philadelphia* lay within half gun-shot of the Bashaw's castle and principal battery, with two Tripolitan cruisers at the distance of about 200 yards on her starboard quarter, and on the same bow a number of gun-boats. "All her guns were mounted and loaded."† At about 11 p. m., just as the *Intrepid* had arrived within 200 yards of the larboard and outward side of the *Philadelphia*, the latter hailed and desired the ketch to anchor on peril of being fired into. The pilot of the *Intrepid*, as he had been instructed, and who, we imagine, was himself a mussulman, answered that they had lost all their anchors. Upon this the ketch was suffered to advance; and, so well was the deception kept up, that a rope was per-

\* James's Naval Occurrences between Great Britain and America, p. 73.

† Clark's Naval History of the United States, vol. i., p. 153. This wants confirmation.



mitted to be made fast to the frigate's fore chains, by which the *Intrepid* hauled herself alongside.

Lieutenant Decatur and his party now gallantly sprang on board, and, rushing upon the alarmed Tripolitans, killed about 20, and quickly subdued the remainder. Having thus, in a much easier manner than could have been anticipated, got possession of the *Philadelphia*, Lieutenant Decatur directed her to be set on fire; which was done so promptly and effectively, that the *Intrepid* herself was nearly involved in the flames. A fine wind from the land, however, at that moment sprang up; and the ketch, profiting by it, soon ran out of the harbour with the gallant party who had so fully executed the bold and perilous service intrusted to them. Although, as soon as the Tripolitans on shore had ascertained that the *Philadelphia* was in their enemy's possession, the forts and surrounding vessels opened a fire upon her, the Americans were so fortunate as to escape with only four men wounded.

In the course of the summer, at two or three different periods, the American squadron, assisted by some Neapolitan gun-boats and bomb-vessels, bombarded the town and batteries of Tripoli; and lieutenant, or rather captain (for he then had been deservedly promoted), Decatur, who commanded a gun-boat again greatly distinguished himself. "Captain Decatur," says Mr. Clark, "having grappled a Tripolitan boat and boarded her with only 15 Americans; in 10 minutes her decks were cleared, and she was captured. Three Americans were wounded. At this moment Captain Decatur was informed that the gun-boat, commanded by his brother (Lieutenant James Decatur), had captured a boat belonging to the enemy; but that his brother, as he was stepping on board was treacherously shot by the Tripolitan commander, who made off with his boat. Captain Decatur immediately pursued the murderer, who was retreating within the lines; having succeeded in coming alongside, he boarded with only 11 men. A doubtful contest of 20 minutes ensued. Decatur immediately attacked the Tripolitan commander, who was armed with a spear and cutlass. In parrying the Turk's spear, Decatur broke his sword close to the hilt, and received a slight wound in the right arm and breast; but, having seized the spear, he closed; and after a violent struggle, both fell, Decatur uppermost. The Turk then drew a dagger from his belt; but Decatur caught hold of his arm, drew a pistol from his pocket, and shot him."

An exploit fully equal to this is recorded of another American officer. "Lieutenant Trippe boarded one of the enemy's large boats, with only a midshipman, Mr. Jonathan Henley, and nine men, his boat falling off before any more could join him. He was thus left either to perish, or to conquer 36 men with only 11. Though at first the victory seemed doubtful, yet, in a few minutes, the Tripolitans were subdued; 14 of them were killed,

and 22 taken prisoners. Seven of these last were severely wounded. Lieutenant Trippe received 11 sabre wounds, some of them dangerous. The blade of his sword bending, he closed with his antagonist. Both fell. In the struggle, Trippe wrested the Turk's sword from him, and with it stabbed him to the heart."\*

The American archives contain the records of several more such desperate feats between the American and Tripolitan officers and men. At length, however, an end was put to all hostility between the United States, and the regency of Tripoli, by a treaty of peace concluded in June 1805, but not, it appears, upon terms so advantageous as the Americans had anticipated.

\* Clark's Naval History of the United States, vol. i., p. 157.

## BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

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THE most remarkable feature, in the abstract\* for the commencement of the present year, is the number of vessels that appear in the two "Built" columns. At no former or subsequent period have 87 British ships of war been launched within the year. All these ships, except the five principal ones, had been ordered to be built since the commencement of the war, and upwards of 50 of them since the commencement of the year in which they first took the water. Nothing can better demonstrate the exertions made by the new lord of the admiralty (the late Lord Melville) to recover the British navy from the low state into which it had previously fallen. Of 87 vessels so launched in the year 1804, 80 had been built in the merchants' yards, a number amounting to nearly two thirds of all that had been similarly built during the whole nine years of the preceding war.

Of the 88 new vessels ordered in 1804, 48 were gun-brigs, and 10 belonged to the N, or middling class of 74. The utility of the latter cannot be disputed ; but the former would probably have better answered the intended purpose of their construction had they been differently armed. Their light draught of water enabled them, certainly, to approach very near to an enemy's coast ; but what effective opposition could 18-pounder carronades offer to the heavy long guns mounted by the French batteries and gun-boats ? The new gun-brigs were of a size (180 tons) to carry with ease four 32-pounder carronades, fitted to throw shells, and two long 18-pounders on traversing carriages, one at the bow, the other at the stern. With this reduction in their nominal, but increase in their real strength, these brigs would have been better able to cope with the description of force, which they were likely to encounter in the waters that were to be the scene of their services.

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 13.

The prize and casualty lists for the year 1804 will furnish the names and other particulars of the ships respectively contained in the fourth column of the "Increase," and first of the "Decrease" compartments of the Abstract.\*

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year 1805, was,

Admirals . . . . .	50
Vice-admirals . . . . .	36
Rear-admirals . . . . .	63
„ superannuated 22	
Post-captains . . . . .	639
„ „ 25	
Commanders, or Sloop-captains . . . . .	422
„ superannuated 45	
Lieutenants . . . . .	2472
Masters . . . . .	556

And the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of the same year, was 120,000.†

Scarcely had Spain issued her declaration of war against England,‡ than France began to put in requisition the fleets and armies of her new ally. On the 4th of January, three days actually before the Spanish declaration reached London, a secret treaty between the two courts was signed at Paris, by Vice-admiral Decrès on the part of France, and Vice-admiral Don Frederico Gravina on the part of Spain. The first article contains a display of the force by sea and land at the French emperor's disposal. At the Texel are 30,000 men, with the necessary transports. At Ostende, Dunkerque, Calais, Boulogne, and Havre, respectively, are flotillas, capable of embarking altogether, 120,000 men and 25,000 horses; at Brest, a fleet of 21 sail of the line,§ besides frigates and transports, with 25,000 men ready for embarkation; at Rochefort, a squadron of six sail of the line (including the Achille 74, nearly ready for launching) and four frigates, having on board 4000 men; and at Toulon, a fleet of 11 sail of the line, eight frigates, and sundry transports, having on board 9000; total 188,000 men.

By the second, third, and fourth articles, the King of Spain engages to arm, and supply with six months' provisions and four months' water, from 25 to 29 sail of the line, and to have them ready, with from 4000 to 5000 Spanish troops (in conjunction with 20,000 French to embark from Cadiz), by the 20th, or at furthest, the 30th of March. Of those 25 or 29 sail of the line, Ferrol is to furnish from seven to eight, and which are to

\* See Appendix, Nos. 29, 30, and 31.

† See Appendix, No. 32.

‡ It bore date at Madrid, December 12, 1804. See p. 283.

§ The Ocean three-decker is here meant to be excluded, and probably some other ship equally in an unseaworthy state. See p. 217, where 23 sail of the line are mentioned as in the port.

combine in their operations with the five French sail of the line in that port; Cadiz is to supply from 12 to 15, and Carthage six. By the fifth article the two high contracting parties mutually engage, to augment their fleets by all the ships of the line and frigates that may be subsequently constructed, repaired, and fitted in their respective ports. The sixth article contains an engagement on the part of Napoléon to guarantee to his catholic majesty, as well the integrity of his European dominions, as the restitution of all colonies that may be taken from him during the war; and that, should the fortune of arms, "in accordance with the justice of the cause which their majesties are defending," grant success to their armies and fleets, the emperor will employ his influence to get Trinidad restored, and also the treasure taken out of the four frigates. The seventh article contains a mutual undertaking not to make a separate peace; and the eighth provides that the ratifications shall be exchanged within a month.\* To the treaty a note is appended, signed by the Spanish ambassador, Don Frederico Gravina, in which he expresses a doubt as to the possibility of collecting a sufficiency of sailors for the ships, and, above all, of having ready, by the time stated, so many as six millions of rations.†

If Napoléon, with his 40 or 45 sail of the line, had calculated to create such a diversion of the British fleets, as should give him a clear channel for his flotilla to cross, how must his expectations have been raised now that he possessed the disposal of upwards of 70 sail of the line. It is true that the public lists and journals did show and insist, that the number of commissioned line-of-battle ships belonging to England at the time amounted to 105; but, as respects sea-going ships, the fact was not so: the British navy could send forth no more than 83 sail of the line, and scarcely the whole of them. Buonaparte had constantly a Steel's list before him, and, with the aid of the information derived from his numerous spies, knew, better by far than many in England, how to analyze the accounts, and separate the non-combatant from the combatant ships. Let it then be kept in remembrance, that, at the commencement of the year 1805, the British and the Franco-Spanish navies (leaving the Batavian navy out of the question) were, as to number of effective line-of-battle ships, nearly upon a par. What changes took place in the relative numbers of these navies before the close of this eventful year, we shall now proceed methodically to relate.

The commencement of the year found Admiral Cornwallis at his station off Ushant, with a force not exceeding 11 sail of the line; while the French fleet that lay in the road of Brest, ready for sea, numbered, as has on more than one occasion been shown, 21 sail. On the 3d of February, when the blockading force,

\* They were exchanged on the 18th of January.

† For a copy of this important treaty, see vol. xi., p. 215, of *Précis des Evénemens*, &c.

by successive arrivals, had been augmented to 16 sail, the departure of five, under Vice-admiral Sir Robert Calder, to the station off Ferrol and Corunna, left the admiral again, for a short time, with only 11 sail. The perseverance with which, during a period of 22 months, including two boisterous winters, Admiral Cornwallis had maintained the blockade of Brest, affected his health, and obliged him to suspend his arduous labours, and seek a few weeks' relaxation on shore. Accordingly, on the 20th of March, the *Ville-de-Paris* anchored at Spithead, and in the course of the day struck the flag at her main. The command of the Channel fleet devolved upon Admiral Lord Gardner, whose flag was flying on board the *Trent* frigate at Cork. In the mean time the fleet, cruising off Ushant and numbering 17 sail of the line, had been left in charge of Vice-admiral Sir Charles Cotton, in the 112-gun ship *San-Josef*.

On the 3d of April Admiral Lord Gardner, in the new first-rate *Hibernia*, arrived off Ushant, and relieved Sir Charles Cotton in the command of the fleet, then consisting of 21 sail of the line. On the 11th a gale of wind drove the British fleet from the French coast. On the 13th, in the afternoon, Lord Gardner, with 17 sail, regained his station; and, the next morning, the 14th, in consequence of some intelligence received from his lookout frigates, he despatched the *Warrior* 74 to reconnoitre the harbour of Brest. At 5 h. 30 m. p. m. Captain William Bligh rejoined, with the signal flying, that the French ships were getting under way. Upon this the British ships formed in line of battle to be ready to receive them. On the following morning, the 15th, the French van-division, composed of nine sail of the line, appeared in sight off the Black Rocks, and was presently joined by the main body, forming a total, as counted, of 40 sail of vessels, including 21 of the line. This formidable fleet had on board 2000 troops, and was provisioned for six months. The British admiral, whose force in the course of the day amounted to 24 sail of the line, strove his utmost to bring the French fleet to action; but the latter, after manœuvring for a few hours between Bertheaume and Camaret bays returned into port.

Unlike a few former shifts of position and manœuvres in Brest and Bertheaume roads, and which served the double purpose of exercising the crews, and of enabling the *Moniteur* to insert a boastful paragraph, about offering battle to, and chasing away, the blockading force, this was a real attempt to put to sea. Vice-admiral Villeneuve had sailed from Toulon, and Napoléon's object now was, that the two fleets should effect their junction in the West Indies, and, after ravaging the British possessions there, return to the Channel, augmented, by the Rochefort squadron on the route, and by the combined squadron at Ferrol on appearing off that port, to 56 sail of the line. It

was then that the great blow was to be struck. All Napoléon's letters, written at this period, betray his anxiety about M. Ganteaume's departure. In one dated "Au château de Stupinis, le 21 Avril," he says to his minister of marine, "Le non départ de Ganteaume me contrarie beaucoup;" and, in another dated at the same place two days afterwards, wherein he informs M. Decrès that he has despatched a courier to Ganteaume, to inform him that Nelson had gone to Egypt in search of Villeneuve, Buonaparte emphatically adds: "Dieu veuille que mon courrier ne le trouve point à Brest."

After a vain endeavour, by forging news of disastrous events to the English in India, to weaken, by detachments abroad, the fleet off Ushant, Napoléon directs that, if Ganteaume cannot put to sea before the 20th of May, he is to remain quiet.\* The fact is, that M. Villeneuve's stock of provisions was expending fast, and a longer delay might throw serious obstacles in the way of the expedition. The British blockading fleet still retaining its menacing posture, the next plan was, that Vice-admiral Ganteaume should remove with his fleet to a position outside the goulet, between Camaret bay and the east end of Bertheaume bay. To prevent the British from paying the spot a visit, when thus temptingly occupied, directions were given to strengthen the defences along the coast in the neighbourhood. This was so expeditiously as well as effectually done, that, by the first week in May, upwards of 150 pieces of cannon were mounted on the different batteries around Bertheaume and Camaret bays. The object of ordering M. Ganteaume to this outer anchorage was to facilitate his putting to sea, but, above all, to enable him to effect his junction with Vice-admiral Villeneuve; who, on the probability that the former would not be able to quit Brest in time to meet the latter in the West Indies, had been directed to hasten to Ferrol. Having there augmented his force to 34 sail of the line, Vice-admiral Villeneuve was to take his choice of four routes for reaching Boulogne. The first two supposed a junction with the Brest fleet, thus: to appear before Rochefort, and, joining the five ships there and the one at Lorient, proceed to Brest, and then with 60 sail of the line enter the Channel; or, as the Rochefort squadron occupied an equal number of British ships, letting that remain, proceed straight to M. Ganteaume's anchorage, and thence to the Channel with 54 sail of the line: in either of which cases, it appears, Napoléon designed that Vice-admiral Ganteaume, although junior to M. Villeneuve, should assume the command. All this was to be effected, if possible, without an action; but, should one be unavoidable, it was to be fought, for obvious reasons, as near as possible to Brest. The third and fourth routes were, either to double Ireland, and, calling for the Texel squadron of seven,

\* Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., pp. 228—239.

arrive before Boulogne with 41 sail of the line, or to pass straight up Channel, out of view of the coasts or of the blockading fleet off Brest, and, with 34 sail only, appear off Boulogne, four or five days before the Channel fleet could arrive there; in which four or five days the flotilla was to cross and the descent be effected.\* A fifth plan, left as an alternative to M. Villeneuve, having reference exclusively to a distant service, is deferred to the proper period for introducing it.

It was at about the date of these orders, that some reflections in the English newspapers, cast upon the Brest fleet for not sailing out and engaging a much inferior force, gave disquietude to Napoleon, and caused him to write thus to his minister of marine: "Have inserted in the journals of Holland an article against the system of blockade; let it be made appear that we sail out of Brest when we choose; that Bruix sailed out such a day, Morard de Galles such a day, Ganteaume several times; that in his last trip to Bertheaume, nothing prevented his putting to sea, and that the English squadron did not so much as know of his being under sail: that it is therefore impossible to blockade the port of Brest, especially in the months of September and October. This article will show, that we have no desire to put to sea, but wish merely to keep the enemy in awe."† Many of the London opposition journals, taking all this for truth, became very strenuous coadjutors in Buonaparte's plan of deception.

On the 6th of July accounts reached the Channel fleet of the arrival of the combined fleet at Martinique; and on the same day Admiral Cornwallis, having recovered his health, arrived in the *Ville-de-Paris* off Ushant, and relieved Lord Gardner in the command of the former, now consisting of 18 sail of the line, and which, considering the force likely to assail it from different points, was rather critically situated. On the 11th intelligence that the combined fleet was on its return reached Admiral Cornwallis from the admiralty, with orders for Rear-admiral Sterling to quit his station off Rochefort, and, with his five sail of the line, join Vice-admiral Calder off Ferrol. The circumstances under which these orders had been despatched are deserving of attention. The British brig-sloop *Curieux*, Captain George Edmund Byron Bettesworth, with the intelligence, anchored at Plymouth on the 7th, in the morning; and at about 11 p. m. on the 8th the captain arrived at the admiralty. The first lord having retired to rest, the despatches were not communicated to him until early on the morning of the 9th. At this Lord Barham was very angry, saying, that seven or eight hours had been lost. Without waiting to dress himself, he wrote orders for Admiral Cornwallis to detach Rear-admiral Sterling from off Rochefort to join Vice-admiral Calder, who was to take

\* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 253.

† See Appendix, No. 33.



a station to the westward of Cape Finisterre, while Admiral Cornwallis himself, with the Channel fleet, was to cruise between Ushant and Finisterre. By 9 A.M. the admiralty messengers were on their way to Portsmouth and Plymouth, and on the 11th, as already mentioned, Admiral Cornwallis received his orders. Such promptitude on the part of the British admiralty could not be credited by Napoléon. "Ce ne que le 20 messidor" (July 8), says he, "que le brick le Curieux est arrivé en Angleterre. L'amirauté n'a pu se décider dans les vingt-quatre heures sur les mouvemens de ses escadres: dans ce cas, il n'est pas probable que l'ordre à l'escadre devant Rochefort soit arrivé en trois jours. Je mets donc en fait que cette escadre a levé sa croisière par des ordres antérieurs à l'arrivée du Curieux à Londres."\*

On the 20th Vice-admiral Ganteaume received orders to put to sea, and endeavour to form a junction, first with the Rochefort squadron of five sail of the line, off the Lizard, and then with M. Villeneuve. On the 29th the news of the latter's action with Sir Robert Calder reached the Channel fleet, and on the 14th of August Sir Robert himself joined the fleet with eight sail of the line; as, on the following day, the 15th, did Lord Nelson from his long western cruise, with 11. The departure of his lordship on the 16th, with two or three ships, left the admiral with a force of 34 sail of the line. On the 17th, on intelligence arriving that the Franco-Spanish fleet, numbering 27 or 28 sail of the line, had been seen off Ferrol, Admiral Cornwallis detached to that station Sir Robert Calder, with 18.† On the 20th the Captain 74, from Plymouth, joined the Channel fleet, which then amounted to 17 sail of the line.

The affair off Cape Finisterre, being considered to have entailed an equal loss of ships upon the British and the combined fleets, was not allowed to interrupt the grand design, in which the latter had been allotted to take so important a part. On the 20th of August, a little before the time when, as it was conjectured, Vice-admiral Villeneuve would be off the port, Vice-admiral Ganteaume received orders to quit Brest road, where the fleet had recently been lying, and anchor in Bertheaume. On the same day, at about 6 h. 30 m. P.M., the French advanced squadron began to get under way, but not unseen by the British 44-gun frigate *Indefatigable*, Captain John Tremayne Rodd; who, accompanied by the 38-gun frigate *Niobe*, and two or three smaller vessels, was reconnoitring the harbour, and for that purpose had taken a station about four miles south by east of the Black Rocks. On the following morning, the 21st, at 6 A.M., the whole French fleet, consisting of the following 21 sail of the line, five frigates, one ship

\* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 243.

† Napoléon either thought, or affected to think, this to be an egregious folly "insigne bêtise" on the part of Admiral Cornwallis. *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 258.

corvette, and two avisos, under Vice-admiral Ganteaume in the *Impérial* (late *Vengeur*, a name that no one in France, considering the circumstance out of which it had arisen, could expect would so soon have been changed), stood out of the goulet, and, at about 10 h. 30 m. A. M., anchored in the new position between Camaret and Bertheaume :

Gun-ship		Gun-ship		Gun-ship
120	<i>Impérial</i> ,		<i>Bâtave</i> ,	
110	{ <i>Invincible</i> ,		{ <i>Brave</i> ,	
	{ <i>Républicain</i> ,*		{ <i>Cassard</i> ,	
80	{ <i>Alexandre</i> ,	74	{ <i>Conquerant</i> ,	74
	{ <i>Foudroyant</i> ,		{ <i>Dionède</i> ,	{ <i>Tourville</i> ,
74	{ <i>Alliance</i> ,		{ <i>Eole</i> ,	{ <i>Ulysse</i> ,
	{ <i>Aquilon</i> ,		{ <i>Impétueux</i> ,	{ <i>Vétéran</i> ,
				{ <i>Wattigny</i> .

*Frigates.* *Cornète*, *Félicité*, *Indienne*, *Valeureuse*, *Volontaire*.

*Ship-corvette*, *Diligente*, and *brig-corvettes* *Espiègle* and *Vulcain*.

On the first discovery of the ships in the morning, the *Felix* schooner had been sent with the intelligence to the admiral off Ushant; and, on their anchoring, the 36-gun frigate *Aigle*, Captain George Wolfe, who had joined about an hour before, was despatched upon the same errand.

At the time the news reached him, which was soon after noon on the 21st, Admiral Cornwallis lay with his fleet, numbering 17 sail of the line, one frigate (exclusive of two others and a brig-sloop on the look-out in-shore), two cutters, and one schooner, about three leagues south by west of the island of Ushant. The British fleet, the names of the whole of the ships of which, owing to the frequent departures and arrivals of the preceding 10 days, we are unable to give, hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, with a moderate breeze at north by east, and at about 2 h. 30 m. P. M. passed the west end of Ushant within less than three miles. At 3 h. 30 m., having made *Pointe Saint-Mathieu*, the fleet shortened sail, and soon discovered the French ships, some at an anchor and others under way. The admiral being desirous himself to reconnoitre the enemy, the *Ville-de-Paris* made the signal for the fleet to disregard her motions, and then stood in towards the *Indefatigable* and her two consorts. At 5 P. M. the *Ville-de-Paris* and in-shore squadron, having a fair view of the French fleet, shortened sail and counted the number of vessels; which was found to correspond with the number already given, except in the omission of the corvette. At 5 h. 30 m. P. M. *Pointe Saint-Mathieu* bearing north only a mile and a half distant, the *Ville-de-Paris* wore to rejoin her fleet. Immediately several shot and shells were fired at her and the ships in company, both from *Pointe Saint-Mathieu* and from the west point of Bertheaume, but without effect. At 6 h. 30 m.

P. M. Admiral Cornwallis rejoined the fleet ; and, having made known his intention to attack the French fleet at its anchorage early the next morning, anchored at 7 P. M. for the night, a short distance to the southward of the outer Black Rock ; which then bore from the Ville-de-Paris north half-east, St.-Mathieu's lighthouse east-north-east, and the Bec du Raz south half-east.

On the 22d, at 4 h. 30 m. A. M., the British fleet weighed, and, with the weather hazy and the wind still at north by east, stood in on the larboard tack for Camaret bay, in close order of battle ; the Ville-de-Paris leading, and next to her the 80-gun ship Cæsar, Captain Sir Richard John Strachan, and 74-gun ship Montagu, Captain Robert Waller Otway. At 6 h. 30 m. A. M., the Porquelle rock being close ahead, the ships of the fleet tacked in succession. On the haze clearing away a little, the French fleet was seen at anchor ; but at 8 A. M. the ships of the latter began getting under way. In 20 minutes afterwards the British ships tacked in succession, and again stood in under easy sail. At 9 A. M. the Indefatigable, being ahead, stood towards the French 80-gun ship Alexandre, Rear-admiral Willaumez, who was leading the French fleet, then standing out in line of battle. At 9 h. 30 m. the Alexandre fired a broadside at the Indefatigable, but without effect, and was answered by the latter's maindeck guns, the distance being too great for the caronades. On this the Indefatigable tacked, and the Ville-de-Paris and ships in her train made sail towards the French fleet ; but the latter presently tacked for the harbour's mouth, as if to avoid an engagement. At 10 h. 45 m. A. M. the Cæsar and Montagu hauled out of the line to attack the Alexandre, who, with the Foudroyant and Impétueux, formed the rear of the French line. This, at about 11 A. M., brought on a fire from the batteries, which the Ville-de-Paris, Cæsar, and Montagu returned, the three rearmost French ships already named, and the Valeureuse and Volontaire frigates also taking part in it. At 11 h. 30 m., the west point of Bertheaume bearing north half-east distant one mile and a half, the British fleet wore and stood out in order of battle, the batteries keeping up, until a quarter past noon, a constant fire of shot and shells.

The damage done to the British van, principally by the batteries, proved how well the latter were calculated to protect the French fleet at its new anchorage. On board the Ville-de-Paris one shell struck the spare anchor, and burst into innumerable pieces, which flew in all directions. A piece, weighing about a pound and a half, struck Admiral Cornwallis on the breast, but, being entirely spent, did not hurt him. A second piece struck and slightly wounded one of the midshipmen. No other person, it is believed, was hurt ; but the ship had her hull struck in several places, and her rigging and sails a great deal cut. The Cæsar and Montagu both suffered in their rigging and sails ; the

former, indeed, owing to the close position she took, lost three men killed and six wounded. The Montagu had the heel of her fore topmast shot away, but does not appear to have sustained any loss in men. Of the French ships, the whole of which by 2 p. m. had reanchored, the *Alexandre*, who was the *Cæsar*'s principal opponent, is represented to have had her mizen topmast shot away, and, with two or three of the other ships, to have sustained some damage in rigging and sails. With respect to loss, the French accounts give it in the gross, merely stating, that about 20 men were placed hors de combat by the fire of the British ships.

Admitting that this was an affair in which the French advanced squadron alone had retired from the fire of the British, still the two fleets were wholly in sight of each other, and M. Ganteaume had but to stand from under the protection of his batteries to bring on a general action. Considering that he had 21 sail of the line to oppose to 17, we cannot suppose that the French admiral would have declined a battle, had he, from the nature of his orders, been permitted to engage. To know that he was so restrained, and yet be compelled to keep his orders secret, must, to a brave officer like Vice-admiral Ganteaume, have been a sorry compensation for the public obloquy of the transaction, glossed over even as it was, by imperial command, in the columns of the *Moniteur*.

On every succeeding day, from the 23d to the 30th of August, some of the French ships got under way and manœuvred about, but the Brest fleet made no serious attempt to put to sea. Matters remained in this inactive state until the 13th of December; when, taking advantage of a brisk gale from the north-east and the absence of the blockading fleet, which had retired into port to victual and refit, a division of the French fleet, consisting of 11 sail of the line, four frigates, and a corvette, quitted the anchorage outside the goulet, and put to sea. A succession of gales of wind, during the few days that remained of the year, prevented Admiral Cornwallis from regaining his station off Ushant, and concealed from his knowledge any positive information of the sailing of so large a division of the Brest fleet.

As we have done on other occasions, so we shall here, give some account of the different actions of the year fought between the British cruisers stationed off the French coast and the invasion-flotilla. In the course of the spring the corps of Marshal Davoust, encamped in the neighbourhood of Ostende, proceeded to join the grand invading army, of which it formed the right wing. This occasioned a corresponding movement in the Gallo-Batavian flotilla; and accordingly the port of Ambleteuse was fixed upon as the point of rendezvous for the different divisions stationed at Ostende, Dunkerque, and Calais. Admiral Ver-Huell, whom, in the preceding spring, we left at Ostende, whither

he had been driven by the squadron of Sir Sidney Smith,\* succeeded, at length, in reaching Dunkerque; where a great portion of the Gallo-Batavian flotilla had now assembled, and lay watching an opportunity to get to the westward, by departing, a division at a time, as the readiest mode to avoid discovery and molestation.

On the 23d of April, at 9 p.m., favoured by the darkness and a fresh wind from north-east, the first division, consisting of 33 gun-vessels and 19 transports, laden with stores from the camp at Ostende, weighed from Dunkerque road. The division passed Gravelines and Calais undiscovered; when, just before daybreak on the 24th, the wind shifted to south-east, and then to south-south-east. Having a change of tide also against them, the vessels were thrown into disorder. The greater part of them now steered for an anchorage between the capes Blanez and Grinez, while eight schuyts, which had kept too long on the larboard tack, found themselves seven or eight miles from the shore. In this state the division was gained sight of by a British squadron, consisting of the 38-gun frigate *Leda*, Captain Robert Honyman, sloops *Harpy* and *Railleur*, Captains Edmund Heywood and Valentine Collard, bomb-vessel *Fury*, Captain John Yelland, and eight gun-brigs, the whole, except two of the latter which were sailing guard off Ambleteuse, at anchor off Boulogne.

The two gun-brigs off Ambleteuse, which were the *Gallant* and *Watchful*, Lieutenants Thomas Shirly and James Marshall, immediately chased north-east by signal, and the remainder of the squadron weighed and stood in the same direction. At 8 a.m. the above two gun-brigs closed with the eight armed schuyts, and a smart cannonade commenced between the latter, aided by the heavy batteries on shore, and the brigs. In a few minutes four large shot from the batteries struck the *Gallant* between wind and water, and compelled her to haul on the starboard tack in order to stop the leaks, which were gaining fast. One schuyt struck to the *Watchful*. The *Railleur*, and the gun-brigs *Locust* and *Starling*, Lieutenants John Lake and Charles Napier, coming up, compelled six others, before 10 a.m., also to surrender, but not until after a spirited resistance on the part of the schuyts.

Early on the morning of the 25th two other schuyts, which had drifted off the land, were captured by the *Archer* gun-brig, Lieutenant William Price, whose one seaman wounded was all the loss sustained by the British. The eight Gallo-Batavian schuyts averaged about 75 tons, mounted three guns each, chiefly long 24-pounders, and carried, altogether, 142 sailors and soldiers. The remainder of the division, assisted by several armed launches, containing grapnels and hawsers, sent out from

\* See p. 224.

Boulogne by Rear-admiral Lacrosse (since the death of Admiral Bruix, on the 19th of March, the commander-in-chief of the French flotilla), succeeded, after a while, in reaching Ambleteuse, the port of its destination.

On the 10th of June, at 7 A. M., a division of the French flotilla, consisting of the two "corvettes-canonnières" *Foudre*, Capitaine de vaisseau Jacques-Felix-Emmanuel Hemelin, and *Audacieuse*, Lieutenant Dominique Roquebert, each mounting 10 guns (four or six long 18-pounders, the remainder brass 36-pounder carronades, with upwards of 80 men), four gun-vessels, of three long 24-pounders, and an 8-inch mortar each, three others of one 24-pounder and a field-piece each, eight others, of two 4 or 6 pounders, and 14 transports, in all 31 vessels, sailed from the port of Havre bound to Fécamp. By the time they had got abreast of Brunel, the French vessels were chased by the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Chiffonne*, Captain Charles Adam, who, with the ship-sloop *Falcon*, Captain George Sanders, gun-brig *Clinker*, Lieutenant Nisbet Glen, and the *Frances* hired armed cutter, was cruising off the coast.

At 9 h. 30 m. A. M. the *Chiffonne*, then in 10 fathoms' water, considerably ahead of her companions, and close in with the flotilla, opened her fire upon the van, where the *Foudre* had stationed herself; but, in a quarter of an hour, shoaling her water, the frigate was compelled to haul further off. At 10 h. 30 m. A. M. the frigate, followed by the sloop and gun-brig, recommenced firing. Shortly afterwards one of the French brigs caught fire, but succeeded in extinguishing it, and some of the other vessels ran on shore. Towards noon the *Chiffonne*, who had bore the brunt of this attack, again hauled out into deeper water. Shortly afterwards the van of the French flotilla ran close under the batteries of Cap-de-Caisset, until joined by the rearmost vessels, when they again bore up to proceed on their course. At 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the three British vessels again stood in, and at 2 P. M. recommenced firing. The *Falcon* presently became closely engaged with the two sternmost of the French brigs, one of which was the *Audacieuse*. As the British passed along the coast, the forts kept firing shells and shots at them without the smallest intermission: notwithstanding which the *Chiffonne* and *Falcon* continued the engagement, and at 3 h. 15 m. P. M. shot away a brig's fore topmast and then her mainmast. The *Falcon* and *Clinker*, not sailing by any means equal to the frigate, gradually dropped astern, and the flotilla sheltered themselves completely under Fécamp batteries; but the latter did not until 4 h. 30 m. P. M. cease firing at the *Chiffonne*.

Several shot struck the *Chiffonne* in the hull, one of which entered between wind and water; and her rigging was also much cut. Her loss amounted to two men killed and three wounded. The *Falcon* suffered in rigging and sails, and had four men wounded; the *Clinker*, one marine killed and one seaman

wounded by the same shot. The French admit a loss of three men killed and 12 wounded, including among the latter the commander of one of the gun-brigs.

On the 15th of July the British gun-brigs Plumper, Lieutenant James Henry Garrety, and Teazer, Lieutenant George Lewis Ker, while cruising off the port of Granville, on the coast of France, found themselves becalmed, and likely to be carried into danger by the strength of the tide. They therefore anchored near the island of Chausey, but, owing to the exigency of the moment, at too great a distance apart to benefit by any mutual support, in the event of being attacked before a breeze sprang up. The critical situation of these brigs being plainly seen from Granville, which was not four leagues distant, Capitaine de vaisseau Louis-Léon Jacob, commanding the several divisions of the flotilla that were assembled between Saint-Malo and Cherbourg, resolved to send some gun-vessels to attempt the capture of the British vessels.

Accordingly, on that same evening, as soon as it grew dark, seven of the largest class of French gun-vessels, armed each with three long 24-pounders, and an 8-inch howitzer, and amply supplied with men and musketry, swept out of the port, under the command of Capitaine de frégate Joseph Collet. On the 16th, at 2 h. 30 m., they arrived within long range of the nearest brig, the Plumper, and opened a fire upon her from their heavy long guns; taking such a safe position, as they advanced, that the brig's 18-pounder carronades could only at intervals be brought to bear upon them. In the course of half an hour Lieutenant Garrety, who, from the first, had conducted himself in the bravest manner, had his arm shot away; but he continued, for some time, to animate his men in repulsing the enemy. At length, at the end of an hour's cannonade, from which she had greatly suffered in hull and crew, the Plumper surrendered.

Having shifted their prisoners and manned the prize, the French rested at an anchor, until the tide turned again in their favour at 6 A. M.; when, accompanied by the Plumper, they weighed, and stood for her late consort. At 8 h. 45 m. A. M. the seven French gun-vessels and their prize commenced firing at the Teazer; who, at 9 A. M., cut her cable, and, setting all sail, tried to escape. But, the calm continuing, the brig made little or no progress; and her opponents soon surrounded and captured her. The British loss on this occasion has been noticed nowhere but in the French accounts. By these it appears that the two brigs had, including Lieutenant Garrety, 17 men badly wounded, the greater part on board the Plumper; but, with respect to the killed, which probably amounted to four or five, no intelligence was obtained. The loss on board the French gun-vessels appears to have amounted to five men wounded, including Captain Collet; who, on the afternoon of the day on which he had captured them, entered Granville with his two prizes.

The time approaching for concentrating near Boulogne the invading flotilla and the army it was to transport, Admiral Ver-Huell, about the middle of May, became impatient to quit Dunkerque with the division of gun-vessels that lay at anchor in the road and harbour. The majority of these he had himself, in the latter part of April, conducted from Ostende,\* and the remainder had since arrived, by three or four at a time, as opportunity offered. The right wing of the army, then encamped between Ostende and Dunkerque, prepared to march; and Marshal Davoust who commanded it, preferring a water-passage, embarked with Admiral Ver-Huell. Unfavourable winds prevented the latter from weighing; nor did a change take place until towards the middle of July: in the interim the marshal had disembarked, and, with his corps, had marched for Ambletense. On the 17th of the month, at 6 P. M., a light north-east wind enabled the Dutch admiral to put to sea (if keeping close along shore can be called so) with the four prames, Ville-d'Aix, Ville-d'Anvers, Ville-de-Genève, and Ville-de-Mayence, and 32 first-class gun-vessels; the latter under the command of two captains of the Batavian navy, the former of the French capitaine de frégate Bernard-Isidore Lambour. The admiral with great judgment, formed his division into two lines, in such a manner that all the vessels could fire together with ease: two of the prames were placed in the centre of the outer line, where the admiral himself commanded, and the other two at the extremities, which were the stations assigned to the two Dutch captains. Several other gun-vessels were at Dunkerque, but they, being of a smaller class, had retired into the harbour to escape the fury of the north-west gales. Directions had been left by Admiral Ver-Huell for these gun-vessels to follow, in two divisions, as soon as an engagement should be seen to take place between his division and the enemy.

Owing to the numerous banks and shoals off Ostende and Dunkerque, the British squadron in the vicinity, consisting of the 20-gun ship *Ariadne*, Captain the Honourable Edward King, three or four ship-sloops and bombs, and about as many gun-brigs, was at anchor off Gravelines. Ships loom large in thick weather. It must have been owing to this, that the French mistook the *Ariadne*, a ship not above a third larger than either of the French prames, for “un vaisseau rasé,” and her companions (increased in number as well as size) for “deux frégates, trois corvettes à trois mâts, et neuf bricks.”† At 6 h. 30 m. P. M. the *Ariadne* and squadron discovered the flotilla, then just under way; but the lightness of the wind and the slow sailing of the prames so retarded its progress, that its course was not clearly ascertained until 7 h. 15 m. P. M.; when,

\* See p. 306.

† *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 76.



instantly, the British cut their cables and made sail, to meet the Dutch admiral. At 9 h. 15 m. p. m. the *Ariadne* and one or two of her nearest companions opened their fire upon the flotilla; and, notwithstanding the shallowness of the water, the obscurity of the night, and the incessant cannonade maintained, both by the prames and gun-vessels, and by the heavy batteries on the coast, the *Ariadne* and her consorts succeeded in driving three or four gun-vessels on shore, and in cutting away the mainmast and damaging the rigging of the *Ville-de-Genève*, the rearmost prame. With, however, such powerful support from the shore, and the aid of the long 24-pounders mounted by the prames, the bulk of the flotilla, at 11 h. 30 m. p. m., came to anchor in the road of Calais. The only British ship that appears to have sustained any injury was the *Ariadne* herself: she had one sergeant of marines mortally, one lieutenant of marines dangerously, and two seamen slightly wounded, and her rigging and sails a good deal cut. Some loss must undoubtedly have been incurred on the part of the flotilla, especially on board the *Ville-de-Genève* and stranded gun-vessels, but none has been recorded.

The noise of the firing had caused a great bustle among the shipping in the Downs; and, soon after midnight, the 50-gun ship *Trusty*, Captain George Argles, 28-gun frigate *Vestal*, Captain Stephen Thomas Digby, and three ship-sloops, weighed and stood across towards Calais. On the 18th, at 4 a. m., the *Vestal*, outsailing the others, joined the *Ariadne* and squadron; and in half an hour afterwards the British recommenced the action with the Dutch flotilla and the batteries in front of Calais. After a two hours' cannonade, in which the nines of the *Vestal* stood a very poor chance against the 36s and 24s of the forts and gun-vessels, the frigate, with a corporal of marines mortally wounded, made the signal to discontinue the action; and, with her companions, bore away to the westward, where a spirited firing had just commenced, and whither the *Trusty* and sloops had already proceeded.

Will it be believed that the following passage refers to the *Vestal* and squadron? "*Il y fut attaqué le matin, avec aussi peu d'effet que la veille, par dix-neuf bâtimens, dont deux vaisseaux de ligne, onze frégates, et six bricks.*"\* So also it stands, merely substituting "*cinq frégates, six grandes corvettes,*" for "*onze frégates,*" in another French historical work.† These and other similar statements were no doubt originally framed to exalt the flotilla in the opinion of the country, or to serve some such temporary purpose. How careful, then, ought the historian to be in compiling his materials; otherwise, he unknow-

\* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 44.

† *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 77.

ingly assists in propagating a falsehood, not merely by the publicity of his work, but by the sanction of his name.

Informed of the approach of the Gallo-Batavian flotilla and of the attack made upon it, Admiral Lacrosse, on the 18th, at 4 A. M., ordered several divisions of gun-vessels to get under way from the road of Boulogne, in order, by feigning an attack upon the British vessels at their anchorage, to operate a diversion in favour of Admiral Ver-Huell. The *Immortalité*, still commanded by Captain Owen,\* accompanied by the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Hebe*, Captain Macajah Malbon, 20-gun ship *Arab*, Captain Keith Maxwell, and the remainder of the detached squadron, immediately weighed from their station off the port, and stood to meet the flotilla, many of the brigs of which had worked up abreast of Vimereux. By the time the *Immortalité* and the leading ships had got within gun-shot, 49 brigs and 64 luggers were under way, and immediately the batteries and the horse-artillery along the shore opened a fire upon the British vessels; but these reserved their fire until they could bestow it with more effect. At 4 h. 30 m. A. M., having got within half a mile north-west of Vimereux, the *Immortalité*, *Hebe*, *Arab*, and a few other of the British vessels, commenced firing upon the nearest French brigs; which latter, in a few minutes, reanchored in great confusion, close under the batteries. Without having incurred any loss, and no greater damage than a 9-pounder gun disabled on board the *Arab*, the British squadron shortly afterwards reanchored also, about five miles to the north-westward of Boulogne, Captain Owen having previously sent one or two gun-brigs to look out off Cape Grinez.

By way of ensuring to Admiral Ver-Huell a safe passage during the remainder of his short but somewhat hazardous voyage, Marshal Davoust, who had long been waiting for him at Calais, had strengthened with men and ammunition all the batteries on the coast between Calais and Ambleteuse; one of which only, that on the promontory of Cape Grinez, mounted 55 pieces of heavy cannon, besides six immense mortars, placed on a high platform, and where, from its importance as a point of attack, the general of artillery, Lariboissière, commanded in person. This was not all. General Sorbier, commandant of artillery, had been ordered with a strong division of flying artillery and long-range howitzers, "*des obusiers à longue-portée*," to follow the flotilla along the coast, and afford to Admiral Ver-Huell the same protection as formerly, when Captain Hancock with the *Cruiser* and *Rattler* gave so much annoyance to the latter in his voyage from Flushing to Dunkerque.†

On the 18th at 3 P. M., Admiral Ver-Huell, accompanied in his schooner by Marshal Davoust, weighed from the road of Calais, and, with his three remaining prames, and 21 out of his original

\* See p. 229.

† See p. 223.

32 gun-vessels (a tolerable proof how many had been damaged or destroyed), steered straight for Cape Blanez; off which, at some distance, lay the *Trusty*, *Vestal*, *Ariadne*, and about a dozen sloops and other vessels, of a class the best adapted for these shallow waters. At 4 p.m. the gun and mortar batteries on Cape Blanez opened a tremendous fire upon the British; who immediately returned it, but to a great disadvantage, the *Trusty* having, besides losing the use of her main stay, received a large shot in her slop-room, which caused a great quantity of water to rush in, and obliged her to haul off and heave to, to try to stop the leak. Meanwhile the flotilla proceeded, without much further annoyance, until off *Wissant*; where, the shore offering less resistance, the cannonade recommenced on the part of the British vessels, among which, by this time, were the *Immortalité* and a part of the detached squadron from off *Boulogne*. Such was the ardour displayed by the *Arab* to close with the flotilla, that she found herself within musket-shot of the shore, in two fathoms' water. The brig-sloop *Calypso*, Captain Matthew Forster, *La Fleche*, Captain Thomas White, and two or three of the gun-brigs, strove to emulate the *Arab*, and, by their united exertions, drove on shore, before 7 p.m., six of the gun-vessels. The bank off Cape Grinez, and the shot and shells from the right face of its powerful battery, soon compelled the *Arab*, *Calypso*, *La Fleche*, and gun-vessels to haul off from the shore. The *Calypso* had her captain wounded; and the *Arab* had her main topgallantyard shot away, her rigging much cut, and the head of her mainmast splintered and a part of the top and cross-trees carried away by a shell. This ship also received several shot in the hull; one of which, or the fragment of a shell, set fire to her on the poop, but the flames were fortunately extinguished. By some of the other shot that fell on board of her, the ship had seven men wounded, two of them dangerously. The *Fleche* was the closest in shore owing to her light draft of water, so much so indeed as to render it necessary for the French at Blanez to depress their guns; one shot took off the top of a man's hat, shattered a boat under the booms, and went through the water way on the off side. The *Fleche* had five men severely wounded and her running rigging much injured. The *Arab* and *Calypso* rendered themselves conspicuous objects from the shore, as appears by the following passage in one of the French accounts: "*Une frégate et un brick, serrant la terre, s'engagèrent de très-près.*"\*

The *Immortalité*, followed by the *Hebe*, had, since 5 p.m., lay to between the end of the *Banc à laine* and Cape Grinez; and even, when the former found herself in a quarter less four (scarcely half a fathom more water than she drew), her distance from the flotilla was too great to do execution. The two frigates

\*. *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 45.

thereupon hauled off and threw all aback, to wait for the prames; who were ahead of the French gun-vessels, and with the latter, warmly engaged, as just related by the Arab, Calypso, and gun-brigs. Soon after 6 P.M. the *Immortalité* and *Hebe*, being within about half a mile of the shore, and a quarter of a mile of the prames, opened a brisk fire upon the latter; which they and the batteries returned with equal spirit, and, as might be expected, with decidedly more effect. Two schooners, however, were driven on shore: soon after which, or at about 7 P.M., the prames and the remainder of the gun-vessels ran in and anchored under the protection of the batteries between the towers of Endreselles and Ambleteuse. At about 7 h. 30 m. P.M. the firing, in which the 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Renommée*, Captain Sir Thomas Livingstone, baronet, had latterly taken a part, wholly ceased; and the British ships hauled off to repair their damages.

The *Immortalité* had her foremast, main topmast, and spanker-boom shot through, also three of her boats: her rigging and sails were much cut; her hull struck in several places, and the muzzles of two carronades shot away. Her loss amounted to four men killed and 12 wounded, several of them badly. The *Hebe* had her main topmast and main yard wounded, her rigging and sails much injured, and one carronade disabled: she also received three bad shot through her hull, and had three men wounded, one of them mortally. The *Renommée* escaped comparatively unhurt. Captain Owen had gained for the *Immortalité* a high character along this part of the French coast. "*Le Capitaine Owen, commandant la frégate l'Immortalité, fit admirer son audace et sa persévérance sous le feu des batteries de la rade.*"\* By exaggerating tenfold the force of the British, and by concealing the injuries done to the vessels of the flotilla, it was declared, apparently with reason, that "*l'Amiral Ver-Hucll s'acquît beaucoup de gloire dans cette journée.*" Of the two French works usually quoted in these passages, one is written by a military officer. The consequence is, that M. le Comte Dumas has taken care not to overlook the assistance afforded to Admiral Ver-Hucll by the batteries on shore; while his contemporary, in the "*Victoires et Conquêtes*," writes as if every shot or shell directed at the British came from the flotilla. The esprit de corps has been here of use in aiding the development of truth.

Encouraged by the success of the flotilla to the eastward, and favoured by foggy weather and a fine south-west wind, Captain Hamelin, whom we left at Fécamp with his division of gun-vessels, resolved to attempt his passage to Boulogne. Accordingly, on the 23d of July, at 5 h. 15 m. A.M., he put to sea with, according to the French accounts, the *Audacieuse* and *Foudre*

brigs, six first-class gun-vessels, brig-rigged, 10 of the second class (two or three brigs, the remainder luggers), and eight armed pinnaces (luggers and schooners), total 26, or rather, according to the logs of the several British ships, 34 sail.

At this time the British 22-gun ship *Champion*, Captain Robert Howe Bromley, gun-brigs *Clinker* and *Cracker*, Lieutenants Nesbit Glen, and William Henry Douglas, and the *Francis* hired armed cutter, lay at anchor at the distance of little more than a league north-north-east from the jetties of the harbour. The British vessels were soon under way to attack the flotilla; and at 7 A. M., the *Champion* commenced action with the two corvettes, and some of the heaviest of the gun-vessels. The latter presently run on shore under the batteries of Scuneville, and the remainder of the flotilla hugged the coast so closely, that the British vessels, in order to use their carronades with effect, were compelled to approach within range of the batteries. The consequence was, that they were soon cut up in their hulls, masts, and rigging; but in spite of all the obstacles they had to contend with, the *Champion* and the two brigs, particularly the *Cracker*, compelled the French captain, at about 10 h. 30 m. A. M., to shelter himself under the batteries of St.-Valéry en Caux.

What with the heavy long guns on board the flotilla, and those mounted on the shore, the British vessels were considerable sufferers. The *Champion* had all three masts, particularly her foremast, wounded, her rigging and sails much cut, and several large shot-holes in her hull, very low down. The *Cracker* received a large shot through her foremast, which left it in a tottering state, and had her shrouds and stays cut to pieces. The *Clinker* also received some damage and coming out of action, had three feet water in the hold. It appears, however, that the *Champion* was the only vessel that sustained any loss: she had two seamen killed, her boatswain (severely) and two seamen wounded. The French admit that several of their vessels were much damaged, and that they lost four men killed and 22 wounded, 11 of them dangerously. As soon as it was known that the *Champion* and her companions had stood away towards the Downs to refit, M. Hamelin, leaving his wounded men and the most damaged of his vessels, set sail with the remainder, and reached Boulogne without further interruption.

The French, as usual, when they came to fight this battle over again on paper, made it redound greatly to their advantage. They dignified the *Champion* and the two gun-brigs by calling them, "*une frégate et deux corvettes*;" and Captain Hamelin is represented to have considered the squadron as "*la même croisière ennemie qu'il avait déjà combattue*," although the latter consisted of two ships and a brig, and one of those ships double the size and force of the *Champion*. As in most of the other accounts, no allusion is made to the land-batteries, or to the difficulties that the British must have experienced in navi-

gating so near to the shore. "Les cris à l'abordage ! à l'abordage !" says the writer, "retentissaient dans la ligne française." This, if we are to credit the French accounts, is about the hundredth time that the same cry has been uttered ; and yet the French sailors, for some reason or other, have not moved from their own decks.

If, by his perseverance in pushing on towards Ambleteuse, Admiral Ver-Huell had got his gun-vessels somewhat roughly handled by the British, he had brought down upon the latter such a storm of shot and shells from the French batteries, as compelled them to retire to repair damages, thereby leaving open a passage for the remaining divisions of the Gallo-Batavian flotilla at Dunkerque ; some of which appear to have reached Ambleteuse in the course of the night succeeding the action. On the next day, the 20th, an account was taken of the different vessels of the flotilla, armed and unarmed, which then lay at the seven ports, Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, Ambleteuse, Calais, Dunkerque, and Ostende, whence the expedition was to depart. The number of prames and gun-vessels at Boulogne alone amounted to 578, and the number of transports to 526, together 1104 vessels ; and the total of the flotilla amounted to 1339 armed and 954 unarmed vessels, making a grand total of 2293. These were destined to carry 163,645 men and 9059 horses, including among the former 16,783 sailors.\*

The flotilla was separated into six grand divisions. The first under the designation of the left wing, commanded by Rear-admiral Jean-François Courand, and stationed at the port of Etaples, was destined to carry the troops from the camp of Montreuil, commanded by Marshal Ney ; the second and third, called the left and right wings of the centre of the flotilla, under the respective commands of Rear-admiral Daniel Savary and Capitaine de vaisseau Julien Le Ray, occupied the port of Boulogne, and were destined to carry the troops from the two camps to the right and left of the town, commanded by Marshal Soult ; the fourth, named the right wing of the flotilla, commanded by Capitaine de vaisseau François-Henri-Eugène Daugier, occupied the port of Vimereux, and was to carry the corps of Marshal Lannes, composed of sundry divisions of light infantry, among which were those of the grenadiers of the advance and of the reserve. The Gallo-Batavian flotilla, assembled at the port of Ambleteuse, under the command of Vice-admiral Ver-Huell, formed the fifth grand division of the expedition, and was to carry the troops commanded by Marshal Davoust. The sixth or reserve division, lying in the port of Calais, under the command of Capitaine de frégate Charles L'Evêque, was destined to transport the division of Italian infantry, and several divisions of dragoons, mounted and dismounted.

\* See Appendix, No. 34.

The first four grand divisions only had a regular organization: each was separated into two portions, called “escadrilles;” and each of the latter was to embark a division of the army, composed of four regiments of the line, and one of light infantry, with its cavalry, artillery, and baggage. It would be entering too much into detail, to explain all the regulations that contributed to perfect the system of this armament: suffice it that every thing was adopted which ingenuity could devise and ability execute, without much regard to the labour or the expense.

Anxious to have ocular proof of the degree of celerity with which the army could be embarked, Napoléon, who arrived at Boulogne on the 3d of August, ordered the operation to be executed twice in his presence. The result surpassed his belief. Although the troops had to march from camps, the extremities of which were more than two miles from the point of embarkation, one hour and a half after the beating of the *générale*, men and horses, all were on board.

This, as well it might, excited the admiration of the generals and other officers present, and all were elated at the prospect it held out; all, save the prime mover himself, and he, although he did not appear so, was filled with regret. His fleets were not in the Channel, and without them, he knew full well, that his plan could not succeed. Could he, by any means, have drawn away England's ships from England's coast, he considered England's fate as depending upon his nod. “Je ne sais pas, en vérité,” says the French emperor, in one of his letters, of date June 9 in this year, to his minister of marine, “quelle espèce de précaution elle peut prendre pour la mettre à l'abri de la terrible chance qu'elle court. Une nation est bien folle, lorsqu'elle n'a point de fortifications, point d'armée de terre, de se mettre dans le cas de voir arriver dans son sein une armée de cent mille hommes d'élite et aguerris. Voilà le chef-d'œuvre de la flottille; elle coûte de l'argent, mais il ne faut être maître de la mer que six heures pour que l'Angleterre cesse d'exister.”\*

Even admitting that the Channel, Mediterranean, and North Sea fleets of England were away, were no other ships to check the course of the flotilla? Let but a breeze have blown from any point of the compass, and innumerable frigates, heavy frigates too, sloops, bombs, gun-brigs, and cutters, would soon have been on the spot. No shoals or shore-batteries would then have interposed to prevent the guns of the British from producing their full effect. The more numerous the French troops, the greater would have been the slaughter amongst them, the greater the difficulty for the sailors to manœuvre the vessels. Confusion would have ensued; and the destruction or flight of a part of the flotilla would, in the end, have compromised the safety of

\* Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., p. 270.

the remainder. Every hour's delay would have brought fresh British vessels to assist in the general overthrow. Admitting, however, that a considerable portion of the flotilla overcame all these obstacles, and approached the British shore, was there nothing further to dread? Were there really, as Napoléon fancied, "no fortifications, no army"? The invaders would have made the discovery, to their cost, the moment they arrived within shell and shot range. As they advanced nearer they would have found the beach already occupied by the van of an army composed of soldiers, who, if they had not fought at "Lodi, at Zurich, at Héliopolis, at Hohenlinden, and at Marengo," were then fighting in England.

But, in the event of a calm, would he not succeed? was a question frequently asked, as well by those who wished, as those who dreaded, the invasion. Calms in the British Channel are very uncertain: they seldom continue more than 12 hours, and even then may prevail at one part of the coast and not at another. Admitting that a calm existed at Boulogne and the adjacent ports, some time would elapse ere, under the most favourable circumstances, the flotilla could make a start. It has done so, and the oars begin to move: by this time, a boat from every British ship that witnessed the preparation is half across the Channel with the intelligence, and the vessel herself, if less than a frigate, is sweeping with all her strength in the same direction. A fleet of 1200 or 1300 vessels must be rather awkward to manage; particularly, when assembled together for the first time, and possessed, as these variously-constructed gun-vessels necessarily were, of different powers of progression. Against the prames sad complaints were raised; and yet, as there were 17 of these vessels, armed each with 12 long 24-pounders, and carrying altogether about 2000 men and 840 horses, they must be waited for. All this would create confusion. Cross tides and partial currents would increase it. Signals would be necessary: they would, it is more than probable, amidst the many repeaters required to transmit them, be misunderstood. A part of the fleet stops, or pulls in a different direction. Delay ensues. Presently up springs a breeze; and which, in all likelihood, blows either up or down, and not across the Channel. In this case the weather wing of the flotilla begins first to spread its sails, and, without great care, presses upon the centre; and that, in its turn, upon the lee wing. Meanwhile the breeze has not travelled without company, as is evident from the number of white patches that now skirt the windward horizon, swelling and gathering at every moment. Of the operations likely to follow, a slight sketch has already been given.

But, in truth, no attempt would have been made by the flotilla to cross over, even were the Channel clear of British fleets, and a calm, even a two days' calm, to prevail; none whatever, unless a powerful French fleet lay off Boulogne, ready to afford its protection. In a note dictated by him at his return from Bou-



logne, on the 1st of September, the French emperor thus unfolds his plan: "Je voulais réunir," says he, "quarante ou cinquante vaisseaux de guerre dans le port de la Martinique, par des opérations combinées de Toulon, de Cadix, de Ferrol et de Brest; les faire revenir tout d'un coup sur Boulogne; me trouver pendant quinze jours maître de la mer; avoir cent cinquante mille hommes et dix mille chevaux campés sur cette côte; trois ou quatre mille bâtimens de flottille, et aussitôt le signal de l'arrivée de mon escadre, débarquer en Angleterre, m'emparer de Londres et de la Tamise.\* The construction of the heavy prames, and the arming of the flotilla generally, were intended for no other purpose than to deceive the British into a belief, that Napoléon did not contemplate the assistance of his fleet, and that, therefore, the object of sending N. Villeneuve to the West Indies had really in view an attack upon some of the British colonies: hence, the use of the few troops embarked, especially when rumour had multiplied them fivefold, as Napoléon knew would be the case. His own words prove that, in arming the flotilla with cannon, he was only practising a *ruse de guerre* upon England. "Si cinquante vaisseaux de ligne," says he, in the same important document just quoted, "devaient venir protéger le passage de l'armée en Angleterre, il n'y avait besoin d'avoir à Boulogne que des bâtimens de transport; et ce luxe de prames, de chaloupes canonnières, de bateaux plats, de péniches, etc.; tous bâtimens armés, était parfaitement inutile. Si j'eusse ainsi réuni quatre mille bâtimens de transport, nul doute que l'ennemi n'eût vu que j'attendais la présence de mon escadre pour tenter le passage; mais, en construisant des prames et des bateaux canonnières, en armant tous ces bâtimens, c'étaient des canons opposés à des canons; des bâtimens de guerre opposés à des bâtimens de guerre, et l'ennemi a été dupé. Il a cru que je me proposais de passer de vive force par la seule force militaire de la flottille. L'idée de mon véritable projet ne lui est point venue; et lorsque les mouvemens de mes escadres ayant manqué, il s'est aperçu du danger qu'il avait couru, l'effroi a été dans les conseils de Londres, et tous les gens sensés ont avoué que jamais l'Angleterre n'avait été si près de sa perte."†

The French emperor had, therefore, some reason to be sorrowful, when he beheld so disciplined, so zealous, and so numerous an army, without the means of safe transport to the goal of his wishes. In his letter to M. Decrès of June 9 (see p. 316), Napoléon appeared sanguine that he should succeed with 100,000 men; in his note upon the flotilla, written in September and already twice quoted, he states 150,000 as the number which he had assembled for the purpose; and, according to his confessions of much later days, he did not intend to carry over fewer

\* Précis des Evénemens, tome xii., p. 315.

† Ibid., tome xii., p. 316.

than 200,000 men.\* It is remarkable, too, that an increase in the time, during which the Channel was required to be clear of British ships, accompanies each increase of the army that was to conquer the country. Thus: the letter says, "six days," the note, "fifteen days," and O'Meara,† "two months." It is doubtful, however, if, at the time that the expedition (all except the fleet which was to cover it) was declared to be ready, there were as many even as 140,000 fighting men in a situation to embark.

Being in the constant habit of perusing, by the aid of interpreters, the contents of the London newspapers, Napoléon must have seen, with a feeling of bitter disappointment, the formidable preparations that were making to resist his army on its landing: those to obstruct the passage of the flotilla, he cared less about, having, as already has appeared, no intention to make the attempt unless his fleets were in the temporary possession of the Channel. Buonaparte was not the first foreigner, who had reckoned too much upon the grumbling character of the English: he did not consider that, although discontented with their government, they were extremely jealous of foreigners. He ought to have known that, in such a case, a third party would experience much the same treatment, as proverbially follows a similar interference in domestic disagreements: the hitherto mutually opposed parties unite, heart and hand, to expel the intruder. The treatment which, at a subsequent period of his life, Napoléon experienced from the English populace, tended, owing to a misconception on his part, to strengthen the opinion he had originally formed of the "canaille" to aid him in conquering their country. There, again, he mistook the character of the people. It was not love for his person, which collected the crowds that flocked from far and near to gain a sight of him: it was curiosity, endemial curiosity, to behold a man who had compelled most monarchs but their own to succumb to him; who had governed, if not conquered, all Europe, save the little insulated spot in whose power he then was. If they forbore to upbraid or taunt him, it was because he was their prisoner: if they treated him with respect, and even with kindness, it was because they felt some degree of awe in the presence of one who had been so mighty a potentate, and commiserated his fallen greatness.

Intelligence of the battle between Sir Robert Calder and M. Villeneuve reached the French emperor at Boulogne, between the 3d and 9th of August, probably about the 8th; and on the 11th he became acquainted with the arrival of the combined fleet at Ferrol. Buonaparte's rage was most violent, but it was of short duration. This extraordinary man soon carved out work for his army. The intelligent author of a French work now well

\* O'Meara's *Napoleon in Exile*, vol. i., p. 349. † *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 378.

known in England has exhibited, in a single act of Napoléon's, arising out of the circumstances above stated, a most extraordinary instance of his transcendent genius. "At the time I was writing this passage" (one in which M. Dupin has given it as his opinion that, before any thing could be effected against England, the combined fleet must be in possession of the Channel), "I was unacquainted with a very remarkable fact, which deserves a place in history. I am indebted for the knowledge of it to the Count Daru, whose able *History of Venice* we have already cited. In 1805 M. Daru was at Boulogne, the intendant general of the army. One morning the emperor sent for him into his closet. Daru found him transported with rage, striding up and down his apartment, and only breaking a sullen silence by the abrupt and sudden exclamations—"What a navy!—what an admiral!—what sacrifices lost!—my hopes are frustrated!—this Villeneuve! Instead of being in the Channel he has put into Ferrol!—I see it clearly! he will be blockaded.—Daru, sit down there, listen and write." The emperor had, early that morning, received advices of the arrival of Villeneuve in a port of Spain; he saw at once that the conquest of England had miscarried; that the immense expense of the fleet and the flotilla was lost for a long time, perhaps for ever! Then, in the violence of a rage which would scarcely suffer another man to retain his senses, he adopted one of the boldest resolutions, traced one of the most admirable plans of a campaign, that any conqueror could have conceived, even when at leisure and perfectly composed. Without hesitating, without stopping, he dictated the whole plan of the campaign of Austerlitz, the departure of the different corps of the army, as well from Hanover and Holland, as from the western and southern boundaries of France. The order of the routes, their duration, the points of convergence and reunion of the columns; the attacks by surprise and by open force, the various movements of the enemy, the whole is provided for: victory is assured in every one of the hypotheses. Such was the accuracy of this plan, and the immense foresight it displayed, that upon a line of march of 200 leagues, lines of operations of 300 leagues in length were conducted according to the original design, day by day, and league by league, all the way to Munich. Beyond that capital the time alone underwent some alteration; but the points were reached, and the *ensemble* of the plan crowned with success. "Such, then, was the military talent of this man, not less terrible to his enemies by the mightiness of his genius, than to his countrymen by the severity of his despotism."\* The truth of this anecdote is corroborated by the author of the *Précis des Evénemens*, who states, that he himself also heard it related by the Comte Daru.†

\* For the original passage, see Appendix, No. 35.

† *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 118.

On the 31st of August Buonaparte became apprized of the departure of the combined fleet from Ferrol and Corunna, as he hoped, for Brest. This reanimated, in some degree, the hopes of the emperor; and on the 22d Marshal Berthier, the minister of marine, by Napoléon's directions, writes thus to General Marmont, the commander-in-chief of the army of Holland: "Je vous prévien, général, que l'escadre de l'empereur est partie du Ferrol le 26 thermidor (14 août) avec l'escadre espagnole. Si ces escadres combinées arrivent dans la Manche, l'empereur fait de suite l'expédition d'Angleterre; mais si, par des circonstances de vents contraires, ou enfin, par le peu d'audace de nos amiraux,\* elles ne peuvent se rendre dans la Manche, l'empereur et roi ajournera l'expédition à une autre année, parce-qu'elle n'est plus possible." The marshal then directs the general to be ready, at a moment's notice, to disembark his troops, estimated at 20,000, and proceed with them to Mayence, &c.† In about four days after the date of this letter the fatal news arrives that M. Villeneuve, having quitted Ferrol with 29 sail of the line, had steered for Cadiz instead of the Channel, where the emperor and his army had been so long anxiously expecting him.

Thus had the crisis arrived for adjourning the expedition against England to another year. By the end of August, the troops that had been encamped at Ostende, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Montreuil, were making forced marches to the banks of the Rhine. On the 4th of September the emperor quitted Boulogne for Paris, having left orders with Rear-admiral Lacrosse to send out occasionally a division of gun-boats to manœuvre, and to maintain the utmost discipline and good order among the officers and men. The greater part, if not the whole, of the gun-vessels at all the dépôts but Boulogne, were, in a short time, dismantled and laid up. It was the intention of Napoléon to keep a body of troops encamped upon the heights of Boulogne, partly, in conjunction with the gun-vessels in the basin and road, to deceive the British, but chiefly, as it was a remarkably healthy spot, to have an army of 30,000 or 40,000 men ready to act on any emergency. The operations against the remnant of the flotilla were now confined to Boulogne; and, although in September and November two attempts were made to destroy the line of gun-vessels at anchor in the road, the

\* This reflection upon the admirals is only to be found in the quotation from the letter contained in the text of M. Dumas (tome xii., p. 122): it is wholly omitted in what purports to be the entire copy inserted among the "Pièces Justificatives." We may conclude from this, that the author made his extract from the original, without reflecting upon the meaning or tendency of the passage alluded to, but that, when he, or another for him, came to transcribe the letters for the Appendix, the discovery was made, and the offensive words omitted.

† Précis des Evénemens, tome xii., p. 334.

stormy state of the weather, in the last case in particular, rendered them both abortive.

#### BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS.

The declaration of war by Spain, followed up so quickly as it was by the hurried equipment of ships at all her principal dépôts in fulfilment of the secret treaty which she had concluded with France,\* soon assembled a British naval force upon the coasts of the former. Off Ferrol, in which port lay, ready for sea, five French and seven Spanish sail of the line, exclusively of three of the latter fitting, cruised a British squadron of seven sail of the line, under Rear-admiral the Honourable Alexander Cochrane, in the *Northumberland* 74. In Cadiz one French and seven Spanish sail of the line were ready for sea, and four of the latter equipping; and in Carthage, six Spanish sail of the line were ready for sea. Off Cadiz was stationed a British squadron of five, and occasionally six sail of the line, under Vice-admiral Sir John Orde, in the *Glory* 98; and who, in conjunction with Vice-admiral Lord Nelson, whom, with 10 sail of the line, we left on the 31st of December cruising off Cape San-Sebastian,† kept an occasional eye upon the ships in Carthage.

The junction of the six French and 20 Spanish sail of the line, ready for sea in Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthage, with the 11 French sail of the line, also ready for sea in Toulon, was a preliminary step towards the final success of the grand design which reigned the master-thought in the mind of him, who, such was the mean subserviency of Spain, had the whole 37 ships as much under his command, as if the French flag waved at the peak of every one of them. What efforts were made by the one party to accomplish, and by the other to defeat, the important object in agitation, will appear as we proceed in the details upon which we are now about to enter.

Having detached the 38-gun frigates *Active* and *Seahorse*, Captains Richard Hussey Moubay and the Honourable Courtenay Boyle, to watch the port of Toulon, Lord Nelson on the 3d of January made sail from his station off Cape San-Sebastian towards the Magdalena islands, and on the 11th came to at his old anchorage in Agincourt sound. On the 15th the *Superb* rejoined from Algiers, whither she had been sent to arrange some difference with the Dey. The force of Lord Nelson now consisted of 11 sail of the line, with scarcely a frigate or sloop to detach for intelligence.

On the 17th of January, early in the afternoon, the French fleet, consisting of the following 11 sail of the line, seven frigates, and two brigs, commanded by Vice-admiral Villeneuve, and having on board a body of 3500 troops under General Launton, put to sea from the road of Toulon, with a strong wind from the north-north-west:

\* See p. 297.

† See p. 241.

Gun-ship		
80	Bucentaure . . . . .	{ Vice-adm. P.-C.-J.-Bapt.-Silv. Villeneuve. Captain Jean-Jacques Magendie.
	Formidable . . . . .	{ Rear-adm. P.-R.-M.-E. Dumaour-le-Pelley. Captain Jean-Marie Letellier.
	Neptune . . . . .	Commod. Esprit-Tranquille Maistral.
	Indomptable . . . . .	Captain Jean-Joseph Hubert.
	Annibal . . . . .	Commod. Julien-Marie Cosmao-Kerjulien.
74	Mont-Blanc . . . . .	Captain Guillaume-J.-Noël La Villegris.
	Swiftsure . . . . .	" C.-E. L'Hospitalier-Villemadrin.
	Atlas . . . . .	" Pierre-Nicolas Rolland.
	Intrépide . . . . .	" Léonore Deperonne.
	Scipion . . . . .	" Charles Berenger.
	Berwick . . . . .	" Jean-Gilles Filhol-Camas.
<i>Frigates, Cornélie, Hortense, Incorruptible, Rhin, Sirène, Thémis, and Uranie.</i>		

*Brigs, Furet and Naïade.*

By 5 p. m. the last French ship was outside Cape Sepet; and at 6 h. 30 m. the advanced or reconnoitring division, consisting of two sail of the line and a frigate, was descried by the British frigates *Active* and *Seahorse*. On the 18th, at 9 h. 15 m., the French advanced ships, still in sight, hauled their wind to the northward, and the two British frigates did the same. At 4 p. m. the island of Polacross bore from the latter north by west five leagues, and the wind now blew a strong gale from west-north-west. At 9 h. 45 m. the *Seahorse*, who was to windward of her consort, saw nine sail of the French fleet in the north quarter, only three miles distant, and apparently steering south. The frigate showed a light, and immediately bore up; on which the enemy's advanced ship threw up two rockets. The *Active* and *Seahorse* kept sight of the latter ship until 2 a. m. on the 19th; and, by carrying a press of sail, were, at 1 h. 50 m. p. m., sufficiently near to their friends in Agincourt sound, to make the distant signal of the enemy's being at sea.

At 4 h. 30 m. p. m. Lord Nelson weighed with the following 11 sail of the line and two frigates:

Gun-ship		
100	Victory . . . . .	{ Vice-admiral (w.) Lord Nelson, K.B. Rear-admiral (b.) George Murray. Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy.
	Royal Sovereign . . . . .	{ Rear-Admiral (r.) Sir R. H. Bickerton, Bart. Captain John Stuart.
	Canopus . . . . .	" John Conn.
80	Superb . . . . .	" Richard Goodwin Keats.
	Spencer . . . . .	" Hon. Robert Stopford.
	Swiftsure . . . . .	" Mark Robinson.
	Belleisle . . . . .	" William Hargood.
	Conqueror . . . . .	" Israel Pellew.
74	Tigre . . . . .	" Benjamin Hallowell.
	Leviathan . . . . .	" Henry William Bayntun.
	Donegal . . . . .	" Pulteney Malcolm.

*Frigates, Active and Seahorse.\**

The fleet made sail for the passage between the island of

\* Lord Nelson was continually complaining to the admiralty of the small number of frigates attached to his command.

Biche and Sardinia; a passage so narrow that the ships had to proceed in line ahead, each, except the Victory who undertook to lead the fleet, being guided by the stern-lights of her second ahead. At 6 P. M. the Victory was clear, and at 7 P. M. every ship in her train. Lord Nelson then despatched the Seahorse round the southern extremity of Sardinia, to look into St.-Pietro for the French fleet, and to return immediately. At 8 h. 30 m. P. M. the fleet, with now only one frigate attending it, bore away along the island of Sardinia. On the following day, the 20th, the vice-admiral appointed the Spencer and Leviathan, as the two fastest-sailing ships, to be a detached squadron; directing Captain Stopford to keep on the Victory's weather beam, to be ready to act as occasion might require. During the latter part of this, and the whole of the succeeding day, the fleet encountered very hard gales from south-south-west to south-west; and, for a great part of the time, the ships were under their storm-staysails.

On the 22d, at 10 A. M., the Seahorse rejoined, having, on the preceding afternoon, been chased by the French 40-gun frigate *Cornélie*, standing in for Pulla. The gale was so heavy and the weather so thick, that the Seahorse could not see the anchorage either in that bay or in Cagliari, and, from the same cause, lost sight of the French frigate in the night. The Seahorse, accompanied by the Active, was sent back to Cagliari, but no French ships were lying there; and a message to the viceroy and consul at that port, carried by the Active, and for a reply to which Lord Nelson waited off the island of Serpentina, produced no better intelligence. The Seahorse was then sent with despatches to Naples, and the Active directed to cruise for three days to the eastward, about five or six leagues from Serpentina, to speak any British ship that might be in search of the British admiral.

On the 25th, at noon, Cape Carbonara, island of Sardinia, bore from the Victory north-north-east half-east distant three and a half leagues; and on the next day, the 26th, the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Phœbe*, Captain the Honourable Thomas Bladen Capel, joined company. On the 19th, at 4 P. M., when sailing down the west coast of Corsica with a strong west-north-west wind, the *Phœbe* discovered a disabled line-of-battle ship, the *Indomptable*, one of M. Villeneuve's fleet, standing in for the land, under courses only, having carried away her topmasts. The frigate immediately hauled up towards, and at 4 h. 45 m. passed within hail of, the *Indomptable*, who had previously hoisted French colours. Having ascertained that the dismasted ship was an enemy's two-decker, bound apparently for Ajaccio bay, the *Phœbe* did not, as it appears, make any attempt to molest her, but bore up for the Magdalena islands, where Captain Capel expected to find Lord Nelson. It was owing to this circuitous route that the frigate was so many days in joining the fleet.

Having sent in all directions to gain information, but without effect, Lord Nelson continued his course to the eastward, and at 3 A. M. on the 29th, rounded the island of Stromboli. As a proof that, in his anxiety to overtake the enemy, Lord Nelson had passed a sleepless night, the following memorandum appears in his diary: "Stromboli burnt very strongly throughout the night of the 28th." His own persuasion was that the French fleet had gone to Egypt; and thither his lordship hastened, still detaching his frigates, as fast as they joined, to gather what tidings they could.

On the 4th of February, the Canopus made the land of Egypt. On the 7th, the Tigre was sent into Alexandria; but the Turks had nothing to communicate, and on the following day, the 8th, Captain Hallowell rejoined the fleet. Lord Nelson, now half-distracted, steered for Malta; on the 14th, was within 100 leagues of it; and in a few days afterwards received from Naples intelligence of what had really become of the French fleet. It had, on the second day, after quitting Toulon, when crossing the gulf of Lyons, encountered a violent gale of wind, which damaged several of the ships in their masts and rigging, and drove them, on the 20th, with the exception of four, back to their port. The missing ships were the Indomptable and Cornélie already mentioned, and the frigates Hortense and Incorruptible. The Cornélie, after sheltering herself at Genoa, reached Toulon on the 22d, as did the Indomptable in two days afterwards; but the Hortense and Incorruptible remained out for six or seven weeks.

It was on the 14th of February, when about 100 leagues to the eastward of Malta, on his return to Sardinia, that Lord Nelson wrote his celebrated letter to the first lord of the admiralty (Lord Melville), explaining why he had considered Egypt to be the destination of the French fleet. "Feeling as I do," he says, "that I am entirely responsible to my king and country for the whole of my conduct, I find no difficulty at this moment, when I am so unhappy at not finding the French fleet, nor having obtained the smallest information where they are, to lay before you the whole of the reasons which induced me to pursue the line of conduct I have done. I have consulted no man, therefore the whole blame of ignorance in forming my judgment must rest with me. I would allow no man to take from me an atom of my glory had I fallen in with the French fleet, nor do I desire any man to partake of any of the responsibility. All is mine, right or wrong: therefore I shall now state my reasons, after seeing that Sardinia, Naples, and Sicily, were safe, for believing that Egypt was the destination of the French fleet; and at this moment of sorrow, I still feel that I have acted right. Firstly; the wind had blown from north-east to south-east for 14 days before they sailed: therefore they might, without difficulty, have gone to the westward. Secondly; they came out with gentle breezes



at north-west and north-north-west. Had they been bound to Naples, the most natural thing for them to have done would have been to run along their own shore to the eastward, where they would have ports every 20 leagues of coast to take shelter in. Thirdly; they bore away in the evening of the 18th, with a strong gale at north-west or north-north-west, steering south or south by west. It blew so hard that the Seahorse went more than 13 knots an hour to get out of their way. Desirable as Sardinia is for them, they could get it without risking their fleet, although certainly not so quickly as by attacking Cagliari. However, I left nothing to chance in that respect, and therefore went off Cagliari. Having afterwards gone to Sicily, both to Palermo and Messina, and thereby given encouragement for a defence, and knowing all was safe at Naples, I had only the Morea and Egypt to look to. For, although I knew one of the French ships was crippled, yet I considered the character of Buonaparte; and that the orders given by him on the banks of the Seine would not take into consideration wind or weather. Nor, indeed, could the accident of even three or four ships alter, in my opinion, a destination of importance: therefore such an accident did not weigh in my mind, and I went first to Morea, and then to Egypt. The result of my inquiries at Coron and Alexandria confirms me in my former opinion; and therefore, my lord, if my obstinacy or ignorance is so gross, I should be the first to recommend your superseding me. But, on the contrary, if, as I flatter myself, it should be found, that my ideas of the probable destination of the French fleet were well founded, in the opinion of his majesty's ministers, then I shall hope for the consolation of having my conduct approved by his majesty; who will, I am sure, weigh my whole proceedings in the scale of justice.”\*

On the 27th, in the evening, the British fleet, every ship of which, since the 21st of January, had remained prepared for battle, without a bulkhead up night or day, anchored in Pulla road, bay of Cagliari, to water. On the 2d of March Lord Nelson weighed, but, owing to the severity of the weather, was compelled to reanchor. The wind shifting in the course of the night to north-north-east, the fleet reweighed at daylight on the 3d, and stood to the westward; but before noon the wind returned to the north-west, and blew so strong, that the fleet had again to bear up for Pulla. The morning of the 4th brought a return of the north-east wind; but scarcely had the persevering admiral taken advantage of it, than it again shifted to the north-west. Blowing moderately this time, the fleet (some of the ships having anchored for a few hours in the bay of Rouze) succeeded in working to the westward of the gulf of Palma; but, the wind increasing to a heavy gale, the British were compelled, on the evening of the 8th, to run in there for shelter. On the 10th, in

\* Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii., p. 397.

the morning, after one or two fruitless attempts to get out, the fleet weighed with a fine south-east wind, and passed between the island of Vache and the main; or rather, the Victory and a few ships only went through this narrow channel, the remainder of the fleet passing on the outer side of Vache.

A continuance of fine weather brought into view, on the morning of the 12th, the high land over Toulon; and on the 15th, in the evening, Lord Nelson gained his old winter station, a few miles to the eastward of Cape San-Sebastian. After detaching the *Leviathan* off Barcelona, to induce a belief that he was fixed on the coast of Spain, his lordship worked back to the eastward, and on the evening of the 25th, arrived close off the west end of the island of St.-Pietro. On the following day, the 26th, the wind shifted from south-east to south-west, and enabled the fleet, on the 27th, to anchor in the gulf of Palma, where the victuallers and store-ships were lying. On the preceding day, Rear-admiral Thomas Louis had joined in the 32-gun frigate *Ambuscade*, Captain William Durban, and now shifted his flag to the *Canopus*; taking on board of her, in the room of Captain Conn, Captain William Francis Austen, who had accompanied the admiral from England. While Lord Nelson is provisioning and refitting his ships, let us turn our attention to the harbour of Toulon.

Vice-admiral Villeneuve used the utmost despatch in refitting his ships. The *Annibal* (late British *Hannibal*), being found unserviceable, was replaced by the new ship *Pluton*; to whom, at the same time, the former transferred the whole of her officers and men. A similar exchange took place between the frigates *Uranie* and *Hermione*. As to the *Incorruptible*, she had suffered so much from her action with the *Arrow*, of which we shall hereafter give an account, as to be for the present laid up. The French fleet, therefore, consisted of 11 sail of the line, six frigates, and two brigs,\* and still retained on board the 3500 troops under General Lauriston. The departure of Lord Nelson for the gulf of Palma, enabled M. Villeneuve, on the evening of the 29th of March, to sail from Toulon road with the whole of his fleet; which, on clearing Cape Sepet, steered south-south-west, with a moderate breeze from the north-east.

The wind on the following morning veered to north-north-west, and, instead of increasing as had been expected, fell considerably. Owing to this the French fleet, during that and the succeeding day, made very little progress, and on the afternoon of the 31st, Cape Sicie bearing north distant 10 or 12 leagues, was discovered and recognised by the British frigates *Active* and *Phœbe*. These ships kept in sight of it until evening; when the *Phœbe* bore up for the gulf of Palma, with a fresh breeze at west-north-west, and the *Active*, in order to keep company with

\* Their names will be seen at p. 323, omitting the *Incorruptible*, and substituting the *Pluton* for the *Annibal*, and the *Hermione* for the *Uranie*.

the French ships, stood upon a wind to the south-west, but, after dark, saw no more of them. On the 1st of April, in the morning, a Ragusian vessel informed M. Villeneuve that, five days before, she had seen the British fleet to the southward of Sardinia. In consequence of this intelligence, which was correct, the French admiral, who, from previous information that Lord Nelson was off Barcelona (a proof that the *ruse* with the *Leviathan* had begun to take effect), had intended to pass to the eastward of the Balaric islands, was induced to alter his course and pass to the westward of them. The fleet accordingly kept close to the coast of Spain, and on the 6th, in a calm, arrived off the port of Carthage; where we will leave M. Villeneuve awhile, to show what effect his activity had produced upon the movements of him, to avoid whom was so principal a point in the instructions given to the French admiral.

Wanting water for his ships, Lord Nelson had, on the 1st of April, removed from Palma to Pulla bay; whence he had again sailed on the morning of the 3d, steering to the westward, with a moderate breeze at north-east. On the following morning, the 4th, when a few leagues to the westward of the island of Toro, the wind shifted to the north-north-west; and at 8 A.M., in the midst of hazy, unsettled weather and drizzling rain, the *Phœbe* made her appearance in the offing, with the exhilarating signal, that the French admiral was at sea. Cruisers were instantly despatched in all directions; and, on the supposition that the French fleet had continued its course to the southward (as would have been the case, had the Ragusian vessel not crossed it), the British fleet lay to all night, and, on the morning of the 5th, was about midway between the coasts of Barbary and Sardinia.

After waiting in this narrow channel until the 7th, the fleet bore up for Palermo, in order to cover Sicily and the more eastern parts of the Mediterranean, should the French have passed to the northward of Corsica. Two more days having elapsed without the slightest intelligence, Lord Nelson, on the 9th, being then off the western end of Sicily, stood to the westward. Of this change of course to the westward, Napoléon was for a long time unapprized. Even so late as a fortnight afterwards he sent a courier to M. Villeneuve, with information that Lord Nelson was gone to Egypt; and, lest the latter should learn that the French fleet had passed the Straits, he ordered the insertion of a paragraph in the Dutch journals, to the effect, that a French fleet had landed 6000 men in Egypt; that the admiral had made a feint of passing the Straits, but, in the night, had returned unseen along the African coast, and thereby deceived Lord Nelson.\*

The line-of-battle ships making but slow progress against

\* Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., p. 231.

the westerly and north-west winds, Lord Nelson despatched some light vessels in advance to Gibraltar and Lisbon. On the 16th, while the fleet was beating hard against a strong westerly wind, to get round the southern extremity of Sardinia, and obtain a glimpse of Toulon, a neutral vessel informed the *Leviathan* that the French fleet had been seen on the 7th off Cape de Gata. This was quickly followed by intelligence that M. Villeneuve had passed the Straits on the 8th. The prevalence of strong southerly and westerly winds made it the 30th, ere Lord Nelson got sight of the rock of Gibraltar; and about this time he heard that M. Villeneuve had been reinforced by some ships from Cadiz. There being no possibility of passing the Straits with the prevailing wind, and the fleet standing in great need of water and provisions, Lord Nelson, on the 4th of May, anchored in Mazari bay, on the Barbary shore, to water, and sent the *Superb* to Tetuan for cattle, fruit, and vegetables.

We will now see what is become of the object of Lord Nelson's pursuit; of that which, as will clearly appear by the following letter from his lordship to Captain Ball, at Malta, dated April 19, when the fleet was buffeting with head winds, was the principal source of his uneasy frame of mind. "My good fortune, my dear Ball, seems flown away. I cannot get a fair wind, or even a side wind—dead foul! dead foul!—but my mind is fully made up what to do when I leave the Straits, supposing there is no certain information of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill-luck will go near to kill me; but, as these are times for exertion, I must not be cast down, whatever I may feel." In another letter, of the same date, to Lord Melville, this extraordinary man writes: "I am not made to despair; what man can do shall be done. I have marked out for myself a decided line of conduct, and I shall follow it well up, although I have now before me a letter from the physician of the fleet, enforcing my return to England before the hot months. Therefore, notwithstanding I shall pursue the enemy to the East or West Indies, if I know that to have been their destination, yet, if the Mediterranean fleet joins the Channel, I shall request, with that order, permission to go on shore."\*

Returning to M. Villeneuve, while off Carthage, he sent a boat on shore, to offer his services and the protection of his fleet to the six Spanish ships ready for sea in the port; but Rear-admiral Salzeco, having been ordered with his squadron on a different service, declined the junction. So says M. Villeneuve; but the Spanish ambassador at Paris asserted, that the refusal to join came from the French admiral. Napoléon denies this roundly; adding, in his usual energetic way: "*Mais que l'amiral Villeneuve, passant par le détroit et ayant des craintes, eût refusé*

\* Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii., p. 404.

le secours de six vaisseaux, un ambassadeur, un homme sensé ne se laisse pas dire de pareilles nigauderies.”\*

On the evening of the 7th a fresh breeze sprang up from the eastward (and yet at this very time Lord Nelson was plagued with gales from the westward), and the French admiral continued his course towards the Straits. On the 8th, at daylight, Gibraltar appeared in sight; and at noon the French fleet, formed in two columns, with the frigates ahead, entered the gut, causing alarm-guns to be fired from all points of the rock. At 4 p.m. the French stood into the bay of Cadiz, driving away Vice-admiral Sir John Orde and his five sail of the line. Finding the wind to blow strong off shore, M. Villeneuve anchored his ships, having previously despatched the *Hortense* frigate into the harbour, to apprise the Spaniards of his arrival and quicken their movements. In consequence of this, the French 74-gun ship *Aigle*, Captain Pierre-Paul Gourrège, ship-corvette *Torche*, and brig-corvette *Argus*, accompanied by five out of the following six Spanish sail of the line and one frigate, having 1600 troops on board, sailed out of the harbour and anchored in company with the Toulon fleet:

Gun-ship.

80	{	Argonauta . . . . .	{	Admiral don Frederico Gravina.
				Rear-adm. don Antonio Escano.
74	{	San-Rafaël . . . . .	{	Commod. don Francisco Montez.
				Captain don Rafaël Villavicencio.
64	{	Firme . . . . .	{	„ don Francisco Mondragon.
				„ don ——— Darrac.
64	{	Terrible . . . . .	{	„ don ——— Monios.
				„ don ——— Monios.

On the 9th, at 2 A.M., the combined French and Spanish fleet, consisting of 17 sail of the line (12 French and five Spanish), one Spanish, and six French frigates, one ship-corvette, and three brig-corvettes, got under way, and steered a westerly course; leaving the *San-Rafaël*, which had run on shore in coming out, to follow to the rendezvous at Martinique, as soon as she could be got off.

The discreditable practice, adopted by the French emperor's orders, of altering official despatches for the purposes of deception, is nowhere more apparent than in the published correspondence connected with this expedition. M. Villeneuve is made to say that he was joined by eight Spanish sail of the line from Cadiz, thus: “*Peu d'instans après, un officier espagnol vint à mon bord, et m'annonça que huit vaisseaux de S. M. C. et une frégate, sous les ordres de S. E. l'amiral Gravina, allaient mettre sous voiles; et avant minuit je les vis sortir successivement du port, et mouiller en dehors.*”† On the other hand, the

\* Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., p. 236.

† Mon. July 14, 1805.

Madrid Gazette, of April 13, gives the correct number of ships, both French and Spanish, that joined M. Villeneuve; and so does Napoléon himself, when writing confidentially to his minister of marine: "Il paraît que cinq vaisseaux et une frégate ont rallié l'amiral Villeneuve; qu'un sixième avait touché, mais allait partir."\* And yet no French writer, such is the permanent injury of distorting historical facts, has been able to give a consistent account of this transaction.

Scarcely had daylight on the 9th made its appearance, than the French admiral was constrained to shorten sail for his Spanish friends; and, to the additional regret of M. Villeneuve, the wind, before the close of the day, shifted to the westward. An alternation of contrary winds and calms, coupled with the indifferent sailing of one of the French (the *Atlas*) and two or three of the Spanish ships, made it the 12th of May before the fleet arrived in sight of the island of Martinique. In the course of the following day, the 13th, the five Spanish, and 11 of the 12 French sail of the line, accompanied by the seven frigates (one of them Spanish), one ship-corvette, and three brig-corvettes, also by a large store-ship, and the late British ship-sloop *Cyane*, a prize, anchored in the harbour of Fort-Royal, or, as named at the commencement of the republican dynasty, Fort-de-France, but not without having sustained, in passing, a smart cannonade from the *Diamond* rock.†

In the course of the same night, it is believed, the twelfth French line-of-battle ship (probably, from her acknowledged badness of sailing, the *Atlas*) anchored with her companions; and on the 16th, early in the morning, the Spanish 80-gun ship *San-Rafaël*, which had sailed from Cadiz on the 10th of April, rounded *Pointe-Saline*. At 8 A. M. she hoisted a Spanish ensign and pendant; whereupon, by way of decoy, French colours were displayed at the flag-staff of the *Diamond*. At 9 A. M. the Spanish ship, having unsuspectingly approached close under the lee of the rock, on which English colours had just been substituted for French, received a fire as unexpected as it proved annoying. The *San-Rafaël* quickly put her helm up, and, returning one ineffectual shot as she wore, hastened out of range, as fast as the little wind would permit her; anchoring, the same afternoon, in company with M. Villeneuve's fleet.

A very different story from all this is told in the publication which the *Moniteur* was compelled to insert in the shape of a letter from M. Villeneuve, and a translation of which, as of a document of undoubted authenticity, went the rounds of the English newspapers. "*Le 19 floréal*," says this arrant piece of forgery, "*me trouvant à la hauteur prescrite par mes instructions, j'ai, conformément à leur contenu, remis à l'amiral Gra-*

\* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 229.

† See p. 243.

vina ses dépêches, et, sur le signal qui en a été fait, six vaisseaux de S. M. C., deux frégates et deux bricks de S. M. I., se sont rangés sous son pavillon; nous avons été en vue le reste de la soirée, mais le lendemain je n'en ai plus de connaissance, et j'ai lieu de le croire rendre à sa destination. Le 24, au point du jour, j'ai donné dans le canal de Sainte-Lucie, et dans la journée je mouillai à la Martinique, avec l'escadre que m'a confiée S. M. et deux vaisseaux et une frégate espagnols." The number of French and Spanish ships that entered Martinique, as counted both from the Diamond rock, and the Triton West-Indiaman which lay in Basse-Terre road, Sainte-Lucie, agrees exactly with the statement as we have given it. But, it being p. m. when the ships passed, the two accounts are dated, according to log-time, on the 14th instead of on the 13th of May. That the last is the correct date appears, not only from the above letter (there being no interest to deceive in that particular), but from an entry in the rôle d'équipage of the French ship *Formidable*, to which we have had reference.

Even French historians were led into error by the *Moniteur's* forgeries: "L'Amiral Gravina," says M. Dumas, "ne se sépara point de lui (Villeneuve) pour remplir une mission particulière, et c'est encore un fait que nous devons rétablir; il mouilla à la Martinique avec le reste de la flotte combinée et ne la quitta point: ceci doit servir d'erratum au premier paragraphe de la page 131, où, trompés par divers rapports officiels, nous avons dit que l'amiral Gravina, après s'être détaché de la flotte combinée pour porter des secours à Porto-Rico et à la Havane, était venu la rejoindre à sa station aux îles du Vent."\* The object of all this fraud was evidently to induce the British government to weaken still more the force in the Channel, by detaching a greater number of ships to the West Indies; and that object, we believe, was partly accomplished.

Lord Nelson, whom on the 4th of May we left refitting his fleet in Mazari bay,† was enabled, early on the 5th, by the emulation and activity of those he commanded, and by a sudden change of wind to the eastward, to weigh and make sail to the westward. Such, indeed, was Lord Nelson's haste to get away, that the *Superb* was recalled from Tetuan, just as the cattle and other refreshments for the fleet were being brought down to the beach; and which, in consequence, the ship was obliged to leave behind. On the 7th, at 2 p. m., a failure of the breeze obliged the *Victory* and some of the other ships to anchor in Rozia bay, Gibraltar. In the course of the afternoon Rear-admiral Sir Richard Bickerton, who was to be left as the commanding officer in the Mediterranean, shifted his flag from the *Royal-Sovereign* to the *Amfitrite* (late Spanish) frigate; and, a

\* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 417.

† See p. 329.

fine easterly wind now again springing up, Lord Nelson, at 6 p. m., weighed and stood through the Straits.

It had been his lordship's intention, on the supposition that the French were bound to Ireland, to have proceeded to a spot about 50 leagues to the westward of Scilly; but some intelligence, of an undoubted character, pointing to the West Indies as the real destination of the combined fleet, Lord Nelson resolved, at every risk of professional censure, to follow it thither. That information was derived from Rear-admiral Donald Campbell (by birth a Scotchman), of the Portuguese navy, well known to Lord Nelson, from having previously served under him, and from having, on a former occasion, rendered some essential service to the British. For his visit to the Victory, Rear-admiral Campbell appears to have suffered most severely. Notwithstanding the rigid secrecy observed by Lord Nelson, the Spanish naval commander-in-chief at Algeiras got hold of the circumstance, and made a formal complaint against the rear-admiral. This brought down the vengeance of the French ambassador at the court of Portugal, and Rear-admiral Campbell was laid upon the shelf.\*

On the 10th, in the evening, the fleet anchored in Lagos bay, to clear some transports which had been left there by Sir John Orde, when the latter retreated from before M. Villeneuve. Having, in the course of the night, by extraordinary exertions, completed his ships to five months' provisions, Lord Nelson, at 9 A. M. on the 11th, weighed and sailed out of the bay. The expected arrival from England of a fleet of transports, with 5000 troops on board under General Sir James Craig, induced his lordship to remain a short time off Cape St.-Vincent; and on the 12th, in the afternoon, the Queen 98, Rear-admiral Knight, and Dragon 74, Captain Edward Griffiths, with their valuable charge, joined company. In order to afford to the convoy an additional protection in its passage through the Straits, Lord Nelson detached the Royal-Sovereign; and, with his remaining 10 ships of the line and three frigates, namely, the Victory, Canopus, Superb, Spencer, Swiftsure, Belleisle, Conqueror,† Tigre, and Leviathan, and Amazon, Décade, and Amphion, crowded sail to the westward, in chase of an enemy's fleet which, he knew, consisted of 18 ships of the line, and at least treble his number of frigates. One of the British ships too, the Superb, not having been in a home-port since the 16th of January, 1801, was in a very crazy state; and it was only upon the urgent solicitation of Captain Keats, that the Superb was allowed to make one in the pursuing fleet.

Lord Nelson has been accused of rashness, in being so eager

\* Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii., p. 406.

† For this ship a contemporary has substituted the Excellent, Captain Frank Sotheron, left by Lord Nelson in Naples bay. See Brenton, vol. iii., p. 429.



to engage a force nearly double his own; but it should be recollected, that he fully expected to be joined, on reaching Barbadoes, by six sail of the line. During his passage to the West Indies, Lord Nelson prepared a plan of attack, to be adopted in case he should overtake the enemy's fleet. The plan met the general approval of his officers; but we cannot discover by it whether the vice-admiral contemplated a meeting before or after the expected reinforcement.\*

On the 15th of May the British fleet made Madeira; and on the 29th the Amazon was sent on to Barbadoes, to enable Rear-admiral Cochrane to have his ships ready for the expected junction. On the 3d of June Lord Nelson gained, for the first time, certain intelligence that the combined fleet was in the West Indies; and on the 4th he anchored with his squadron in Carlisle bay. Here he found Rear-admiral Cochrane, with only the Northumberland and Spartiate 74s, his remaining four ships having been detained by Rear-admiral Dacres at Jamaica. An unfounded report, circulated, no doubt, on purpose to mislead, that the enemy was bound to Tobago and Trinidad, induced the vice-admiral to receive on board his ships 2000 troops under General Myers, and to proceed with them, on the morning of the 5th, towards those two islands. On the 7th, when in the gulf of Paria; the British discovered that they had been misled; and, although so far to leeward, the fleet arrived on the 9th, off Grenada. Here Lord Nelson received accounts that the enemy had passed the island of Dominique on the 6th, steering to the northward. Having, on the morning of the 13th, reached Antigua, the British fleet there disembarked the troops; and at noon the same day, taking with him the Spartiate, Captain Francis Laforey, but leaving the Northumberland to remain as Rear-admiral Cochrane's flag-ship on the station, Lord Nelson, with 14 sail of the line, stood to the northward; not absolutely in pursuit of an enemy, whose force he knew to consist of at least 18 sail of the line, but in the hope, by a superior knowledge of tactics, to reach the shores of Europe before him.

In one of those unreserved conversations which he occasionally held with his captains when visiting him on board the Victory, Lord Nelson is represented to have said, in reference to the object which had drawn him so far from his station: "I am thankful that the enemy has been driven from the West-India islands with so little loss to our country" (alluding to the capture of the Antigua convoy); "I had made up my mind to great sacrifices, for I had determined, notwithstanding his vast superiority, to stop his career, and to put it out of his power to do any further mischief. Yet do not imagine I am one of those hot-brained

\* That plan, being the work of an acknowledged proficient, may with propriety be transcribed into these pages. It will therefore be found at No. 36, of the Appendix.

people who fight at immense disadvantage, without any adequate object. My object is partly gained. If we meet them, we shall find them not less than 18, I rather think 20, sail of the line; and therefore do not be surprised if I should not fall on them immediately. We won't part without a battle. I think they will be glad to let me alone, if I will let them alone; which I will do, either till we approach the shores of Europe, or they give me an advantage too tempting to be resisted."\* And yet the two writers, from whose work this extract is taken, seldom indulge in their own remarks without making a perfect braggadocio of their hero. Mr. Southey is nearly as bad as Messieurs Clarke and M'Arthur. "Much, indeed, has the memory of this great man suffered by the overweening zeal of his biographers.

On the very day, June 9th, on which Lord Nelson arrived off the island of Grenada, Napoléon, writing from Milan, says: "Je suis d'opinion, cependant, que Nelson est encore dans les mers d'Europe. Le sentiment le plus naturel est qu'il devrait être rentré en Angleterre pour se ravitailler et verser ses équipages sur d'autres bâtimens; car ses vaisseaux ont besoin d'entrer dans le bassin, et son escadre peut être considérée comme étant en très-mauvais état."† The latter part of this statement was true enough, but Napoléon did not seemingly reflect what might be done by such a man as Nelson. The velocity, as well as the direction, of the British admiral's movements had quite outstripped the French emperor's calculations.

That M. Villeneuve was not, in reality, with 18 sail of the line running from 11, is natural to suppose; and yet many persons, both in France and England, have thought otherwise. Nor, indeed, could the French admiral's departure from Martinique have had any possible reference to the arrival of the British admiral at Barbadoes, owing to the simple fact, that the two occurrences took place on the same day. M. Villeneuve's instructions, as well as we can collect what they were from the mass of orders and counter-orders which issued on the subject, may afford us some clue to the French admiral's proceedings.

In the published correspondence between the Emperor Napoléon and his minister of marine, a break occurs of nearly seven months, from September 29, 1804, to April 14, 1805. As, in the interim, the Toulon fleet had twice sailed, and the last time had got fairly to sea, this hiatus happens rather inopportunistically. Coupling the April and September instructions, however, we may gather, that M. Villeneuve was neither to detach ships to take St. Helena, nor, with the aid of the Rochefort squadron, himself to capture Surinam and the other Dutch colonies in the Antilles;‡ but that, on being joined by the Spaniards, he was

\* Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii., p. 413.

† Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., p. 267.

‡ See p. 241.

to proceed straight to Martinique, and; with the 5100 men on board the combined fleet, capture Sainte-Lucie, if not already taken by the Rochefort squadron; leave a garrison there, and, if necessary, strengthen the garrisons of Dominique, Martinique, and Guadaloupe, the two latter of which had already, the one 1500, the other 1600 troops. He was then to wait a month in the Antilles, in order to afford Vice-admiral Ganteaume an opportunity of joining with his 21 sail of the line; and, to make the intervening time pass profitably as well as pleasantly, he was to do all possible injury to the enemy, "*faire tout le mal possible à l'ennemi.*" The governor-generals of Martinique and of Guadaloupe, Vice-admiral Villaret Joyeuse and General Enouf, were to lend their aid, and, if necessary, a portion of their respective garrisons, towards the fulfilment of this object. The want of provisions in the fleet, or of unanimity in the council, or some other unexplained cause, kept M. Villeneuve's ships in the harbour of Fort-Royal until the latter end of May; when two of the 74s moved out to attack the Diamond rock, which, with its sloop's company of officers and men, still persisted to fire at and annoy every French vessel that passed within range of its heavy cannon.

The expedition destined to retake this very harassing and not formidable "king's ship," consisting of the Pluton and Berwick 74s, 36-gun frigate Sirène, 16-gun brig-corvette Argus, Fine armed schooner, and 11 gun-boats, under the orders of Commodore Cosmao of the Pluton, having on board from 300 to 400 troops of the line commanded by chef d'escadron. Boyer. On the 29th of May, at 5 h. 30 m. P.M., the expedition sailed from Fort-Royal. By the morning of the 30th the ships had not made much progress; but on the 31st, at daybreak, they were far to windward of the rock, and at 7 A.M. bore down towards it. The Diamond had been blockaded ever since the arrival of the combined fleet at Martinique: therefore Captain Maurice, when he saw Commodore Cosmao's squadron sail out, anticipated its destination, and prepared accordingly.

Considering it impossible to defend the lower works against such a force as was approaching, Captain Maurice abandoned them, spiking the two guns, drowning the powder, and cutting away the launch from the landing place. At 8 A.M. the ships opened their fire; which was returned by Hood's battery and Fort-Diamond, the one being the 24-pounder about midway up the rock, the other the two 18-pounders on its summit. The ships bombarded the rock during the 31st of May and 1st of June, and until 4 h. 30 m. P.M. on the 2d; when Captain Maurice, having, as he states, "but little powder left, and not a sufficient quantity of ball-cartridges to last until dark," threw out a flag of truce. At 5 P.M. the Fine schooner hoisted a similar flag; and terms honourable to the garrison, which consisted of 107 officers and men, were agreed to the same evening.

In their defence of this extraordinary post, the British sustained a loss of only two men killed, and one man wounded. The chef d'escadron Boyer enumerates the loss of the French troops, "from a hasty calculation," at about 50 in killed and wounded. Captain Maurice considers the loss of the French, who landed at the foot of the rock, to have amounted to at least 30 men killed and 40 wounded, exclusively of the loss sustained on board the ships and boats. Three gun-boats and two rowing boats are stated to have been entirely lost. On his subsequent trial by court-martial, Captain Maurice was not only most honourably acquitted for the loss of the Diamond rock, but highly complimented for his firm and determined behaviour.

On the 1st of June, while the governor-general, General Lauriston, Admirals Villeneuve and Gravina, and a number of other officers, were inspecting the Diamond rock from the contiguous shore, the French 40-gun frigate Didon, Captain Pierre-Bernard Milius, arrived from Guadaloupe; bringing fresh instructions from Napoléon, and likewise intelligence that two French 74s had arrived at that island as a reinforcement to the combined fleet. The Didon had sailed from Lorient on the 2d of May, with duplicates of the instructions, with which, on the day previous, Rear-admiral Magon, with the two new 74-gun ships Algésiras, Captain Gabriel-Auguste Brouard, and Achille, Captain Gabriel Denicourt, had sailed from Rochefort. In those instructions Napoléon directs that Vice-admiral Villeneuve, and General Lauriston, having now with the 2100 troops composing (see p. 336) the united garrisons of Martinique and Guadaloupe, the 3400 carried out by Rear-admiral Missiessy, the 5100, including Spaniards in the combined fleet, and the 840 on board Rear-admiral Magon's two ships, upwards of 11,400 men, do take St.-Vincent, Antigua, Grenada; "et pourquoi ne prendrait-on pas la Barbade?" Certainly, there was no reason why, among the "ten Windward islands, including Tobago and Trinidad," Barbadoes alone should escape free. Tobago having been a French island, was not to be ill-treated, but such of the other English colonies, as it might not be convenient to retain, were to be stripped and pillaged thus: "Il ne faudrait point maltraiter l'île de Tobago, parcequ'elle est française; mais pour les autres colonies anglaises qu'on jugerait devoir abandonner après les avoir occupées, on pourrait en tirer la moitié des noirs, lever une contribution sur les habitans, en ôter l'artillerie, et vendre les noirs à la Martinique et à la Guadaloupe."\*

Having done all this, and waited in the Antilles for the Brest fleet 35 days from the day of receiving his despatches, Vice-admiral Villeneuve was to proceed straight to Ferrol, to carry into effect, in the way already explained,† the ultimate object of the

\* Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., p. 477.

† See p. 300.

expedition; and, compared to which, in the eyes of Napoléon, the capture and pillage of the British West-India islands was mere child's play.

On the 4th of June the combined fleet, composed of the same vessels with which it had anchored, except the *Santa-Madalena Torche*, *Naiade*, and *Cyane*, and having on board in addition to the troops it had brought out, a portion of the garrison of Martinique, set sail from the harbour of Fort-Royal, steering a northerly course. On the same or following day the two 74s, *Algésiras* and *Achille*, which had arrived at Guadaloupe on the 29th of the preceding month, and had sailed on the 2d of June in search of the admiral, effected their junction. On the 6th M. Villeneuve lay to off the road of Basse-Terre, and received on board his fleet a portion of the garrison of Guadaloupe.

Thus reinforced, the French admiral, with his 20 sail of the line, seven frigates, and two brigs, passed to windward of Montserrat and Redundo, and to leeward of Antigua, with what precise object in view has never been satisfactorily explained. However concealment or a distortion of facts might suit the policy of Napoléon, it was aiming a deadly blow at the reputation of his officers to make their public letters the channel of his falsehoods. In M. Villeneuve's letter of 8 thermidor (26th of July), published in the *Moniteur* of August 11, a void occurs between the day of his departure from Martinique, "le 16 prairial," or 4th of June, and that on which he made Cape Finisterre, "le 21 messidor," or 9th of July. Not a word is there about the junction of the two 74s, or the abstraction of the colonial garrisons; a tolerable proof that one or more important paragraphs had been suppressed.

On the 8th, having doubled Antigua, as if with the real intention of operating among the British islands, M. Villeneuve received intelligence from an American schooner, that in the north-north-east he would find a British homeward-bound convoy, which had sailed the day previous from that island. Chase was immediately given; and before night the Franco-Spanish fleet overtook 15 sail of merchant vessels, under the protection of the British 28-gun frigate *Barbadoes*, Captain Joseph Nourse, and 14-gun schooner *Netley*, Lieutenant Richard Harward. The two men of war effected their escape; but the merchantmen, valued with their cargoes at five millions of francs, were captured. The prizes were given in charge to the *Sirène* frigate, with orders to escort them to Guadaloupe, and rejoin the fleet off the Western Islands.

Scarcely had the frigate and her rich convoy parted company, than a rumour reached Admiral Villeneuve, derived, no doubt, from some of the prisoners, that Lord Nelson had arrived in the West Indies in search of him. Smarting under their heavy losses, and suspecting from the troops on board, that the combined fleet, even yet, was destined to act against some of the

British colonies (nearly the whole of which, according to a French writer, had drawn up the capitulations they meant to propose to M. Villeneuve, and counted out the sums of money they could afford to pay him for their ransom\*), the merchant-masters did, most probably, exaggerate the British force under Lord Nelson, in the hope to drive the French admiral back to Europe. If so, the plan produced its effect; for, on the 9th or 10th, all the troops which had been withdrawn from Martinique and Guadaloupe were precipitately embarked on board the *Hortense*, *Didon*, *Hermione*, and *Thémis* frigates, with orders to Captain La-Marre-la-Meillerie, of the *Hortense*, the senior officer, to disembark them at the last-named island, and then to rejoin the fleet at the appointed rendezvous.

That, in acting thus, the French admiral was but obeying his orders, is to be inferred from the fact, that Napoléon anticipated that M. Villeneuve would return straight to Europe on learning that he was pursued. “Je hâterai mon arrivée (à Boulogne) de quelques jours, parce que je pense que l’arrivée de Nelson” (whose force he in another place states at “dix seuls vaisseaux”), “en Amérique, pourrait pousser Villeneuve à partir pour le Ferrol.† The only act for which Napoléon blamed M. Villeneuve, was for not leaving at Martinique and Guadaloupe the troops which the fleet had carried out. In his anger, at the partial failure of his projects, the French emperor did certainly attribute this omission on the part of M. Villeneuve, to fright, “épouvante,” at the rumour of his being pursued; but, at a subsequent day, when the thoughts of invading England had long ceased to agitate his breast, Buonaparte frankly admitted that Villeneuve was a brave man.‡

On the 26th of June, when, having executed their mission, they were returning to the fleet, the *Didon*, *Hermione*, *Hortense*, and *Thémis* fell in with the *Sirène* and her valuable charge; and that but a short distance to windward of the spot whence the latter had made sail 17 days before. Coupling the time already lost with the time it would still take to get a fleet of dull-sailing merchantmen so far to windward as Guadaloupe, Captain La-Marre-la-Meillerie determined to bear up with them for Porto-Rico. On the following day, the 27th, when about 180 miles to north-east of Barbuda, the British 18-gun ship-sloops, *Kim-fisher*, Captain Richard William Cribb, and *Osprey*, Captain Timothy Clinch, appeared in sight to windward, and were chased by the French frigates. In making sail to escape, the two sloops hoisted signals and fired guns, as if to a fleet ahead. This had the desired effect. The chasing ships immediately bore up; and, in a very little time, the whole 15 merchant

\* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 121.

† *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 282.

‡ See O'Meara's *Napoléon in Exile*, vol. i., p. 57.

vessels, with all the rum and sugar and coffee on board, were in flames. A French writer confirms the fact; calling by mistake the two sloops "frigates," and seeming to be unapprized of the ruse that was practised.\*

On the 30th of June, when about 20 leagues to the north-east of the island of Corvo, the northernmost of the Azores, M. Villeneuve was rejoined by his five frigates. On the same day the Didon captured and burnt an English privateer, of 14 guns and 49 men. On the 3d of July the fleet recaptured the late Spanish galleon Matilda, with treasure on board to the estimated value of from 14 to 15 millions of francs; and at the same time captured the privateer, the Mars, of Liverpool, who had made prize of the galleon, and was conducting her to an English port. The privateer was set on fire, and the galleon taken in tow by the Sirène frigate. Nothing further of consequence happened to the combined fleet until it arrived off Cape Finisterre on the 9th of July; on which day a violent gale of wind from the north-east carried away the main topmast of the Indomptable, and otherwise slightly damaged some of the ships. The wind moderated, but continued to blow from the same adverse quarter, until a day or two before the 22d; when, with a favourable change of wind, occurred an event, the account of which had best be deferred till we have brought up the proceedings of the chasing fleet.

After quitting Antigua on the 13th of June,† Lord Nelson, still with no more than his own discretion for a guide, hastened towards Europe, and on the 17th of July came in sight of Cape St.-Vincent; "making," observes the admiral in his diary, "our whole run from Barbuda, day by day, 3459 miles. Our run from Cape St.-Vincent to Barbadoes," he adds, "was 3227 miles; so that our run back was only 232 miles more than our run out, allowance being made for the difference of the latitudes and longitudes of Barbadoes and Barbuda; average per day 34 leagues wanting nine miles." On the following day, the 18th, being on his way to Gibraltar for provisions for his fleet, Lord Nelson fell in with Vice-admiral Collingwood, with the Dreadnought 98 and two other sail of the line; but who had not the slightest information to communicate beyond what his own sagacity, and that was of no common kind, suggested. Vice-admiral Collingwood considered the voyage to the West Indies in the right point of view, merely as a means of drawing off the British force from the Channel, to admit of an attack upon Ireland; and, it will be recollected, a disembarkation on Ireland was one of the preliminary steps in Napoléon's plan.‡

On the 19th of July the British fleet anchored in Gibraltar bay; and "on the 20th," says Lord Nelson in his diary, "I went

\* Victoires et Conquêtes, tome xvi., p. 128.

† See p. 334.

‡ See p. 217; also a letter from Vice-admiral Collingwood to Lord Nelson on this subject, Appendix, No. 87.

on shore for the first time since June 16, 1803, and from having my foot out of the *Victory*, two years wanting 10 days." On the 22d the fleet weighed and stood across to Tetuan to water, anchoring at 8 p. m. in Mazari bay. On the 24th, at noon, the fleet again got under way and steered for Ceuta, and remained during the night in the gut, with variable winds and a thick fog. On the 25th the 18-gun ship-sloop *Termagant*, Captain Robert Pettet, from England, joined, with information that the brig-sloop *Curieux*, on her way home with Lord Nelson's despatches, had, on the 19th of June,\* in latitude  $33^{\circ} 12'$  north, longitude  $58^{\circ}$  west, fallen in with the combined fleet, steering, at first, north by west, but afterwards north-north-west. This intelligence, stale as it was in being communicated five weeks after it bore date, was the earliest, of a positive nature, which the vice-admiral had received.

After passing the Straits, Lord Nelson bore away to the westward, and then proceeded off Cape St.-Vincent, to be ready to steer more northerly as circumstances might direct. On the 3d of August the fleet was in latitude  $39^{\circ}$  north, longitude  $16^{\circ}$  west, with light northerly airs. By his acuteness, Lord Nelson, about this time, extracted from a log-book, found by an American merchant ship on board a vessel which had been set on fire and abandoned, but not destroyed, some far-from unimportant information. The circumstances, as related by each of Lord Nelson's biographers, are as follows: "A log-book and a few seamen's jackets were found in the cabin, and these were brought to Nelson. The log-book closed with these words: 'Two large vessels in the W.N.W.;' and this led him to conclude that the vessel had been a Liverpool privateer cruising off the Western Islands. But there was in this book a scrap of dirty paper, filled with figures. Nelson, immediately upon seeing it, observed that the figures were written by a Frenchman; and, after studying this for a while, said, 'I can explain the whole. The jackets are of French manufacture, and prove that the privateer was in possession of the enemy. She had been chased and taken by the two ships that were seen in the W.N.W. The prize-master, going on board in a hurry, forgot to take with him his reckoning: there is none in the log-book, and the dirty paper contains her work for the number of days since the privateer left Corro, with an unaccounted-for run, which I take to have been the chase, in his endeavour to find out her situation by back-reckoning. By some mismanagement I conclude she was run on board by one of the enemy's ships and dismasted. Not liking delay (for I am satisfied that those two ships were the advanced ones of the French squadron), and fancying we were close at their heels, they set fire to the vessel, and abandoned her in a

\* Both Southey in his, and Clarke and M'Arthur in their, "*Life of Nelson*," make this the 19th of July; a serious mistake. See p. 391.



hurry.'” The compilers of the anecdote, unfortunately, have omitted the dates, both of the last entry in the log-book, and of the day on which the wreck was fallen in with. We might otherwise have been able to show, that it was the late Liverpool privateer *Mars* herself, which had given rise to Lord Nelson’s speculations. If so, the jackets had probably belonged to some of the *Matilda*’s crew, and the scrap of paper been written upon by a Spaniard. Whichever way it was, the inference remained just as the vice-admiral had drawn it, that the capturing fleet had steered to the northward.

A northerly course thus appearing to have been taken by *M. Villeneuve*, a northerly course was taken by his ardent pursuer, but, to the latter’s regret, against northerly winds and hazy weather. On the 8th of August the wind became more favourable. On the 12th the *Niobe* frigate joined from the Channel fleet, but, strange to say, still without intelligence. On the 15th Lord Nelson himself joined Admiral Cornwallis off Ushant, from whom he heard all that had happened, and, on the same evening, proceeded with the *Victory* and *Superb* to Portsmouth; leaving the remainder of his fleet (except the *Belleisle*, who steered for Plymouth) as a reinforcement to the Channel fleet.\* On the 18th the *Victory* and *Superb* anchored at Spithead; and Lord Nelson shortly afterwards struck his flag and went on shore.

\* See p. 302.

## APPENDIX.

No. 1. See p. 2.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the French navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1799.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun ship		
50	(T) <i>Leander</i> .....	Captured, March 3, by the Russians and Turks, on the surrender of Corfu, and restored to England by the Emperor of Russia.
Gun-frig.		
41	(W) <i>Forte</i> .....	Captured, February 28, by the British frigate <i>Sibylle</i> , off Bengal river, East Indies.
38	(B) <i>Junon</i> .....	Captured, June 18, by a British squadron under Captain Markham, of the <i>Centaur</i> , in the Mediterranean.
	(D) <i>Alceste</i> .....	
	" <i>Courageuse</i> .....	
	... <i>Charente</i> .....	Wrecked, November 10, on entering Lorient.
36	... <i>Preneuse</i> .....	Destroyed, December 11, after having been run on shore near Port-Louis, Isle of France, by the <i>Tremendous</i> , 74, and <i>Adamant</i> , 50.
	... <i>Prudente</i> .....	Captured, February 9, by the British frigate <i>Dædalus</i> , near the Cape of Good Hope.
	... <i>Vestale</i> .....	Captured, August 20, by the British frigate <i>Clyde</i> , off Bordeaux.
28	... <i>Brune</i> .....	Captured, with the <i>Leander</i> at Corfu.
	... <i>Républicaine</i> .....	Captured, August 26, by the British frigate <i>Tamer</i> , off Surinam.

## No. 2. See p. 2.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Dutch navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1799.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship		
74	(O) Washington .....	Captured, August 30, by voluntary surrendering (the seamen having refused to fight against the orange flag) to a British squadron under Vice-admiral Mitchell, in the Vlieter, Texel.
64	(P) Cerberus .....	
	" De Ruyter .....	
	" Guelderland .....	
	" Leyden .....	
	" Utrecht .....	Captured, August 28, by the same British squadron, in the Nieuve Diep, Texel.
	... Vervachten .....	
50	(T) Batavier .....	Captured, with the Washington and squadron.
	" Beschermers .....	
	" Broëderchap .....	
44	... Belle-Antoinette .....	Captured, with the Vervachten and squadron.
	... Constitutie .....	
	... Duifze .....	
	... Expeditie .....	
	(V) Hector .....	
	" Unie .....	
Gun-frig.		
44	(W) Mars .....	Captured, with the Washington and her squadron.
40	(X) Amphitrite .....	
32	(G) Ambuscade .....	
28	(I) Heldin .....	Captured, with the Vervachten and squadron.
	" Minerve .....	
	... Alarm .....	
24	... Pollock .....	
	(O) Venus .....	

## No. 3. See p. 2.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Spanish navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1799.

Name.		How, when, and where lost.
Gun-frig.		
34 {	... Guadalupe .....	Destroyed, March 16, by being run on shore by the Centaur 74, and Cormorant 20, near Cape Oropesa, Mediterranean.
	(II) <i>Hermione</i> .....	Captured, October 26, by being cut out of Puerto-Caballo, South America, by the boats of the Surprise frigate.
	... Santa-Brigida .....	Captured, October 18, by a British frigate-squadron, near Cape Finisterre.
	(D) Santa-Teresa .....	Captured, February 6, by the Argo 44, in company with the Leviathan 74, near Majorca, Mediterranean.
	... Thetis .....	Captured, October 17, by the British frigate Ethalion, in company with the Naïad and others, near Ferrol.

## No. 4. See p. 2.

An abstract of French, Dutch, and Spanish ships of the line and frigates, captured, &c. during the year 1799.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the F.D.&S. navies.	Total added to the British navy.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
	—	—					
Ships of the line	Du.	7	...	...	...	7	6
Frigates .....	Fr.	9	1	1	...	11	5
	Du.	17	...	...	...	17	11
	Sp.	4	1	...	...	5	
Total.....		37	2	1	...	40	21

## No. 5. See p. 2.

A list of ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1799.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship 98	(H) Impregnable .....	Jonathan Fullnor	Wrecked, October 19, between Langstone and Chichester : crew saved.
64	(P) Sceptre .....	Valentine Edwards	Wrecked, December 5, in Table Bay, Cape of Good Hope : 291 of the crew perished.
Gun-frig. 38	{ (A) Apollo .....	Peter Halkett.....	Wrecked, January 7, on the coast of Holland : crew saved.
	{ „ Ethalion .....	John Clarke Searle	Wrecked, December 25, on the Penmarcks : crew saved.
36	(D) Lutine .....	Lancelot Skynner.	Wrecked, October 9, off the Vlie-island, coast of Holland : crew, except two, perished.
28	(I) Proserpine ...	James Wallis .....	Wrecked, February 1, in the river Elbe : crew, except 15, saved.
G. sh. slp. 16	{ (T) Nautilus .....	Henry Gunter .....	Wrecked, February 2, off Flamborough Head : crew saved.
	{ (V) Trincomalé ...	John Rowe .....	Destroyed, October 12, by being blown up in action with a French privateer, in the Straits of Babelmandel : crew perished.
18	(Y) Orestes .....	William Haggitt ...	Foundered, exact date unknown, in a hurricane in the Indian ocean : crew perished.
G. bg. slp. 14	{ (b) Amaranthe ...	John Blake .....	Wrecked, in September, on the coast of Florida ; and many of the crew perished on shore with hunger.
	{ „ Weazle .....	Hon. Henry Grey	Wrecked, January 12, in Barnstable Bay : crew, except the purser, perished.
Gun brig 14	{ (f) Deux-Amis ...	Hen. Smith Wilson	Wrecked, May 23, on the back of the Isle of Wight : crew saved.
	{ (g) Contest .....	John Ides Short ...	Wrecked, exact date unknown, off the coast of Holland : crew saved.
10	(h) Fortune .....	Lewis Davis .....	Captured, May 8, by a squadron of French frigates, off the coast of Syria.
Gun-sch. 14	(i) Fox .....	Wm. Wooldridge ..	Wrecked, September 28, in the gulf of Mexico : crew saved.
6	(u) Musquito ....	Thomas White ....	Captured, exact date unknown, by two Spanish frigates, off Cuba.

## No. 5—continued.

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where lost.</u>
T.S.	(q) Nassau.....	George Tripp. ...	Wrecked, October 14, on the coast of Holland: crew, except 42, saved.
	(r) Grampus.....	George Hart ....	Wrecked, February, on Barking shelf, near Woolwich: crew saved.
	(t) Blanche.....	John Ayscough..	Wrecked, September 28, in the Texel: crew saved.
	„ <i>Espion</i> .....	Jonas Rose .....	Wrecked, November 16, on the Goodwin Sands: crew saved. Was <i>Atalante</i> .
g. v.	(w) <i>Dame-de-Grace</i> .....		Captured along with <i>Fortune</i> .

## ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line.....	...	...	2	...	...	2
„ under the line .....	3	1	14	1	...	19
Total .....	3	1	16	1	...	21

## No. 6. See p. 3.

	£	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance during the first two lunar months, of 120 000 seamen, including 22,696 marines, and during the remaining eleven lunar months, of 110,000 seamen, including the same number of marines	5,437,500	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.....	4,350,000	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including the half-pay to sea and marine officers; also the expense of sea ordnance.....	1,169,439	13	11
„ the extraordinary; including the building and re- -coasting of ships, and other extra work .....	772,140	0	0
„ the expense of the transport service .....	1,300,000	0	0
„ the maintenance of prisoners of war in health.....	500,000	0	0
„ the care and maintenance of sick prisoners of war.....	90,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service .....	£13,619,079	13	11

## No. 7. See p. 4.

Paris, le 5 nivose an viii de la république.

*Bonaparte, premier consul de la république française, à sa majesté le roi de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande.*

Appelé par le vœu de la nation française à occuper la première magistrature de la république, je crois convenable, en entrant en charge, d'en faire directement part à votre majesté.

La guerre qui, depuis huit ans, ravage les quatre parties du monde, doit-elle être éternelle? n'est-il donc aucun moyen de s'entendre?

Comment les deux nations les plus éclairées de l'Europe, puissantes et fortes plus que ne l'exigent leur sûreté et leur indépendance, peuvent-elles sacrifier à des idées de vaine grandeur le bien du commerce, la prospérité intérieure, le bonheur des familles? comment ne sentent-elles pas que la paix est le premier des besoins comme la première des gloires?

Ces sentimens ne peuvent pas être étrangers au cœur de votre majesté, qui gouverne une nation libre, et dans le seul but de la rendre heureuse.

Votre majesté ne verra dans cette ouverture que mon désir sincère de contribuer efficacement, pour la seconde fois, à la pacification générale, par une démarche prompte, toute de confiance, et dégagée de ces formes qui, nécessaires peut-être pour déguiser la dépendance des états faibles, ne décèlent dans les états forts que le désir de se tromper.

La France, l'Angleterre, par l'abus de leurs forces, peuvent long-temps encore pour le malheur de tous les peuples, en retarder l'épuisement; mais, j'ose le dire, le sort de toutes les nations civilisées est attaché à la fin d'une guerre qui embrase le monde entier.

De votre majesté, etc

BONAPARTE.

## No. 8. See p. 62.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the French navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1800.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship		
80	(K) Guillaume-Tell.....	{ Captured, March 30, by a British squadron off Malta.
74	(M) Généreux.....	
64	(P) Athénien.....	{ Captured, February 18, by a British squadron in the Mediterranean.
...	Dégo.....	
Gun-frig.		
...	Concorde.....	{ Captured, September 4, at the surrender of Malta.
40	(Z) Diane.....	
	" Vengeance.....	{ Captured, August 5, by the British 64, Belliqueux, near Rio-Janeiro, South America.
		{ Captured, August 24, by a British squadron off Malta.
		{ Captured, August 25, by the British 38-gun frigate Seinc, in the Mona Passage.

## No. 8—continued.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-frig.		
38	(B) Désirée.....	Captured, July 8, by the British 28-gun sloop Dart, in Dunkirk roads.
	„ Pallas.....	Captured, February 6, by the Loire, British frigate and other vessels near the Seven Islands, coast of France.
36	... Carthagénoise .....	Captured, with the Athénien and Dégé.
	... Médéc .....	Captured, August 5, by the Bombay-Castle, and Exeter Indiaman, in sight of the Belliqueux 64, and convoy.
28	... Vénus .....	Captured, October 22, by the British frigates Indefatigable and Fisgard, off Lisbon.

No Dutch ship of war as high as a 24-gun corvette, captured, &c. during the year 1800.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Spanish navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1800.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-frig.			
34	(D) Del-Carmen...don Fraquin Porcel		Captured, April 7, by the Leviathan 74, and Emerald 36, near Cadiz. The prizes were laden with 3000 quintals of quick-silver.
	„ Florentina....don Manuel Norates		

An abstract of French, and Spanish ships and vessels of war, captured, &c. during the year 1800.

		Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the F. & S. navies.	Total added to the British navy.
		Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line . .	Fr.	4	...	...	...	...	4	3
	Fr.	8	...	...	...	...	8	4
	Sp.	2	...	...	..	...	2	2
Total.....		14	...	...	...	...	14	9

## No. 9. See p. 62.

A list of ships and vessels, late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1800.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship			
100	(D) Queen - Charlotte.....	Lord Keith (V.-admiral). Andrew Todd	Accidentally burnt and blown up, March 17, off Leghorn; crew, except 167, perished.
74	(O) Marlborough...	Thomas Sotheby	Wrecked, November 4, on a sunken rock near Belleisle: crew saved.



## No. 9—continued.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship			
64	(P) Repulse.....	James Alms.....	Wrecked, March 10, on a sunken rock 25 leagues south-east of Ushant : crew, except 10, saved on the Glenan islands, but made prisoners.
Gun-frig.			
32	(F) Stag.....	Robert Winthrop..	Wrecked, September 6, in Vigo Bay : crew saved.
Gun p. ship			
	{ (O) <i>Danaë</i> .....	Lord Proby.....	Captured, March 17, by her crew mutinying and carrying her into Brest.
20	{ (P) <i>Cormorant</i> .....	Courtney Boyle...	Wrecked, exact date unknown, on the coast of Egypt : crew saved, but made prisoners by the French.
G. sh. ship.			
	{ (S) <i>Brazen</i> .....	James Hanson....	Wrecked, January 26, near Brighton : crew, except one man, perished.
18	{ „ <i>Chance</i> .....	George S. Stovin	Foundered, October 9, after upsetting on her beam-ends : crew, except 25, perished.
	{ „ <i>Trompeuse</i> .....	Parker Robinson	Foundered, May 16 or 17, as is supposed, having parted company in a gale in the Channel : crew perished.
	{ (T) <i>Harick</i> .....	Phil. Bartholomew	Wrecked, November 9, in St. Alban's bay Jersey. crew saved.
16	{ (U) <i>Martin</i> .....	Hon. Mat. St.-Clair	Foundered, in October, in the North Sea, as is supposed : crew perished.
14	(X) <i>Railler</i> .....	John Raynor.....	Foundered, at the same time as the <i>Trompeuse</i> .
G. bg. ship.			
	{ (Z) <i>Diligence</i> .....	C. B. Hodgson Ross	Wrecked, in September, on a small island near Havana. crew saved.
18	{ „ <i>Hound</i> .....	W. Jas. Turquand	Wrecked, September 26, near Shetland : crew perished.
14	(b) <i>Albanaise</i> .....	Fran. Newcombe	Captured, November 23, by her crew mutinying and carrying her into Malaga.
F.S.	{ (c) <i>Comet</i> .....	Thomas Leef.....	Destroyed, July 7, in Dunkirk roads, in attempting to burn some French frigates.
	{ „ <i>Falcon</i> .....	H. Samuel Butt...	
	{ „ <i>Rosario</i> .....	James Carthew....	
	{ „ <i>Wasp</i> .....	John Edwards.....	
Gun-brig			
12	(g) <i>Mastiff</i> .....	James Watson ..	Wrecked, January 5, on Yarmouth sands : crew, except eight, saved.
T.S.	{ (r) <i>Weymouth</i> ....	Ambrose Crofton	Wrecked, January 21, on the Bar of Lisbon : crew saved.
	{ (s) <i>Dromedary</i> ....	Benj. W. Taylor	Wrecked, August 10, in the Bocca, near the island of Trinidad : crew saved.

## ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line.....	...	...	2	...		3
„ under the line.....	2	4	9	4	.	19
Total.....	2	4	11	4	-	22

## No. 10. See p. 63.

For the pay and maintenance of 97,304 seamen and 22,696 marines for three lunar months, and of 105,000 seamen and 30,000 marines, for the remaining ten lunar months	£	s.	d.
	6,412,500	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.....	5,850,000	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including the half-pay to sea and marine officers; also the expense of sea-ordnance .....	1,269,918	5	8
„ the extraordinaries; including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work.....	933,900	0	0
„ the expense of the transport-service .....	1,920,718	14	6
„ the care and maintenance of prisoners of war.....	190,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service .....	£16,577,037	0	2

## No. 11. See p. 112.

Je proposai de conduire l'armée navale de la république à Lisbonne, de mouiller l'armée devant cette capitale, à une portée de fusil de la ville et du palais du roi; de la faire précéder par une frégate parlementaire, qui avertirait que l'armée de la république ne vient pas pour nuire aux Portugais, quoiqu'ils soient esclaves de l'Angleterre; mais qu'elle vient pour exiger que tous les magasins et vaisseaux anglais lui soient livrés sur-le-champ, sous peine de raser la ville de fond en comble. Cette opération procurait à la France 200 millions en numéraire ou en marchandises anglaises; l'Angleterre recevait un échec terrible, qui y causait et des banqueroutes et une désolation générale. Notre armée, sans être fatiguée de la mer, revenait à Brest, comblée de richesses, couverte de gloire, et la France étonnait encore l'Europe par un nouveau triomphe.—*Rélation des Combats, &c.* par Kerguelen, p. 373.

## No. 12. Sec p. 131

A quatre heures du matin, il aperçut dans ses eaux quatre bâtimens, qu'il reconnut pour ennemis : c'était en effet une partie de l'escadre anglaise : le César, monté par l'amiral Saumarez, le Vénérable, le Superbe et la frégate la Tamise. Le brave Troude se disposa au combat et renforça ses batteries par les hommes des gaillards. Il fut joint d'abord par le Vénérable et la Tamise : le premier envoya sa volée par la hanche de babord, et le Formidable arriva pour serrer cet adversaire au feu : le combat le plus vif s'engagea vergue à vergue, et souvent à longueur d'écouvillon. Le capitaine français ordonna de mettre jusqu'à trois boulets dans chaque canon. La Tamise le battait en poupe ; mais ses canons de retraite ripostaient à ce feu. Les deux autres vaisseaux ennemis arrivèrent successivement, et, ne pouvant doubler le Formidable au vent, ils prirent position par sa hanche de babord. Les premières volées du vaisseau français démâtèrent le Vénérable de son perroquet de fougue, et bientôt après de son grand mât. L'anglais laissa arriver ; mais Troude le suivit dans ce mouvement pour le battre en poupe, en même temps qu'il faisait canonner le César, qui, se trouvant de l'avant du Vénérable, ne pouvait riposter : pas un boulet français n'était perdu. Dans cette position, le Vénérable perdit encore son mât de misaine. Troude fit diriger ensuite tout son feu sur le César, le serrant le plus près possible ; après demi-heure d'engagement, quoique l'anglais, qui avait toutes ses voiles, dépassât le Formidable, et forçât celui-ci à manœuvrer pour le tenir par son travers, le César abandonna la partie, arriva en désordre, prit les amures à babord, et rejoignit le Vénérable, auquel la Tamise portait des secours. Il restait encore à combattre le Superbe, qui était par la joue de babord du vaisseau français ; mais l'anglais laissa arriver, passa sous le vent au Formidable, hors de portée, et rejoignit les autres bâtimens. A sept heures du matin, le capitaine Troude était maître du champ de bataille. Il fit monter dans les batteries le reste des boulets, qui pouvaient lui faire tenir encore une heure de combat, rafraîchir le vaillant équipage qui l'avait si bien secondé, et réparer son grément ; ses voiles étaient en lambeaux ; la brèche de terre avait cessé, et il se trouvait en calme, à portée de canon de l'escadre ennemie, dont les embarcations étaient alors occupées à secourir le Vénérable. Ce vaisseau avait encore démâté de son mât d'artimon, et les courans le portaient à la côte. A dix heures, le vent ayant fraîchi, la Tamise essaya de prendre ce même vaisseau à la remorque ; mais, ne pouvant se relever, il fut s'échouer entre l'île de Léon et la pointe Saint-Roch, à deux ou trois lieues de Cadix.—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xiv., p. 168.

## No. 13. See p. 163.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the French navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1801.

Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship 74 (N) Saint-Antoine .....	{ Captured, July 12, by squadron of Sir James Saumarez, Straits of Gibraltar.
64 ... Causse.....	{ Captured, September 2, by a combined British and Turkish force at the capitulation of Alexandria.
Gun-frig 44 (W) Egyptienne .....	{ Captured, February 19, by the British frigate <i>Phœbe</i> , Mediterranean.
{ (Z) <i>Africaine</i> .....	{ Captured, with <i>Egyptienne</i> , and transferred to the Turks.
40 { ... <i>Justice</i> .....	{ Captured, August 3, by a squadron of British frigates, Mediterranean.
38 (B) <i>Carrère</i> .....	{ Destroyed by being driven on shore, September 2, by a squadron of British frigates off Vado.
36 { (D) <i>Chiffonne</i> .....	{ Captured, August 19, by the British frigate <i>Sibylle</i> , at the Seychelles.
„ <i>Dédaigneuse</i> .....	{ Captured, February 5, by a squadron of British frigates, off the coast of Portugal.....
„ <i>Régénérée</i> .....	{ Captured with the <i>Egyptienne</i> .
{ (H) <i>Succès</i> .....	{ Captured, September 2, by a squadron of British frigates, Mediterranean.
{ .. Name unknown .....	{ Captured with <i>Egyptienne</i> .
{ .. Do .....	

## No. 14. See p. 163.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Spanish navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1801.

Name.		How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship		
112 {	... Real-Carlos .....	{ Destroyed, July 12, by being set on fire in an engagement with a British squadron in the Straits of Gibraltar; and the greater part of the two crews perished.
	San-Hermenegildo.....	
Gun-frig.		
34	... Perla.....	{ Destroyed, by sinking off the Barbary coast, from damage received in the same engagement.
Gun-xebec		
30	... Gamio.....	{ Captured, May 6, by the British 14-gun brig Speedy, near Barcelona.

## No. 15. See p. 163.

A list of ships of the line late belonging to the Danish navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1801.

Name.		How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship		
74	... Zealand .....	{ Captured, April 2, by Admiral Parker's fleet, off Copenhagen. The Zealand was afterwards destroyed.
64	(P) Holstein .....	

These are the only vessels of the 13 taken, sunk, and destroyed off Copenhagen, that can be considered as ships of war: the remainder were mere floating batteries.

An abstract of French, Spanish, and Danish ships of the line and frigates, captured, &c., during the year 1801.

		Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the F.S.&D. navies.	Total added to the British navy.
		Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line	{ Fr.	2	...	...	...	...	2	1
	{ Sp.	...	2	...	...	...	2	...
	{ Da.	2	...	...	...	...	2	1
Frigates .....	{ Fr.	10	1	...	...	...	11	7
	{ Sp.	1	1	...	...	...	2	...
Total.....		15	4	...	...	...	19	9

No. 16. See p. 163.

A list of ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1801.

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where lost.</u>
Gun-ship	(O) Hannibal.....	Solomon Ferris....	Captured, July 5, by a French squadron, under the batteries of Algeiras, Gibraltar bay.
74 {	„ Invincible {	Tho. Totty (R.-adm.) John Rennie, Capt.	Wrecked, March 16, on Hasborough Sand, near Yarmouth: crew, except about 126, perished.
	„ Swiftsure.....	Benjamin Hallowell	Captured, June 24, by a French squadron, under Rear-admiral Ganteaume, Mediterranean.
Gun-frig.	44 (W) Forte.....	Lucius Hardyman	Wrecked, in June, in Jeddah harbour, Red Sea: crew saved.
36 (B)	Jason.....	Hon. James Murray	Wrecked, July 21, by striking on a sunken rock in the bay of St.-Malo: crew saved, but made prisoners.
	(G) <i>Prosélyte</i> .....	George Fowke..	Wrecked, September 4, by striking on a sunken rock off the island of St.-Martin, West Indies: crew saved.
32 {	(H) Lowestoffe...Robert Plampin.		Wrecked, August 11, on the island of Henegga, West Indies: crew saved.
	„ Melcager..	Hon. T. Bladen Capel	Wrecked, June 9, on the Triangles in the Gulf of Mexico: crew saved.
	„ Success .....	Shuldham Peard	Captured, February 13, by a French squadron under Rear-admiral Ganteaume Mediterranean.
G. p. ship	20 (O) <i>Babet</i> .....	Jemmett Mainwaring	Foundered, as is supposed, exact date unknown, in the West Indies: crew perished.
G. sh. ship.	{ (R) <i>Légère</i> .....	Cornelius Quinton	Wrecked, exact date unknown, near Carthagena, South America: crew saved, but made prisoners.
18 {	(S) <i>Bonetta</i> .....	Thomas New.....	Wrecked, October 25, on the Jardines, Cuba: crew saved.
	„ <i>Scout</i> .....	Henry Duncan.....	Wrecked, March 25, on the Shingles, west end of the Isle of Wight: crew saved.

No. 16—*continued.*

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where lost.</u>
G. bg. slp.			
16 (a)	<i>Utile</i> .....	Edw. Jekyl Canes .	Foundered, in November, by upsetting in a gale on passage from Gibraltar to Malta : crew perished.
13 (b)	<i>Speedy</i> .....	Lord Cochrane ...	Captured, in June, by a French squadron under Rear-admiral Linois.
Bb. (d)	<i>Bull-dog</i> .....	Bairington Dacres	Captured, February 27, at Ancona, having entered unapprized of its being in the possession of the French.
F.S. (c)	<i>Incendiary</i> ...	Rich. Dalling Dunn	Captured, January 29, by Rear-admiral Ganteaume, Mediterranean.
Gun-brig			
12 (g)	<i>Blazer</i> .....	John Tiller .....	Captured, March 23, under the Swedish fort of Warberg, Baltic ; but afterwards restored.
10 (h)	<i>Requin</i> .....	Samuel Forvell ....	Wrecked, January 1, on the French coast near Quiberon : crew saved, but about 20 were made prisoners.
G. cut.			
12 (k)	<i>Sprightly</i> ....	Robert Jump .....	Captured, February 10, by Rear-admiral Ganteaume, Mediterranean.
T.S. (t)	<i>Iphigenia</i> ....	Hassard Stackpole	Accidentally burnt, in July, at Alexandria, Mediterranean : crew saved.

## ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line .....	2	...	1	...	...	3
„ under the line .....	6	...	3	2	1	18
Total .....	8	...	10	2	1	21

## No. 17. See p. 164.

	£	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 100,000 seamen and 30,000 marines, for five lunar months, of 70,000 seamen, and 18,000 marines, for one lunar month, and of 56,000 seamen, and 14,000 marines, for the remaining seven lunar months .....	4,601,000	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c. ....	3,684,000	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including the half-pay to sea and marine officers; also the expense of sea-ordnance .....	1,365,524	17	5
„ the extraordinaries; including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work .....	773,500	0	0
„ the expense of the transport-service, and maintenance of prisoners of war in health .....	1,321,545	15	1
„ the care and maintenance of sick prisoners of war ...	58,000	0	0
„ an increase of half-pay to the commissioned, and of additional pay to the warrant, officers of the navy, for six months, commencing 1st July .....	30,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service ...	£11,833,570	12	

## No. 17 bis. See p. 165.

## RECAPITULATORY ABSTRACT.

Showing the number of French, Dutch, Spanish, and Danish ships of the line and frigates, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and accidentally burnt, during the war commencing in February, 1793, and ending in October, 1801; also the number of captured ships added to the British navy during the same period.

		Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the F.D.S & Da. navies.	Total added to the British navy.
		Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line	Fr.	34	11	5	4	1	55	28
	Du.	18	...	...	...	...	18	17
	Sp.	5	5	...	...	...	10	4
	Da.	2	...	...	...	...	2	1
Total. ....		58	16	5	4	1	84	50
Frigates	Fr.	82	14	4	2	...	102	62
	Du.	33	...	...	...	...	33	25
	Sp.	11	4	...	...	...	15	7
Grand Total		184	34	9	6	1	234	144



No. 18. See p. 166.

## RECAPITULATORY ABSTRACT,

Showing the number of British ships and vessels of war captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the war commencing in February, 1793, and ending in October, 1801; with the foundered vessels divided into British and foreign built.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.	
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.			Burnt.
				Br.-built.	For.-built.		
Ships of the line.....	5	...	9	...	6	20	
„ under the line .....	37	9	73	8	14	145	
Total.....	42	9	82	8	14	165	

Of the eight foundered British-built vessels, one, the *Malabar*, had been an East-Indiaman. Seven of the others were sloops, the largest of which did not exceed 324 tons; and it is even doubtful whether three of those were not *wrecked*. The remaining vessel was the *Leda* frigate; which vessel, according to one account, upset in a heavy squall, according to another account, struck on a sunken rock, and, according to a third, filled in consequence of having her side stove by some of her guns that had broken loose in a severe gale of wind: in fact, the fate of the *Leda* is still involved in mystery.

No. 19. See p. 174.

A list of ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1802.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
<b>Gun-ship</b>			
50 (T)	<i>Assistance</i> ...	Richard Lee.....	{ Wrecked, March 29, between Dunkerque and Gravelines: crew saved.
<b>G. sh. sloop.</b>			
18 (S)	<i>Scout</i> .....	Henry Duncan..	{ Foundered, exact date unknown, off coast of Newfoundland: crews perished.
14 (W)	<i>Fly</i> .....	Thomas Duval...	
<b>T.S. (t)</b>	<i>Sensible</i> .....	Robert Saucy....	{ Wrecked, March 2, on a quick- sand off Ceylon: crew saved.

## ABSTRACT.

	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	Total.
<b>Ships under the line.....</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>...</b>	<b>4</b>

## No. 20. See p. 175.

	£	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 38,000 seamen, and 12,000 marines, for two lunar months, commencing January 1, of 45,600 seamen, and 14,400 marines, for four lunar months, commencing February 26, and of 77,600 seamen, and 22,400 marines, for seven lunar months, commencing June 12.....	3,900,000	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.....	3,120,000	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including, half-pay to sea and marine officers; also the expense of sea-ordnance .....	1,488,238	13	1
„ the extraordinaries, including the building and repairing of ships and other extra work.....	901,140	0	0
„ the expense of the transport-service, and maintenance of prisoners of war, in health and sickness.....	802,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service.....	£10,211,378	13	1

## No. 21. See p. 176.

## French line-of-battle force in March, 1803.

	No.	No.
Ordered to be built from Dutch models at -----	<div> <div> <div>FLUSHING, and shores of the Scheldt....</div> <div>NANTES .....</div> <div>BORDEAUX .....</div> <div>MARSEILLES .....</div> <div>OSTENDE .....</div> </div> <div> <div>5</div> <div>2</div> <div>1</div> <div>1</div> <div>1</div> </div> </div>	
BREST, { afloat, repaired or repairing .....	18	10
{ building and nearly ready .....	3	
	—	21
LORIENT, building, { nearly ready .....	3	
{ ordered.....	2	
SAINT-MALO, ordered .....	—	
ROCHEFORT, building, { nearly ready .....	3	
{ ordered .....	3	
	—	6
TO. LON, { afloat .....	8	
{ building { nearly ready .....	2	
{ ordered .....	2	
	—	12
GENOA, ordered .....	—	1
At SEA .....	—	10
		—
Total	66	

No. 22. See p. 176.

**Instruction particulière du premier Consul au général de division Decaen, capitaine-général des établissemens français au delà du cap de Bonne-Espérance.**

Paris, février 1803.

Indépendamment des instructions générales que le ministre donnera au capitaine-général des possessions françaises dans les Indes, et à l'amiral, l'un et l'autre auront des instructions d'un ordre supérieur, lesquelles seront signées par le premier consul.

Il faudra donc ôter des deux instructions ci-jointes tout ce qui a rapport à la haute politique et à la direction des forces militaires ; ce qui se réduit à retrancher quelques paragraphes. Les instructions particulières seraient rédigées ainsi :—“Le ministre de la marine a dû remettre au capitaine-général des instructions sur l'administration et les différens droits et prérogatives dont nos établissemens et notre commerce doivent jouir aux Indes ; mais le premier consul a cru devoir signer lui-même toutes les instructions servant de base à la direction politique et militaire. Le capitaine-général arrivera dans un pays où nos rivaux dominent, mais où ils pèsent aussi sur tous les peuples de ces vastes contrées. Il doit donc s'attacher à ne leur donner aucun sujet d'alarme, aucun sujet de querelle, et à dissimuler le plus possible. Il doit s'en tenir aux relations indispensables pour la sûreté et l'approvisionnement de nos établissemens, et dans les relations qu'il aura avec les peuples ou les princes qui supportent le plus impatiemment le joug anglais, il s'étudiera à ne mettre aucune affectation, à ne leur donner aucune inquiétude. Ils sont les tyrans des Indes ; ils y sont inquiets et jaloux, il faut s'y comporter avec douceur, dissimulation et simplicité.

“Six mois après son arrivée aux Indes, le capitaine-général expédiera en France, porteur de ses dépêches, un des officiers ayant le plus sa confiance, pour faire connaître en grand détail tout ce qu'il a connu de la force, situation et disposition d'esprit des différens peuples des Indes, ainsi que de la force et de la situation des différens établissemens anglais. Il fera connaître ses vues et les espérances qu'il aurait de trouver de l'appui en cas de guerre, pour pouvoir se maintenir dans le presqu'île, en faisant connaître la quantité et qualité de troupes, d'armemens et d'approvisionnement dont il aurait besoin pour nourrir la guerre pendant plusieurs campagnes au centre des Indes. Il doit porter la plus grande attention dans toutes les phrases de son Mémoire, parce que toutes seront pesées et pourront servir à décider, dans des circonstances imprévues, la marche et la politique du gouvernement. Pour nourrir la guerre aux Indes plusieurs campagnes, il faut raisonner dans l'hypothèse que nous ne serions pas maîtres des mers, et que nous aurions à espérer peu de secours considérables. Il paraîtrait difficile qu'avec un corps d'armée on pût long-temps résister aux forces considérables que peuvent opposer les Anglais, sans alliances et sans une place servant de point d'appui, où dans un cas extrême on pût capituler et se trouver encore maître de se faire transporter en France ou à l'Île-de-France avec armes et bagages, sans être prisonniers, et sans compromettre l'honneur et un corps considérable de Français.

Un point d'appui doit avoir le caractère d'être fortifié, et d'avoir une rade ou un port où des frégates ou des vaisseaux de commerce soient à l'abri d'une force supérieure. Quelle que soit la nation à laquelle appartienne cette place, portugaise, hollandaise, ou anglaise, le premier projet paraît devoir

tendre à s'en emparer dès les premiers mois, en calculant sur l'effet de l'arrivée d'une force européenne inattendue et incalculée. Après avoir fait un plan d'alliance et de guerre avec une force demandée, il faudrait établir ce que croirait devoir faire le capitaine-général, si, au lieu de cette force, on ne lui en envoyait que la moitié. Après avoir pensé aux alliances et à un point d'appui, les objets qui intéressent le plus une armée dans une campagne, sont les vivres et les munitions de guerre, objets que le capitaine-général traitera également dans le plus grand détail. Six mois après cet envoi, le capitaine-général, dans un nouveau Mémoire, traitera les mêmes questions, en y ajoutant les nouvelles connaissances qu'il aura pu acquérir.

"Ainsi, il sera établi que tous les six mois le capitaine-général enverra en France des officiers sûrs, des Mémoires traitant toujours les mêmes questions, et confirmant, modifiant ou contre-disant les idées des Mémoires précédens. Si la guerre venait à se déclarer entre la France et l'Angleterre avant le 1<sup>er</sup> vendémiaire an XIII, et que le capitaine-général en fût prévenu avant de recevoir les ordres gouvernement, il a carte blanche, est autorisé à se reposer sur l'Île-de-France et le Cap, ou à rester dans la presqu'île, selon les circonstances où il se trouvera, et les espérances qu'il pourrait concevoir, sans cependant exposer notre corps de troupes à une capitulation honteuse, et nos armes à jouer un rôle qui ajouterait à notre discrédit aux Indes, et sans diminuer, par l'anéantissement de nos forces, la résistance que peut présenter l'Île-de-France en s'y retenant. On ne conçoit pas aujourd'hui que nous puissions avoir la guerre avec l'Angleterre, sans y entraîner la Hollande. Un des premiers soins du capitaine-général sera de s'assurer de la situation des établissemens hollandais, portugais, espagnols, et des ressources qu'ils pourraient offrir.

"La mission du capitaine-général est d'abord une mission d'observation sous les rapports politique et militaire, avec le peu de forces qu'il mène et une occupation de comptoirs pour notre commerce; mais la premier consul, bien instruit par lui et par l'exécution ponctuelle des instructions qui précèdent, pourra peut-être le mettre à même d'acquiescer un jour la grande gloire qui prolonge la mémoire des hommes au-delà de la durée des siècles."—*Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 189.

## No. 23. See p. 214.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the French navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1803.

Name.		How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship		
74	(M) Duquesne .....	Captured, July 25, by the Bellephophon and Vanguard 74s, and others, off St. Domingo.
Gun-frig.		
	(Z) Créole .....	Captured, July 1, by a British squadron under Captain Henry W. Bayntun, off St. Domingo.
40	„ Clorinde .....	Captured, November 30, by a British squadron, under Captain John Loring, at the surrender of Cape François, St. Domingo.
	„ Surveillante .....	
	„ Vertu .....	
36	(D) Franchise .....	Captured, May 28, by a British squadron in the Channel.
32	(H) <i>Embuscade</i> .....	Captured, May 28, by the 100-gun ship Victory, on passage to Gibraltar.
28	„ Baïonnaise .....	Destroyed, November 27, by her own crew, after having been chased on shore near Cape Finisterre by the Ardent 64.

No Dutch ship of war above an 18-gun corvette captured, &c. in 1803.

An abstract of French ships of the line and frigates captured, &c. during the year 1803.

	Capt.	rough enemy.	Lost through accident.				Total lost to the French navy.	Total added to the British navy.
		Dest.	Wrecked.	Found' red.	Burnt.			
<b>Ships of the line</b> .....	1	....	....	....	....		1	1
<b>Frigates</b> .....	6	1	....	....	....		7	6
<b>Total</b> ....	7	1	....	....	....		8	7

## No. 24. See p. 214.

A list of ships and vessels, late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1803.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-frig.			
38 {	(Z) <i>Minerve</i> ...	Jahleel Brenton...	Captured, July 2, after having run aground near Cherbourg: crew saved, but made prisoners.
	„ <i>Seine</i> .....	David Milne .....	Wrecked, in the night of June 5, on a sand-bank near the Texel: crew saved.
36 {	(C) <i>Resistance</i>	Hon. P. Wodehouse	Wrecked, May 31, on Cape St. Vincent: crew saved.
	„ <i>Shannon</i> ..	Ed. Leveson Gower	Wrecked in a gale, December 10, under the batteries near Cape la Hogue: crew saved, but made prisoners. Hull of the ship destroyed by the Merlin's boats.
28	(I) <i>Circe</i> .....	Charles Fielding	Wrecked, November 16, on the Lemon and Ower, North Sea, in chase of an enemy: crew saved.
Gun p. ship			
22 {	(N) <i>Garland</i> ...	Frederick Cottrell	Wrecked, November, off Cape François, St. Domingo: crew saved.
	„ <i>Déterminée</i>	Alexander Becher	Wrecked, March 26, on a sunken rock off the island of Jersey: crew and passengers (soldiers) saved, except 19.
Gun-sh. ship.			
18	(S) <i>Surinam</i> .....	Robert Tucker ...	Captured by the Dutch, at the island of Curaçoa.
16	(T) <i>Calypso</i> ...	William Veuour	Foundered, August, by being ran down in a gale, by one of a convoy coming from Jamaica: crew perished.
14	(X) <i>Avenger</i> ...	Frs. Jackson Snell	Foundered, December, off the Weser: crew saved.
G. h. ship.			
16	(.) <i>Suffisante</i> ..	George Heathcote	Wrecked, December 15, in a gale off Spike island, Cork harbour: crew saved.
Gun-brig			
12	(g) <i>Grappler</i> ...	A. Wantner Thomas	Wrecked, December 31, on the isles de Chosey, and hull destroyed by the French: crew saved, but made prisoners.
Gun-sch.			
12	(k) <i>Redbridge</i> .	George Lempriere	Captured, August, by a squadron of French frigates, near Toulon.
SS.	(r) <i>Porpoise</i> ...	Robert Fowler ...	Wrecked, August 17, on a reef of coral in the Pacific Ocean: crew saved.

No. 24—*continued.*

## ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line . . . . .	...	...	...	...	...	...
„ under the line . . . . .	3	...	9	2	...	14
Total . . . . .	3	...	9	2	...	14

## No. 25. See p. 215.

	£	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 78,000 seamen and 22,000 marines . . . . .	4,875,000	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c. . . . .	3,900,000	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including the half-pay to sea and marine officers ; also the expense of sea-ordnance . . . . .	1,345,670	9	9
„ the*extraordinaries ; including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work . . . . .	948,520	0	0
„ the expense of the transport-service, and the maintenance of prisoners of war, in health and sickness . . .	971,415	17	9
„ increasing the naval defence of the country . . . .	310,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service . . .	£12,350,606	7	6

## No. 26. See p. 238.

Abord du Bucentaure en rade du Toulon,  
le 26 prairial, an 12.

Général,

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte de la sortie de toute l'escadre à mes ordres. Sur l'avis que j'avais reçu que plusieurs corsairs anglais infestaient la côte et les îles d'Hières, je donnai l'ordre, il y a trois jours, aux frégates l'Incorruptible et la Syrène, et le brick le Furet, de ce rendre dans la baie d'Hières. Le vents d'est les ayant contrariées, elles mouillèrent sous le château de Porquerolles. Hier matin, les ennemis en eurent connaissance. Vers midi, ils détachèrent deux frégates et un vaisseau, qui entrèrent par la grande passe, dans l'intention de couper la retraite à nos frégates. Du moment où je m'aperçus de sa manœuvre, je fis signal d'appareiller à toute l'escadre ; ce qui fut exécuté. En 14 minutes, tout était sous voiles, et je fis porter sur l'ennemi pour lui couper le chemin de la petite passe, et dans le dessein de l'y suivre s'il avait tenté d'y passer ; mais l'amiral anglais ne tarda pas à renoncer à son projet, rappela son vaisseau et ses deux frégates engagés dans l'île, et prit chasse. Je l'ai poursuivi jusqu'à la nuit : il courait au sud-est. Le matin, au jour, je n'en ai eu aucune connaissance.

Je vous salue avec respect,

LA TOUCHE-TREVILLE.

## No. 27. See p. 249.

" Si la contenance des ennemis pendant le jour n'avait été qu'une ruse ayant pour but de nous en imposer, pour cacher leur faiblesse, ils auraient pu profiter de l'obscurité de la nuit pour tenter de nous dérober leur marche, et dans cette occasion je pus profiter avec avantage de leur manœuvres. Mais je pus bientôt me convaincre que cette sécurité n'avait point été simulée ; trois de leurs vaisseaux eurent constamment leurs feux allumés, et la flotte conserva la panne tout la nuit, en se tenant bien ralliée. Cette position me facilita les moyens de lui gagner le vent et de l'observer de près."

## No. 28. See p. 250.

" Le vaisseau ennemi le plus avancé (the Royal George) ayant éprouvé quelques avaries, laissa arriver ; mais, soutenu par ceux qui la suivaient, il prêta de nouveau côté, et fit, ainsi que les autres bâtimens, un feu très-nourri. Les vaisseaux qui avaient viré se réunirent à ceux qui nous combattaient, et trois de ceux qui avaient des premiers pris part à l'action, manœuvraient pour nous doubler à l'arrière, tandis que le reste de la flotte, se couvrant de voile, et laissant arriver, annonçait le projet de nous envelopper. Les ennemis, par cette manœuvre, auraient rendu ma position très-dangereuse ; la supériorité de leurs forces était reconnue, et je n'avais plus à délibérer sur le parti que je devais prendre pour éviter les suites funestes d'un engagement inégal ; profitant de la fumée qui m'enveloppait, je virai lof-pour-lof pour venir sur babord, et courant à l'est-nord-est, je m'éloignai de l'ennemi, qui continua à poursuivre la division jusqu'à trois heures, en lui envoyant plusieurs bordées sans effet."

## No. 29. See p. 297.

A list of ships of the line and frigates late belonging to the Dutch navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1804.

Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gur. Frig.	
22 (G) Proserpine . . . . .	{ Captured, May 4, at the surrender of Surinam to the British.

No French ship of the line or frigate captured, &c. in 1804.



## No. 30. See p. 297.

A list of ships of the line and frigates late belonging to the Spanish navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1804.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-frig.		
40 {	(A) Amfitrite . . . . .	Captured, November 25, by the British 74-gunship Donegal, off Cadiz.
	„ Medea . . . . .	Captured, October 5, by a squadron of four British frigates under Captain Graham Moore.
	„ Fama . . . . .	
	(D) Clara . . . . .	Destroyed, by being blown up on the same occasion: crew and passengers, except 41 persons, perished.
34 {	„ Mercedes . . . . .	
	(G) Sta.-Gertruyda . . . . .	Captured, December 7, by the Polyphemus 64 and Lively frigate, off Cape Santa-Maria.

An abstract of Dutch and Spanish ships of the line and frigates captured, &c. during the year 1804.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the D.&S. navies.	Total added to the British navy.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Frigates . . . . .	Du. } Sp. }	1	..	..	..	1	1
		5	1	..	..	..	6
Total. . . . .		6	1	..	..	7	6

## No. 31. See p. 297.

A list of ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1804.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship			
74 {	(O) Magnificent . .	William Henry Jervis	Wrecked, March 25, near the P'eres Noires, in the environs of Brest: crew saved, but 86 made prisoners.
	„ Venerable . .	John Hunter . . .	Wrecked, November 24, on sunken rocks in Torbay: crew saved.

No. 31—*continued.*

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where lost.</u>
	Gun-brig 64 (P) York . . .	Henry Mitford . .	Foundered, as is supposed, in January, in the North Sea : crew perished.
	50 (T) Romney . .	Hon. John Colville	Wrecked, November 19, on the Haaks, near the Texel : crew saved.
	Gun-frig.		
	38 { (Z) <i>Créole</i> . . .	Austen Bissell . .	Foundered, January 2, on passage from Jamaica: crews saved.
	(A) Hussar . . .	Philip Wilkinson	Wrecked, February, on the Saintes, in the bay of Biscay : crew saved.
	36 (C) Apollo . . .	J.W. Taylor Dixon	Wrecked, April 1, on the coast of Portugal: captain and many of the crew perished.
	G.-sh.-slp. 14 (X) Lilly . . .	William Compton	Captured, July 14, by the Dame-Ambert fr. privateer, off the Coast of Georgia.
	G.-br.-slp. 18 Y' <i>Raven</i> . . .	Spelman Swaine	Wrecked, July 6, on the coast of Sicily, Mediterranean : crew saved.
	16 (a) <i>Vincejo</i> . .	James Wesley Wright	Captured, May 20, in a calm, by a flotilla of fr. gun-boats, in Quiberon-bay.
	(b) <i>Drake</i> . . .	William Ferris . .	Wrecked, September, on a shoal off the island of Nevis : crew saved.
	14 { „ Weazle . . .	William Layman	Wrecked, March 1, on Cabaretta point, Gibraltar-bay : crew, except one man, saved.
	„ Wolverine . .	Henry Gordon . .	Captured, March 24, by a French privateer, on passage to Newfoundland.
	bb. (d) Tartarus . .	Thomas Withers	Wrecked, December 20, on Margate sands : crew saved.
	Gun-brig (g) Conflict . . .	Charles C. Ormsby	Wrecked, October 24, in chase of the enemy, near Nieuport Isle of Wight : crew saved.
	„ Fearless . . .	George Williams	Wrecked, February, off Redding-point, Cawsand-bay : crew saved.
	12 { „ Mallard . . .	Thomas Read . .	Captured, December 25, after running on shore near Calais : crew saved, but made prisoners.
	„ Sterling . .	George Skottowe	Wrecked, December 18, near Calais : crew saved.

## No. 31—continued.

Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
<b>Gun-brig</b>		
10 (h) <i>Cerbère</i> . . . .	Joseph Patey . . . .	Wrecked, February 19, on the Berry-head: crew saved.
<b>G.-sch.</b>		
6 { (n) <i>Morne-Fortunée</i> . . . .	John L. Dale . . . .	Wrecked, in December, on Crooked Island, West Indies: crew saved.
6 { „ <i>Demerara</i> . . . .	Thomas Dutton . . . .	Captured, July 14, by the fr. priv. Grand-Décidé, West Indies.
TS. (q) <i>Severn</i> . . . .	Prince of Bouillon	Wrecked, December 21, in Grouville-bay, Jersey: crew saved.
SS. (r) <i>Hindustan</i> . . . .	John Le Gros . . . .	Burnt, April 2, having caught fire in the hold, Mediterranean: crew, except five men, saved.
RS. (a) <i>De-Ruyter</i> . . . .	J. Beckett . . . .	Wrecked, September 3, in the hurricane at Antigua: crew saved.

## ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line . . . .	...	...	2	1	...	3
„ under the line . . . .	5	...	14	1	1	21
Total . . . .	5	...	16	2	1	24

## No. 32. See p. 297.

	£	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 90,000 seamen and 30,000 marines . . . . .	5,850,000	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c. . . . .	4,680,000	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including half-pay to sea and marine officers; also the extra of sea-ordnance . . . . .	1,394,940	6	9
„ the extraordinaries, including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work . . . . .	1,553,690	0	0
„ the expenses of the transport-service, and the maintenance of prisoners of war, in health and sickness . . . . .	1,557,000	0	0

Total supplies granted for the sea-service . . . £15,035,630 6 9

## No. 33. See p. 301.

Faites mettre dans les journaux de Hollande un article contre le système de blocus ; faites-y sentir que nous sommes sortis de Brest quand nous l'avons voulu ; que Bruix est sorti tel jour, Morard de Galles tel jour, Gantheaume tant de fois ; que dans sa dernière sortie à Bertheaume, rien ne l'empêchait de sortir, et que l'escadre le savait tellement qu'elle mit à la voile ; qu'il est donc impossible de bloquer le port de Brest, surtout aux mois de septembre et d'octobre. Cet article fera sentir que nous ne voulons pas sortir, mais tenir l'ennemi en échec.—*Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 271.

## No. 34. See p. 315.

The following table will show the state of the flotilla at the different ports, on July 20, 1805, with the number of men and horses it was destined to carry.

FLOTILLA.	PORTS.							Total of vessels.	TOTAL.	
	Etaples.	Boulogne.	Vimereux.	Ambleteuse.	Calais.	Dunkerque.	Ostende.		Men.	Horses
Prames . . . . .	..	13	..	3	1	..	..	17	1920	840
Bombardes, Pa- quebots, and										
Avisos. . . . .	1	11	..	..	..	..	..	12	480	56
Gun- { French	217	530	144	1	2	..	30	924	89885	676
vessels { Dutch .	..	..	..	195	14	131	..	280	28038	404
Caïques, corvet- tes de pêche and péniches .	1	22	..	..	81	..	..	88	9315	233
Vessels of war..	219	*	144	139	98	131	30	1339	130638	2219
Transports. . . .	146	526	92	34	105	26	25	954	30577	6840
Grand total . . .	365	1104	236	173	203	157	55	2293	161215	9059
Crews of trans- ports . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2430	
									163645	

The two totals marked \* do not quite agree with the items ; but, as it is impossible, without the originals, to discover where the error lies, and as the difference is not at all material, the figures have been left as they appear in the work that contains the table, whence this has been extracted. See *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 304.

No. 35. See p. 320.

A l'époque où j'écrivais ce passage, j'ignorais un fait bien remarquable, et qui mérite de prendre place dans l'histoire. J'en dois la connaissance à M. le comte Daru, dont nous avons déjà cité la savante Histoire de Venise. En 1805, M. Daru était à Boulogne, intendant général de l'armée. Un matin l'empereur le fait appeler dans son cabinet. Daru l'y trouve transporté de colère, parcourant à grands pas son appartement, et ne rompant un morne silence que par des exclamations brusques et courtes. . . . Quelle marine! . . . Quel amiral! . . . Quels sacrifices perdus! . . . Mon espoir est déçu! . . . Ce Villeneuve; Au lieu d'être dans la Manche, il vient d'entrer au Férol! . . . C'en est fait! Il y sera bloqué.—Daru, mettez-vous là, écoutez et écrivez. L'empereur avait reçu de grand matin la nouvelle de l'arrivée de Villeneuve dans un port d'Espagne; il avait vu sur-le-champ la conquête de l'Angleterre avortée; les immenses dépenses de la flotte et de la flottille perdues pour long-temps, pour toujours peut-être! Alors, dans l'emportement d'une fureur qui ne permet pas même aux autres hommes de conserver leur jugement, il avait pris l'une des résolutions les plus hardies, et tracé l'un des plans de campagne les plus admirables qu'aucun conquérant ait pu concevoir à loisir et de sang-froid. Sans hésiter, sans s'arrêter, il dicte en entier le plan de la campagne d'Austerlitz, le départ de tous les corps d'armée, depuis le Hanovre et la Hollande jusqu'aux confins de l'ouest et du sud de la France. L'ordre des marches, leur durée, les lieux de convergence et de réunion des colonnes; les enlèvements par surprise et les attaques de vive force, les mouvemens divers de l'ennemi, tout est prévu: la victoire est assurée dans toutes les hypothèses. Telle était la justesse et la vaste prévoyance de ce plan, que, sur une ligne de départ de deux cents lieues, des lignes d'opérations de trois cents lieues de longueur furent suivies d'après les indications primitives, jour par jour, et lieu par lieu, jusqu'à Munich. Au-delà de cette capitale, les époques seules éprouvèrent quelques altérations; mais les lieux furent atteints et l'ensemble du plan fut couronné d'un succès complet. Tel était donc le talent militaire de cet homme, aussi redoutable à ses ennemis par la puissance de son génie, qu'à ses concitoyens par la force de son despotisme!"—*Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne, Force Navale*, tome i., p. 244.

## No. 36. Sec. p. 334.

## LORD NELSON'S PLAN OF ATTACK.

"The business of an English commander-in-chief," says his lordship, "being first to bring an enemy's fleet to battle, on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean, that of laying his ships close on board those of the enemy as expeditiously as possible, and secondly, to continue them there without separating until the business is decided), I am sensible, beyond this object, it is not necessary I should say a word, being fully assured, that the admirals and captains of the fleet I have the honour to command will, knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply any deficiency in my not making signals; which may, if extended beyond these objects, either be misunderstood, or, if waited for, very probably, from various causes, be impossible for the commander-in-chief to make. Therefore it will only be requisite for me to state, in as few words as possible, the various modes by which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object, on which depends not only the honour and glory of our country, but possibly its safety, and, with it, that of all Europe, from French tyranny and oppression.

"If the two fleets are both willing to fight, but little manœuvring is necessary. The less the better; a day is soon lost in that business. Therefore I will only suppose that the enemy's fleet being to leeward, standing close upon a wind on the starboard tack, and that I am nearly ahead of them, standing on the larboard tack; of course I should weather them. The weather must be supposed to be moderate; for, if it be a gale of wind, the manœuvring of both fleets is but of little avail, and probably no decisive action would take place with the whole fleet. Two modes present themselves; one, to stand on just out of gun-shot until the van-ship of my line would be abreast of the centre-ship of the enemy, then make the signal to wear together, then bear up, engage with all our force the six or five van-ships of the enemy, passing certainly, if opportunity offered, through their line. This would prevent their bearing up, and the action, from the known bravery and conduct of the admirals and captains, would certainly be decisive; the second or third rear-ships of the enemy would act as they pleased, and our ships would give a good account of them, should they persist in mixing with our ships. The other mode would be, to stand under an easy but commanding sail, directly for their headmost ship, so as to prevent the enemy from knowing whether I should pass to leeward or to windward of him. In that situation, I would make the signal to engage the enemy to leeward, and to cut through their fleet about the sixth ship from the van, passing very close; they being on a wind, you, going large, could cut their line when you please. The van-ships of the enemy would, by the time our rear came abreast of the van-ship, be severely cut up, and our van could not expect to escape damage. I would then have our rear-ship, and every ship in succession, wear, continue the action with either the van-ship or second-ship, as it might appear most eligible from her crippled state; and, this mode pursued, I see nothing to prevent the capture of the five or six ships of the enemy's van. The two or three ships of the enemy's rear must either bear up or wear; and, in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably than our two van-ships (now the rear), yet they would be separated and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our ships time to refit; and by that time, I believe, the battle would, from the judgment of the admirals and captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from these moments are useless, when every man is disposed to do his duty. The great object is, for us to support each other, and to keep close to the

enemy and to leeward of him. If the enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be, to engage the enemy as arriving up with them, and the other ships to pass on for the second, third, &c. , giving, if possible, a close fire into the enemy in passing, taking care to give our ships engaged notice of your intention."—*Clarke and M<sup>r</sup> Arthur's Life of Nelson*, vol. II., p. 427.

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No. 37. See p. 340.

VIC-ADMIRAL COLLINGWOOD TO LORD NELSON.

We approached, my dear lord, with caution, not knowing whether we were to expect you or the Frenchmen first. I have always had an idea that Ireland alone was the object they have in view, and still believe that to be their ultimate destination. They will now liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, make the round of the Bay, and, taking the Rochefort people with them, will appear off Ushant, perhaps with thirty-four sail, there to be joined by twenty more. Thus appears a probable plan, for, unless it be to bring their powerful fleets and armies to some great point of service, some rash attempt at conquest, they have only been subjecting them to chance of loss, which I do not believe the Corsican would do, without the hope of an adequate reward. \* \* \* \* \*

The French government never aim at little things, while great objects are in view. I have considered the invasion of Ireland as the real mark and butt of all their operations. Their flight to the West Indies was to take off the naval force, which proved the great impediment to their undertaking — *Clarke and M<sup>r</sup> Arthur's Life of Nelson*, vol. II., p. 416.

# NOTES

TO

## ANNUAL ABSTRACTS.

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### NOTE TO ABSTRACT No. 8.

\* THE hired vessels numbered about 96. It will here be seen, that the *Victory* has quitted her degraded post at *a*, to resume the rank which, for the space of 33 years, she had so honourably filled. See note *a*\* to Abstract No. 6.

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### NOTE TO ABSTRACT No. 9.

\* THE hired vessels numbered about 104. In consequence of the mistake of a unit in the "Tons," of class *t*, not discovered until after Abstract No. 9 was printed, this total exceeds by 1 the corresponding total in Abstract No. 8.

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### NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 10.

W\*. THE purchased ship of this class was the *Cornwallis*, late a teak-built Indiaman.

x\*. A very ancient class revived. "Advice boats, so called officially, are said to have been employed, for the first time, in 1692, before the battle off Cape La Hogue, in order to gain intelligence of what was passing at Brest." See Derrick, p. 113, note \*.

\* As the hired vessels had begun to be discharged, they now numbered only about 62. This Abstract, having been put to press along with the one which precedes it, contains the same deficiency of a unit in the "Tons," that is remarked upon in the single note of Abstract No. 9.

Owing to an inadvertency on our part, two 74s, one of the *N*, the other of the *O* class, that were, late in the year 1801, ordered to be built, have been left out of the "ordered" column. The addition of them will make the line numerical grand total 191, and the general numerical grand total 783.

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### NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 11.

\* WITH the view to render the remaining Abstracts more perspicuous and useful, a partial alteration has been made in the manner of heading them. Instead of being confined to "Cruisers," this compartment now extends to every ship fitted or about to be fitted for sea-service; and lines are drawn to show the totals, as well of the former, as of the less material portion of the navy.



<sup>b</sup> This head has also been slightly altered; and in particular the "&c." has a different signification from that assigned to it in note ‡ to No. 1 Abstract. See vol. i., p. 398. It signifies that all the ships and vessels of this, as we shall call it, the second compartment, which are not commissioned for harbour-service, remain in ordinary until sold or taken to pieces, a period which is sometimes extended to several years.

<sup>c</sup> The term "Built" has been substituted for "Launched," as being more explicit, and contrasting better with "Purchased." In the preceding Abstracts every ship down this pair of columns formed part of the "Total of Increase," and having, in the generality of cases, been included among the "Ordered to be built" of an antecedent year, became reckoned twice over. To obviate this, a double line now excludes the built ships from the increase; and the increase-total, without any other deduction than the decrease-total may require, proves the grand total. For instance, the grand total of N, by the former method, must have been produced thus: 15 | 26032 (the corresponding total in No. 10 Abstract) + 3 | 5168 = 18 | 31200 — 1 | 1743 = 17 | 29457, instead of by simply adding the 2 | 3425.

<sup>d</sup> The "&c." includes ships converted to sheer-hulks, breakwaters, and similar uses.

<sup>e</sup> The correction of a mistake of 50 tons in one ship (the Cornwallis, see note W\* in the preceding page), occasions this total to exceed by that amount the corresponding total in the preceding Abstract.

<sup>f</sup> See last note.

<sup>g</sup> This division of the *armées en flûte* into "Troop-ships" and "Store-ships" tends to simplify the arrangement, but it was not adopted in the official register until a much later period. There, as elsewhere observed, the reduced ships, with few exceptions, ranked, until very recently, along with their full-armed classmates. The lower columns of the first compartment are now no longer in blank, the substituted term at the top admitting all ships fitted or about to be fitted "for sea-service."

<sup>h</sup> The addition of the deficient unit remarked upon in notes \* to Nos. 9 and 10 Abstracts, appears in the excess of this total over its corresponding one in the latter.

<sup>i</sup> This is merely a separation from various other classes of such stationary ships as are so registered in the official list, and might have been made a class from the first. In strictness, the three commissioned harbour-service ships at T, T', and W, and all others, which may appear in that column throughout the series, ought to belong to it: but, as the official list continues them in their original classes, we have done the same.

<sup>k</sup> The "Small Yachts," with the exception of the Medina, not being commanded by naval officers, this class has been reduced; and the one next above it, now including the Medina, will henceforward be denominated "Royal Yachts."

<sup>l</sup> This being a year of peace, no hired vessels were attached to the navy. As to the grand total of "Tons," see notes e, f, and h.

## NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 12.

<sup>a</sup> It was remarked in note ‡ to No. 2 Abstract, that "captured vessels are also purchased from the captors before they can enter the service." The union of these two columns under the head of "Purchased," subject to the distinction pointed out, claims a preference, therefore, over the plan adopted in the preceding Abstracts. The names of the ships in the second column will, without the exception formerly requisite, be found in the proper list in the work; and where, among the vessels in the first column, a purchased British merchantman rates above a gun-brig, the circumstance will be adverted to in a note.

<sup>b</sup> Late the *Brave*, French privateer; presented by the merchants of Barbadoes to the British government, and on that account named Barbadoes.

<sup>c</sup> These had been British merchant vessels.

<sup>d</sup> Also these.

<sup>e</sup> The *Scorpion*; built from the draught of the *Cruiser*. See vol. ii., p. 396, note Y\*. The four British-built vessels, exclusive of these, in the "Sea-service" total, are the remnant of eight, built of fir in 1795, measuring about 369 tons each, and now nearly worn out. Considering the fine qualities of the *Cruiser*, it is rather surprising that, during six years, three vessels only should have been built from her draught. These were launched in 1798, and were not brig, but ship rigged: consequently, they belong to class S. The *Osprey*, *Snake*, and *Victor*, were, however, found fault with as ships; and all others from the same draught were thenceforward constructed as brigs. As a man of war, a ship has a decided advantage, in action, over a brig. A ship will lie to more closely, and, if she loses her mizenmast or spanker, has still a trysail on the mainmast; whereas, the moment a brig has her gaff or main boom shot away, she loses the use of her boom mainsail, and is no longer manageable. It may, however, be said on the behalf of brig-rigged vessels, that many of their apparent faults arise from an improper mode of handling them.

<sup>f</sup> These, also, had been British merchant vessels.

<sup>g</sup> The hired vessels numbered about 34.

#### NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 13.

<sup>a</sup> The *Hibernia*; ordered in 1790, and intended to be of the same tonnage as the *Ville-de-Paris*, but afterwards lengthened eleven feet. Began building November, 1792; launched November 17, 1804.

<sup>b</sup> The *Namur*; reduced from a 90 to a 74 gun-ship, under the direction of Mr. Robert Seppings, the master-builder at Chatham. It having occurred to the philosophic mind of this ingenious architect, that, by not removing the solid bow in the wake of the second deck, in order to substitute the usual flimsy fabric, called the beak-head, the ship would acquire additional strength in that part of her frame, as well as afford some protection to her crew when going end-on upon an enemy, the circular bow of the *Namur* was allowed to remain. The advantages of this important alteration struck every one who saw the ship when finished; and subsequently, as we shall hereafter have occasion more fully to relate, every ship in the British navy was ordered to be constructed with a solid circular bow instead of a beak-head.

<sup>c</sup> Had been *Indiamen*, and were built of teak.

<sup>d</sup> The same.

<sup>e</sup> The two latest-built frigates of this class were launched in 1786, the *Aquilon* of 724, and the *Thames* of 656 tons. As the ships in general were a full third smaller than those of any French frigate-class, the class was considered not worth keeping up until the year 1804, when some newly-discovered properties in the *Thames* at her breaking up caused seven frigates to be laid down from her draught, one of old oak and named after herself, the remainder of fir. This was at a time, too, when scarcely a single 12-pounder frigate belonged to the French or any foreign navy. Frigates carrying 18-pounders were justly preferred, and, with the French in particular, were rapidly increasing in number.

<sup>f</sup> Had been a British merchant vessel; and so had every one of the 13 ships next below her in the same column.

<sup>g</sup> This will exemplify the exception to the generality of cases adverted to in note c to No. 11 Abstract. According to the method adopted previously to the date of the latter, 41 built or launched gun-brigs would have been

separated from the 48 at b, and the difference, 7, have become the apparent number that had been ordered to be built. No deduction would here have been requisite towards proving the grand total: at the same time the true number ordered could only be obtained by noticing that none had been left as building in the preceding Abstract. For a case in point a reference may be made to the same class in Abstracts No. 10 and 9. Now, the "Ordered" column shows, at one view, and without any operation of figures, the precise number of ships ordered to be built within the year.

<sup>h</sup> See last note.

<sup>i</sup> These vessels were a disgrace to the British navy. They were built at Bermuda, of the pencil-cedar, measured about 78 tons, mounted four 12-pounder carronades, and were manned with 20 men and boys. In point of force, three of them; united, were not more than a match for a single gun-boat, as usually armed. Their very appearance as "men of war" raised a laugh at the expense of the projector. Many officers refused to take the command of them. Others gave a decided preference to some vessels built at the same yard, to be employed as water-tanks at Jamaica. Moreover, when sent forth to cruise against the enemies of England, to "burn, sink, and destroy" all they met, these "king's schooners" were found to sail wretchedly, and proved so crank and unseaworthy, that almost every one of them that escaped capture went to the bottom with the unfortunate men on board.

<sup>k</sup> Number of hired vessels about 140.

THE END OF VOL. III.

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